



TO  
A PSI

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL  
Sécurité

FROM  
De GEA

DATE June 23, 1976

REFERENCE  
Référence

NUMBER INT. CIAISON  
Numéro SPECIAL REGISTRY

SUBJECT Olympic Games Security:  
Sujet Ukrainian Canadian Activities

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| FILE    | DOSSIER |
| OTTAWA  |         |
| 55-26-2 |         |
| MISSION |         |

ENCLOSURES  
Annexes


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Soviet First Secretary G.I. Zolotov called on Mr. Chistoff to discuss the general question of security at the Olympic Games. Mr. Skrabec was present at the meeting. Referring to an informal conversation on this subject which the Soviet Ambassador had had with GEA earlier, Mr. Zolotov said he had come in to make a more formal presentation. Although Moscow tel XYFC 2557 of June 2 spoke of Soviet concerns about Ukrainian Canadians planning to "intimidate" Soviet athletes, Mr. Zolotov had no specific information about possible terrorist activities. Rather, he put his presentation in terms not of Canadian security measures (about which the Soviet authorities seem satisfied) but of the political activities of Ukrainian Canadian groups that would put the Soviet Delegation at a disadvantage during the Games. Specifically, he indicated that, according to Soviet information, (about which the International Olympic Committee was now aware) Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Canada were preparing the following actions:

- (a) the convening of a Congress of the League of the Ukraine's Liberation in Montreal during the Games;
- (b) the use of Valentyn Moroz as a slogan for anti-Soviet actions;
- (c) the establishment of a Ukrainian Olympic Committee in Montreal by the Canadian Ukrainian Committee and the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. The office of this Committee is located at 3270 Beaubien East, Montreal.



The Committee apparently intends to open an information bureau somewhere in Montreal and take other actions such as radio broadcasting and distribution of leaflets about Soviet colonialism etc. It also intends to raise the matter of separate Ukrainian participation in the Olympics. It was not clear how this would be done but presumably it would be before the IOC at its sessions in Montreal beginning July 13. As an indication of the political nature of the Ukrainian nationalist organizations' activities, he made reference to a meeting which was now being held at the Verhovina Camp outside Montreal (June 18-26). This was apparently a World Congress of Ukrainian Youth which aimed at involving the participants in activities which the Soviet authorities regarded as detrimental to the Soviet Delegation to the Olympics.

2. In drawing Soviet concerns to our attention, Mr. Zolotov made reference to IOC regulations 54 and 55 which prohibited the holding of international events of a political or other nature in the Olympic city a week before, during and a week after the Olympics. Mr. Zolotov saw this matter as one for the federal government to deal with rather than strictly that for the police authorities in Montreal.

3. Mr. Chistoff's reply to Mr. Zolotov was that while it might be possible for the Canadian authorities to look into questions such as the holding of an event like the Congress of the League of the Ukraine's Liberation and demonstrations during the period of the Olympics, he was not certain there was much that could be done about preventing some of the other actions Mr. Zolotov had mentioned. Whether IOC regulations could supersede the right of Canadians to give expression to their political views within the law was a question that involved the issue of Canadian sovereignty as Mr. Skrabec pointed out. As regards the other actions, much would depend on the particular way in which the Ukrainian Canadian organizations tried to implement their various plans. He undertook to try to determine what the Montreal authorities' policy would be regarding demonstrations during the period of the Olympics and also about the holding of a political Congress. He was not sure how the group could broadcast on the radio. Mr. Zolotov had no information to elaborate on this point; nor did he have any information on where the group's information bureau was to be located. As for the group's intention to raise the matter of separate Ukrainian participation in the Olympics, Mr. Skrabec pointed out that this was a matter between the IOC and the Ukrainian groups. In his view, the Ukrainian Canadian demands would likely be regarded as frivolous since the Ukrainian Republic appeared to have no interest in separate participation. He pointed out however that the Ukrainian Canadian groups would probably make reference to precedents set by separate representation from Bermuda, Taiwan and others.

4. We should be grateful if you would pass on the above information to the RCMP. We would be interested in learning about the Montreal authorities' policy on demonstrations during the Olympics. We would also like to know whether the holding of a Congress of the League of the Ukrainian Liberation is being permitted during the course of the Games. As for the other points such as the opening up of an information bureau, radio broadcasting and the organizing of a leaflet distribution campaign, we would appreciate knowing anything that the RCMP can determine about the Ukrainian Canadian groups' intentions (e.g. where the information bureau is to be set up; how they propose to broadcast etc.). While this will be of interest to us, we doubt that there is much the Canadian government can do with the exception perhaps of the question of radio broadcasting which would have to conform with regulations monitored by the CRTC.

  
Eastern European Division

... Since preparing the above, we have received a copy of a letter dated June 21 from Mr. Ivan Head to the Under-Secretary (copy attached) reporting on representations made by the Soviet Ambassador on this subject on June 18. Of particular interest is the Ambassador's request for permission to increase by a small number the size of his security staff in Montreal and Ottawa during the Olympic period. We have already received a visa application (Moscow tel XYCS 3014 of June 21) for a member of the Soviet MFA to come to the Consulate General in Montreal on temporary duty for 50 days in connection with the Olympic Games. This will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

SOC FOR ACTION  
CC: PDM, PDB, PDG, GEA, PPR, PPRT,  
PSP, PSI, ACR  
JMS 22-6-76

June 21st, 1976.

CONFIDENTIAL


Mr. Basil Robinson,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
L. B. Pearson Building,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Basil:

The Soviet Ambassador called on me Friday afternoon on instructions to discuss a subject that I understand he has raised already with External Affairs. It concerns information received by his Embassy about alleged preparations by certain Ukrainian and Jewish organizations in Canada for demonstrations against the Soviet and other Eastern European teams during the Montreal Olympics. The Ambassador stated as well that a special Olympic committee has been formed under the auspices of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. This committee is headed by one Yaroslav Pryshlyak. It plans, according to the Ambassador, to open a Ukrainian information bureau in Montreal and to stage a world congress of Ukrainian youth nearby. He stated as well that the Ukrainian Canadian Committee is attempting to open a pavilion in Montreal which, it is planned, will be of an anti-Soviet character.

The Ambassador drew to my attention the fact that articles 54 and 55 of the Olympic regulations forbid the staging of demonstrations or propaganda events whether of a political, religious or racial character during the Olympic period in the Olympic city. The Ambassador seeks assurance that the Canadian government and COJO will lend every effort to ensure that these regulations are not breached.

Finally, the Ambassador has asked for permission to increase by a small number the size of his security staff in each of Montreal and Ottawa during the Olympic period. The functions of these persons would be limited strictly to guarding the Embassy and the Consulate General. The request, the Ambassador said, extended only to two or three persons and only for a brief period of time.



S E C R E T

February 27, 1976

SECURITY ASSESSMENT  
1976 OLYMPICS

SUMMARY:



The potential for violence at the Olympic Games, from any one of several groups that are planning to use this occasion to publicize their causes, continues to be of major concern.

The Security problem has two aspects; that presented by domestic groups is probably one of controlling large numbers of demonstrators while that posed by international terrorist groups is one of being able to detect and prevent such a premeditated violent act as occurred at the Munich Olympics.

The potential for terrorists to succeed and to undertake violent activity is enhanced by rapid transportation, the availability of sophisticated weaponry and the instant reporting of terrorist activity by the mass media.

To offset this threat a number of steps have been taken. Bilateral links with national security agencies have been strengthened and expanded to enhance the flow of intelligence. The screening of applicants for admission to Canada has been reviewed and updated to facilitate the detection of undesirable elements prior to entry. Contingency plans have been developed to ensure the protection of athletes and official delegates to the Games. Recently instituted security measures that have been developed in concert with the Department of Manpower and Immigration are proving to be effective instruments in detecting suspected terrorists upon their entry into Canada. An ongoing briefing program, given to persons at major entry control points is similarly contributing positive results in detecting suspected terrorists. Coverage has also been stepped up on certain groups in Canada, and where necessary pre-emptive measures are being taken, i.e., establishing dialogue with leaders of various groups to minimize the potential for violent activity.

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TO / A Deputy Director General (Ops)

FROM / DE The Officer i/c Security Service, Olympic Secretariat

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|---|
| SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ |
| <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>                     |
| OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE                  |
| [REDACTED]                              |
| YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE                 |
| DATE                                    |
| October 31, 1975                        |

SUBJECT / OBJET 1976 Summer Olympics Montreal - Threats General

As you are aware the Security Service role within the Olympic Secretariat is to supply effective political intelligence, on all aspects of the Olympics to the Federal Security Coordinator, Chief Superintendent R. Quintal. Such intelligence should provide him with information concerning potential threats and developing situations so that he can formulate plans, make decisions and prepare knowledgeable answers to questions that are likely to come from a variety of Governmental Agencies.

Two recent incidents were the cause of considerable embarrassment to the F.S.C. because he was unable to answer questions about problems which legitimately would fall within his jurisdiction. This embarrassment was mirrored by this Unit because we were unable to provide him with current intelligence on the developing situations, some of which was available at other Units but unknown to us. C/Supt. Quintal feels, and we agree, that these problems may have arisen from inadvertent oversights.

In an attempt to rectify this crucial problem area, we are attaching a proposed telex for your consideration and signature.

I also wish to advise you that C/Supt. Quintal has indicated that he may wish to speak to you personally on this matter in the near future.

Attach.

I.W. Taylor, Supt. Officer i/c Security Service Olympic Secretariat

TELEX SENT 3/11/75  
PA  
Revised 11-75  
31.10

- ① DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY WITH DDG(OPS) WHO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR & REGRETS OVERSIGHT IN THE ARAB TERRORIST CASE.
- ② HOLD FOR PERUSAL BY FSC, PLSE.

5/11/75

C. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS

It is clear that from a jurisdictional point of view the responsibility for policing the 1976 Olympics rests with the Montreal Police backed up by the Province of Quebec and, of course, to a lesser extent the Kingston Police and the Province of Ontario. A Montreal Urban Community police officer has recently been appointed the coordinator of police activities for the Olympics 1976 although there has not yet been a public announcement. It is anticipated that he will soon be asking for RCMP assistance. In a recent letter to the Federal Government's Interdepartmental Committee on the Olympics 1976, COJO made the following remarks about security:

"The security aspect is one which clearly takes priority in our planning. As the Games will be held on the territory of the Montreal Urban Community, it seems logical that the police force of that organization should have primary responsibility in the area. It was therefore decided last March 30 that a coordinator of the police forces should be appointed by the Montreal Urban Community in connection with preparations for the Olympic Games. This coordinator, in addition to directing COJO efforts in this area, will be in charge of the sub-committee on security which will be comprised of representatives of all the police forces, including the MUC police, provincial police and RCMP, as well as representatives of the various interested departments or agencies, such as the Canadian Army, Civil Defence, etc. There is no doubt in our minds that the cooperation of

the federal government through the services of the RCMP is essential to the holding of the Games. In this regard, Chief Superintendent Jean Ouimet is already well informed on COJO plans. We are leaving it up to those in charge of security to work out their own plan and to organize their staff in relation to the needs of 1976."

With regard to these remarks by COJO, it should be stated categorically that the RCMP is not yet aware of any security plans nor have any discussions on that score yet been held with the newly appointed police coordinator.

Jurisdictional problems may arise when it is considered that there are several types of security to consider, namely,

(a) Ground Security

This relates to crowd control, traffic control and the investigation of Criminal code offences within the City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec. These duties can be defined as "in house" security and clearly lie within the jurisdiction of the Province of Quebec. The same applies in Ontario vis-a-vis Kingston and other satellite locations yet to be determined.

(b) Internal Security

This relates to terrorism which affects Canada as a whole, e.g. mass demonstrations directed against the Government of Canada, destruction of vital points installations and Federal property which are geographically located within the boundaries of the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario.



(c) Protection of Foreign Government Representatives

Foreign government representatives will be in attendance and will require protection.

(d) Airport Security

The RCMP is responsible under contract with the Ministry of Transport for policing and security of federal airports. While jurisdiction for criminal matters rests with local police forces, by 1976 it may be assumed by the RCMP.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) COJO's line of thinking at this stage leads one to believe that Montreal is shaping its programme on the Munich philosophy of 1972. If this philosophy were accepted for 1976, the security force, as a combined effort (municipal-provincial-federal) could easily make the same mistakes which were made in Munich in 1972. While the Montreal Urban Community Police does have the jurisdictional responsibility for policing the Olympics in Montreal, the Federal Government cannot depend on the Montreal Urban Community Police to manage the entire security programme.

If a serious incident occurs, either a mass demonstration or terrorist attack, the ultimate responsibility will fall on the federal government.

(b) Jurisdictional problems are complex and have always been sensitive issues in dealings with the provinces. They are especially difficult in the cases of Quebec and Ontario where the RCMP acts only in a Federal capacity.

(c) The areas of responsibility for security, assigned to local, provincial and federal jurisdictions, must be clearly determined by mutual discussion and agreement before planning for the security programme commences.

It must be made clear that the RCMP as the federal police authority has a clear responsibility to safeguard national interests in this programme.

(d) The RCMP should be instructed to ensure that security arrangements mutually agreed upon are consistent with the threat estimate. For planning purposes it must be assumed that the threat to security at the Olympics will be serious and that a high security profile as recommended below is acceptable to the Government.

(e) The RCMP must be allotted the necessary personnel, material and financial resources for security planning and implementation of the federal portion of the security plan and, at the same time, the RCMP must be supported by a firm Government posture when negotiations are held with Montreal, Quebec and Olympic authorities.

(f) Ministers should be prepared for the necessity of discussions at the political level should official level negotiations fail to make progress. This might be accomplished by the establishment of a sub-committee of Cabinet including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of Manpower & Immigration and the Solicitor General.

D. OTHER SECURITY MATTERS REQUIRING FEDERAL PLANNING

a. Immigration Control

Control over the entry to Canada of citizens, residents, immigrants and visitors is a firmly established federal responsibility. Thus it will be under federal Immigration laws that functionaries, participants, media representatives and visitors will be allowed entry to Canada during the Olympic games. At this time the numbers are largely speculation, however, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 Olympic participants, officials and the press and some 500,000 visitors will seek admission to Canada specifically for the 21st Olympiad.

OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNINGTHE THREAT:a. General Problem

The escalation of acts of terrorism and violence in recent years presents a serious threat to the maintenance of national internal security at the Olympics and to the thousands of foreign dignitaries, athletes, trainers, newsmen and other visitors for whose safety Canada will be responsible. The problem may be illustrated by the growing threat to diplomatic personnel. In the past five years, for example, over two dozen diplomats from various countries have been kidnapped and six assassinated. While law enforcement authorities are endeavouring to develop effective measures to deal with political violence, the international community remains vulnerable to a variety of tactics and techniques employed by organized terrorist groups with an alarming degree of success, as exemplified by the Lod, Munich and Khartoum tragedies.

b. Terrorist Activities

The activities of terrorists and urban guerrillas have developed in response to various issues which may not be resolved by 1976 and, therefore, must be considered in the formulation of security plans for the Olympic Games. Those causes and groups which, at the present time, appear to be most relevant to forecast of the security problem in 1976 are described. These include:

(1) The Arab/Israeli Dispute

The task of seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab/Israeli dispute has become more complex due to the activities of the Black September Organization and other terrorist groups. For example, the recent establishment of a new Al Fatah training base in South Yemen indicates that the number of skilled terrorists is likely to increase.

In the light of the complexity and protracted duration of the dispute, it is difficult to foresee whether and when a viable Arab/Israeli settlement in the area can be reached. Even if an inter-state settlement were reached, it is still possible that disaffected Palestinian groups would undertake international terrorist actions and in such circumstances the threat would have to be regarded with some degree of seriousness. Should the dispute remain unsettled in 1976 there would continue to exist a much more serious threat of international terrorist actions by these groups.

(2) The British/Irish Question

As in the case of the Arab/Israeli dispute, any settlement of the British/Irish question must contend with hard-line minorities such as the I.R.A. provisionals who are unwilling to accept compromise solutions and are prepared to deploy terrorist tactics until they are victorious.

While they have, until now, looked to North America primarily for financial and material support and have not extended their terrorist activities beyond the United Kingdom and Ireland, a switch in tactics which could involve North America in this fashion must be borne in mind.

(3) Quebec Separatism

Currently, the leadership of the Front de liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) projects a public posture that violence and terrorism is inappropriate. However, depending on the results of the next Quebec provincial election, it is possible that there will be a reassessment of the F.L.Q.'s position vis-a-vis Quebec independence and a re-evaluation of the organization's tactics. A situation could then arise where the F.L.Q. might gain strength from

radical elements disillusioned with the prospects for achieving an independent socialist Quebec, through democratic means.

(4) Black Extremism

Since his return to the United States in September 1972, Stokely CARMICHAEL, head of the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party has made many speeches predicting that America is headed for armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare. Similar calls for intensification of revolutionary activity are detected in the activities of the Black Liberation Army, De Mau Mau, with the support from non-Black groups such as Venceremos. There is a serious possibility of a spill-over from the United States by Black Extremists who choose to utilize the Olympic Games as a focal point in drawing attention to their cause.

(5) Red Power

As the recent incident at Wounded Knee demonstrates, advocates of Red Power are becoming more active and vocal in soliciting support for their cause. The interaction of Canadian and American Red extremists is showing continued developments.

(6) Urban Guerrilla Activity

In recent years, leading revolutionaries in the United States have called for an intensification of urban Guerrilla activity. There were an estimated 195 incidents of urban guerrilla activity (criminal acts with revolutionary motivation) in the United States in 1972.

(7) Liberation and Secessionist Movements

At the conclusion of the Tri-Continental conference in Havana in 1966, a communique was issued implying "no peaceful reform, only revolutionary violence".

The office of the Tri-Continental Conference continues to operate and to lend support to the cause of revolution. A strong possibility already exists that such groups will attempt to utilize the Olympics to draw attention to their grievances through demonstrations and other incidents. Secessionist groups such as the Croatian nationalists have clearly demonstrated that the battleground for their struggle is not limited by geographical boundaries.

The results of the conference of World Liberation Movements held in March 1973 in Santiago, Chile are as yet unknown to the Security Service.

c. Other Internal Organizations

In assessing our security requirements for the Olympic Games we must also consider internal groups other than those mentioned above. Security problems could arise from the activities of left-wing organizations such as the Maoists, Trotskyists and New Left. Right-wing groups and national extremists such as the Jewish Defence League, Western Guard, Ku Klux Klan, Nazi Supporters, Serbians and Croatian emigre groups are also a cause for concern.


d. Conclusion

(1) Most recent studies of international terrorism indicate that both the scope and the intensity of terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare will continue to present serious unsettled problems for the maintenance of law and order within the international community. The fact that members of these groups adhere to numerous causes and include a multiplicity of national origins is of primary importance in the formulation of security

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## OLYMPICS 1976 - TERRORISM

### OBJECT:

To assimilate, assess and make available for review all intelligence on potential and specific threats in relation to the  XI Olympiad.

### SUMMARY:

The precedent for an attack on the Olympic Games was of course established with the incident created in Munich during September, 1972. As unsettled conditions continue to prevail throughout the world, they provide numerous political deviants with the opportunity to publicize their grievances by selecting targets to coincide with the upcoming Games. In pondering whether or not an incident might occur, it must be stated that the query is not one of; do threats exist against certain participants and/or visitors to the Games, indeed they do, but the key question is whether the motive for revenge is sufficiently strong enough to warrant such violent action, bearing in mind the possible consequences of adverse international reaction. On the basis of past performances it can be assessed that the motives of certain groups are sufficiently strong enough to justify, in their opinion, an attack during an international event such as the Olympic Games.

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CONTENT:

MIDDLE EAST:

The internal upheaval in Lebanon continues to dominate the Middle East scene and has resulted in few, if any, Palestinian incursions into Israel in the past several months. These conditions should continue to exist until the Lebanese problem is solved and the Palestinians are able to assess their own position and status in that country. On the other hand, Syrian penetration of Lebanon is sealing off the Israeli border to Palestinian raids and this could have repercussions in the form of a resurgence of Palestinian attacks on the international scene. The Olympics is one type of international forum which could become a target for display of Palestinian frustrations. The potential threat to the Olympics from within the Palestinian milieu can be perceived to lie with the Rejection Front. During 1975, this group was responsible for, or involved with, incidents such as; two attacks at Orly Airport, Paris, in January, the occupation of the U.S. Consulate in Kuala Lumpur in August and the attack on the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Headquarters, Vienna in December.

The Rejection Front is composed of the following

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groups:

Popular Front for the Liberation of  
Palestine (PFLP)

PFLP - General Command

Arab Liberation Front (IRAQ)

Abu Nidhal Faction (IRAQ)

Arab National Youth Organization for  
the Liberation of Palestine (ANYOLP)

Arm of the Arab Revolution (LIBYA?)

Based on past activities, an attack by the  
Rejection Front would consist of:

- 1) A hostage/barricade situation
- 2) An attack on an airport/aircraft, or
- 3) An assassination attempt.

Apart from the general Palestinian threat, the  
following specific cases have been recorded and placed  
under investigation:

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Direction: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE - Bureau ou Division: Month - Mois: July 1975

REGISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL: CO-ORDINATION GROUP OF OLYMPICS

| Activity & File No.<br>Date & Dossier no. | Activity Description<br>Description de l'Activite   | Status<br>Progres | Date of Completion<br>Date Prevue<br>Achievement | Remarks<br>Observations   |
|---|---|-------------------|--|---|
| 1-9-6<br>1-1                              | <p><u>EXTERNAL AFFAIRS</u></p> <p>Olympic Co-ordinator, Protocol and Instructions to Posts abroad.</p> <p>Countries not recognized by the Government of Canada.</p> |                   |  | <p>Rhodesia is no longer a member of the IOC, a memorandum dated July 17, 1975 addressed to the Minister, outlined the External Affairs Department policy re the participation of Taiwanese athletes in the 'Competitions '75' held in Montreal.</p>  |
| -5-4                                      | <p>Passport Office -</p> <p>Lists of Lost or Stolen passports in the Middle East countries as input in the Micro-fiche system.</p>                                  | <p>going</p>      |  | <p><i>What is this?</i></p> <p>The first lists containing information on more than 22,000 lost or stolen Canadian passports have been received.</p> <p>As of July 31, half of the total entries will have been transferred to the Olympic Lookout form M&amp;I 473, at H.Q., for eventual production of the micro-fiche on lost or stolen valid Canadian passports.</p> |

Office - Direction: OFFICE OF DIVISION - Bureau ou Division  
 Month - Mois: July 1975

Activity & File No. / Titre & Dossier no.      Activity Description / Description de l'Activite      Status / Statut      Project Date / Date Prevue      Remarks / Observations

| Activity & File No.<br>Titre & Dossier no. | Activity Description<br>Description de l'Activite  | Status<br>Statut | Project Date<br>Date Prevue | Remarks<br>Observations  |
|--|--|------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 71-5                                       | <p>ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE - SOLICITOR GENERAL</p> <p>C.P.I.C. / C.O.I.L.S. -<br/>                     Re the Computerized Olympic Immigration Lookout System; the input into the Immigration (CPIC) file; the rental and installation of terminals at 26 locations across Canada.</p> | On going         |                             | The question of delaying the installation of some terminals due to alterations to be made, is known by Inspector H. Tabler, RCMP/CPIC.   |
| 71-4-2<br>71-5-9                           | <p>Security Services -<br/>                     Lists of terrorists (22,000) known, suspected, sympathizers, supporters; input into the Micro-fiche Reader system and the C.P.I.C. Immigration File.</p>   | On-going         |                             | <p>Foreign Service Region was provided with 170 copies containing the names of persons who are not subject to 7.63 and yet require N.I. Visas.</p> <p>The RCMP, Security Services data on terrorists has been re-programmed to the format suitable for input into the CPIC Immigration File.</p> |

*Classified Information to be relayed over commercial lines - on/CP should be discussed*



January 1, 1975

OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNINGINTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In spite of the diplomatic success he achieved at the UN when Yasar ARAFAT, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) addressed the General Assembly he demonstrated his desire for violent confrontation with Israel when he called upon Palestinians living in Israel occupied territory to "continue and escalate your resistance and sacrifices" in their struggle for independence. "We are with you, you have our complete support". Since the legitimization of the PLOs cause there has been signs of dissatisfaction and splintering within the PLO.

The second largest of the commando groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) is attempting to organize a cell structure in countries outside the Middle East in order that terrorist operations can be conducted with a minimum of assistance from the Middle East. The P.F.L.P. has an extensive clandestine network in North America with Headquarters in Chicago and links to Detroit, Southern Ontario, Toronto, Calgary and Edmonton.

The current "Peace" negotiations underway at Geneva have of course "temporarily" reduced the threat from Arab terrorism on the international scene at present. However, current indications are that the "talks" are not achieving much success and therefore a breakdown would probably create a new outbreak of violence beyond the Middle East. Should the negotiations be successful the threat of terrorism still exists as organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) and the Arab Liberation Front and countries such as Libya and Iraq have vowed never to recognize Israel and to fight against her existence. As Israel has proved to be almost impenetrable to the terrorists the most probable target areas appear to be Europe and possibly major events such as the Olympic Games. Of recent concern is the indication that Algeria has decided to issue passports to scores of Palestinians who have no identity papers or whose Jordanian passports were not renewed by the Jordanian Government. Enquiries are underway to establish the veracity of this information and if true, this will indeed be a major asset to Palestinian terrorists who could therefore travel on legitimate travel documents in order to commit terrorist acts abroad. Another area of concern is the turmoil

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between the various Arab states. There have been threats against the various heads of state and attacks on foreign diplomats and should circumstances warrant it and the situation present itself V.I.P.'s or groups at the Olympics could become targets for the various extremist groups.

The unsettled conditions in South America continue to prevail and in Argentinian alone 40 persons have been killed in political violence since President Juan Peron died on July 1, 1974. Seventy E.R.P. guerrillas unsuccessfully attempted a raid recently and 16 were killed the following day by police. The threat potential from this particular "phase" of terrorism will continue to be carefully monitored for any evidence of North American activity. At present the problems continue to remain regionalized to that part of the hemisphere although foreign V.I.P.'s have been kidnapped and killed by South American terrorists.

NATIVE EXTREMISM

Since last March 1974 the impetus for Indian activism appears to have shifted from the American Indian Movement (A.I.M.) to a group of nonaligned young Indian extremists. Canadian Indian militants are showing increasing leadership capabilities in their own right.

As an example the occupation of Anicinabe Park at Kenora, Ontario on 22 July by approximately 100 armed Indians marks a new development in Indian militancy. Riding the wave of momentum precipitated by earlier demonstrations and sit-ins the Kenora incident added a new dimension of Indian protest in that armaments were evident and rhetoric indicated their use was inevitable should demands not be met.

The reaction by Civic and Provincial authorities at Kenora was no doubt in part responsible for a further armed confrontation

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occurring at Cache Creek, B.C. Having learned that armed confrontation generates immediate response a small group of Indians took up arms to man a roadblock in order to focus attention on their demands.

The confrontation on Parliament Hill last Sept. between the RCMP and members of a native peoples caravan and the occupation of an old building on Victoria Island in Ottawa by the Indians added to public awareness of the demands of Indians.

The future mood and trend is unpredictable. Numerous variable require consideration to make any prognosis meaningful and at this time these variable cannot be isolated in the sense of allowing a predicative capability. As an example the future course of Government action or inaction will undoubtedly play a major role in determining the temper and direction of Indian activity.

At present there is no available information and no trends that are emerging which would indicate that the Olympics are being considered as a target to focus attention on Indian demands.

#### BLACK EXTREMISM

Since our last assessment 6 months ago, two developments occurring in Canada are being viewed with some concern. Firstly, a branch of the Black Muslim Nation of Islam (N.O.I.) has been established in Toronto. Weekly meetings are being held under tight security and a concerted attempt is being made to increase membership. Frequent references are made to the need for members to protect themselves from the "White Beast" with lessons in unarmed combat and use of fire arms having been given. Zedekiah Fielding, a resident leader of the Toronto N.O.I. is reported telling the membership that he did not want to hear Muslims complaining of beatings by the police but would rather hear that Muslims had severely beaten a policeman or killed him if necessary. These remarks drew a standing ovation from the members. The introduction of such a militant group as the N.O.I. can only serve to increase

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the threat from the Black Race due to their increasing awareness and exposure to violence.

Secondly, Stokely Carmichael, well known Black Power advocate of Revolutionary Pan Africanism visited Toronto in early August 1974 to establish a Black Nationalist base in that city which would include the formation of a Toronto chapter of Carmichaels "All African Peoples Revolutionary Party" (A.A.P.R.P.) The A.A.P.R.P. is a new Black Political Party formed in 1972 by Carmichael and calls for the destruction of capitalism to liberate all African peoples. Carmichael has indicated that democratic methods would be utilized but only as a means to an end - not as an end in itself. Carmichael will, through his occasional presence in Canada, add impetus to the existing Black Extremist Movement. While the question of increasing Black Revolutionary consciousness among otherwise moderate Black Nationalists is an arguable one, there is nevertheless, little doubt but that the pulse of the Black community in Canada is heightened after being exposed to the Carmichael style of political activism.

Several other events have as well, occurred which will have some influence and effect on Canada's relationship with the International Black Power Movement. Firstly, the granting of independence to Grenada in February, 1974 has not lessened the efforts of Caribbean extremists to unseat the current Prime Minister of that island, Eric GAIRY, and lose liaison and contact in terms of formulation of new revolutionary plans is being continued between Caribbean and Canadian based radicals. The Olympic threat emanating from this situation continues to appear insignificant as violence against current Governments in power remains confined within national boundaries.

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S E C R E T

Secondly, the Sixth Pan African Congress (S.P.A.C.) finally took place in Tanzania in June 1974, amid much internal strife and division. S.P.A.C. nevertheless acted as a forum for the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist goals of those associated with S.P.A.C. and its parent body, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). Delegates from the Arab world including Egypt and Palestine were present. On a resolution regarding the Palestine question, the S.P.A.C. committed its "delegates to take action in their respective countries aimed at continuing and stepping up support for the legitimate combat which the Palestinian people are selflessly waging for the liberation of their usurped homeland and the restoration of their national rights". A member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) advised a member of the Canadian delegation that the P.L.O. supports the African Liberation Movement and hoped that the free African nations could support the P.L.O. adding that when the Arabs take to the streets in Canada they will be joined by their black brothers. Canada, due to its close association with the U.S.A. was included in all attacks against imperialist powers by the S.P.A.C. delegates. Although a comprehensive analysis of the S.P.A.C. and its future effect on Canada is not as yet complete, it is safe to say that the possibility of increased Arab-Black cooperation in terms of International Terrorism may well be taking an upward swing.

Because radical blacks from the Caribbean were excluded from the S.P.A.C., they have repudiated to a large extent, the concept of Pan Africanism and their ties with Africa. Instead, they will increasingly turn to the doctrine of Marxism in its various forms and look to closer ties and support from such centers as Havana, Moscow and Peking.

In summary, the threat from the International Black Extremist Movement is expected to increase due to their continued and expanded association with the Arab Terrorist Movement.

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Within Canada, the situation remains stable and quiet however the national picture may well change depending on how successful the AAPRP and the N.O.I. become in Toronto. As well, Roosevelt (Rosie) Douglas, well known Marxist and Activist was released early in November 1974 on parole. His mysterious charisma among Blacks in Canada and his well known propensity for violence may prove to be a further disruptive factor on the national scene.

#### RIGHT WING EXTREMISTS

The potential threat in this particular sector remains unchanged from that indicated in our threat assessment of 1 March 1974.

#### THE BRITISH/IRISH QUESTION

Our concerns in this particular sector remain largely unchanged. During the past 6 months, the IRA has continued to export its terrorist tactics to mainland Britain, the most significant being the July 17, 1974 bombing of the Tower of London during which one woman was killed and 40 other persons injured, half of them children. Terrorism in Ireland itself continues unabated. Although the IRA has not as yet been known to export its violence outside the British Isles, a close watch continues to be maintained for a possible broadening of these activities to other countries.

An estimated 150 delegates from approximately 15 countries attended the opening of the "Festival of Anti-Imperialist Struggle" in Dublin, Ireland on July 22, 1974. In addition to 50 IRA members, most of the delegates were reportedly West European Leftists from France, Germany, Sweden and Netherlands. U.S. Palestinian delegates Black

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Liberation leaders and representatives of the American Indian Movement had also been invited but it is not known at this time if they were in attendance. Information on the results of this meeting is not yet available, however forthcoming intelligence will be analyzed carefully.

Domestically, particular attention is being paid to individuals resident in Canada who have been identified or who are suspected of having IRA links. This has resulted in the recent arrest and conviction of several individuals in the Toronto area who have been involved in the shipment of arms to Ireland. To date, no intelligence has been developed to indicate that Irish Extremists have been targeted against the Olympic Games, however particular attention is being paid to this aspect.

#### QUEBEC SEPARATISM

The Front De Liberation Du Quebec (F.L.Q.) which first introduced political terrorism to this Province as early as 1963 presents a potential threat to the 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal. Its continued existence, even though at a reduced level, indicates that remnants of the Organization have a capacity to tarnish Canada's image during these events in efforts to gain international attention. Recent information has revealed the presence of a small group of revolutionaries in the Gaspé region of the Province who are reported to be preparing for imminent action in 1976. The group has approached Belgian national Jean Magnee to assume its leadership, however, he has not indicated his intentions in this regard. Magnee was the alleged owner of the Maison Du Pecheur, a revolutionary haven established in Gaspé in 1969 where plans were set afoot culminating in the Political kidnappings of October 1970.

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Labour unrest and violence is expected to erupt in the coming months particularly in the construction industry. The frequency of strikes in the City of Montreal stemming mainly from pressures by union members for inclusion of cost-of-living clauses in their contracts is exacerbated by an increasing dissatisfaction with existing labour and management relations which leading union members attributed partly to the Civic Party currently in power. Since 1970, when Mayor Drapeau was elected by a landslide victory, there has been growing criticism of the social policies being implemented by the Municipal Government and the use of public funds for such projects as the Olympics, a symbol of what dissidents consider to be the "English Language Canadian Establishment". The major trade unions (C.S.N., T.T.Q. and C.E.O.), generically referred to as the Common Front, were instrumental in mounting an effective opposition in the form of a Municipal Labour Party to contest the Drapeau Administration in the elections on 10 November 1974.

At the present time, the concept of a United Front is being honored more theoretically than in practice as the F.T.Q. jostles with its rival, the C.S.N., for supremacy in the labour context. Current inter-union conflicts resulting from pressures produced by the F.T.Q. to gain autonomy of the construction industry, more specifically the 30% sector controlled by the C.S.N., directly affected the construction of the Velodrome Olympic site. This forced the Olympic Organizing Committee (C.O.J.O.) to host the World Cyclist Championships at the University of Montreal.

The occurrence of a major work stoppage during the construction of Olympic sites has seriously delayed their completion and caused international embarrassment

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for Canada. In the case of Expo 67 and such world expositions as those hosted by Seattle and New York, the probability of work slowdowns was reduced by the incorporation of "no-strike" agreements into contracts.

CHILEAN REFUGEES

There have been no new developments in this particular area since our last assessment 6 months ago. Chilean refugees in Canada, have to the present time, kept their activities confined to areas of peaceful well planned demonstrations. The newly formed Chilean Resistance Movement which at the time of our last assessment, had 300 of its members training in Cuba has not been involved in any activities coming to our knowledge. Whether or not the publicity in the media alledging that numerous Chileans have been tortured by the current Chilean Regime will incite the Chilean Resistance Movement or Chilean Refugees resident in Canada into action remains to be seen, however, close attention will be kept to developments in this area.

ERITREAN LIBERATION FRONT

Recent developments in Ethiopia have surfaced a new area of concern as generated by the activities of the Eritrean Liberation Front (E.L.F.). The E.L.F. is active mainly in Ethiopia where they conduct guerrilla warfare against the Government. E.L.F. support appears to extend to Canada. Two individuals who have been arrested and convicted for bank robbery in London, Ontario claim membership in the Eritrean Liberation Front. These individuals had also been involved in previous bank robberies along with a third person who was arrested in Dayton, Ohio. Money from the bank robberies would presumably find its way to the E.L.F. in Ethiopia. Recent intelligence indicates the possibility

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of the E.L.F. having organizations in Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa with funding from the U.S.A. for their operations. A number of individuals have allegedly been trained in Toronto before being sent to join the E.L.F. in Ethiopia. Investigation is continuing and close watch is being maintained on developments.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA  
(MARXIST/LENINIST)

The position of the Communist Party of Canada-Marxist/Leninist in relations to the 1976 Summer Olympic Games remains unchanged in that no emphasis has so far been placed on the staging of this athletic event in Canada. Of significance is the fact that the International Cycling Championships recently held in Montreal were completely disregarded as an exploitable issue by the CP of C M/L and its front groups.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA

The threat estimate in this sector remains unchanged in that we do not expect that the Communist Party of Canada and its ancillary groups to initiate acts of violence during the Olympic Games.

CUBAN REFUGEES

Earlier last year, anti-Castro Cubans operating out of the U.S.A. and Mexico, launched a campaign of terror against Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel. Bombs were received through the mail at Cuban establishments in France, Peru, Mexico, Spain and Canada. A bomb received at the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa, in January 1974, failed to explode because of defective wiring. It was postmarked in Mexico. Although there has been no significant activity by Cuban exiles during the past 6 months, projections outlined in our March 1st 1974 threat estimate remain unchanged and a distinct possibility.

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OBSERVATIONS

While the degree of potential threat to the 1976 Summer Olympic Games remains at approximately the same level as that projected a year ago, the German experience with respect to their hosting of the 1974 World Cup Soccer Matches in Frankfurt Germany several months ago, indicates that international sporting events can still be staged in relative safety albeit under massive and stringent security. Although considerable exposure was given to the massive security measures by the media on the opening day of the World Cup Soccer Matches, no further references were made, at least in the Canadian Press, to this aspect of the Matches during the remainder of the event. This would appear to have set not only a precedent for stringent security measures to be employed in relation to international sporting events, but illustrates that security forces can withstand any initial criticism which may arise as a result of restrictions being placed upon the media and the public.

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| OTHER FILE REFERENCES:<br>REF. AUTRES DOSSIERS:<br><br>00081 MAY 11 1975 | DIVISION<br>"C"                           | DATE<br>23 APR 75 | RCMP FILE REFERENCES:<br>REF. DOSSIERS GRC: |
|  | SUB-DIVISION - SOUS-DIVISION              |                   |   |
|  | DETACHMENT - DÉTACHEMENT<br>MONTREAL S.S. |                   |   |

RE:  
OBJET:  
  
BLACK POWER - OLYMPIC '76 ACTIVITIES - Canada

INTRODUCTION

1. The following is a threat assessment

INFORMATION

2. G A M E S

As the highest level of organized sports, the Olympic Games would arouse international interest. It is essentially for this reason that a wide and varied range of individuals and groups, and combinations thereof, would seek this opportunity to dramatize their grievances—real or imagined, and, in some cases, to redress such grievances.

3. The following analysis attempts to place in perspective some of the important categories of people who would most likely seek this opportunity "to create an incident" during the forthcoming Games. This analysis is predicated on the understanding that because the immediate causal factors cannot be known until very near the commencement of or during the Games, the whole range of possibilities cannot now be fully explored. It is perhaps laboring a point also to mention that some strategies, with the aid of proper timing, could penetrate the tightest of security measures.

A. Causal Factor(s)

1. The most important single cause of an "incident" in the circumstance could be categorized as "nurturing a feeling of (individual or social) injustice."

B. Effect(s)

1. To politicize and dramatize such feeling of injustice for propaganda purposes and/or to seek redress
2. To embarrass the (Canadian) host government.

C. Categories of Individuals and Groups Most Likely to Create an Incident

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1. Unorganized Elementsa) The Lunatic Fringe:

An individual or small group may seek to:

- i) express or redress a grievance, real or imagined, against some public figure, or participants representing a country against which they bear a grudge.
- ii) express displeasure over the participation of some country because of some policy or action of that country or for some incident with which they disagree.

Possible Acts:

- i) assassination
- ii) bombing
- iii) incendiarism
- iv) disrupting the Games

b) Mob Behavior:

- i) dissatisfaction of a sizeable number of persons before or during the course of the Games for any number of reasons, among which are: having to wait unduly long or unavailability of tickets and having to be turned away; disagreement with crowd control measures, poor services or facilities, an unpopular decision.

Possible Acts:

- i) riot and vandalism
- ii) personal attack on some personality, crowd control officers, Games officials

2. Organized Elementsa) Ethnic Groups Within Canada:

- i) Jews (Zionists or members of the Jewish Defense League - ██████████)
  - may wish to avenge the Munich massacres;
  - show displeasure over U.S.S.R. participation;
  - displeasure over Libya's participation.



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BLACK POWER - OLYMPIC '76 ACTIVITIES - Canada

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(Continuation)

- ii) Quebec's (radical) separatists and F.L.Q. sympathizers (unlikely)
  - may wish to dramatize their demand for independent statehood.
- iii) Blacks
  - displeasure over participation of Rhodesia;
  - seemingly discriminatory practices by Canada, U.S.A., or any other country whose policies appear to them to be discriminatory; of deportation of Haitians; Rosie DOUGLAS if this were to occur; Canada's new immigration policies;
  - support by Canadian or U.S. government of any unpopular regime, esp. Canada's economic interest in and link with Rhodesia and South Africa.
- iv) Greeks
  - against Turkish participants over the Cyprus issue.
- v) Ugandan Asians (unlikely)
  - against participation of Uganda as a result of their expulsion.
- b) Other Organized Groups Within Canada:
  - i) Trade Unions (and other forms of organized labor) (especially the C.N.T.U.) (unlikely)
    - usually to lend support to another group, either ethnic or ideologically oriented, to express displeasure over the policies of a participating country.
  - c) Organized Groups on Basis of Nationalism:

(This is perhaps the most dangerous, as evidenced from the Mexico and Munich Games.)

    - i) Zionists
      - against U.S.S.R., Arab states for Munich massacres.
    - ii) Separatists of Quebec
      - already discussed overleaf under ethnic groups
    - iii) Arabs
      - especially members of the P.L.O.

BLACK POWER -- OLYMPIC '76 ACTIVITIES -- Canada

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- iv) Haitians
  - against the existing government of Haiti from which they fled.
- v) Ethiopians
- vi) Zimbabwe
  - for denial by White Rhodesia of political demands
- vii) North American Black nationalism combined with African and Caribbean Black nationalism.
- d) Organized Groups on Basis of Ideology
  - i) Anti-Communists:
    - comprising former South Vietnamese, Cambodians, Cubans, etc.
    - against the existing communist regimes.
  - ii) Communists:
    - Black groups, Maoists, Marxists/Leninists, etc.
    - protesting injustices and discriminatory practices.

4. The only useful empirical data available and from which some pattern might be discerned are those from the Mexico Games (Black nationalism) and the Munich massacres (Palestinian nationalism). Thus, in two incidents the element of nationalism was evident. This is because nationalism combines two of the most explosive elements: power politics and emotions (a desire for power and the courage to obtain it).

5. In the hierarchy of security risks, however, not only must nationalistic groups, per se, be considered a threat, but also the possibilities of combinations of other categories of groups that might create the elements which could spark off nationalist sentiments. At the same time a review of the entire picture would be necessary immediately preceding the Games to determine what "immediate or current" situational factors could bring about such combinations.

6. Thus the above mentioned categories of possibilities must remain theoretical and await more specific and substantive data in order for a more accurate assessment to be made.

RE: - OBJET:

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BLACK POWER - OLYMPIC '76 ACTIVITIES - Canada


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Problem Areas

- 1. Nationalism - ex. Arab-Jews; Cypriots; Greek and Turkish
- 2. Refugees - Chileans, Uganda Asians, Cubans, etc.




INVESTIGATOR'S COMMENTS

- 8. Forwarded for information purposes.

Cpl.  
"D" Operations.

CC: Olympic Secretariat, Montreal



*Noted  
23-5-75  
[Signature]*

*[Signature]*  
J.L.G. GRAND, S/Sgt.  
N.E.O. i/c "D" OPS.



ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA

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REF. NO.

S E C R E T



201 January 1974

Director General,  
Bureau of Security and Intelligence,  
Department of External Affairs.

ATTENTION: Mr. A.F. Hart

Re: Attendance of Representatives of  
African Liberation Movements  
Recognized by the Organization of  
African Unity at Meetings of  
Specialized UN Agencies

This relates to your conversations with Mr. H.C. Draper, DDC (Operations) in this regard.

We wish to express our concern at the change in attitude and policy reflected in Canada's recent positive votes cast in favour of African Liberation Movement (ALM) representation on specialized UN agencies and our apparent intention to support such representation on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal. The RCMP Security Service is aware that the UN is generally in favour of such attendance, that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference recognized the legitimacy of the struggle in Southern Africa, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs in September extended Canada's position to one of "studying ways to broaden its humanitarian support for those engaged" and that Mr. Sharp has since approved new guidelines for Canadian humanitarian aid to the peoples of Southern Africa. While External Affairs undoubtedly believes that it is furthering clearly articulated government policy in adopting its new position, we feel we would be remiss in not voicing our serious reservations and concern.

Attached is a list of "liberation movements" recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), together with thumbnail sketches of the OAU and those movements which are recorded in our indices. "Liberation Movements" is, perhaps, a misnomer for some of the groups

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listed. FNLA, MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC have all been recognized by the UN as representing the true aspirations of their people. Perhaps this can also be said of MOLINACO and others. But many of these groups are still locked in struggle with colonial powers.

Regardless of how one might feel of the rightness of the cause of such groups or the position adopted by the UN in relation to them, it is obvious that many members of these groups are trained guerrillas, hardened by years of oppression and struggle; that their values and attitudes are not within the Canadian experience; and methods adopted by them to attain their ends would shock, if not horrify, Canadians. The regular presence of such people on Canadian soil is disturbing, as you will appreciate from the attached information on SWAPO, [REDACTED]

The Security Service believes that it would benefit from the views of other Departments in this and other close related matters. It is, therefore, my intention to request that this topic be raised for discussion by members of the Security Advisory Committee in the near future. For this purpose, a copy of this correspondence will be supplied to Mr. Robin Bourne. I am also forwarding a copy to the Ministry of Transport which, I believe, has a particular interest.

Yours sincerely,

M.R. Dare  
Director General,  
Security Service.

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND  
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS RECOGNIZED BY IT

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Organized in May 1963 by 30 African states to coordinate the cultural, political, scientific and economic policies of member states, to end colonialism in Africa and to promote a common defense of its members' independence. The group, which has its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, now has 41 members and holds regular meetings of heads of government. The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for Liberating Movement in Africa has its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. It collects and distributes funds and materials to several African liberation movements. Perhaps a measure of OAU effectiveness can be seen in the fact that in May 1973 only six black African countries had broken relations with Israel; by November, all 41 OAU members had agreed to a strong public denunciation of that state in its dispute with the Arabs.

Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

FRELIMO, which was formed in 1962, began its armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial Government in Mozambique in 1964. It is dedicated to liberating Mozambique from Portuguese control and is headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. At the present time FRELIMO controls approximately 25% of Mozambique and has 7 to 10,000 men in the field actively fighting the Portuguese forces. Initially, FRELIMO only received support from the USSR. Now China is also supplying arms and training. Financial assistance is also being provided by some Scandinavian countries and from Holland. FRELIMO is one of Africa's best organized and most effective nationalist movements.

African Party for the Independence of  
Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands  
(PAIGC)

The PAIGC was formed in 1963 by Amilcar CABRAL who was assassinated on 20 January 1973. In actual fact the PAIGC is no longer considered a liberation movement as it announced the independence of Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands on 24 September 1973. United Nations findings showed that the PAIGC had been the effective Government of the Guinean people for the past two years. As a result, Guinea Bissau was admitted to the UN and the PAIGC was recognized as the Government of Guinea Bissau by 70 countries. Portugal, however, still occupies 20% of the territory and the war between PAIGC forces and the Portuguese Army continues. Canada, as a fellow

NATO member, has not recognized the PAIGC's declaration of independence and still supports the Portuguese claim to Guinea Bissau. The PAIGC receives both financial and material support from the USSR and is also given assistance by Sweden and the People's Republic of China.

Popular Movement for the Liberation  
of Angola (MPLA)

MPLA was formed in 1956 following the amalgamation of several smaller revolutionary groups. At the present time, MPLA forces are engaged in guerrilla warfare against Portuguese colonial forces in an attempt to liberate Angola. With an estimated 4,000 men in the field, the MPLA currently controls one-third of Angola territory. Although it receives primarily Soviet support, some assistance has also been provided by the Chinese. Members of the MPLA have received military training in Czechoslovakia, and MPLA members are currently studying in the USSR. Headquarters of the MPLA are located in the Congo at Brazzaville and in Tanzania.

Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA)

This group amalgamated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in December 1972.

South West Africa People's  
Organization (SWAPO)

SWAPO was formed in 1958 and has been engaged in active fighting since 1966. Headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, SWAPO seeks the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) from South Africa. To date, it has not had much success. Its main international activity has been in raising funds for the defence of South African political prisoners, but SWAPO members have been trained in guerrilla warfare in the USSR, China, Algeria, Korea, the UAR, Ghana, Tanzania and Cuba. The organization has received finances from the USSR and China and is equipped with Chinese weapons. While SWAPO boasts a membership of 100,000, its actual membership is probably between 3,000 and 4,000.

In November 1971 three SWAPO members visited Canada. During the visit they discussed the co-ordinated destruction of jet aircraft at an unnamed airport in England and the placing of a bomb at Sir George Williams University in Montreal. Also discussed, and abandoned through lack of manpower, was the kidnapping and killing of the South African Ambassador to Canada or the bombing of a South African building in Canada.

The Zimbabwe African Peoples'  
Union (ZAPU)

and

The Zimbabwe African National  
Union (ZANU)

These groups are opposed to white minority rule in Rhodesia and are both headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Both are opposed to white minority rule in Rhodesia. ZAPU is financed by the USSR and claims a doubtful membership of 2,000. ZANU is actually a Chinese-financed ZAPU breakaway group. In March 1973 these groups combined fighting forces in the hope of increasing their effectiveness. The coalition is not working and the groups have had little success, possibly because of the backing of the different factions by the USSR and China, but also because of continuing dissent between individual members.

The foregoing is for the information of your Department/Agency only and is not to be further disseminated without the consent of the originator.



LIBERATION MOVEMENTS RECOGNIZED BY OAU

| <u>Full name</u>   | <u>Abbreviation</u> | <u>Territory</u>               |
|--|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Frente de Libertação de Moçambique                         | FRELIMO             | Mozambique                     |
| Partido Africano da Independencia<br>da Guiné e Cabo Verde | PAIGC               | Guinea (Bissau)                |
| Movimento Popular de Libertação<br>de Angola               | MPLA                | Angola                         |
| Frente Nacional para a Libertação<br>de Angola             | FNLA                | Angola                         |
| The South West Africa People's<br>Organization             | SWAPO               | South West Africa<br>(Namibia) |
| The Zimbabwe African Peoples'<br>Union                     | ZAPU                | Zimbabwe<br>(Rhodesia)         |
| The Zimbabwe African National<br>Union                     | ZANU                | Zimbabwe<br>(Rhodesia)         |
| Front de Libération de la Côte<br>des Somalis              | FLCS                | Erythrea                       |
| Mouvement de Libération national<br>des Comores            | MOLINACO            | Comoro Islands                 |
| Mouvement de Libération de Djibouti                        | MLD                 | Djibouti                       |
| Comité de Libertação de Sao<br>Tomé e Príncipe             | CLSTP               | Sao Tomé and<br>Príncipe       |
| Seychelles People's United Party                           | SPUP                | Seychelles                     |

TO: Memo for file

FROM: Assistant Security Service Coordinator

SUBJECT: "Mission 80"

|                                       |
|---------------------------------------|
| SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ |
| SECRET                                |
| OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE                |
| YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE               |
| DATE<br>May 9, 1975                   |

On Thursday, May 8, 1975, a meeting was held in the office of the D.D.G. (Operations) concerning Security Service participation in the General Physical Security Briefing Program and "Mission 80" (See attached agenda). Those in attendance were C/Supt. Quintal, Federal Security Co-Ordinator; Supt. Begalki, A/D.D.G. (Ops); Insp. Taylor, Olympic Secretariat; Insp. Venner, External Affairs; Insp. Banning, "B" Operations; Insp. Mumby, "D" Operations; Sgt. "B" Operations; and the writer.

The following is a resumé of the discussions:

1. (a) C/Supt. Quintal advised that the General Briefing Program will be centered with C.P.S.P.J.C. and will consist of (1) a standardized brief on physical security offered to all 130 countries, and (2) a specific briefing to high-risk countries i.e. Israel. This subject has already been raised by the Soviets, Israelis and West Germans. Supt. Begalki stated that the Security Service wished to participate in the briefings in order that firstly, we could respond to an assessment of the national threat against teams and secondly, we could establish a transmission link for incoming intelligence with the foreign attache or his delegate.

(b) There will be specific consideration given to Israel, and the concept of asking the Israelis to send a security expert to Canada is still under consideration. A Security Service member must be allocated to deal with the Israelis, and he must acquire the knowledge to operate in this arena. In terms of dealing with either the Israelis or Soviets, Supt. Begalki pointed out that, based on past experience, our member must insist, in face to face confrontations, that all intelligence provided by them must be substantiated.

(c) S/Supt. Quintal informed that he plans to present the Force's views on the program to Mr. Toupin in the near future. Prior to doing so, he was interested in determining the degree of participation of the Security Service so that the concepts could be put forward as a complete unit.

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*MD*  
*224*  
*29.5.75*

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|-----------------------------|
| Reviewed <i>[Signature]</i> |
| MAY 29 1975                 |
| SECURITY SERVICE            |

(d) Insp. Venner stated that the Dept. of External Affairs was interested in the date of implementation of the program so that they could respond to questions posed by the Soviet Security Officer, Mr. Sukharov. He was informed that he would be advised of Mr. Toupin's reaction as soon as possible.

2. (a) C/Supt. Quintal was given a general briefing of our plans concerning the D.N.D. Liaison Officer and the Soviet Observer Delegation.


(b) There was general agreement that the "Mission 80" Delegation would be given only the general philosophy of our planning prior to the Games, and that actual details would be handled in the Post-Games period.

3. (a) The A/D.D.G. (Ops) agreed with the policy discussed above concerning the Attaches and that "B" Operations in Montreal would be responsible for Soviet Bloc and Asian targets while "D" Operations would deal with the remaining countries of interest.

(b) The matter of personnel security of our personnel should also be considered together with established policy on supervision of our members involved in this program. Issues to be kept in mind here include instructions on socializing, acceptance of gifts, and a 48 hour reporting system.

(c) Insp. Banning raised the point of the necessity of informing all Divisions on our actual Olympic programs. He cited the example of a case in Toronto where involvement in Olympic planning was used to approach a "B" Ops target.

4. (a) Supt. Begalki agreed that we should proceed with our portion of planning for this briefing program as soon as possible. Authorization was given to proceed with a meeting between the operations groups from Headquarters and Montreal in the near future.

  
G.E. Godfrey, Insp.,  
A/Security Service Coordinator  
Olympics Secretariat




Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE



TO  
À

Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat

FROM  
DE

Officer i/c "D" Operations


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| [Redacted]                              |
| DATE                                    |
| March 27, 1975                          |

SUBJECT  
OBJET Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -  
Threat Assessment

This has reference to your correspondence of 25 February 1975 with attachments and in particular memorandum dated 25 February re 76 Summer Olympics - Threat Assessment - (General). As discussed in recent meetings between Olympics Secretariat and "D" Operations personnel the following pertains to your submission:

(a) Organization Threats - Information on organizations of interest has been made available to you in material compiled [Redacted] Updates and changes in the threat potential of such organizations will be forwarded to you as and when received.

(b) Individual Threats - [Redacted]



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
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SECURITY SERVICE  
RECORDS

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
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Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -  
Threat Assessment


(c) New Weaponry -



(d) Documentation -



(e) General Threat Intelligence -



2. With reference to page 2 of your submission and the threat projections for individual security functions, S/Sgt. [REDACTED] has ascertained that the Protection of Property Branch, "P" Directorate have surveyed various vital points and other key security functions in Canada and projected threat assessments for major events such as the

CONFIDENTIAL



Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -  
Threat Assessment

Olympics. A review of their material along with ongoing intelligence from the Security Service should provide the information necessary to assist in overall threat projections. Regarding items (b) and (c), concerning individual and organization terrorist profiles, these have been covered in items (a) and (b) above.

G. Begalka, Supt.  
Officer i/c "NW" Ops.



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO  
A

Insp. G. Godfrey  
S/Sgt.

FROM  
DE

Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT  
OBJET

76 Summer Olympics -  
Threat Assessment - (General)

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| DATE                                  |
| 25 February 1975                      |

On 24 February 1975 the Federal Security Coordinator discussed with me a need he perceives for the analysis and correlation of Security Service threat intelligence in such a way as to be of maximum utility to both himself and the Secretariat, for planning and briefing purposes.

Firstly, the Federal Security Coordinator stated that he would like us to extract all items from Guidelines, terrorist weekly and monthly bulletins, which have direct relevance to the Olympics and to set them out by appropriate subject categories. He proposed that an initial threat updating be presented at a future Monday general meeting and that a weekly intelligence updating be given at each subsequent general meeting. I agreed to discuss his proposal with members of the Security Service Secretariat to arrive at a practical solution. The following categories were suggested by the Federal Security Coordinator for our consideration:

(a) Organization Threats -

(b) Individual threats - synopsis and activities of specific persons who may be preparing some action which would pose some threat to the Olympics.

(c) New weaponry - for example Sam 7, miniature explosive devices, which could be utilized to disrupt the Olympics.

(d) Documentation - intelligence indicating a possible utilization of false, altered or stolen documents by terrorist suspects.

(e) General threat intelligence - not falling under any of the above categories but generally relevant.

MAR 15 1975  
SECURITY SERVICE  
RECORDS

*Handwritten notes:*  
PA  
17/3/75  
16/3/75  
JEL 276  
16-2-75

I would like to discuss the Federal Security Coordinator's request as soon as S/Sgt. Diepold returns off course to determine feasibility and format. The F.S.C. is basically looking for material prepared in a loose-leaf style to permit regular updating with a minimum of effort. The first step, is to review back issues of the Guidelines and terrorist bulletins as well as any other material we have on hand to identify relevant items. Once this is done a format can then be designed which may also lend itself to other uses in conjunction with our development of suitable threat packages for dissemination to "A", "C" and "O" Divisions and other police forces involved in Olympic planning.

The F.S.C. also brought up [redacted] recently received from "D" Ops. and asked me if "D" Ops. would also be supplying specific material in the following categories:

(a) threat projections for individual security functions specifically, Vital Points, Harbours, Borders, Airports, V.I.P.'s and Athletes. *see "P" Dir.*

(b) terrorist organization [redacted]

(c) individual terrorist [redacted]

In reply I stated that a threat assessment relevant to airports and sky-jacking incidents was currently being prepared by "D" Ops. for the information of both "P" Directorate and the Olympic Secretariat. Insofar as the other items are concerned, I stated that I would discuss them with the Officer i/c "D" Ops. and his staff.

*"G" ops?*

[redacted]

*I.W. Taylor*  
I.W. Taylor, Insp.  
Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat





Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

IT/9h

TO  
A

Officer i/c "D" Operations

FROM  
DE

Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT  
OBJET

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| DATE<br>25 February 1975                |

I am attaching for your information copy of memo dated 25 February 1975, to Insp. G. Godfrey and S/Sgt. J. Diepold of my staff which deals with several requests from the Federal Security Coordinator relating to Security Service Threat Intelligence.

A somewhat similar request from the A/Federal Security Coordinator dated 11 July 1974, copy of attached, was forwarded to you on 18 October 1974 for consideration. I subsequently had a general discussion with Insp. Hugo when it was agreed that the Terrorist Briefing would be given to the Olympic Secretariat at a suitable time. This briefing was delayed on several occasions due to the absence of key people of the Secretariat. It was carried out on 17 February 1975.

You will see from the attachments that we intend to develop a suitable weekly briefing based on revelant extracts from Guidelines, The Terrorist Bullentins and other available material, which should adequately meet the first request of the Federal Security Coordinator. His other requests are somewhat broader in scope and I would like to discuss them with you at your convenience. Subsequently it may be useful to arrange a meeting with the Federal Security Coordinator to review current and projected "D" Ops. threat related programs.

*I.W. Taylor*  
 I.W. Taylor, Insp.  
 Officer i/c Security Service  
 Olympics Secretariat

MAR 13 1975  
 SECURITY SERVICE

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MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À: Officer i/c "D" Operations  
Officer i/c "B" Operations

FROM / DE: Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat


SUBJECT / OBJET: Olympic Security Briefing Program

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| DATE<br>25 July 1975                    |

As you are aware, the D/Commr (Operations) and the Director General have recently approved policy guidelines for a security briefing program for Olympic attachees and foreign security officials concerned with the Olympics. A copy of that approval is attached for your reference.

The approved guidelines are, by necessity, quite general in nature and it is evident that specific policy must be developed to ensure that this program functions effectively and smoothly. As a supplement to existing policy instructions, all participants should be absolutely clear on the limits on supplying information to foreign officials, reporting procedures and conduct. You will recall that Soviet Bloc countries were to be the responsibility of "B" Operations, while the Middle-East, Yugoslavia and Albania, Africa, South and Central America, except Cuba, fall under the mandate of "D" Operations.

The necessity of some form of in-service training for those Security Service members involved has also been surfaced. This might involve some form of lectures by people experienced in liaison, i.e. External Affairs, and from Internal Security. Your views on this concept would be appreciated.

  
I.W. Taylor, Supt.  
Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympic Secretariat

TO: DIRECTOR GENERAL, SECURITY SERVICE  
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CRIMINAL OPERATIONS

FROM: FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATOR  
DE: FOR THE 1976 OLYMPICS

SUBJECT: Briefing Program for  
OBJET: Foreign Countries

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
The following policy guidelines, emanating from discussions with the Department of External Affairs, the Deputy Commissioner (Ops) and Security Service representatives, are recommended for your approval:

- (a) The briefings should be prepared in slide form, be standardized and contain only material approved by the Principal Coordinator, after comments from the police Forces participating in the security plan.
- (b) There should be two types of briefings:
  - (i) A general type briefing which could be given individually to any country participating in the Games.
  - (ii) Specific briefings for individual countries dealing with special measures being taken to satisfy the requirements of their delegation, and which would also include (i).
- (c) There should be one main centre for all briefings in Montreal.
- (d) A briefing Sub/Committee should be formed in Montreal to deal with the preparation of the briefing material. Because there may be a need to do some briefings in Ottawa, a member of the "HQ" Olympic Secretariat should be a member of that Sub/Committee.


- (e) The briefings should be given by a "Criminal Operations" member of the Force.
- (f) The briefings should make it absolutely clear that Canadian authorities oppose Foreign Nationals bringing firearms into Canada to protect their athletes.
- (g) An accurate and complete record of each briefing should be maintained in order that Headquarters can keep the Department of External Affairs fully informed.
- (h) The Security Service objective of being present at all briefings is to establish communication links with the Olympic Attaches or their delegates which will continue throughout the Games. These links will enable the Security Service to receive information concerning knowledge of any threat to any particular national team for eventual analysis at Headquarters and transmission to the operational sector. As a result of participation at the time of the briefing, the Security Service representative will be prepared to respond to any general questions on topics which fall within Security Service areas of responsibility, such as level of threat towards a specific delegation from groups within Canada.
- (i) The Security Service will participate to the following extent:
  - (i) Have a fully briefed investigator, for each country or closely related countries, available to take part in each briefing.
  - (ii) The investigator will be familiar with the foreign country itself and the groups from within Canada which might pose a threat to the Olympic team.


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- (iii) He will answer questions of a general nature raised by the Attache. In cases of high risk countries given a more detailed physical briefing, the Security Service member will be prepared to respond more specifically.
- (iv) In all cases, he will establish himself as the continuing contact point for that particular Attache should the Attache wish to pass any threat information to Canadian authorities.
- (v) The investigator will develop an association with the Attache and
- (vi) during the period that the Olympic team is in Canada, i.e. July 1 to August 1, 1976, will be available on a continuous basis to act as the transmission link for incoming intelligence information.

  
 J.R.R. Quintal, C/Supt.  
 Federal Security Coordinator  
 for the 1976 Olympics

APPROVED:

  
 Deputy Commissioner (Ops)

  
 Director General, Security Service

26/6/75  
 Date

26 June 75  
 Date

protests of a socio-cultural dimension: examples of this can be found in the most often quoted "Black Power", "Red Power", Symbionese Liberation Army, linguistic problems of Belgium, etc. On the other hand, we have been witnessing for many years now in Africa, Asia, and the Middle-East, an awakening of Third-World countries to their decolonization and their desire for independence; problems clearly of the political and economic realms. Lastly on the national level, the most contentious issue is undoubtedly the desire for independence of certain provinces and thereby the questioning of the federal regime and, at the same, a certain protest against the existing economic system. The most striking example of this would be development of Quebec trade unionism.

(C) Dir. can help us here if they do some work in their own Province, where they have some expertise

C. Dir SS VS HQ.

Inside each of the three (3) areas of work, there exists a research and analysis function that are, in fact, two (2) phases which the same product must go through. Here is the main reason for which we find at the same time an analyst and a research-assistant.


B) STUDY-GROUP

The research-analysis structure also includes a work-unit that we shall call the study-group. This group has as its primary goal the examination and evaluation of the product of the three (3) main areas of work. Also included in its functions is the checking of the comprehensibility of the research-analysis product to its eventual "suscribers";

BY HAND

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO  
BE ADDRESSED:

COMMISSIONER  
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
OTTAWA 7, CANADA



TOUTE CORRESPONDANCE DOIT  
ÊTRE ADRESSÉE COMME SUIT:

LE COMMISSAIRE  
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA  
OTTAWA 7, CANADA

HEADQUARTERS - DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE

YOUR NO.  
VOTRE N°

OUR NO.  
NOTRE N°

OTTAWA 7, CANADA

Copy on IP 155-4-1  
Copies to "D" & "G" Ops &  
Sgt. [redacted] (Olympics)  
Copy to be forwarded to  
Mr. Bourne on IP 155-4-1  
29 January 1974

SECRET

Director General,  
Bureau of Security and Intelligence,  
Department of External Affairs.

ATTENTION: Mr. A.F. Hart

Re: Attendance of Representatives of  
African Liberation Movements  
Recognized by the Organization of  
African Unity at Meetings of  
Specialized UN Agencies

This relates to your conversations with Mr. H.C.  
Draper, DDG (Operations) in this regard.

We wish to express our concern at the change in  
attitude and policy reflected in Canada's recent positive  
votes cast in favour of African Liberation Movement (ALM)  
representation on specialized UN agencies and our apparent  
intention to support such representation on the International  
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal. The RCMP  
Security Service is aware that the UN is generally in favour  
of such attendance, that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'  
Conference recognized the legitimacy of the struggle in  
Southern Africa, that the Secretary of State for External  
Affairs in September extended Canada's position to one of  
"studying ways to broaden its humanitarian support for  
those engaged" and that Mr. Sharp has since approved new  
guidelines for Canadian humanitarian aid to the peoples of  
Southern Africa. While External Affairs undoubtedly  
believes that it is furthering clearly articulated govern-  
ment policy in adopting its new position, we feel we would  
be remiss in not voicing our serious reservations and  
concern.

Attached is a list of "liberation movements"  
recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU),  
together with thumbnail sketches of the OAU and those move-  
ments which are recorded in our indices. "Liberation  
Movements" is, perhaps, a misnomer for some of the groups

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listed. FNLA, MPLA, PRELIMO and PAIGC have all been recognized by the UN as representing the true aspirations of their people. Perhaps this can also be said of MOLINACO and others. But many of these groups are still locked in struggle with colonial powers.

Regardless of how one might feel of the rightness of the cause of such groups or the position adopted by the UN in relation to them, it is obvious that many members of these groups are trained guerrillas, hardened by years of oppression and struggle; that their values and attitudes are not within the Canadian experience; and methods adopted by them to attain their ends would shock, if not horrify, Canadians. The regular presence of such people on Canadian soil is disturbing, as you will appreciate from the attached information on SWAPO.

The Security Service believes that it would benefit from the views of other Departments in this and other closely related matters. It is, therefore, my intention to request that this topic be raised for discussion by members of the Security Advisory Committee in the near future. For this purpose, a copy of this correspondence will be supplied to Mr. Robin Bourne. I am also forwarding a copy to the Ministry of Transport which, I believe, has a particular interest.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY D. G.

M.R. Dare  
Director General,  
Security Service.





Copy on IP 155-4-1  
Copies to D & G Ops  
Sgt [redacted] (Olympics)  
Copy to be forwarded to  
Mr. Bourne on IP 155-4-1

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA

OTTAWA 7, CANADA

REF. NO. [redacted]

S E C R E T

29 January 1974

Director,  
Bureau of International and  
Environmental Affairs,  
Ministry of Transport.

ATTENTION: Mr. Henry M. Walsh

Re: Attendance of Representatives of  
African Liberation Movements  
Recognized by the Organization of  
African Unity at Meetings of  
Specialized UN Agencies

Attached is a copy of my letter to Mr. A.F. Hart of the Department of External Affairs which was being prepared coincidentally to your letter of 11 January. I believe that the attachment contains the information you require on the liberation movements involved, although many of the groups supported by the Organization of African Unity have not come to adverse Canadian security notice.

It was my intention as well to have this matter raised for discussion in the Security Advisory Committee at an early date and the paper you intend to prepare would be invaluable in facilitating SAC consideration. I would like to assure you of my personal support during any such deliberations and would welcome the opportunity of making whatever contribution I can in establishing the Canadian position to be adopted at ICAO.

Should the attachment not satisfy your requirements or should I be able to be of further assistance in this regard, please do not hesitate to call.

Yours sincerely,  
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY D. G.

M.R. Dare  
Director General,  
Security Service.

FEB - 4 1974  
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FEB 18  
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TO  
A

INSP. M.J. SPOONER

FROM  
DE

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| HQP 465-3-2                         |
| DATE                                |
| 25-1-74                             |

SUBJECT  
OBJET

SECURITY THREAT ESTIMATES  
OLYMPICS '76

Black extremists have been active in Canada since the Sir George Williams University affair in 1969 but apart from the initial outburst against alleged racism black extremism has not been directed at Canada. Rather, the hard-core of approximately 30 to 40 black racists, mostly West Indian, have used Canada as a base of operations in support of revolutionary movements in the Caribbean, the Pan-African movement in the U.S. and revolutionary liberation movements in Africa.

2. Support provided the revolutionary activity in the Caribbean has been both moral and physical. Black extremists in Canada have raised funds,

[REDACTED]

and the Conference Towards the Continuing Decolonization of the Caribbean held in Montreal, May 4-6, 1973 provided the opportunity for leading left wing intellectuals and black revolutionaries from the West Indies to meet in Montreal, whereas many of those involved would have been refused entry to a number of the Caribbean Islands. This conference was organized, primarily, by Theodore Alphonso ROBERTS (Alfie) an intellectual black marxist from St. Vincent who has been a resident of Montreal for some years.

[REDACTED]

He is also an executive member of the Cote des Neiges Black Community Development Project in Montreal which is run by a close associate Leroy BUTCHER and which has received substantial government grants. Another leading West Indian marxist with international connections is Franklyn HARVEY from Grenada who is now living in Toronto.

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
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S E C R E T

Your No. HQP 465-3-2

Our No. [REDACTED]

HARVEY is a founding member of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada and the New Beginning Movement in Trinidad, the two most active organizations in the Caribbean at the present time. HARVEY has declared his intention of seeking financial support from white left wing organizations in Canada and the US and has already been in contact with the League for Socialist Action and the Young Socialists in Toronto soliciting their backing. HARVEY is also actively supporting recent activities of the New Jewel Movement against Premier GAIRY's government in Grenada.



4. With regard to the Pan-African movement, leading extremists in Canada have maintained close contact with the movement's leaders in the US, particularly Howard FULLER, ex-President of the now defunct Malcolm X Liberation University and first National Chairman of the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC). This organization was founded in 1972 to support the African Liberation Movement on the continent of Africa and to fight the "pattern of exploitation plaguing African black people all over the world". Speaking to a university audience at Washington, D.C. in 1972 FULLER indicated that black people of the whole world must destroy capitalism, not by mere rhetoric alone, but by any means necessary, including such action as that taken by the Arab terrorists against the Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. FULLER and other leading Pan-African activists from the US have made frequent trips to Canada to meet extremist leaders in this country and to address meetings in Toronto and Montreal. The African Liberation Support Committees in Toronto and Montreal have been actively supporting the promotion of the Six Pan-African Congress to be held in Tanzania in June 1974.

S E C R E T

Your No. HCP 465-3-2

Our No. [REDACTED]

5. The ALSC and leading extremists have also hosted visiting African liberation movement representatives, although there has been little activity on the part of African students in Canada to date. In 1971 a delegation from the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) visited Canada

[REDACTED]

6. So far the more aggressive rhetoric of the Pan-Africanists in the US has not been taken up by their Canadian 'brothers', nor has there been any indication that the violent tactics of some US black extremist movements are about to be adopted in Canada. There is little doubt, however, that black extremists in Canada are increasingly viewing themselves as part of an international brotherhood of black revolutionaries devoted to the overthrow of reactionary black governments in the Caribbean, to the establishment of an independent Africa freed from the oppression of white imperialism and the unity of blacks throughout the world. As part of this movement, there is the possibility that extremists in Canada will be persuaded to commit acts of violence to demonstrate the solidarity of black brothers everywhere in pursuit of their common goals.

7. The fact that black extremist activity has not yet posed a serious threat to Canadian security may be attributed to several factors not least the relatively stable employment situation that has existed for black immigrants and the absence of any noticeable harassment of the black communities in the major centers i.e. Toronto, Montreal and Halifax. This has helped to deny the extremists any basic domestic issues around which they could rally mass support. Another factor that has limited their effectiveness has been the inability of the extremists to form a strong co-ordinating organization, coupled with their continual lack of effective leadership. Individuals such as Roosevelt DOUGLAS and Franklyn HARVEY who appeared to have the potential for national leadership have been unable to command the continued respect of all the factions involved. At the present time DOUGLAS is serving two years imprisonment for his role in the Sir George Williams University affair and prior to his going to jail had been losing support. Franklyn HARVEY appeared to be assuming


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Your No. HQP 465-3-2

Our No.   

DOUGLAS' leadership role but over the past few months he has alienated Alfie ROBERTS and his group in Montreal and appears to have lost the support of Howard FULLER and an influential faction of the Pan-African Congress in the US. If HARVEY's North American support continues to erode it will affect his ability to promote revolutionary activities in the Caribbean and will diminish his credibility as a leader in the black extremist movement in Canada. The absence of a strong leadership has undoubtedly contributed to the factional and personal disputes that have developed between leading radicals and their supporters so that the black extremist movement in Canada has lost some of its momentum over the last year, and continues along divisive rather than co-ordinated lines.

8. Black activists certainly have the capability of organizing demonstrations in support of such matters as African Liberation Day or the release of Rosie DOUGLAS from jail. But in the short term, providing there are no national or international events that could have repercussions in the black communities, black extremism does not appear to pose any violent threat to the internal security of Canada. This situation could, of course, change before the advent of the 1976 Olympic Games and black extremist activity will continue to be closely monitored along the lines outlined in the memo from Insp. Spooner to C/Supt. Ouimet dated January 10, 1974, on file HQP-465-1.



Sgt.

A) TO ATTAIN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTANCE  
AND SUPPORT OF THE OLYMPIC SECURITY PROGRAM

AND

B) TO ATTAIN MEDIA UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTANCE,  
SUPPORT OF AND PARTICIPATION <sup>IN</sup> CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
IN THE OLYMPICS CONTEXT.

3. IN RELATION TO THE FIRST OBJECTIVE, I WOULD SUGGEST  
THAT THE FOLLOWING GOALS MIGHT BE SET, AMONG OTHERS:

A) TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC THE APPREHENDED THREATS  
TO OLYMPIC SECURITY POSED BY PAST AND  
PRESENT WORLD, NATIONAL AND LOCAL CONDITIONS;

B) TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF THE NATURE OF THE MEASURES  
PLANNED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO RESPOND TO  
THE APPREHENDED THREAT.

C) TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF HOW THE VARIOUS RAMIFICATIONS  
OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MAY IMPACT <sup>ON</sup> THE VARIOUS  
CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR AT OLYMPIC  
EVENTS;

D) TO PERSUADE THE PUBLIC OF THE NEED FOR THE SECURITY  
MEASURES PLANNED AND HOW MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC CAN  
COOPERATE PASSIVELY AND ACTIVELY WITH SECURITY  
AUTHORITIES.

...../2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File: IP 210-32-5  
5500-7-2




October 29, 1974

A second point mentioned at the meeting concerned the presentation of briefings by Security Service personnel to your Enforcement Officers prior to the Olympics. We would be prepared to apprise your Enforcement Officers on current activities of terrorists, the type of individual they might encounter, the origin and security of our intelligence, etc. As the world social, political, and economic situation could present new areas of concern by 1976, we would suggest such briefings not take place until the spring of 1976.

We will await a reply to our proposals raised at the meeting and confirmed by this letter. Should you agree with our first proposal, please provide a Personal History Form for the designated programmer so that the necessary security clearance can be expedited. A Top Secret clearance would be necessary to effectively carry out the required liaison with Security Service personnel.

Yours truly,

  
H.C. Draper  
Assistant Commissioner  
Deputy Director General (Ops.)

c.c. D.C.I.  
Attn: Officer in Charge G.I.B.

C.P.I.C. Law Enforcement Liaison Branch  
Attn: Insp. J.P.I. Aubry

Officer i/c Security Service Olympic Secretariat



# MEMORANDUM


CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

TO  
A

Insp. I.W. Taylor  
Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympic Secretariat

YOUR FILE No.  
Votre dossier

FROM  
De

G.E. Godfrey, Insp.   
A/Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympic Secretariat



OUR FILE No.  
Notre dossier



DATE 30 May 1975

FOLD

SUBJECT Summer Olympics in Montreal - 1976  
Sujet Physical Security Briefing Program -  
Security Service

This is further to my memorandum of 9 May 1975, concerning the participation of the Security Service in the General Physical Security Briefing Program. You will recall that we expressed the wish to be involved in the briefing of the 132 countries, or as many as requested the briefing, so that the Security Service would be in a position to (a) respond to any request for comment on the threat from within Canada toward any specific team and (b) establish a transmission link for incoming intelligence with the particular Olympic attache or his delegate. The latter point is the primary objective of the program.

On Tuesday, May 27, 1975, a meeting was held in Montreal for the purpose of up-dating the operational representatives and developing specific policy guidelines for this program. Those in attendance were as follows: Insp.s Robichaud, Lees, Bossé, Banning, Dupont, Vermette, Hugo and Godfrey, S/Sgt.s  Sgt.s 

Cpl.  Cst.  and members of the Montreal Olympic Secretariat.

The issues discussed are summarized as follows:

1. The meeting was briefed on the development of this program and its objectives.
2. Insp. Robichaud pointed out that we must distinguish this liaison program from the original concept of assessing foreign delegates. The portion pertaining to assessment is now the responsibility of "B" Branch which relates to the "Mission 80" Observer Delegation.
3. Insp. Vermette informed that Mr. Toupin does not envisage the briefings commencing before May of 1976, however, from current indications, the Soviets seem to be expecting something earlier. It was agreed we should be prepared to proceed by Jan. 1976, if necessary. Discussion followed concerning one big briefing or individual briefings, and it was generally agreed that the time



factor would limit the Committee representatives to one big briefing. It was mentioned that Mr. Toupin's original concept was for one large briefing of a general nature with individual and specific briefings to countries requesting special consideration.

4. According to Insp. Vermette, a total of 18 men, from the three forces, have been allotted to the three major sites to act as contact points for security operations. This would place one man from each force (3 men on 12 hour shifts) at each of the major sites, except for the silent hours. The question was raised as to whether this same member could hold a double responsibility for both positions. Insp. Robichaud objected to this idea on the grounds that the members on this Liaison Program should have one responsibility only, albeit for two or three different countries, and they should be available to meet with counterparts at all times. After considerable discussion, the concensus was reached that these two programs should remain completely separate, with the exception that the site program could be used as a central point of contact by those assigned to the Liaison Program.


5. Insp. Lees commented that "B" Branch has 12 members allotted to this Program and are prepared to accept responsibility for the six Soviet Bloc countries. They do not foresee any problems in implementing this Program.

6. On behalf of "D" Branch, Insp. Robichaud will be responsible for Yugoslavia and Albania, the Middle-East, African and Central and South American countries. In the event that the P.R.C. are admitted by the I.O.C., the Chinese Section will assume responsibility for that group. Insp. Robichaud pointed out that his major problem would be manpower in that this Liaison Program was supported only by 10 men requested from Headquarters, however, he could request another 10 men from Security Service personnel in Quebec S/Division.

7. The matter of personal security will be the responsibility of each unit and existing policy and procedures will be followed. Only experienced investigators will be used here and they will, of course, be under the supervision of their unit commanders. The respective unit commanders will proceed to identify their personnel, commence a training program, and establish specific guidelines, i.e. a 48 hour reporting system, in which this program will function.

8. On this same topic of personal security it was suggested that some form of briefing should be included in the general Olympic training program so as to avoid a repetition of Expo 67, when some of our members became involved with female representatives of Soviet Bloc countries.

The objective of this meeting was to brief the operational personnel. The Unit commanders in "C" Division are now making manpower requests to satisfy their requirements. You will be kept informed of the development of this program.

  
G.E. Godfrey, Insp.

OCT 28 11 15  
TELETYPE



3107-08 ROUTINE/ROUTINE OTT5 OCT27 CONFIDENTIAL

C DIV MTL ATTN OIC D OPS  
INFO OIC SS OLYMPIC SECRETARIAT MTL  
OIC D OPS HQ (LABOUR DESK)

SS(OS) 616-376.

RE: LABOUR CONDITIONS - TRADE UNION ATTITUDES  
AND REACTIONS TO OLYMPICS 1976

THE HQ S.S. OLYMPIC SECRETARIAT HAS THE TASK AND THE RESPONSIBILITY  
TO INFORM THE FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATOR (F.S.C.) ON ANY MATTER  
OR INCIDENT WHICH IS RELATED TO OR MAY AFFECT THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

THE F.S.C. EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE RECENT LABOUR INCIDENTS AT  
THE OLYMPIC SITE AND CONSEQUENTLY WAS BRIEFED ON THE DEVELOPMENTS.

IN ORDER TO BE PROVIDED WITH THE ACTUAL INFORMATION AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE, WE WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE BEING PROVIDED AT THE HQ S.S.  
OLYMPIC SECRETARIAT (OTTAWA 5) WITH AN INFORMATION COPY OF ALL  
CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO OLYMPIC LABOUR PROBLEMS.

THIS SECURITY SERVICE DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED. IT IS  
PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. NEITHER THE DOCUMENT,  
NOR ITS CONTENTS ARE TO BE DISSEMINATED IN ANY FORM, OUT-  
SIDE THE P.C.M.P. WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE DIRECTOR  
GENERAL, SECURITY SERVICE.

RISE EN BAS DE

LE PRESENT DOCUMENT DU SERVICE DE SECURITE EST CLASSIFIE  
ET N'EST TRANSMIS QUE POUR VOTRE PROPRE GOUVERNE. NI LE  
DOCUMENT, NI SON CONTENU, NE DOIVENT ETRE DIVULGUES SOUS  
AUCUNE FORME, QUE CE SOIT A L'INTERIEUR DE LA G.S.C.  
SANS L'APPROBATION DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL DU SERVICE DE SECURITE.

OLYMPIC SECT. OTTAWA

Reviewed *John J*  
OCT 6 1976  
SECURITY SERVICE  
RECORDS

*31.10*  
*NOTED*  
*+ AGREED*  
*OWJ*



## ARGENTINA

### INTRODUCTION:

Argentina is the second largest country in South America with a population of thirty million. Its people are of Spanish descent and Spanish is the national language. Argentina has been an independent republic since 1810, however, throughout its history it has had a record of political instability with military juntas regularly controlling the country. At the present time Argentina is ruled by a duly elected civilian government, however, its authority is undermined by dissident terrorist groups which carry out urban guerrilla warfare and other terrorist acts. These groups, along with other non-terrorist right and left wing activists pose such a distinct threat to the political stability of Argentina that another military overthrow cannot be discounted.

### POLITICAL BACKGROUND:

Argentina is ruled by an elected civilian government consisting of a President and a Vice President. There is also a Congress consisting of a 46 member Senate along with a House of Deputies. The President of Argentina is Maria Estela de Peron, the wife of deceased ex-President Juan Peron who died on 1 July 1974. At the time of her husband's death Estela Peron was the Vice President and the next-in-line.

Argentina has a history of political turbulence and civilian governments have never been able to consolidate their power before being overthrown by military juntas. Juan Peron, long a power in Argentina politics, ruled as a dictator from 1944 until overthrown by the military in September 1955. The military ruled until 1958 when they restored civilian power, however, the civilian government was replaced in June 1966 when the military again took over control. The military relinquished its power in 1973 and Juan Peron was elected in August 1973. He ruled until July 1974 when he died of a heart attack. His wife took over the Presidency after his death, however, the political atmosphere is such that many feel she is incapable of controlling the dissent, and it is entirely possible that a military coup in the near future will overthrow her government.

### MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES:

There are four major political parties in Argentina. A brief description of these parties follows:

- (a) Justicialist Party (FREJULI) - the ruling party in the government. Estela Peron's political vehicle. Moderate to left of center in orient-

ation, with strong emphasis on state control of the economy.

- (b) Radical Civic Union (UCR) - a middle class party representing primarily white collar workers and businessmen. Nationalistic in outlook, it opposes foreign exploitation of Argentine natural resources.
- (c) Popular Federalist Alliance (APF) - a coalition of small provincial parties; party has aggressive economic growth policy, anti-statist.
- (d) Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APR) - a coalition of former radical and Christian Democrats supported by the Argentine CP. The party has a nationalistic socialistic economic platform; center to left coalition which appeals to the leftists.

DISSIDENT GROUPS:

There are three major dissident groups in Argentina, two being aligned to pro-Soviet Communism while one is aligned politically to the Chinese. These groups are:

- (a) Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) - Orthodox Marxist adherent to international Communist line as dictated by Moscow.
- (b) Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina (PCRA) - Militant, pro-Soviet dissident faction of PCA; consists mainly of former PCA youth; sympathetic to the Cuban idea of a Latin American revolution.
- (c) Communist Vanguard Party (PVC) - small, tightly knit pro-Chinese party with hemispheric and international connections, consisting of 1,000 militants and cultivating ties with like-minded groups.

IF NECESSARY SUBMIT ORGANIZATION PROFILE SHEETS ON THESE DISSIDENT GROUPS.

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS:

There are, at the present time, seven organized extremist groups active in guerrilla and terrorist warfare within Argentina. These groups are all Marxist-Leninist in their political orientation, and their terrorist actions cover such

diverse activities as kidnappings, assassinations and bank robberies, to armed attacks on police and army installations. These groups regard the overthrow of the existing regime and the installation of a socialist government as their prime function. They also use kidnappings and bank robberies to finance their operations and have been very successful in these endeavours. The seven terrorist groups are as follows, in descending order of importance:

- (a) People's Revolutionary Army (Ejerito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP).
- (b) 22nd August faction of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP - 22 August).
- (c) Red Faction of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP - Fraccion Rojo).
- (d) Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP).
- (e) Revolutionary Armed Forces/Montoneros (FAR/Montoneros).
- (f) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries (FAR).
- (g) Fuerzas Argentinas de Liberacion (FAL).

Attached are organizational profile sheets on each of these terrorist groups.

THREAT ASSESSMENT:

Although terrorist activities continue on a high level within Argentina, there has never been any indication that these groups operate outside South America. Argentina terrorist groups have confined their attacks to businesses and individuals residing in their country, and we have no knowledge of attacks outside Argentina. Argentine terrorist groups have the capability and the finances to travel abroad, however, up to this point they have not mounted any operations in North America, and unless their tactics change radically they are not expected to pose a threat to the 1976 Olympics.

THREAT DESIGNATION:

Moderate.

ORGANIZATION PROFILE

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

NAME

People's Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo) E.R.P.

HISTORY

A Marxist-Leninist clandestine organization founded in 1969. This group was opposed to the regime of Juan PERON and is dedicated to the overthrow of the present regime and replacing it with a socialist government. ERP is the largest terrorist organization in Argentina with approximately 500 hard core members and 1,200 supporters. It started out as an urban guerrilla group but has extended its activities to include rural warfare.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

This group was formed under the banner of the IV Trotskyist International and is generally referred to as a Trotskyist organization. The ERP originated as the action arm of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRT), however, it has since split with the Trotskyist movement and there are indications that it now allies itself with Cuban interests.

SINO-SOVIET BLOC ASSISTANCE

This organization has just recently broken its affiliation with the Trotskyist IV International and is now supposedly politically oriented with Cuba. If this is the case the ERP can expect assistance from Cuba in the training of its members, in having access to arms and ammunition and, generally, in having its capability to wage guerrilla warfare increased. Its political affiliation with Cuba should not change its political objectives nor its methods of conducting its terrorist campaigns.

NATIONAL LEADER

Mario Roberto SANTUCHO

OTHER LEADERS

Domingo MENA, Juan Manuel CARRIZO, Enoique GORRIARAN

ORGANIZATIONAL  
STRUCTURE

The ERP is organized into twelve regional committees and each region operates under a tightly knit cell structure. It operates mostly in large urban areas with its HQ being in the capitol, Buenos Aires. It is also strong in the cities of Cordoba, Rosario and Tucuman.

INTERNAL AFFILIATION

has co-operated with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (F.A.R.)

EXTERNAL AFFILIATION

Some co-operation with the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement of Chile (MIR) and the National Liberation Army of Bolivia (ELN). These organizations, like the ERP are terrorist groups with Marxist Leninist ideology dedicated to class warfare against imperialism.

POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE

Extremely violent in nature. Have carried out assassinations, kidnappings, bank robberies, and armed attacks on police and military installations. Are well-armed as a result of these raids on police and military posts and they never hesitate to do battle with authorities.

FINANCES

This group carries out kidnappings and bank robberies to finance their operations. They are the richest terrorist group in Argentina having realized in excess of twenty million dollars from their victims. Were responsible for the kidnapping of Victor SAMUELSON for whom Esso Oil Co., reportedly paid 14.2 million dollars to have released.



MOBILITY

This group has the finances and the capability to travel, however their travel so far has been restricted to South America and Cuba. There have been no reports of them travelling to North America, and no indication that they are responsible for terrorist acts outside Argentina.

TRADITIONAL ENEMIES

As this is a Marxist-Leninist organization their enemies are the state and its repressive institutions, the police and military, plus groups of the right and "imperialist corporations".

CURRENT ACTIVITIES

The ELP continue their extremist tactics and continually have confrontations with civil authorities.

FUTURE PLANS

They expect to expand their rural guerrilla campaign in an effort to mobilize the masses. They have also formed a Latin American Revolutionary Co-ordination Board with the Tupamaros of Uruguay, and the ELM of Bolivia and the MIR of Chile, and have donated five million dollars to be distributed amongst them. They hope to bring down the government of Estela PERON and then form a socialist government in her stead.

CANADIAN LINKS

We have no information to indicate that the ERP have links with Canadian organizations Marxist-Leninist or otherwise. However, it should be noted that due to their political orientation the ERP should have no problem in establishing Canadian contacts if they so desired.

IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS CANADIAN CONTACTS GIVE NAME OF CANADIAN ORGANIZATION, ITS LOCATION AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION. ALSO GIVE NAME OF INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED ALONG WITH BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND UP-TO-DATE PHOTOGRAPH.



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

FIDN/ms

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO  
À

Insp. D.H. Mumby

FROM  
DE

[Redacted]

|   |
|---|
| SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ |
| <b>S E C R E T</b>                      |
| OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE                  |
| [Redacted]                              |
| YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE                 |
| HQP 465-3-2                             |
| DATE                                    |
| August 29, 1974                         |



SUBJECT  
OBJET

Security Threat Estimates  
Olympics '76

The earlier submission dealt primarily with the international black extremist movement and its links with the Canadian scene. Since that time, two events occurred which have some influence and effect on Canada's relationship with this international black power movement. Firstly, the granting of independence to Grenada in February, 1974 has not lessened the efforts of Caribbean extremists to unseat the current Prime Minister of that island, Eric GAIRY.

The Olympic threat emanating from this situation does not appear significant as violence against current governments in power has been confined within national boundaries.

2. The second new development is that the Sixth Pan African Congress (SPAC) finally took place in Tanzania in June, 1974. Held amid much internal strife and division the SPAC, nevertheless, acted as a forum for the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist goals of those associated with the SPAC and its parent body, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Delegates from the Arab world including Egypt and Palestine were present at the SPAC. On a resolution regarding the Palestine question the SPAC committed its delegates to take action in their respective countries aimed at continuing and stepping up support for the legitimate combat which the Palestinian people are selflessly waging for the liberation of their usurped homeland and the restoration of their national rights".

[Redacted]

It should be noted that in all attacks against imperialist powers by the SPAC delegates that Canada was included due to its close association with the United States.

MP 12-34  
4/9/74

27/14  
JAN 17 1975  
SECURITY SERVICE  
RECORDS

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
S E C R E T

Re: Security Threat Estimates  
Olympics '76

3. Although a comprehensive analysis of the SPAC and its future affect on Canada is not as yet complete, it is safe to say that the possibility of increased Arab-black co-operation in terms of international terrorism may well be taking an upward swing. This particular area is being targeted against and developments in this connection will be watched with interest. Because the radical blacks from the Caribbean were excluded from the SPAC, they have repudiated to a large extent the concept of Pan Africanism and their ties with Africa. Instead, they will increasingly turn to the doctrine of Marxism in its various forms and look to closer ties and support from such centres as Havana, Moscow, and Peking. The immediate connection between Caribbean politics and the Olympic threat is somewhat distant at this time, however, continued monitoring of this area should enable us to assess any future developments.

4. The black community in Canada continues to respond on an isolated basis to various developments which smacks of racism, however, these incidents are normally of minor nature and so localized that a national black protest does not emerge.

5. Two developments within Canada since our last submission are viewed with some concern.



The second development concerns the well known black power advocate of revolutionary Panek Africanism, Stokely CARMICHAEL. CARMICHAEL visited Toronto in early August, 1974 to establish a black nationalist base in Toronto

S E C R E T

Re: Security Threat Estimates  
Olympics '76

which would include the formation of a Toronto chapter of CARMICHAEL's All African Peoples Revolutionary Party (AAPRP). The AAPRP is a new black political party formed in 1972 by CARMICHAEL. It was envisaged by CARMICHAEL that the AAPRP would become an international movement to further the concept of Pan Africanism defined by CARMICHAEL as the total liberation and unification of Africa. The AAPRP calls for the destruction of capitalism to liberate all African people. CARMICHAEL has indicated that democratic methods would be utilized but only as a means to an end - not as an end in itself. CARMICHAEL, who has called for the destruction of the capitalist system will clearly, through his occasional presence in Canada, add impetus to the existing black extremist movement while simultaneously providing prestige to his associates in Toronto. The question of increasing black revolutionary consciousness among otherwise moderate black nationalists through the presence of a leader such as CARMICHAEL is an arguable one. Nevertheless, there is little doubt but that the pulse of the black community in Canada is heightened after being exposed to the CARMICHAEL style of political activism.

6. To summarize then, the threat from the international black extremist movement is expected to increase due to their continual and expanded association with the Arab terrorist movement. Within Canada, the situation remains stable and quiet, however, the national picture may well change depending on how successful the AAPRP become in Toronto.

7. The foregoing assessment may well require updating on a more urgent basis if Rosie DOUGLAS, well known black Marxist and activist, becomes totally involved in the national black power movement in Canada. Due for release on September 3, the mysterious charisma which DOUGLAS has among the blacks in Canada is well known as is his propensity for violence.

Cpl.

0000 173273

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION  
SECRET

*Ernest Spooner - we can discuss with*  
Director General, Security Service *Sgt.*

Att: "HQ" Security Service Coordinator

FILE No. [redacted]  
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. HQP-465-1  
Notre dossier

*for implementation*

*[Signature]*

DATE 3-12-75

Federal Security Coordinator  
for the 1976 Olympics

FROM  
De

FOLO

SUBJECT  
Sujet

Summer Olympics 1976  
Montreal, Quebec

I have recently read with interest an essay prepared for the Annual Conference on the Caribbean held at Washington D.C. in October 1973 entitled "Black Extremism in Canada". *1957*

2. Certain passages contained in this article lead me to believe that in 1976 Canada may be confronted with a black racial problem of sizable proportion especially in some of the larger cities of Canada. To cite an example, Montreal's black population has increased from 5,000 to over 40,000 within the last 2 or 3 years

It also appears that the black community in Montreal has been forming committees in order to voice their opinions in an attempt to forcefully exercise their rights as citizens. This, of course, is commendable if it is carried out in a peaceful and orderly fashion. However, the sudden and alarming increase of blacks in Montreal is cause for concern and it may be that many such persons have taken up residence illegally in Montreal as well as other parts of Canada.

3. In consequence, thereof, and in my capacity as Federal Security Coordinator for the 1976 Olympics, I believe it is timely for me to suggest that a very close survey and assessment be made of the black situation especially in the City of Montreal. I feel that the results may be interesting and it would serve to launch a program that could enable Security Service to supply the Olympic Secretariat with intelligence on this problem on a continuous basis until 1976. May I have your views in this respect please.

*[Signature]*

J.T.J. Ouimet, C/Supt.  
Federal Security Coordinator  
for the 1976 Olympics.

Reviewed *MD/28*  
FEB 18 1974  
SECURITY SERVICE  
RECORDS

*D ops. Preparing Reply  
+ Study of Situation.*

*MP/239  
4/1/74  
Toronto  
Incident  
Liaison/Stat.*