

00181 MAY 26 1975

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO: Assistant Federal Security Coordinator

FROM: Officer i/c Olympics Secretariat
DE: Security Service

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
HQY 465-83
DATE
April 4, 1975

SUBJECT: Olympic Security Planning
OBJET: Threat Estimates

Attached is a copy of letter received from the Officer i/c "D" Operations, Security Service in reply to my letter to him dated 25 Feb 1975.

Further to this, the Olympics Secretariat, Security Service, has compiled a list of Terrorist Organizations as an index for the front of Vol. I of the Country Profiles Books. A copy of the index is attached hereto. This will facilitate anyone who wishes to look up an assessment of a particular Terrorist Group. There is at present a looseleaf binder being created which will contain up to date information on Organizations, Weapons, individual terrorists, Incidents-National and International, terrorist use of documentation and Vital Points Threats General. Both the index and the binder will be updated as new information becomes available. The binder will be held in S/Sgt. Chubb Safe.

I.W. Taylor, Insp.,
Officer i/c Olympics Secretariat
Security Service

PA
JW 229

4/5

In estimating the possible support to the RCMP, which may be required from the Canadian Armed Forces, it is again necessary, to ensure that resources will be available, to plan for the worst foreseeable situation. Otherwise, Armed Forces resources will be committed to other than security tasks and will not be available to support the RCMP when and if they are required.

For internal security requirements to support the RCMP, the total resource requirement can only be re-evaluated at regular intervals in relation to the threat estimates. Support to the internal security forces is presently estimated as follows:

- (a) A main operational headquarters, based in Montreal with a detachment in Kingston, to coordinate DND support.
- (b) Air Transport: 12 helicopters
 - 2 C-130's on standby -
5 hours notice
 - 2 additional C-130's on
8 hours notice
- (c) 30 jeep-mounted communication sets with operators for a 24-hour day.
- (d)
 - (i) Up to 300 Military Police in plain clothes equipped with revolvers.
 - (ii) Up to 50 snipers prepared for operations in Montreal and 25 in the Kingston area.
 - (iii) 24-hour guard of 50 vital points.
 - (iv) A force of approximately 2,000 men trained to assist in supporting the police for crowd control.
 - (v) A mobile reserve of 1,000 men at 4 hours notice to move.
 - (vi) DND marine assistance - 6 harbour launches and crews at Kingston.
- (e) Ground transport based at St. Hubert to move and lift 300 to 500 men.
- (f) 12 APC's on 5 hours notice based at St. Hubert plus 6 wheeled AFV's.

There will be a certain amount of joint RCMP-Canadian Armed Forces training required for internal security duties. An efficient command and control

The Department of National Defence has estimated that the operational manpower requirement to meet these needs would amount to approximately 5,100 men. This does not include logistic personnel whose numbers have not yet been determined.

ALTERNATIVES:

There are two alternatives open to the government:

1. "The German model" which would be to take the risks of sacrificing effective security in order to play up Olympic ideals of international cooperation, brotherhood and freedom. The memorandum has discussed the consequences of this approach which would include relatively free entry and no customs check, and concludes that the resultant danger of losing effective security control is not acceptable.
2. A strong and effective level of security which would make it clear nationally and internationally that Canada intends to control entry to Canada for the games, and to ensure the safety of participants and others to the fullest extent possible. An essential requirement will be an agreement as to jurisdictional responsibilities. Every effort will be made to accommodate I.O.C. expectations providing that strong and effective security is not compromised. Special legislation to be brought forward closer to 1976 may be desirable to permit, for the few weeks surrounding the games, immediate removal from Canada of persons not admissible. Such a security posture would also require normal customs inspection procedures. This posture may well invite considerable criticism from the I.O.C. and its federations, but at the same time will likely be understood and accepted by most countries. On the other hand, an incident at Montreal like that at Munich could draw even greater criticism.

CONFIDENTIAL

Officer i/c "D" Ops.

I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator
Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

18-10-74

The attached memo dated 11-7-74 from the A/FSC has been held in abeyance pending reorganization of the Secretariat, which has now been completed.

2. I have had detailed discussions with Insp. Allen on the several matters raised in his memo. He has also been briefed on the country profile program and the DRAE exercises.

3. In essence, the A/FSC is requesting the following additional support from the Security Service:

(i) Threat projections for individual responsibility sectors, specifically, vital points, harbours, borders, airports.

(ii) Synopsis handouts on known terrorist activities, groups, aims, modus operandi, etc.

4. To fully consider this request I recommend a meeting be set up at your earliest convenience to review current and projected threat planning, and to explore the feasibility of additional action. Both Insp. Allen and I would like to attend such a meeting with appropriate members of your staff.



I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator

✓ cc: Insp. Allen, A/FSC
CC: Officer i/c Pol. Planning and Co-ordinator^{ion}

*Noted
J. Allen
21/10/74*

OCT 23 1974

*R-4
3/10/74*

*PA
4/10/74
465-51
D
21/10/74*

000289

Salminen
16-7-74

NY 70 5-17

CONFIDENTIAL

Insp. Taylor A/F.S.C. (Security Service)

Insp. Allen A/F.S.C.

July 11, 1974

Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

In your absence a general meeting of the secretariat was held wherein our role and function was discussed in Olympic Security Planning.

Specific tasks were assigned each responsibility desk to review all files relative to their area; in preparation for a briefing session Monday, July 15, 1974. This exercise is intended to bring the secretariat to date on what has been done in these areas, what needs to be done and generally where we are going.

One issue which was raised and holds considerable merit and requires immediate attention is:

Having Security Service provide a resume of the threat estimate in each of our responsibility areas: ie: Vital Points, Harbours, Boarders, Airports etc.

We believe this is essential to our basic and preliminary security planning. This stage of the threat estimate could include (1) what has happened in the past and (2) what is happening today in the respective areas.

The second stage threat estimate could (1) bring us up to date and (2) with the aid of "games" or "scenarios" you may ~~be~~ in a position to tell us what we may reasonably expect in terrorism etc.

Periodic up-dating, as the need arises, would be necessary in some areas prior to the final approval of an operational plan (from the national standpoint); at which time we would again like to have a complete and final assessment prior to implementation.

We should also consider the feasibility of producing a general hand-out for all secretariat members which would capsualize known terrorist, militant groups etc., who may conceivably use the

..... 2

staging of the games as a vehicle to further their goals. This might include such ready reference material as their general philosophy, numbers aims and mode of achieving public recognition.

Although it will understandably take some time to develop the threat estimates and a hand-out you may wish to set your goals in line with our priorities in planning for policy statements and carry this out unilaterally in order that the secretariat will be in a position to advise the operational units ASAP on the perimeters of security planning at this stage.

I have raised the subject with S/Sgt. [redacted] of your staff last week and would like to discuss with you and the F.S.C. as soon as conveniently possible.

G.W. Allen, Insp.,
Assistant Federal Security Coordinator
for the 1976 Olympics

cc: F.S.C.

S/Sgt. [redacted]

Further to our earlier conversation, I would like you to attend with me when meeting arranged.

G. Allen



R-145