

ITEM	TASK	RESPONSIBILITY	TARGET DATE	REMARKS
	and "C" Divs. As far as these programs are concerned Customs and Immigration will look after their own respective areas and will have to resolve any questions of where the machines are located, physically, and who is to operate them.			
6	Use of CPIC for Terrorist Searches - Inclusion of names now will only be conducted on an individual basis if information is first provided to indicate the subject is coming to or is in Canada.			
7	Security Service Training Programs - All courses proceeding as scheduled. English courses start next week in Montreal. The "I" Ops. course starts 31 March 1976 for 2 weeks.			
8	EOC Staffing and Planning - EOC staffing and Planning is in hand.			
9	Ops. Olympic Requirements - Nothing new to report.			
10	Screening - Media and COJO Employees - Progressing very well. 1 possible media reject to date.			
11	"I" Ops. Olympic Planning - Nothing further.			
12	Liaison Program - Well underway. Attche meeting scheduled for 26 April 1976.			
13	Refugee/Defector Program - Under control			
14	RAE Conflict Games - Next game scheduled for 24 March 1976 in Montreal.			

00149 MAY 26 75

Government
of CanadaGouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Officer i/c "D" Operations

FROM
DEOfficer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

14 April 1975

SUBJECT
OBJETSummer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec
1976 - Threat Assessment - General

The Federal Security Coordinator has been asked and has accepted the role of keynote speaker at a Canadian Forces Annual Explosives Ordinance Disposal Conference at C.F.B. Shearwater. He has been asked to speak on the subject:

"An assessment of the terrorist threat and the potential terrorist use of improvised explosives devices during the 1976 Summer Olympic Games and the related threat to national security in the future."

on Monday 5 May 1975 from 10:40 a.m. to lunch.

The Federal Security Coordinator has requested assistance from the Security Service to provide material relative to the topic which he wishes to incorporate into his speech. Along these lines we wondered if the Terrorist Desk could provide us with information concerning:

Any other related items the Terrorist Desk might feel is pertinent would be appreciated.

As the speech must be prepared and drafted for the 5th of May could we please receive your reply by the 25th of April.

(J.W. Taylor) Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

TO
A
D.C.I.

YOUR FILE No. GC 275-103
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. GP 275-10
Notre dossier

FROM
De
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DATE 13 JAN 75

SUBJECT
Sujet
Co-Operation with D.N.D.

This refers to your memorandum with attachments dated 31-12-74.

2. The proposed integrated Security Service/D.N.D. project has been scrutinized with interest and while we agree the material outlined should be made available to persons with a need to know, we have reservations on the methods proposed to do so. Two basic questions have surfaced, (1) are the weapons used by terrorists so different from those used by the criminal element, and (2) what is to be achieved where obviously so few people will have access to the presentations. Our limited experience in the terrorist field has indicated that in general, terrorist groups will utilize any available weapon. We have realized that there are exceptions and accordingly, those which have come to our attention have been circularized to the Canadian law enforcement community through the facilities of the Canadian Bomb Data Centre (CBDC). A few examples of these publications are the SA-7 STRELA (SAM) missile and various improvised weapons and improvised explosive devices. Sample publications are attached.

3. Considering the foregoing, I suggest that better coverage and more positive results can be achieved by using CBDC facilities to bring terrorist weapons to the attention of those who have a need to know. As you may recall when the initial terms of reference for CBDC were submitted by "L" Directorate, it was recommended the new centre not restrict itself to bomb incidents but remain versatile so information on other terrorist methods could be collected and disseminated, i.e. C.I.C.T.T. (Canadian Information Centre on Terrorist Techniques).

4. Now that CBDC has been operational for one year and has acquired knowledgeable ex-military technical staff (land and air element) as well as D.N.D. and international liaison with other information centres, it is in a position to accomplish part of the proposed objective through its publication facilities.


CONFIDENTIAL

January 13, 1975

GC 275-103
GP 275-10

5. I would also like to point out that the IACP, through their Clandestine Tactics and Technology Service, anticipate publishing a manual on all weapons known to have been used by terrorists (except those categorized as improvised explosive devices) this Spring. A manual such as this would probably serve the stated purpose of this project greater than the exercise proposed by Security Service.

6. One area of the proposed presentation which we consider equally as important as the hardware side, namely the Security Service briefings on international terrorism as it applies to Canada, would not be covered through CBDC. While there is no doubt that the best means of presenting this material is through the personal approach which is now being used, we feel this form of information should receive wider coverage than the proposed tour will encompass. CBDC has had inquiries on this aspect and it is suggested Security Service may wish to consider drafting articles from time to time on this subject for dissemination through CBDC. With this in mind consideration is now being given to having our CBDC and Special "L" members meet with Security Service to explore this area.



D.W. McGibbon, Supt.,
Executive Officer,
"P" Directorate

→ c.c. D.D.G. (A & P)
Security Service
IP 210-36

are requested to provide the information and intelligence detailed under each of the three categories. Divisions where members of the Royal family will not actually be visiting are required to submit intelligence of a substantive nature as detailed under the current intelligence category.

I Basic Intelligence

The basic intelligence aspect of our project is designed to provide the information required to provide an initial estimate and assessment of the threat to members of the Royal family. Initially, we require information and intelligence that will enable us to identify and describe the presumed nature of the threat to the Royal family; the historical setting, existing cleavages, issues and animosities, potential type(s) of action, and the propensity and capabilities of those groups and individuals from whom the presumed threat stems. For this purpose, divisions are required to provide the following information as fully as possible:

- (i) identify those ethno-linguistic-racial groupings and associations as well as those social, economic and political organizations which may pose some form of threat or may be the source of embarrassment to the Queen and other members of the Royal family;
- (ii) identify and describe the general attitudes of these groups toward the Queen and other members of the Royal family;
- (iii) identify and describe "local" controversial issues and animosities specific to these groups, with particular attention to those issues and animosities relevant to the visit of the Royal family;
- (iv) identify and describe general attitudes toward the use of violence and/or the use of tactics of embarrassment among these groupings, associations and organizations, including a brief synopsis of the past use of violence, protests, demonstrations, etc.;
- (v) identify and describe the potential type(s) of incidents that can reasonably be expected from those groups with regard to the Royal visit, identifying the reasons why these incidents should be

- anticipated (i.e. previous activity, direct or implied threats against members of the Royal family) and including a brief evaluation of the capabilities of of these groups to carry the potential incidents out; and

- (vi) identify those "individuals" within these groups who possess the propensity to possibly undertake individual action(s) against the Queen, identify the potential type(s) of individual action that should be anticipated, identifying why these actions should be anticipated, and including a brief assessment of the capabilities of these individuals to carry out the identified action.

II Counter-Intelligence

This aspect of our project is designed to assess our capabilities to anticipate, forewarn, and/or counter and prevent potential threats to the Royal family. In this regard, the following information is required:


- (i) indicate the extent of source coverage (human and technical) on those groups and/or individuals who have been identified as posing a potential threat to members of the Royal family, including comments on the source's ability (i.e. position of trust in the group, past experience in gaining information regarding planned or unplanned action(s), etc.) to provide information that will enable us to forewarn the responsible authorities and counter and/or prevent the action(s), where necessary;
- (ii) indicate those groups and/or individuals who have been identified as posing a potential threat to members of the Royal family, wherein we have inadequate source coverage, and identify projects or programs which will or might feasibly be undertaken at this time (i.e. source development, "green-light", source reallocation, etc.); and
- (iii) indicate those operations (diffusion programs, disruption projects, deception projects, etc.) which could or will be usefully employed to counter and/or prevent threatened actions.

III Current Intelligence

The current intelligence aspect of our project vis-a-vis the visit of the Royal family is designed to provide information and intelligence of a substantive nature (i.e. direct threats against members of the Royal family, potential incidents, etc.) that will enable us to update, alter, and/or add to the initial assessment. The data requirements and reporting procedures for current intelligence are covered in the previously mentioned memorandum from the Officer i/c "D" Operations dated 4 July 1975; and here, we would simply like to re-emphasize the need for timely reporting and the necessity of keeping current intelligence in the proper context.

7. In conclusion, it should be noted that it is not our intention to have field Divisions carry out extensive or in-depth research and analysis to provide the information and intelligence detailed in the three categories outlined above. Rather, it is anticipated that field Divisions will be able to provide the data through first-hand knowledge of the local situation and source interviews. As divisional situation and status reports and updates are received, it will be Headquarters responsibility to conduct indepth research and analysis in order to provide the optimum estimate and assessment. Divisions where the members of the Royal family will be visiting are requested to submit the undernoted reports and updatings by the dates indicated:

- (1) Initial Divisional Situation and Status Report, due 1 January 1976.
- (2) First Divisional Situation and Status Update, due 1 March 1976.
- (3) Second Divisional Situation and Status Update, due 1 May 1976.
- (4) Third Divisional Situation and Status Update, due 1 June 1976.


M.S. Sexsmith, A/Commr.
D.D.G. (Ops.)

MEMORANDUM

TO: L.O.'s

London,
Paris.

CONFIDENTIAL

IP135-27

3 October 1975

OIC: A,B,D, ,F,G,H,I, Ops.,
Automated Information Services,
Olympics Secretariat, Policy -
Planning & Co-ordination, Mail Room,
Communications Center (Security Service)
& ("C" Directorate)

FROM: Officer i/c Foreign Services

Re: Visa Control - Non Immigrants -
Terrorist Suspects

The Terrorist Non Immigrant Screening Program, under Section 7.63 of the Immigration Manual, known as VARLET will in future, be referred to as STATESMAN, effective 20 October 1975.

2. We anticipate there will be a number of incoming telex's for some time under both designations. There will, however, be no changes in handling procedures at the "HQ" level.


Officer i/c Foreign Services

Place copy on



000084

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES
TUESDAY 18 NOVEMBER 1975
PAGE 9189-90
TAB 2225

IMMIGRATION

REFUSAL OF ENTRY PERMITS TO KNOWN TERRORISTS—
AUTHORITY FOR PERMIT TO SHAFIK AL-HOUT

Mr. Jake Epp (Provencher): Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Manpower and Immigration and relates to his answer to the hon. member for Saint-Hyacinthe, to

the effect that we will not allow known terrorists to enter Canada. Can the minister indicate under whose auspices a minister's permit was granted to Shafik Al-Hout and if security checks indicate he is not a known terrorist or member of a group promoting international terrorism?

Hon. Robert K. Andras (Minister of Manpower and Immigration): Mr. Speaker, I indicated to the hon. member for Saint-Hyacinthe—and this was repeated by the President of the Privy Council—that the policy has been long established and most recently repeated as to how such ministers' permits are granted. The PLO is considered a prohibited organization, but members of the PLO who are not themselves known terrorists are not denied ministers' permits. They require them, and they are granted when the person concerned is invited by a reputable Canadian organization and if the visit is to be for a short, specific period. The person in question was examined under these criteria. As reports indicated that he, himself, was not a known terrorist, he was permitted entry for a specific period, and the purposes of entry were known.

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES
TUESDAY 18 NOVEMBER 1975
PAGE 9186
TAB 2224

CONSULTATION WITH UNITED STATES ON BORDER SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. Claude Wagner (Saint-Hyacinthe): Mr. Speaker, with regard to the Olympic Games, I should like to put a supplementary to the Solicitor General.

In view of the most recent decision of the American Treasury to reduce quite substantially, if I am not mistaken, the funds appropriated for customs stations along the Canada-US border and traffic control between our two countries, can the minister assure the House that the security of the 1976 Games will in no way be affected? And can he indicate if, since that statement was made, there have been any discussions in this regard with his U.S. and Quebec counterparts?

[English]

Hon. Warren Allmand (Solicitor General): Mr. Speaker, the story which appeared in the press has not yet been confirmed by American authorities. The RCMP will be in touch with them about this, but in any case we intend to have as effective a security on our part as is necessary to combat any terrorist activities at the Olympics.

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES
THURSDAY 6 NOVEMBER 1975
PAGE 8940-8942
TAB 2217

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE--ALLEGED
SURVEILLANCE OF CERTAIN CANADIANS OF ARAB DESCENT--
REQUEST FOR REPORT

Mr. Heath Macquarrie (Hillsborough): Mr. Speaker, on October 30 when I asked the Solicitor General (Mr. Allmand) about the surveillance of Canadians of Arab descent it was against a background of great concern about the inequity, if not iniquity, in having decent Canadian citizens smeared.

The outrageous and harmful article in the *Globe and Mail* on October 27 is but one of the efforts to malign the record and impugn the motives of one group of Canadians,

namely, those who came themselves, or whose ancestors came from the Arab countries. The article itself was sufficiently disturbing, but the contradictory statements following it muddled the waters further. After discovering who Mr. Toupin was, the Solicitor General declared that the Arabs were not under surveillance, while security director Toupin was quoted in the same news item as saying they were. I am glad the minister reiterated his own view when he answered my question. Yet there is far from sufficient reassurance on this matter.

Four days after my question a young Canadian of Arab descent gave information on the CBC to the effect that he is being questioned by the RCMP. This young man, Ismail Munder of Winnipeg, declared that he was being interrogated about the PLO, the Montreal Olympics, and the Arab community. Mr. Munder claimed that he was being treated as a potential subversive. These are the young man's words. He is, I am sure, only one of many Canadians in this category. Therefore I am less than satisfied with what is going on. For many months I have heard of Canadians of Arab descent being watched, interrogated, and generally made to feel like second class citizens.

• (2200)

A good government in a good democracy must be ever zealous of the rights of the citizens and concerned lest the individual be made to suffer because of his membership in any linguistic, ethnic or social group.

Canadians of Arab descent, like all other Canadians have the right to be considered innocent unless and until they are proven guilty.

There is a far too prevalent tendency in this country and in the United States to degrade the word Arab and Arab peoples. It is subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, suggested that all PLO are terrorists. All Palestinians are PLO, so before long you get to the nasty implication that all Arabs are seen to be terrorists.

How many times, when the increase in the price of oil is discussed in the media, does one hear the expression "the Arab states have again hiked the price of oil"? Often this is followed by the use of the expression blackmail. Of course in OPEC are such prominent non Arab states as Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran, Indonesia and Ecuador.

This same tendency to stigmatize and suspect whole groups is revealed in our government's immigration department. Time and time again when Palestinian leaders are invited to address perfectly reputable and respected organizations they are harassed, delayed, and made totally unwelcome at immigration centres and borders of this country. I spoke in the House some months ago about the treatment accorded Dr. Fayez Sayegh, a distinguished scholar and statesman, who was guest speaker at the annual meeting of the Canadian Arab Federation. This was as unnecessary as it was deplorable.

Of course any government has the right, indeed the obligation, to give thought to national security. In a world where terrorism is tragically too common there is a special problem. But it is wrong to assume that terrorism is unique to some frustrated Palestinian people. We know that there is much violence, and even in the Middle East it is not confined to Palestinians or Arabs. It is wrong to be snooping on decent Canadian citizens because their people

Adjournment Motion

came from an Arab country. Are our security people checking up on all Irish societies in this country because there is terrorism in Ireland? Surely not. But there is much snooping into Arab organizations in this country, which is reprehensible and indecent.

The *Globe and Mail's* sensationalist article has been injurious to many of the 90,000 Canadians of Arab origin with its reference to conspiracy, and students plotting this, and others scheming that. The minister, of course, is not responsible for the press, and the bias of the *Globe and Mail* on the Middle East crisis is too well known to warrant discussion. But I do call on the minister who, while often wrong, is still, I think, a well intentioned man, to be just and fair in his treatment of Arab Canadians. I ask him to see that his security people do not trespass on the rights of decent Canadians because they happen to be related to people from the Arab world.

Mr. Hugh Poulin (Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General): Mr. Speaker, in reply to the hon. member for Hillsborough (Mr. Macquarrie) may I say that I know that he has stated in his concluding remarks that the sensational article which appeared in the *Globe and Mail* is not the responsibility of the minister.

In response to the hon. gentleman's question I must repeat what the minister has already said, that is, that the RCMP has indicated that there is no plot among Arab Canadians such as imputed in the *Globe and Mail* last week. I repeat this, for I wish to make it very clear that I believe Canadians of Arab background are honest, hard working citizens, and their integrity and honesty should not be questioned.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. Poulin: Doubts of this nature cast upon any group in Canada because of ethnic background are most unfair and unjust.

However, as I am sure this House is aware, there has been an increasing amount of terrorist activity in recent years. This activity has not been limited to any one country. Indeed it would appear that no country is immune from these attacks. I am sure that this is of concern to all members of this House, and likewise to all Canadians.

The Solicitor General (Mr. Allmand) has an obligation, through the RCMP, to ensure the security and safety of Canadians from these terrorist activities. The RCMP security service is in communication with all ethnic communities in Canada in an attempt to ensure that terrorist activity may be discovered before it can harm any citizen. It is part of the ongoing dialogue with people in Canada who may have information or who are prepared to co-operate in ensuring that terrorist elements are not successful in carrying out their acts in this country.

Although terrorist activity is not limited to any one particular time or location, the incident at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich shows clearly that individuals or groups who favour these methods endeavour to select times and places which provide the greatest amount of publicity for their cause.

The RCMP security service is concerned about the possibility of terrorist activity at the Montreal Olympics, and

Adjournment Motion

therefore is taking every precaution to ensure that there are no such occurrences. They would be derelict in their duty as security officers, as would the Solicitor General, the minister responsible for the RCMP, if they did not proceed in this fashion.

The Solicitor General has stated publicly that the RCMP are aware of the existence of many individuals and groups who are sympathizers on both sides of the Palestinian conflict. As I have stated, the RCMP are always on guard against terrorism of any kind, and in this respect become aware of groups and individuals who are sympathizers to one side or the other. This is not limited to this conflict alone.

Once again I think it is most unfair and most regrettable if this story has cast a shadow of subversion, as has been described by the hon. member, on the many thousands of decent, law abiding Canadians of Arab descent.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

P.S.P.C.
C.P.A.P.S.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



CANADA

BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE 35/5
DOSSIER

OTTAWA, K1A 0A3

April 22nd, 1975.

Mr. R. P. Bourne,
Assistant Deputy Minister
(Police & Security),
Ministry of the Solicitor General,
O t t a w a.

Dear Mr. Bourne:

You probably have already seen the attached clipping from a column in the Montreal Gazette which discusses Olympic security arrangements.

It does not appear that any of this information resulted from federal "leaks" and the information does not appear to be damaging in any way, but it does indicate the level of interest which seems to prevail in security arrangements for the Olympics.

Since there is this interest and since a strong security posture has been adopted for the Games, it might be worth considering the drafting of a public statement on Olympics security, for government approval. Perhaps this would forestall conjecture and questions which seem to be becoming more prevalent.

Yours truly,

D. W. Hall

D. W. Hall,
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet
(Security and Intelligence).

Attach.

001078



Montreal this morning.

By L. Ian MacDonald

Secret squad gears to tackle security for Olympic Games

Operation Alpha is the code name for a top secret security plan of the Olympic Organizing Committee (COJO) to combat any Munich-style guerrilla action that might occur here during next summer's Games.

The confidential preparations call for the creation of a "special tactical unit," which presumably will include officers and men from the three forces co-ordinating Games security — the Montreal Urban Community police, RCMP and Canadian Armed Forces.

COJO plans to spend \$133,334 in equipment alone, supplying the men of Operation Alpha with a bomb disposal unit, communications equipment, 30 bullet proof vests, machine guns and high-powered rifles.

A second confidential security plan, Operation Delta, has been drawn up against the possibility of potentially explosive demonstrations.

But Operation Delta will be a more routine policing function as compared with the crack anti-terrorist squad of Operation Alpha.

Size of the elite force remains secret, but it's understood the men will train at CFB Camp Borden, Ont., and be split into two 12-hour shifts during the Games. Physical and mental stamina, as well as expert marksmanship are obvious requirements for membership in Operation Alpha. Another criterion is that no one will be accepted who has the slightest blemish on his record.

And that includes being late.

TO
4 Supt. I.W. Taylor,
Olympics Secretariat

FROM
DE Officer i/c "D" Operations

SUBJECT
OBJET Security - Olympic Games

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION DE SECURITE

OUR FILE / NO. REFERENCE

DATE

November 19, 1975.

I have reviewed the contents of the attached message and find that the information requested by our [redacted] can best be provided by your staff. I would agree that our International Terrorist Desk and Country Profile people might be able to assist in answering query (2) and you may wish to have one of your members contact these respective desks for that purpose.


G. Begalki
G. Begalki, C/Supt.,
Officer in Charge,
"D" Operations.

Encl.

20.11.75 → SIS [redacted]

This was routed to 'D' Ops in error as it was addressed to FSC, not an info copy. Please discuss with Ray with Ralph Aldrich.

copy to [redacted]



TO : S/Cst. [redacted]
i/c "A" Div. "I" Operations
Security Service

FROM : S/Cst. i/c Training Section
"A" Div. "I" Operations
Security Service

SUBJECT: Olympics Training "I" Ops.
OBJET: Montreal Familiarization
Mar. 29 to Apr. 9, 1976

SECURITY-CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
Confidential
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
IA 50-6-763
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
27 April 1976

1976 Olympics
Estimates of Surveillance
Requirements

In an effort to ascertain whether the above period was considered sufficient by our group of twenty-four destined to work in Montreal, a canvass of the senior members of the group was conducted.

2. Their response, which is shared by all involved, was to the effect that another week would be necessary in order to cover certain aspects in more depth. Areas which they feel require far more study are shopping centres, stores, and most important the Metro system.

3. Sgt. [redacted] Olympics Co-ordinator informs me that the possibility of a further weeks training may exist around the beginning of June and that the planned "I" Ops. accomodation for the Olympics will be available at that time. In view of this I would strongly recommend that one more week of training be laid on for this period for our group of twenty-four, in view of the apparent shortcomings felt by our people.

4. With respect to the training planning, I would also suggest that the syllabus for this week be put together by S/Cst. [redacted] based on the needs as seen by the members of the group.

[redacted]
S/Cst.

To: O i/c "A" Division
Security Service

Forwarded with the recommendation that another week of familiarization in Montreal, ideally in early June, be provided for the twenty-four members involved.

.....2

000070

OLYMPIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

PROTECTION OF:

- (a) Participants
- (b) Selected Dignitaries
- (c) Facilities

PREVENTION OF:

- (a) Disruption of Events
- (b) Infiltration by Organized Crime

Protection

Participants by:

- (a) providing personal security
- (b) providing physical protection to Olympic facilities
- (c) developing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence
- (d) maintaining surveillance on known or suspected radicals or terrorists
- (e) security screening and investigation

2

Selected Dignataries by:

- (a) providing personal security
- (b) developing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence
- (c) maintaining surveillance on known or suspected radicals and terrorists
- (d) security screening and investigation

Facilities by:

- (a) providing physical security
- (b) providing technical security
- (c) developing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence
- (d) maintaining surveillance on known or suspected radicals and terrorists
- (e) security screening and investigation

Prevention

Disruption of Events by:

- (a) controlling entry into Canada of radicals and terrorists
- (b) Security Olympic Vital Points
- (c) developing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence

- (d) maintaining surveillance on known or suspected radicals, terrorists or dissident groups

Infiltration of Organized Crime by:

- (a) security screening and investigation
- (b) surveillance
- (c) developing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence



TO
A

R.H. Jones,
O. i/c, Operations

File No. (originator) - Dossier n° (source)

IA 10-2-91

FROM
DE

Insp. Taylor

File No. (addressee) - Dossier n° (destinataire)


Subject - 1976 Olympics - Manpower Requirements

With reference to the "C" Division memorandum of May 2, 1975. I have relatively few comments since most of "C" Division's requests involve Operations. However, and based on verbal discussions between Supt. Cobb and myself, I intend to commit essentially our whole Operations Section to Olympics associated targets as necessary after January 1, 1976. Before that time I intend to send key individuals into Montreal on orientation sessions. While presumably Montreal will be the main center for Olympics associated operations, the personnel will be available on a priority basis for any Olympic associated target anywhere in Canada. Basically, what I am saying is that the Olympics will get first priority but this does not necessarily mean that Montreal itself will get first priority.

In general, I foresee that the highest priority for

Operations over the period of September 1975 to August 1976, will be the 1976 Olympics and that we must be prepared to commit all available manpower on a priority basis to that target.

7-5-75



WKO

Signature

Date

Canada weapons and other materiel which might increase the internal security problems. (See ANNEX I)

- (b) Despite the jurisdictional responsibilities of various levels of police forces, Canada and not the Provincial or Municipal governments will be held responsible for any failure to prevent breaches of security which could result in an international incident. This must be made clear to the Quebec and Montreal authorities and to the Canadian and International Olympic Committees.
- (c) For planning purposes, it must be assumed that the current trends in international terrorism and the growth of social unrest in many parts of the world will continue to escalate and that security planning must be based on maintaining strong and effective security. If the actual threat is not as serious as current developments indicate it will be, then the initial strong security measures can be modified. The reverse process would be much more difficult if not impossible.


RECOMMENDATIONS:


That Cabinet agree:

- (a) to a strong security posture which would recognize the possibility of a serious security threat, recognize the ultimate responsibility of Canada for the safety of participants and others and have its expression in
 - (i) control by Canada, not the I.O.C., of entry by participants, coaches, officials, media representatives and visitors,
 - (ii) normal customs examination procedures as opposed to I.O.C. expectations of blanket customs exemption,

- (iii) close cooperation with provincial and municipal police forces which will probably involve federal leadership in security planning and will require delicate negotiations and agreement concerning jurisdiction,
 - (iv) possible legislation to be introduced later to provide, during a period of a few weeks before, during and after the games, for rejection and immediate removal of foreign terrorists, criminals and demonstrators without recourse to inquiry and appeal procedures;
- (b) that the Solicitor General be authorized to instruct the Commissioner, R.C.M. Police,
- (i) to negotiate with provincial and local police forces and COJO in order to clearly determine and agree upon appropriate jurisdictions recognizing always the federal responsibility to safeguard national interests, and the large federal input of security personnel,
 - (ii) to appoint within the Force a coordinator of security planning who will include in his responsibilities coordination of federal involvement and liaison with COJO,
 - (iii) to augment RCMP resources in personnel, materiel and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended;
- (c) that the Minister of Manpower and Immigration be authorized to augment his resources in personnel and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended,

(d) that a committee of Ministers be formed drawn from the Cabinet Committee on Security & Intelligence and consisting of those Ministers having a direct interest in Olympic security which would, subject to Cabinet confirmation, consider and approve, where appropriate, federal involvement in security planning as it develops which might include negotiations with appropriate Ministers in Quebec and Ontario.


Warren Allmand,
Solicitor General of Canada.


Robert Andras,
Minister of Manpower & Immigration.



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

D.D.G. (Ops)

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

Olympic Secretariat Situation Reports -
OS SIT REP

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

S E C R E T

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

October 14, 1975

The need for an effective system designed to expediently deliver into the hands of the security planners and, at the time of the Olympiad itself, to the decision-makers all the hard intelligence developed and analyses thereof that could have an effect on plans or decisions has been recognized by this office.

The Research Unit of the Montreal Olympic Secretariat has already implemented a program which produces situation reports based on open and "guarded" material. These semi-monthly reports, SOC RAPSIT (Att. #1), are produced to advise our associates and concerned members in Quebec of any developments and/or trends of interest. We feel that the SOC RAPSIT is now and will in the future provide for the requirements outlined in paragraph one for that province. However, there is not only a need for, but also a responsibility to produce a similar report for Ontario. Therefore, we will implement the following system in all phases, subject to your approval, as quickly as possible:

TITLE:

OS SIT REP

FORMAT:

The format developed by the Montreal group will be used because it will easily adapt to our needs. The SIT REP will be capsulized reports of current intelligence on the Maximum Threat (I) and Medium Threat Groups (II). The groups within each section will be listed alphabetically. Any significant developments or incidents of Minimal Threat Groups (III) will also be reported. The various groups have been categorized using the Country Profiles produced by the "D" Ops Olympic Coordinator S/Sgt. Eric Rud. The categories are subject to changes as circumstances warrant. Analyses of information and intelligence will be provided.

000609

INFORMATION BASE:

Data will be outlined by monitoring mass media resources, topical periodicals of interest and the N.Y. Times Data Bank. In addition all information and other intelligence from field Divisions and other Police Agencies which has a bearing on threats to the Olympics will be scrutinized and reported as required.

CONTRIBUTORS:

We envisage receiving input from "D" Ops., Foreign Services, O.P.P., Q.P.F., and the Municipal Police Agencies in Kingston, Montreal, Ottawa, Peel District and Toronto.

CIRCULATION:

OS SIT REP will receive the following distribution:

RCMP - D.D.G. (Ops)

F.S.C.

OIC "D" Ops. "B" : M

OIC Foreign Services

OIC's Sec. Ser. "A", "B", "C", "D",
"E", "F", "H", "J", "O",
"K" Divisions

"C" Division, Security Service,
Olympics Secretariat

"E" Division, Security Service,
(Re: Habitat '76)

OTHER- ~~PSPAC (Mr. Robin Bourne)~~

Kingston City Police via Kingston Security Service
Ottawa City Police via "A" Division, Security Service
Vancouver City Police via "E" Division, Security
Service

Ontario Provincial Police

Peel Regional Police Force - via "O" Div., Sec. Ser.
Metro Toronto Police Department

TOTAL REQUIRED: 22 + 8 spares = 30

CAVEAT:

CAUTION

This document is provided to you for your permanent retention. It and its contents must be carefully guarded, and should not be disseminated further without prior clearance from the originator.

SCHEDULE:

OS SIT REP will be produced at the first of each month from Oct. 75 until Feb. 76. At that time the SIT REP will become a twice monthly production (from Feb. 76 until the end of May 76.) Beginning in June 76 a weekly report will be sent via KW-7 for the sake of when the games are in progress. Daily and/or hourly SIT REPS to required departments will be forwarded by the available communications channels.

The attached SIT REP #1 is a sample of what is felt will provide the required information to all parties concerned with Olympic Security. In order to ensure that our personnel and the personnel of the other Forces are totally aware of the reasons for this product and what we expect in return, Cpl. D. Boyd will travel to Toronto and Kingston in the near future to confer with Officials of the various Police Agencies mentioned in the "Circulation" section. To facilitate these conferences, arrangements will be made through Sgt. [redacted] in Toronto and Cpl. [redacted] in Kingston. The program will also be introduced in Ottawa through Sgt. [redacted] of "A" Division Security Service.

Attach.

I.W. Taylor, Supt.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

PSI

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité

GEA

DATE May 15, 1975.

NUMBER
Numéro INT. LIAISON
SPECIAL REGISTRY

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 55-26-2	
MISSION 29-13-13-USSR	
29-13-1-USSR	

Call by Soviet First Secretary
B.A. Soukharev

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

 PPR
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At Mr. Chistoff's request, Mr. Soukharev visited the Division on May 14 so that we could discuss with him a few matters before his return to Moscow on May 15 for a five week holiday.

Olympic Security Briefing

2. Mr. Chistoff informed Mr. Soukharev that, following the representations made by him and Mr. Makarov, it had been decided that security briefings would be given to those governments requesting them. He went on to say that the mechanics of these briefings had not yet been settled, i.e., who would give them, where they would be given and when they would be given. These questions would probably be decided before Mr. Soukharev's return from holidays. In any case, it was probably too early at this stage to provide such briefings, since there was a whole year before the Olympics were to take place.

3. Mr. Soukharev appeared pleased to receive this bit of news. He said, however, that in his view it was not too early to begin thinking about security problems, since terrorists from the Middle East would begin well in advance their penetration of Canada. He said that, depending on how forthcoming the Canadian side was in its security arrangements, the Soviet authorities would be able to hand the Canadian security authorities a list of known terrorists, six of whom were Japanese, a number Indian, one Canadian and one American. He assured Mr. Chistoff that the information he would be able to hand over would be completely authoritative. In reply to Mr. Soukharev's question, Mr. Chistoff said he thought that there would be a general type of briefing for all governments concerned and individual briefings that would take into account

.../2

the particular concerns of each government. He said that, after the briefings were given, Mr. Soukharev would be in a position to say whether he thought the Canadian security authorities were sufficiently forthcoming to satisfy the Soviet authorities and he would be able to decide whether to hand over the information which the Soviet side had. Mr. Chistoff cautioned Mr. Soukharev about expecting the Canadian security authorities to be 100% forthcoming, since their main concern was security and there was a danger that whatever information was handed out would leak to non-authorized people. Perhaps because of a misunderstanding about what Mr. Chistoff said, Mr. Soukharev commented that on such questions he spoke to no one in the Embassy except the Ambassador, so that we could be assured there would be no leaks. //

Activities of Canadian-Ukrainian Nationalists

4. In view of the information contained in the attachment to PSI Memorandum 671 of March 27, particularly the suggestion that the Russians might use the alleged threat of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists to request increases in their security staffs in Western countries, Mr. Chistoff returned to this subject, which had originally been raised by Mr. Soukharev during his meeting at the Department on February 13. Mr. Chistoff said that we had looked into this question since that meeting and no information we had led us to anticipate that any Canadian-Ukrainian groups planned any violent action against Soviet nationals. He said that there now appeared to be two different points of view on this matter and repeated his earlier request that, if the Soviet Embassy received any firm information to the contrary, it should let the Department know immediately. Mr. Chistoff also mentioned that, at the last meeting, Mr. Soukharev said he would provide, through Mr. Chistoff, additional information on the Munich-based Ukrainian group but so far we had not received this. Mr. Soukharev said he had handed over this information to the RCMP just the day before. The documents he handed over contained names and full addresses of members of this Ukrainian group living in Canada as well as the organizational structure of this group.

.../3


*Noted
we did
receive
some material
R.S.A.
12/6/75.*

Traffic Police Coverage for Soviet Representatives

5. Mr. Chistoff informed Mr. Soukharev that this Division had looked into the matter raised with him on May 8 and had discussed the question with Protocol and, through Protocol, with the police. He informed Mr. Soukharev that no written request from the Soviet Embassy for traffic control coverage for Soviet receptions would be necessary, only an oral request. The police, however, asked that the Embassy give at least one full day's notice. The Embassy should also phone Staff Inspector Zukow in charge of the Morality Division of the Ottawa City Police, rather than the Traffic Control Section. Mr. Chistoff pointed out that this procedure differed from that suggestion at the February 13 meeting. Mr. Soukharev appeared to be particularly pleased at this news and at receiving a specific name of someone to contact in the City Police.

Traffic Infractions

6. Mr. Chistoff informed Mr. Soukharev that Protocol Division had expressed to us their concern about some traffic violations by Soviet personnel which had reached the serious stage. These involved speeding. He said that Protocol would probably speak about this to someone in the Embassy during Mr. Soukharev's absence. He emphasized that he was not the one responsible for dealing with this question and that he mentioned it to Mr. Soukharev only to alert him to the problem and to the fact that it would be taken up during his absence. Mr. Soukharev seemed genuinely concerned about this problem and said that, at every meeting of diplomats and other members of the staff, including chauffeurs, this question was always emphasized to them. He himself regarded this as a serious matter and, even before any representations by this Department, he would take it up again with the Ambassador. Mr. Chistoff suggested that, as one of the Embassy chauffeurs was involved in the speeding violations, it could mean that he could lose his license and therefore his whole purpose at the Embassy.


Eastern European Division



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat
Security Service Headquarters

FROM
DE

S/Sgt. [REDACTED]
Senior N.C.O.

SUBJECT
OBJET

Summer Olympics in Montreal 1976 Security Service Planning

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

December 9, 1975

With reference to item 3 on page 4 of our most recent Interdivisional Monthly Meeting minutes dated November 14, 1975, I contacted Sgt. [REDACTED] of the Immigration and Passport Section of "C" Directorate on the 8 of December, 1975. He advised me that at the present time, there were approximately 12,000 lost or stolen passports included in the NPSIC stolen property file. They anticipated that they would have between 13,000 and 15,000 lost or stolen passports included in the file by the end of December. This would bring the system completely up to date as far as Canadian passports were concerned and they would be updated on a monthly basis with an anticipated change of between 300 and 400 passports every month. These would either be deletions from the system or additions to the system.

2. The Interpol Section of the NPS has taken on the task of placing foreign lost or stolen passports in the same system. They will only be including passports on which they have sufficient information to justify their inclusion. If the information that they are provided through the Interpol services is speculative or not complete, the passport will not be included. It would appear that as a result of this, very few lost or stolen foreign passports will be included.

[REDACTED]
S/Sgt.

Senior N.C.O.

c.c. Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat Security Service "C" Division
Officer i/c Security Service "A" Division
Officer i/c Security Service "O" Division

Reviewed *BM*

DEC 11 1975

SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS

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FORMULE NORMALISÉE 226 DE L'ONGC

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

S E C R E T

Cab. Doc.

January 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET:

Olympic Games, 1976 - Security
Planning

SUMMARY:

The attached memorandum contains a resume of Olympic Security planning which is being developed toward the attainment of the "strong security posture" adopted by Cabinet on June 1, 1973 in relation to the staging of the 1976 Summer Olympics.

The memorandum points out that the frequency and intensity of acts of international terrorism will not likely decrease between now and the staging of the Olympics and that new areas of potential strife and conflict are continuing to surface on the international scene; noting that a high and visible security posture was adopted at the Seventh Asian Games Tehran 1974 and at the 74 World Cup Series in West Germany.

The memorandum describes the terms of reference of the Federal Security Coordinator as well as the police planning structures in Quebec and Ontario.

The principal security functions identified to date are described in terms of the level of planning, jurisdiction, task sharing and resource requirements. See matrix of manpower requirements (annex 7).

LE PRESENT DOCUMENT EST LA PROPRIETE
DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

S E C R E T

Doc. du Cab.

le 6 janvier 1975

NOTE A L'INTENTION DU CABINET

Jeux Olympiques de 1976 -
Planification des mesures de sécurité

RESUME:

La note ci-jointe résume les dispositions prises en vue d'assurer la "situation de force en matière de sécurité", adoptée par le Cabinet, le 1er juin 1973, relativement au déroulement des Jeux olympiques d'été de 1976.

La note souligne que la fréquence et l'intensité des actes de terrorisme sur le plan international ne diminueront probablement pas d'ici les Olympiques et que de nouvelles possibilités de conflits et de luttes font sans cesse leur apparition sur la scène internationale. On y fait également observer que les mesures de sécurité prises en 1974 en vue des Septièmes Jeux asiatiques de Téhéran et des éliminatoires de la Coupe du monde en Allemagne de l'Ouest, étaient très sévères et évidentes.

La note au Cabinet décrit les attributions du Coordonateur fédéral de la sécurité ainsi que la structure de l'organisation policière au Québec et en Ontario.

A ce jour, on a décrit les fonctions principales de sécurité sur les plans du niveau d'organisation, de la juridiction, du partage des tâches et des ressources nécessaires. Voir la charte des besoins en personnel (annex 7).

SECRET

The memorandum explains the need for an increase in RCMP expenditures and substantial DND participation to ensure a strong security posture prior to and during the Olympic Games.

In view of the high level of Federal involvement, the memorandum recommends Cabinet reaffirmation of the adopted "strong security posture" early budgetary approval and agreement of the outlined Federal participation in security.

Detailed recommendations are included on page 25 and 26.

La note explique le besoin d'une augmentation des dépenses de la G.R.C. et de la participation considérable du ministère de la Défense, afin d'être en "situation de force en matière de sécurité", aussi bien avant que pendant les Jeux olympiques.

Vu le profond engagement du gouvernement fédéral, la note propose que le Cabinet réaffirme son intention d'autoriser rapidement le budget nécessaire pour être prêt à toute éventualité sur le plan de la sécurité et son acceptation de la participation fédérale, déjà esquissée, du côté sécurité.

Les propositions détaillées se trouvent à la page 25 et 26.

SECRET

HAY-465-24-5

12 June 75

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. G. Pollard
Manpower and Immigration,
Home Branch, Admin.
E.A. Bourque Memorial Bldg.,
305 Rideau Street,
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0J9

Re: Briefing Program for Immigration and Customs Officers

This is further to our letter of 18 April 75 and the viewing of the Olympics lead in portion of our proposed briefing program held on 10 June 75 and at which Mr. Art. Butroid, Mr. Roger St. Vincent and yourself were present.

Our proposed briefing program is composed of two main segments.

The first part is the Olympic lead in and is now complete. It illustrates the different general threats Olympics 76 may be subjected to and also that the Games could be used to further the aims of any organization, group or individual and as well to obtain international publicity. It will also emphasize the need to provide a strong security posture at points of entry into Canada in order to deny access to undesirable individuals or groups who are determined to endanger the lives of VIP's or athletes and/or to disrupt the peaceful staging of the Games.

The second segment is the international terrorist briefing. Because of the everchanging picture as it relates to world politics and the emergence of new terrorist organizations (e.g. Black April) our "D" Operations would like the presentation to be as current as


..... 2

possible and feel that they would prefer to work on developing a package which would be ready in September-October 1975. The terrorist briefing will identify possible threats from specific terrorists organizations, groups or individuals and also from those organizations, groups or individuals capable of violence. You will appreciate the fact that the threats to the Olympics may change often as we get closer to the Games and, for this reason, we will be unable to specify exactly which organizations, groups or individuals will most likely attempt in a violent manner to use the Olympics for its own purposes. Every effort will be made to present a clear picture of the possible threats and project a realistic threat estimate.

Efforts are being made to add a third segment, "Weapons Display" to the proposed briefing program. This weapons display should be most beneficial to all Immigration and Customs Officers and would certainly provide a better knowledge and understanding of how typical terrorist weapons and explosives can be concealed.

Should we be able to add the "Weapons Display" segment we will be pleased to arrange for a viewing together with the Olympics lead in portion for your representatives.

With regards to the briefing program, we are also in the process of preparing a tour schedule for the fall to visit the main cities across Canada. It is our intention to brief as many officers as possible and the itinerary will be arranged to meet this objective. We will keep you informed of any new developments.



I.W. Taylor, Insp.,
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Deputy Director General
(Operations)

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

Summer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec
1976 - Security Service Planning - "I" Operations

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
SECRET
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE 30 June 1975

This is further to my submission of 14 May 1975, concerning the general allocation of manpower for the 1976 Olympics. Of nearly equal importance is the development of a program for "I" Operations who will be one of our most important assets in counter-terrorist efforts. The following proposals have been developed with the "I" Operations National Coordinator and are set out for your consideration.

STAGED DEPLOYMENT:

In the interests of clarity, the functions of "I" Operations during the Olympics is being considered in two stages. These stages are as follows:

STAGE 1. "I" Operations Olympic Program from 1 July 76 to 1 Aug. 76. Leave and Training Courses suspended. Two teams of "A" Division personnel (24 men and 12 vehicles) functioning in Montreal. One "O" Division team prepared to move to Kingston at short notice.

STAGE 2. Condition of Extreme Emergency. This situation would require that all possible manpower and equipment be moved to one centre.

The authority to move from STAGE 1 to STAGE 2 conditions will rest with the D.D.G. (Operations) in consultation with the Federal Security Coordinator.

RESOURCES:

Considerable misunderstanding exists outside of "I" Operations as to the resource capability in terms of man-

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power vis-a-vis targets. Consideration must, of course, be given to the type of target and the degree of coverage desired. In order to avoid any miscalculations, "I" Operations capability in terms of targets of a terrorist nature is set out below:

STAGE 1	(short span coverage 12 hours)	normal coverage 24 hr day-7 days a week
(Olympic Program)	"C" Div. 10 targets	4
	"A" Div. 3 targets	2
	"O" Div. 4 targets	2

(Extreme Emergency) Any point - 17 targets

This is a maximum effort which can be sustained for only a short time span.

(detail) 78 Hours maximum. ID 2/7

The STAGE 1 deployment, on behalf of "C" Division, includes the 24 "I" Operations personnel and 12 vehicles from "A" Division. As you are aware, "C" Division originally requested 38 men, however, the Officer i/c Security Service "A" Division feels that to take more than 24 from his complement would sharply reduce surveillance capabilities in the Ottawa area. This same STAGE would involve the stand-by of 12 men from "O" Division "I" Operations to supplement "A" Division in Kingston, if required. This is a contingency plan only which will be facilitated by a relatively brief training exercise in Kingston. Maximum coverage which could be afforded would be against 10 targets in Montreal, 3 in Ottawa and 4 in Toronto but this could only be done for about 12 hours and would require shutting down surveillance totally for a rest period afterwards. Normal coverage which allows normal time off for rest and recuperation could provide target coverage of 4, 2 and 2 respectively.

The STAGE 2 deployment is the maximum target capability should a group of terrorists be centered at any one point. This capability would probably be reduced by lack of area familiarity of some of the teams and communications problems. It must be stressed that such coverage could only be sustained for a short period of time.

ACCOMMODATIONS:

Discussions have also taken place concerning the accommodation of the teams in Montreal and Kingston. In Montreal,



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Deputy Director General
(Operations)

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

Summer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec
1976 - Security Service Planning - "I" Operations

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
SECRET
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
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.....2

000093

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The STAGE 2 deployment is the maximum target capability should a group of terrorists be centered at any one point. This capability would probably be reduced by lack of area familiarity of some of the teams and communications problems. It must be stressed that such coverage could only be sustained for a short period of time.

ACCOMMODATIONS:

Discussions have also taken place concerning the accommodation of the teams in Montreal and Kingston. In Montreal,

a request has been forwarded to the Chief Security Committee for private accommodation for the 24 men, and an early reply is anticipated. Sufficient garage space is available in Montreal. The "A" Division Olympic representative is currently examining the feasibility of renting a cottage near Kingston for "A" Division "I" Ops. personnel, and this could be extended for the "O" Division team, if required. Contact has already been made with a local garage owner for storage in Kingston. A report on the progress made in Kingston is anticipated shortly.

OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY:

Several discussions have taken place concerning the philosophy of surveillance for "I" Operations, when measured against the use of units from Special "O" Sections, the MUCP and the QPF. As you can appreciate, this is a rather delicate area when dealing with other police components, however, we intend to stress that anonymity of our personnel and vehicles is of utmost importance. In order to make our position perfectly clear, we have developed the following guidelines:

COORDINATION:

In Montreal, the present concept is that all surveillance teams (326 men from "I" Ops., Special "O", [REDACTED]) will operate under one surveillance coordinator. This is designed to prevent any possibility of overlapping or confusion of targets.

Good

SECRET

SS(D)1782/49

PAGE ^{four} TWO

INCARCERATED TERRORIST RESEARCH PROJECT:

DID NOT INVOLVE "O" DIVISION.

SITUATION REPORTS - DIVISION AND HEADQUARTERS:

"O" DIVISION EXPERIENCED NO DIFFICULTY IN PREPARATION OF SITUATION REPORTS INVOLVING LOCAL SITUATION. HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER DIVISION SITUATION REPORTS WERE FOUND TO BE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE IN PROJECTING POSSIBLE THREAT AREAS AS WELL AS AN AID IN ASSESSING LOCAL SITUATIONS AND ISSUES.

THE ONE POINT OF CONCERN WAS THE RECEIPT OF FRENCH LANGUAGE SITUATION REPORTS. WHILE "O" DIVISION HAS A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CAPABLE IN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE, NONE ARE OFFICIALLY BI-LINGUAL. FOR TRANSLATION PURPOSES IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRAW RESOURCES, FROM OTHER ASSIGNED DUTIES FOR TRANSLATION PURPOSES. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN FUTURE SITUATION REPORTS DIRECTED TO OTHER DIVISIONS BE SUPPLIED IN ENGLISH WHICH WILL BE TIME SAVING FOR THE RECIPIENTS.

DEFUSING:

BY MID-1975 "O" DIVISION HAD UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM OF SOURCE AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN VARIOUS AREAS, WITH THE VIEW OF HAVING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION IN AND OUT OF THE VARIOUS ETHNIC AREAS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PROGRAM WE TOOK THE ADDED OPPORTUNITY TO CARRY OUT AN ONGOING DEFUSING PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM INCLUDED THE INTERVIEWING OF SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PROMINENT IN KNOWN "LEFT" WING AND NEO-TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. OF PARTICULAR NOTE WERE THE PROGRAMS CARRIED OUT IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

GENERALLY WE FEEL OUR DEFUSION PROCESS WAS EFFECTIVE IN BOTH GAINING INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES AND HAD THE DESIRED RESULTS OF EASING OUR EFFORTS

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SECRET

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SECRET

SS(D)1782/49

PAGE ~~THREE~~ ^{ACE}

IN OBTAINING INFORMATION. WE FEEL, HOWEVER, IN FUTURE SITUATIONS OF THIS TYPE THAT SIMILAR EFFORT IN OTHER DIVISIONS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AT THE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. SUCH COORDINATION SHOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE TO ENSURE EACH DIVISION CARRIES OUT THEIR DEFUSION AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT INFORMATION DEVELOPED IS FREELY EXCHANGED, PARTICULARLY THAT WHICH IS OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTEREST.

THE DEFUSION PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED US WITH MANY VALUABLE LONG-TERM "CONTACTS" IN THE VARIOUS ETHNIC COMMUNITIES. WE ARE BETTER INFORMED OF ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN TORONTO THAN EVER BEFORE AND PLAN TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THESE CONTACTS.

THREAT ASSESSMENT: THIS AREA IS IN OUR OPINION, DIVIDED INTO TWO AREAS; 1) THE THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND 2) THE COUNTRY PROFILE BOOKS PREPARED BY THE "D" SECTION, SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECTION. THESE BOOKS WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES FOR COUNTRY BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHEN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING DEFUSION. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN USED WHEN PLANNING VIP SECURITY. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RETAIN AND UP-DATE THE INFORMATION IN THE BOOKS.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS WERE A VALUABLE TOOL FOR KEEPING OLYMPIC COMMANDERS, OTHER OFFICES AND OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS ADVISED OF DEVELOPING SITUATIONS.

OLYMPIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: NO COMMENT.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER FORCES TO THE JOINT SECURITY SERVICE COMMITTEES:

OUR MAJOR DEALINGS WITH OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS CONSISTED OF LIAISONING OF INFORMATION WITH METRO TORONTO POLICE, PEEL REGIONAL POLICE AND ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE.

RELATIONSHIPS AND COOPERATION WITH THE METRO TORONTO POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS FELT TO BE EXCELLENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY WORKED DIRECTLY WITH SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS AND AFFORDED EVERY ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE. INFORMATION LIAISED WAS TREATED IN A RESTRICTED MANNER.

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE WAS SUPPLIED WITH INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THEM AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE TORONTO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE, IN THE TORONTO AREA, WAS RESTRICTED. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THEIR MAXIMUM EFFORT AFFORDED TO THE KINGSTON SITE. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN METRO TORONTO POLICE AND O.P.P. MERELY METRO ASSUMED SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TORONTO AREA DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH O.P.P. WERE GENERALLY HANDLED THROUGH THE KINGSTON POST.

AN AREA OF CONCERN WAS THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM USED BY O.P.P. IN TORONTO. THE PURPOSE OF THEIR OPERATIONS CENTRE WAS NEVER CLARIFIED TO EITHER THIS FORCE OR APPARENTLY TO THE METRO TORONTO POLICE. THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE AN OPERATIONS CENTRE IN TORONTO WAS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN UNTIL LATE IN THE PLANNING STAGES AND DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD WAS NOT UTILIZED IN THE TORONTO AREA. AS A RESULT METRO USED OUR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR CONTACTING SUCH POINTS AS KINGSTON FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. IT WAS NOTICED THAT ON ABOUT TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS THE O.P.P. AT KINGSTON WERE

1A-10-16-8-2

SECRET



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Insp. G. Godfrey
S/Sgt. [REDACTED]

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

76 Summer Olympics -
Threat Assessment - (General)

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

25 February 1975

On 24 February 1975 the Federal Security Coordinator discussed with me a need he perceives for the analysis and correlation of Security Service threat intelligence in such a way as to be of maximum utility to both himself and the Secretariat, for planning and briefing purposes.

Firstly, the Federal Security Coordinator stated that he would like us to extract all items from Guidelines, terrorist weekly and monthly bulletins, which have direct relevance to the Olympics and to set them out by appropriate subject categories. He proposed that an initial threat updating be presented at a future Monday general meeting and that a weekly intelligence updating be given at each subsequent general meeting. I agreed to discuss his proposal with members of the Security Service Secretariat to arrive at a practical solution. The following categories were suggested by the Federal Security Coordinator for our consideration:

Copy placed on [REDACTED]
(a) Organization Threats - P.L.O., J.D/L., J.R.A., I.R.A. etc. to include brief overview, simplified organizational chart, and specific threat.

Copy placed on [REDACTED]
(b) Individual threats - synopsis and activities of specific persons who may be preparing some action which would pose some threat to the Olympics.

(c) New weaponry - for example Sam 7, miniature explosive devices, which could be utilized to disrupt the Olympics.

(d) Documentation - intelligence indicating a possible utilization of false, altered or stolen documents by terrorist suspects.

Copy placed on [REDACTED]
(e) General threat intelligence - not falling under any of the above categories but generally relevant.

MAY 13 1975

SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS

000285

I would like to discuss the Federal Security Coordinator's request as soon as S/Sgt. [redacted] returns off course to determine feasibility and format. The F.S.C. is basically looking for material prepared in a loose-leaf style to permit regular updating with a minimum of effort. The first step, is to review back issues of the Guidelines and terrorist bulletins as well as any other material we have on hand to identify relevant items. Once this is done a format can then be designed which may also lend itself to other uses in conjunction with our development of suitable threat packages for dissemination to "A", "C" and "O" Divisions and other police forces involved in Olympic planning.

The F.S.C. also brought up the Country Profiles, recently received from "D" Ops. and asked me if "D" Ops. would also be supplying specific material in the following categories:


(a) threat projections for individual security functions specifically, Vital Points, Harbours, Borders, Airports, V.I.P.'s and Athletes. *see "P" Dir.*

(b) terrorist organization profiles. *Country profiles*

(c) individual terrorist profiles.

In reply I stated that a threat assessment relevant to airports and sky-jacking incidents was currently being prepared by "D" Ops. for the information of both "P" Directorate and the Olympic Secretariat. Insofar as the other items are concerned, I stated that I would discuss them with the Officer i/c "D" Ops. and his staff.

"G" ops ?


I.W. Taylor, Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SECRET

~~SEPT. BEHALK~~

RE: BRIEFING TO COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
ON MEMORANDUM TO CABINET 6-1-75

M. R. DARE

SECURITY PLANNING FOR THE 1976 SUMMER OLYMPICS
HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1970. IT HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED TO DATE ON A JOINT BASIS BY POLICE FORCES IN
QUEBEC AND ONTARIO AS WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENCE.

THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH SECURITY HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED WERE DERIVED FROM THREE SOURCES: FIRST AND
FOREMOST, IS THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1972 OLYMPICS IN
MUNICH WHICH MANIFESTED THE DANGERS OF A LOW SECURITY
PROFILE. THE SECOND FACTOR INVOLVED GOVERNMENT POLICY
AS OUTLINED IN CABINET DIRECTIVE DATED JUNE 1, 1973
WHICH STATED "THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT A STRONG
SECURITY POSTURE IN RELATION TO OLYMPICS 1976 WHICH
WOULD RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS SECURITY
THREAT" AND FINALLY OUR POSTURE TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION
BOTH THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL THREAT. THE POLITICAL
SITUATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTHERN IRELAND, AFRICA
AND SOUTH AMERICA HAVE PROGRESSIVELY DETERIORATED. NEW
AREAS OF POTENTIAL STRIFE AND CONFLICT ARE CONTINUING TO
SURFACE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. NATIONALLY, RECENT
ACTIVITIES OF NATIVE PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION INDICATE A
POTENTIAL THREAT WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO DIMINISH BY 1976.

MANPOWER RESOURCES, SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY

also Mexico
& Japan
- World Soccer Cup
- Major
INTER Nat
Sport. EVENTS

.....2



TO
A

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

D.G., D.D.G. (Ops.)

M. R. DARE

JUL 4. 1974

YOUR FILE No.
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No.
Notre dossier

FROM
De

Security Service Coordinator

DATE 3 July 1974

FOLD

SUBJECT
Sujet

Summer Olympics 76 - Security Service
Planning - General

I accompanied the Federal Security Coordinator, C/Supt. Ouimet, and members of his staff to "C" Division "HQ" for discussions with the "C" Division Secretariat and the Officer i/c Security Service on 25 and 26 June 1974.

2. On Wednesday 26 June 1974 both the Federal Security Coordinator and the Division Security Coordinator presented revised organizational proposals to the C.O. "C" Division and the Officer i/c CIB. At the conclusion of this briefing Supt. Cobb, Insp. Vermette and I presented an informal outline of the Division and "HQ" role for the Security Service and the steps being taken to meet our responsibilities. This presentation was well received and I believe gave the C.O. "C" Division and Officer i/c CIB a clear picture of Security Service Operations.

3. I also had discussions with Supt. Cobb and Insp. Vermette in the remaining time available. A number of significant points emerged during the briefing sessions and subsequent discussion, as follows:

(A) Threat Projection - DRAE War Games

4. This was mentioned during the Security Service briefing. The C.O. "C" Division stated that he agreed with the program and hoped it was intended to involve operational representation from both the Q.P.F. and M.U.C.P. as well as Regional DND. The C.O. "C" Division further mentioned that last year the provincial Government initiate a somewhat comparable program related to Airport Security, terrorist scenarios and sky jacking games in which there had been joint participation. In the C.O.'s view the exercises were quite professional and developed considerable expertise which should certainly be taken ~~on~~ advantage of for Regional Olympic planning. I advised the C.O. "C" Division that I would inform the D.G. of his views and recommendations.

(B) Development and Preparation of Security Service Global Threat Assessment

5. During the Security Service briefing we gave an overview of the way it was presently visualized our threat intelligence would develop. From the general discussions which followed it became very clear that the Security Service is expected to supply timely, relevant and highly professional intelligence on all dimensions of the internal and global threat, for dissemination to an integrated operational command structure of the three

principal police forces in Quebec, and DND. As I understand it, to date the Service has developed or conceived the following:

- (i) A quarterly threat paper which could be produced at more frequent intervals during the final pre-games phase.
 - (ii) Weekly information bulletins on National and International Terrorism [REDACTED] which could be stepped up to a daily bulletin at the final stage. I am not currently aware of the total distribution of this bulletin and how it is intended to permit dissemination to other operational forces.
- [REDACTED]

6. In summary I believe the total intelligence preparation is a substantial and vital undertaking. Quite frankly, I wonder if sufficient resources are being assigned and see the need for a small professional task force to review existing capabilities, establish total requirements and be assigned primary responsibility for production and dissemination. Scheduling, frequency of issue, dissemination and related issues must be logically identified, recommendations approved and initiated without delay if the Service is to meet the expectations of its customers. Both Officers i/c "C" Division Security Service and CIB are concerned over the question of dissemination of threat intelligence to other forces with significant primary operational roles.

Will be done

(C) Audio Visual Olympic Briefing

7. Supt. Cobb stated he perceives a priority need to quickly develop a professional bilingual total threat briefing package with both "HQ" and "C" Division input, suitable for presentation to senior Federal Committees as well as appropriate Quebec Committees. Some of the Quebec Committees are the Principal Committee, Joint Operations Committee, Joint Policy Committee, Public Safety Committee, COJO and selected media representatives. As seen the briefing unit would develop a flexible threat package in compatibility with the total Olympic program of the Service, including the DRAE exercises. I advised Supt. Cobb that I was aware that the briefing requirement was not being overlooked and that I would bring his point of view to notice at "HQ".

Agreed

(D) Screening

8. Insp. Vermette informed that he had recently been advised by COJO that they would be employing 30,000 persons in all categories from day one of the games. This has considerable implications for our screening resources and I intend following this aspect up very shortly with both "A" Operations and Foreign Services.

(E) Global Threat Studies

9. Further to item (B) Supt. Cobb enquired as to the intended involvement of other Departments and Agencies in our total threat develop-

TO / À Supt. Begalki

FROM / DE Cpl. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT / OBJET

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE 1P-100-3
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE June 27, 1974

I am submitting this memo as an idea/suggestion paper on how "D" Operations can improve their photo identification system across the country. After working on the International Terrorist briefing unit for the past month, I became increasingly aware of our deficiencies in this area. The end product of months of investigation can quite often be no more than a positive ident made on one of our main subjects at a V.I.P. or Special Events demonstration. The positive ident by our members or city police, and subsequent action can effectively neutralize a potentially dangerous situation. However, before an arrest can be affected or close surveillance applied to a subject he must be positively identified. Our job at these demonstrations, V.I.P. meetings etc. has been to advise the C.I.B. members of a subjects presence and then to render assistance.

2. In the past we have been able to accomplish this by having Security Service members, who know the subjects, in attendance at every event. Most events have been centralized and fairly easy to cover. Even Expo 67 was at least held on 3 islands and surveillance could be taken up at the relatively few entrance areas. However, the 76 Olympics is shaping up as a multi-dimensional security nightmare. True, the athletes village will be very secure, but the events themselves are a different matter. For example, the archery events are slated for the Laurentians; soccer for Sherbrooke; handball for Quebec City; water sports in Kingston, etc. In short, any one "threat" country could be in 10 events at 10 different locations around Montreal and area at any one time. All the parks in Montreal are being turned into training fields for the athletes, some of whom are slated to arrive up to 3 months prior to the Olympics. Again any "threat" country could have its athletes spread over 5 different training parks at the same time.

31.7.74
[Signature]

Reviewed [Signature]
FEB 17 1974
SECURITY SERVICE
000870 RECORDS

3. Given that we only have so many investigators who know the subjects in their own interest area, given the number of locations we will be asked to cover should we learn of a threat to any one team on a given day, I submit that the task becomes impossible unless we have an excellent photo album that we can distribute to our own C.I.B. and their counterparts.

4. At the present time we completely lack this capability. Certain "HQ" desks have national albums but these are bulky, cumbersome, and cover every subject instead of just those that pose a security threat. Some field units have their own albums but again these are in black and white, contain superfluous detail which limit their access and are by no means standardized or adaptable to quick change or a mendment.

5. Through my Montreal grapevine, I learned that "C" Division, "D" Operations, Special Projects had instituted a new photo program and had put one Cst. [redacted] in charge of instituting it. As Cst. [redacted] is presently in Ottawa on an Induction Course I took the liberty of interviewing him about the project. He has been appointed the Security Service photographer and he alone will photograph the subjects. Each section submits to him the names of the more potentially dangerous subjects. At the present time the sum total for "C" Division is 60 subjects. He has purchased special colour equipment and by taking the photos himself he will be guaranteed a professional and standardized product. He will be preparing a photo bank and slide bank to be used for briefings and in the Ops. Centre, however, he returns the photo's to the section for them to make albums for distribution.

6. Herein lies what I see to be the main drawbacks of this project. They will be neither standardized nor compiled as one complete Security Service album, not to mention either national or international coverage.

7. I would therefore like to make the following proposal, "HQ" "D" Operations should co-ordinate this project and institute it in Toronto and Vancouver. The photos should be taken in those centres by one person using identical equipment and film (Cst. [redacted] could travel to the other smaller Divisions to take their pictures for them and aid them in setting up a photo bank). To further standardize the product the "HQ" co-ordinator should set up a standard format so that it is distributable and not restrictive in nature. This will also ensure that all albums have the same subjects on the same pages for easy reference and direction. For example we could put out an x APB on all subjects on pages 10-14 (i.e. CPC (M-L)) if they are the threat of the day. The CPC (M-L) could have pages

10-14 with 15 & 16 in reserve for any additions (similar to CSO's).

8. By having a "HQ" co-ordinator we also simplify the technical problems. At the present time the Force does not have the equipment to print colour photos on paper. The "C" Division project was therefore going to produce various albums with "glued" in pictures. The problems here are obvious; unprofessional, sloppy and a monumental task when you consider we could end up with 200 subjects and 500 albums.

9. My discussions with our IDENT Branch have shown that we could have the album lithographed at a local established print shop for the photos only. The sheets could then be run through our own printing shop for the addition of the biographical data and collation.

10. The end product is a professional colour album produced in final form 3 months prior to the Olympics but easily adaptable to new amendments etc. I believe that this album project could come under direction of the man assigned to the briefing unit of the International Terrorist Section for initial implementation. I would also suggest that the album be broken down into 3 separate volumes. National (those subjects already in Canada), American (those subjects in North or South America that could enter Canada via our Southern border) and International (those subjects that would be arriving by International Flights). This would restrict the size of the album that you would have to supply our Airport security or our Border crossings etc.

11. The cost of this project is minimal when weighed against the fact that a positive identification of a potentially dangerous subject could prevent an international incident. (Munich and Black September, Kosygin and Matri, Nixon and Bremmer, Ghandi and the CPC M-L). In actual dollars and cents I have been advised by Cst. [redacted] that he purchased \$1,500.00 worth of new equipment which, when added to existing facilities gives him all that is required (besides expertise) to produce a very professional product.

12. Proper "HQ" direction and co-ordination early in the preparatory stages will not only guarantee us this professional product but will be welcomed, I believe, by the field.

[redacted]
[redacted]
Cpl.

Sup. By alke
Discussed with DG 30/1/75
DDG-ops - As I discussed with you we must keep this on track
Insp. I.W. Taylor,
Security Service Representative,
Olympic Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

W
M. R. DARE

Officer i/c "D" Operations

HQP 465-83-1

JAN 30 1975

January 29, 1975.

Threat Estimates
Olympics 1976

I refer to the memorandum appended to your A-5 dated 27 JAN 75. At the outset may I say that on reading the attachment, I wonder if the writer is aware of the job descriptions written for Security Service people who are posted in the Secretariat. That said, I will attempt to respond to the various points raised.

2. It was envisaged that Security Service personnel would be free to call on the resources of the entire Security Service for information and that they in turn would translate it in a manner that would interface with the particular audience they were dealing with. For instance, if Insp. Hugo's International Terrorist Section provide a paper on current developments, the D.D.G. (Ops) envisaged that since we have posted senior people to the Secretariat, they could extract that information and cleanse it in a form to meet a particular audience. In other words, the major bolt of cloth would be tailored to the needs of the Olympic Secretariat. We are now providing a quarterly assessment which goes along to the Cabinet. If you need more nuts and bolts on day-to-day terrorism, you are in receipt of the weekly terrorist bulletin, which is rather comprehensive and is produced by Insp. Hugo's staff. You therefore have experienced people on your staff that should be able to recognize sensitive information that should not be disseminated for open publication. There are those items and material that can be tailored to get the message across without jeopardizing the source.

3. Now, the matter of briefing select people. There will be instances, although there should not be many, where separate threat presentation may be made from those within "D" and "G" Operations that are now being designed in relation to our Presentation Unit, but I do not foresee that we will ever have the resources to give this to all audiences, nor have

.... 2

- (a) Basic security information might be accumulated over an extended period through the establishment of a special control centre in a suitable location. This centre would screen visa applications from persons who may pose a terrorist threat.
- (b) Work on improved methods of identifying false documents can be advanced.
- (c) Intensified examinations can be conducted to identify possible threats.
- (d) The Immigration Intelligence capability can be expanded and concentrate on identifying threats against the Olympics.
- (e) Work on a computerized system to identify known criminals and security risks can be advanced.
- (f) An Immigration Co-ordinator for the Olympics can be appointed.

None of these steps would require major new resources, and some would be beneficial beyond the scope of Olympic games, immediately and in the future. Additional start-up costs could be in the order of \$2-3 millions, with a continuing annual cost for computer systems in the order of \$800,000. Integration with existing or other developing systems of computerized identification of criminal and security risks could reduce these costs.

Refugees and Defectors

As a part of the security preparations, provision should also be made for dealing with persons who decide to defect and remain in Canada as refugees. The German authorities were faced with some 30-40 applicants for political asylum, mainly from

Communist dominated countries. We can expect that in 1976 the numbers seeking sanctuary in Canada will increase. Such individuals can be moved quickly and quietly to Immigration Accommodation quarters at Champlain Harbour, Quebec, where their applications can be examined.

Removal from Canada

Despite all possible efforts it would be unrealistic to expect that some criminal, or terrorist elements will not gain entry to the country. Once in the capability to remove^{them}/quickly and effectively is very limited. Even if proposed new Appeals Legislation is in effect there will still need to be full access to the Immigration Inquiry system and the Canadian Courts which can cause long delay. In addition, security information can seldom be used as evidence at an Immigration Inquiry.

To meet the eventuality of a serious threat, it will be proposed later that special legislation be enacted to be effective during the period from June 15 to October 15, 1976, which would grant the Minister of Manpower and Immigration emergency powers to refuse entry or order the removal of persons whose presence in Canada would be detrimental to Canadian interests during that period on the basis of security or criminal reports received by the Minister. These powers would be used to remove from Canada foreign demonstrators threatening to disrupt the Olympic games and to prevent the admission of suspected terrorists. The order for rejection or removal would only apply during the specified period. The preventive effect of such special powers could obviate the need to use them.

The proposed special powers could be added to an omnibus Olympics bill now being prepared or by a subsequent amendment to an Olympics bill. A provision for summary removal or refusal of entry, however, will require an exclusion from the Bill of Rights and most certainly will be attacked as an unwarranted invasion of civil liberties. Furthermore, a new Immigration Act, including a clause that would provide additional powers for removal of security risks from Canada might well be in force in time for the commencement of the Olympic games. Despite these considerations it is imperative to know at this time whether security planning can proceed in anticipation that there will be legislative authority to permit immediate rejection or removal from Canada of such persons as foreign terrorists, criminals and demonstrators without recourse to appeal and inquiry procedures.

b. Customs Clearance

I.O.C. advocates no inspection of baggage or belongings for persons in possession of Olympic Identity Cards. Such conditions appear in the Munich Olympic Booklet of 1972. The danger of following such a procedure is that if such demands are acceded to, persons intent on causing harm would have an open invitation to import the necessary weapons.

There is no basis in Canadian Customs law for exemption from baggage examination, except for accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign governments. Although Customs practices in effect may not entail actual examination of all baggage, this is determined on a selective basis, through the application of certain criteria at the discretion of the examining officer.

In no particular case or types of cases are Customs officers empowered to waive examination on a 100% basis. To eliminate or even lower standards of examination would serve only to enhance the possibilities for a security threat and necessitate the employment of greater numbers of personnel and equipment for detection and protection purposes. Consequently, it is considered extremely inadvisable to entertain any suggestion of a "blanket" exemption from Customs examination for visitors coming to Canada for the Games.

There should be no difficulty in arranging baggage examination procedures that will accommodate Olympic visitors with a minimum of delay or inconvenience and without compromising security. There is sufficient time to review the requirements, devise systems, test procedures and train personnel.

c. Participant and VIP Security

Plans for the protection of participants, coaches officials, etc., must match the estimate of the threat. Understandably, no accurate forecast of the threat can be made for 1976 at this time. All that can be done now is to examine the current trends, project them to 1976 and plan for the worst possible situation such as attempted assassination or kidnapping.

At Munich in 1972 VIP's, athletes, coaches and trainers numbered about 12,000. It seems doubtful that the city of Montreal could provide more than a token effort of personnel protection for this number. As members of Olympic teams, participants are representatives of their respective countries, and therefore some may have to be placed in a high risk category from a security point of view as were the Israelis at Munich.

d. Airports and National Harbours

Plans must be made to increase security forces on a gradual scale until 1976 to meet the expected flow of traffic entering Canada from overseas. Seventy-two per cent of the persons visiting the Olympics in Japan arrived by air. In 1968, Mexico's percentage was sixty-eight. Canada's figure can be estimated as between sixty and seventy per cent.

e. Canada - United States Border Crossings

Ground traffic will be a major problem at border points. The Immigration and Customs services and the RCMP assisted by DND, must develop contingency plans for special border patrols for unmanned border crossings and to control traffic to or at points of examination.

f. Vital points

Depending upon the degree of the threat, the RCMP may very well be required to provide security to protect Vital Points. These number 37 in Quebec and 4 in Ontario. There are also 27 Provincial Peacetime Vital Points located in Montreal.

E. SUPPORT TO THE RCMP FROM THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

DND support has been requested by the RCMP, both in Montreal and Kingston, in a variety of areas such as ground and air transport, communications, guard duty, crowd control, riot control, border surveillance and marine assistance.

Defence Department plans to meet these needs and those requested of it by COJO are detailed in Cabinet Document 454/73 entitled "DND Support to Olympic 1976".



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

00181 MAY 26 75

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A Assistant Federal Security Coordinator

FROM
DE Officer i/c Olympics Secretariat
Security Service

SUBJECT
OBJET

Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
[REDACTED]
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
HQY 465-83
DATE
April 4, 1975

Attached is a copy of letter received from the Officer i/c "D" Operations, Security Service in reply to my letter to him dated 25 Feb 1975.

Further to this, the Olympics Secretariat, Security Service, has compiled a list of Terrorist Organizations as an index for the front of Vol. I of the Country Profiles Books. A copy of the index is attached hereto. This will facilitate anyone who wishes to look up an assessment of a particular Terrorist Group. There is at present a looseleaf binder being created which will contain up to date information on Organizations, Weapons, individual terrorists, Incidents-National and International, terrorist use of documentation and Vital Points Threats General. Both the index and the binder will be updated as new information becomes available. - The binder will be held in S/Sgt. [REDACTED] Chubb Safe.

I.W. Taylor, Insp.,
Officer i/c Olympics Secretariat
Security Service

PA
370229

8/5/75

APPENDIX 3

THE TEHRAN JOURNAL

SEPTEMBER 14, 1974

AND THERE'S AN EXCESS OF
POLITICS IN THE SPORTS ARENA

When it comes to politics, the Seventh Asian Games in Tehran, has seen more than its fair share. And that is one aspect of the games that the Tehran organizing committee, who set out so admirably to have things fair and square at this event, are not too happy about.

Political disruptions at the games began on a major scale with the Chinese refusing to enter the arena for a fencing bout with an Israeli contendeer. Since then, they've gone on to include the Pakistanis refusing to play basketball with the Israelis, the North Koreans refusing to meet the Israeli football team on Thursday and the Kuwait footballers announcing that they will not play Israel in Saturday's match.

In between the Chinese have also walked out of other arenas and between them all the sportsmen and team officials refusing to meet this or that team, have managed to throw the games into a war of words and walkouts unequalled in previous Asian Games.

The political bickering even went into the medical side of the games. When doping charges came - including those that were eventually cleared up - some team officials were going around intimidating that "someone" from "such and such a nation"

was meanwhile heaving verbal balls of fire at the suspected nation for "cheating" in the sports arena.

And with all the dope talk going on and the "we won't play them" mix-ups, team officials and sportsmen, alike have been having their full say outside the sports arena, giving their reasons in full, which, seeing as they are slated full of political blasts, are not worth repeating.

In the middle of all this very unsporting activity, DPRK spectators and officials at a boxing match choose to storm into the boxing ring, fists at the ready, to dispute a jury ruling when one of their nation's prize boxers lost. While this wasn't a political event as such, it was enough to create another storm of, again unsporting, confusion when the police had to be moved in to quell the row.

The whole spectacle in Tehran - decked with political backbiting behind the scenes, mostly among team officials with the sportsmen left in confusion in the middle - illustrates just how far the emergence of politics in sports arena has come. In fact, with Munich currently standing as the most glaring example of the passing of the sports arena as a neutral zone, it would seem that they could be here to stay.

Perhaps the state of things which occurred in Tehran which at the start was sparked by the Chinese, is best phrased by a Chinese official who declined to be identified.

"There are", he said, "some things that we cannot forget - not even in the sports ring."

When a nation admits that it is not prepared - or

not willing - to concentrate on sports and forget politics, and a nation like China with such superb sports prowess as that illustrated in Tehran, then there would not appear to be much hope for the future of politically clean sports events in the future.

Does China feel the same way? Would they expect similar walkouts in the future?

"We cannot say," said the official, "we are only thinking of the way things stand today."

For most of the press people covering the Tehran games the political happenings here have come as a surprise.

Newsmen we spoke to from Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and even Chinese and Pakistani members, were not expecting to see the flowering of a political battle on the tennis courts, in the fencing room, in the football pitch and beside the basketball nets.

The unhappiest newsman we spoke to was one from Israel who did not comment fully on the events to date but simply summed up his feeling by saying, "I came to Tehran to cover good, clean sport and I've ended up writing about politics."

Many of the press people at the games in fact, say they seem to have spent their time writing "more about political events than sports".

While that is not entirely true, because the games have provided some excellent sports copy, there has obviously been enough political activity to have left a sharp impression on the newsmen's minds.

How do the visiting newsmen feel the Tehran show of

walkouts is going to affect the Asian Games of the future and, indeed, other major sports events from the Olympic down?

Generally, they feel that after the Munich Olympic disaster which showed that the international sports arena can no longer be considered as an honored, non-political, neutral testing ground for the feats of the human being, anything can happen.

One suggestion to stop a similar display of political grievances at future Asian Games at least, was given by a South Korean journalist who said he was "totally upset" by the political meanderings in Tehran.

"What we must do is get all participating nations to sign an official document saying they will take part in all sports events, regardless of political differences, or else stay at home," he said.

It sounds very nice. But would it in fact stop similar occurrences. Would team officials, so obviously influenced by feelings back home, be willing to concentrate on winning national prestige through sports, rather than gaining newspace for their walkouts?

The South Korean, and other journalists from Asia and the Western world, feel that such a ruling - perhaps with added possible penalties imposed for nations who break it - would at least force recognition that the Asian Games, and other international sports events, are completely neutral exhibition grounds for sports and sports alone.

"If something isn't done," said the Korean, "then politics will gradually sneak into every international sports event and the spirit of sports competition will be lost."

Perhaps the entrance of politics into the sports arena, both here and at other events before, is best summed up by a Western journalist we spoke to.

"The entrance of politics into the Asian Games could mean the end of an admirable competition of the strength and effort of men and women out to break sports records," he said.

"Politics must be kept out of sports, otherwise there will be nothing more to watch. The time has come for all sporting nations to remember that if they want to continue in this drive of showing the success of human beings in the sports arena, then they must play politics at home - not through their sportsmen."

CONFIDENTIAL

Officer i/c "D" Ops.

I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator
Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

18-10-74

The attached memo dated 11-7-74 from the A/FSC has been held in abeyance pending reorganization of the Secretariat, which has now been completed.

2. I have had detailed discussions with Insp. Allen on the several matters raised in his memo. He has also been briefed on the country profile program and the DRAE exercises.

3. In essence, the A/FSC is requesting the following additional support from the Security Service:

(i) Threat projections for individual responsibility sectors, specifically, vital points, harbours, borders, airports.

(ii) Synopsis handouts on known terrorist activities, groups, aims, modus operandi, etc.

4. To fully consider this request I recommend a meeting be set up at your earliest convenience to review current and projected threat planning, and to explore the feasibility of additional action. Both Insp. Allen and I would like to attend such a meeting with appropriate members of your staff.

IWT
I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator

✓ cc: Insp. Allen, A/FSC
CC: Officer i/c Pol. Planning and Co-ordinator^{ion}

Noted J. Allen 21/10/74
OCT 23 1974

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PA ple 465-51
14/11/74
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Salminen
16-7-74

CONFIDENTIAL

Insp. Taylor A/F.S.C. (Security Service)

Insp. Allen A/F.S.C.

July 11, 1974

Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

In your absence a general meeting of the secretariat was held wherein our role and function was discussed in Olympic Security Planning.

Specific tasks were assigned each responsibility desk to review all files relative to their area; in preparation for a briefing session Monday, July 15, 1974. This exercise is intended to bring the secretariat to date on what has been done in these areas, what needs to be done and generally where we are going.

One issue which was raised and holds considerable merit and requires immediate attention is:

Having Security Service provide a resume of the threat estimate in each of our responsibility areas: ie: Vital Points, Harbours, Boarders, Airports etc..

We believe this is essential to our basic and preliminary security planning. This stage of the threat estimate could include (1) what has happened in the past and (2) what is happening today in the respective areas.

The second stage threat estimate could (1) bring us up to date and (2) with the aid of "games" or "scenarios" you may be in a position to tell us what we may reasonably expect in terrorism etc.

Periodic up-dating, as the need arises, would be necessary in some areas prior to the final approval of an operational plan (from the national standpoint); at which time we would again like to have a complete and final assessment prior to implementation.

We should also consider the feasibility of producing a general hand-out for all secretariat members which would capsualize known terrorist, militant groups etc., who may conceivably use the

..... 2

staging of the games as a vehicle to further their goals. This might include such ready reference material as their general philosophy, numbers aims and mode of achieving public recognition.

Although it will understandably take some time to develop the threat estimates and a hand-out you may wish to set your goals in line with our priorities in planning for policy statements and carry this out unilaterally in order that the secretariat will be in a position to advise the operational units ASAP on the perimeters of security planning at this stage.

I have raised the subject with S/Sgt. [REDACTED] of your staff last week and would like to discuss with you and the F.S.C. as soon as conveniently possible.

G.W. Allen, Insp.,
Assistant Federal Security Coordinator
for the 1976 Olympics

cc: F.S.C.

S/Sgt. [REDACTED]

Further to our earlier conversation; I would like you to attend with me when meeting arranged.

G. Allen

[Handwritten signature]

R-145

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT/WEAPONS/BOMBS/DEVICES

OBJECTIVE:

Provide a one-half day three hour presentation in Halifax, Fredericton, Montreal, Kingston, Ottawa, Vancouver, Edmonton (or Calgary), Regina, and Toronto.

TIME REQUIRED:

Two weeks (permits one presentation in each city).

ALTERNATE 'A'

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT/WEAPONS/BOMBS/DEVICES

RESOURCE PERSONNEL - 3

TOPICS:

- Terrorist Threat
- Terrorist Weapons
- Bombs and Devices

CONTENT:

- 1 hour on terrorist threat in Canada.
- 1 hour on weapons. How transported and used.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ hour on bombs and devices.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ hour - general discussion and questions.

AIDS:

- Colour slides; 9 demonstration weapons; several grenades; several bombs and devices; limited handouts.

COST:

- \$3,034 (inflation could increase cost to \$3,187).

EFFECT:

- High

ALTERNATE 'B'

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT/WEAPONS/BOMBS/DEVICES

RESOURCE PERSONNEL - 2

TOPICS:

- Terrorist threat
- Terrorist weapons, bombs, devices.

CONTENT:

- 1 hour on terrorist threat in Canada.
- 1½ hours on weapons, bombs, devices
- ½ hour - general discussion and questions.

AIDS:

- Colour slides; approximately 9 demonstration weapons; several grenades; several bombs and devices; some handouts.

COST:

- \$2,052 (inflation could increase cost to \$2,155)

EFFECT:

- High

ALTERNATE 'C'

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT/WEAPONS/BOMBS/DEVICES

RESOURCE PERSONNEL - 1

TOPICS: - Terrorist threat

CONTENT: - 2½ hours on terrorist threat in Canada;
relating incidents and weapons/bombs/
devices used elsewhere.

AIDS: - Colour slides; handouts; some demonstration
weapons, bombs or devices (little discussion
regarding them)

COST: - \$1,070 (inflation could increase cost
to \$1,124)

EFFECT: - Satisfactory.

ALTERNATE 'D'

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

RESOURCE PERSONNEL - 1

TOPIC: - Terrorist threat

CONTENT: - 2½ hours on terrorist threat in Canada
- using handouts to show pictures of
weapons, bombs, devices used in various
incidents.

AIDS: - Colour slides; handouts.

COST: - \$1,070 (inflation could increase cost
to \$1,124)

EFFECT: - Satisfactory - regarding the threat;
probably less than satisfactory
regarding weapons, etc.

ALTERNATE 'E'

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

RESOURCE PERSONNEL - NONE

TOPIC: - Terrorist threat

CONTENT: - Use circulars, pamphlets, etc. to disseminate certain information.

COST: - Estimated: \$800.00 based on a 20 page, black and white, 8½" X 11" booklet.

EFFECT: - Difficult to ascertain; however may be unsatisfactory.

- A) TO ATTAIN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTANCE
AND SUPPORT OF THE OLYMPIC SECURITY PROGRAM

AND

- B) TO ATTAIN MEDIA UNDERSTANDING, ACCEPTANCE,
SUPPORT OF AND PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
IN THE OLYMPICS CONTEXT.

3. IN RELATION TO THE FIRST OBJECTIVE, I WOULD SUGGEST
THAT THE FOLLOWING GOALS MIGHT BE SET, AMONG OTHERS:

- A) TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC THE APPREHENDED THREATS
TO OLYMPIC SECURITY POSED BY PAST AND
PRESENT WORLD, NATIONAL AND LOCAL CONDITIONS;
- B) TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF THE NATURE OF THE MEASURES
PLANNED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO RESPOND TO
THE APPREHENDED THREAT.
- C) TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF HOW THE VARIOUS RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS MAY IMPACT^{ON} THE VARIOUS
CATEGORIES OF PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR AT OLYMPIC
EVENTS;
- D) TO PERSUADE THE PUBLIC OF THE NEED FOR THE SECURITY
MEASURES PLANNED AND HOW MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC CAN
COOPERATE PASSIVELY AND ACTIVELY WITH SECURITY
AUTHORITIES.

*Transmitted to
19-7-75*

...../2

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

Imp. Higgs / Taylor

Have we ever seen the material mentioned in

page 2 - Para 4 - 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Our file: 55-26-2

Let me know

PSI-1078

12-6-75

OTTAWA, May 23, 1975.

The Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
O T T A W A.

ATTENTION: Chief Superintendant J.R. Quintal
Federal Olympic Security Co-ordinator

You will recall discussions with Mr. Venner of this Division concerning the necessity for us to give Mr. Soukharev of the Soviet Embassy an answer to his request for a security briefing on the Olympics. On 14 May Mr. Chistoff of our Eastern European Division had a discussion with Mr. Soukharev on this matter and he has reported as follows:

" At Mr. Chistoff's request, Mr. Soukharev visited the Division on May 14 so that we could discuss with him a few matters before his return to Moscow on May 15 for a five week holiday.

Olympic Security Briefing

Mr. Chistoff informed Mr. Soukharev that, following the representations made by him and Mr. Makarov, it had been decided that security briefings would be given to those governments requesting them. He went on to say that the mechanics of these briefings had not yet been settled, i.e., "who would give them, where they would be given and when they would be given." These questions would probably be decided before Mr. Soukharev's return from holidays. In any case, it was probably too early at this stage to provide such briefings, since there was a whole year before the Olympics were to take place.



NOTED
Can. 17.6.75

Noted
28/5/75

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- 2 -


Mr. Soukharev appeared pleased to receive this bit of news. He said, however, that in his view it was not too early to begin thinking about security problems, since terrorists from the Middle East would begin well in advance their penetration of Canada. He said that, depending on how forthcoming the Canadian side was in its security arrangements, the Soviet authorities would be able to hand the Canadian security authorities a list of known terrorists, six of whom were Japanese, a number Indian, one Canadian and one American. He assured Mr. Chistoff that the information he would be able to hand over would be completely authoritative. In reply to Mr. Soukharev's question, Mr. Chistoff said he thought that there could be a general type of briefing for all governments concerned and individual briefings that would take into account the particular concerns of each government. He said that, after the briefings were given, Mr. Soukharev would be in a position to say whether he thought the Canadian security authorities were sufficiently forthcoming to satisfy the Soviet authorities and he would be able to decide whether to hand over the information which the Soviet side had. Mr. Chistoff cautioned Mr. Soukharev about expecting the Canadian security authorities to be 100% forthcoming, since their main concern was security and there was a danger that whatever information was handed out would leak to non-authorized people. Perhaps because of a misunderstanding about what Mr. Chistoff said, Mr. Soukharev commented that on such questions he spoke to no one in the Embassy except the Ambassador, so that we could be assured there would be no leaks."

You will note that Mr. Soukharev has some information on terrorists which he will provide during the security briefing. Please let us know when the arrangements for this briefing are finalized in order that we may put Mr. Soukharev in direct touch with the appropriate authorities.



R.M. Middleton
Director

Intelligence and Security Liaison Division



001057

SECRET

SS(D)1782/49

PAGE ~~THREE~~ ^{ACE}

IN OBTAINING INFORMATION. WE FEEL, HOWEVER, IN FUTURE SITUATIONS OF THIS TYPE THAT SIMILAR EFFORT IN OTHER DIVISIONS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AT THE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. SUCH COORDINATION SHOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE TO ENSURE EACH DIVISION CARRIES OUT THEIR DEFUSION AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT INFORMATION DEVELOPED IS FREELY EXCHANGED, PARTICULARLY THAT WHICH IS OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTEREST.

THE DEFUSION PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED US WITH MANY VALUABLE LONG-TERM "CONTACTS" IN THE VARIOUS ETHNIC COMMUNITIES. WE ARE BETTER INFORMED OF ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN TORONTO THAN EVER BEFORE AND PLAN TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THESE CONTACTS.

THREAT ASSESSMENT: THIS AREA IS IN OUR OPINION, DIVIDED INTO TWO AREAS; 1) THE THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND 2) THE COUNTRY PROFILE BOOKS PREPARED BY THE "D" SECTION, SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECTION. THESE BOOKS WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES FOR COUNTRY BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHEN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING DEFUSION. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN USED WHEN PLANNING VIP SECURITY. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RETAIN AND UP-DATE THE INFORMATION IN THE BOOKS.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS WERE A VALUABLE TOOL FOR KEEPING OLYMPIC COMMANDERS, OTHER OFFICES AND OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS ADVISED OF DEVELOPING SITUATIONS.

OLYMPIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: NO COMMENT.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER FORCES TO THE JOINT SECURITY SERVICE COMMITTEES:

OUR MAJOR DEALINGS WITH OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS CONSISTED OF LIAISONING OF INFORMATION WITH METRO TORONTO POLICE, PEEL REGIONAL POLICE AND ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE.

RELATIONSHIPS AND COOPERATION WITH THE METRO TORONTO POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS FELT TO BE EXCELLENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY WORKED DIRECTLY WITH SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS AND AFFORDED EVERY ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE. INFORMATION LIAISED WAS TREATED IN A RESTRICTED MANNER.

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE WAS SUPPLIED WITH INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THEM AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE TORONTO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE, IN THE TORONTO AREA, WAS RESTRICTED. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THEIR MAXIMUM EFFORT AFFORDED TO THE KINGSTON SITE. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN METRO TORONTO POLICE AND O.P.P. MERELY METRO ASSUMED SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TORONTO AREA DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH O.P.P. WERE GENERALLY HANDLED THROUGH THE KINGSTON POST.

AN AREA OF CONCERN WAS THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM USED BY O.P.P. IN TORONTO. THE PURPOSE OF THEIR OPERATIONS CENTRE WAS NEVER CLARIFIED TO EITHER THIS FORCE OR APPARENTLY TO THE METRO TORONTO POLICE. THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE AN OPERATIONS CENTRE IN TORONTO WAS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN UNTIL LATE IN THE PLANNING STAGES AND DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD WAS NOT UTILIZED IN THE TORONTO AREA. AS A RESULT METRO USED OUR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR CONTACTING SUCH POINTS AS KINGSTON FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. IT WAS NOTICED THAT ON ABOUT TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS THE O.P.P. AT KINGSTON WERE

1A-10-16-8-2

SECRET



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Insp. G. Godfrey
S/Sgt. [REDACTED]

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

76 Summer Olympics -
Threat Assessment - (General)

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SECURITE

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE


YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

25 February 1975

On 24 February 1975 the Federal Security Coordinator discussed with me a need he perceives for the analysis and correlation of Security Service threat intelligence in such a way as to be of maximum utility to both himself and the Secretariat, for planning and briefing purposes.

Firstly, the Federal Security Coordinator stated that he would like us to extract all items from Guidelines, terrorist weekly and monthly bulletins, which have direct relevance to the Olympics and to set them out by appropriate subject categories. He proposed that an initial threat updating be presented at a future Monday general meeting and that a weekly intelligence updating be given at each subsequent general meeting. I agreed to discuss his proposal with members of the Security Service Secretariat to arrive at a practical solution. The following categories were suggested by the Federal Security Coordinator for our consideration:



MAY 15 1975
SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS


I would like to discuss the Federal Security Coordinator's request as soon as S/Sgt. [redacted] returns off course to determine feasibility and format. The F.S.C. is basically looking for material prepared in a loose-leaf style to permit regular updating with a minimum of effort. The first step, is to review back issues of the Guidelines and terrorist bulletins as well as any other material we have on hand to identify relevant items. Once this is done a format can then be designed which may also lend itself to other uses in conjunction with our development of suitable threat packages for dissemination to "A", "C" and "O" Divisions and other police forces involved in Olympic planning.

[redacted]

In reply I stated that a threat assessment relevant to airports and sky-jacking incidents was currently being prepared by "D" Ops. for the information of both "P" Directorate and the Olympic Secretariat. Insofar as the other items are concerned, I stated that I would discuss them with the Officer i/c "D" Ops. and his staff.

[redacted]

"G" ops ?
✓


I.W. Taylor, Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

IT/gh

TO
A

Officer i/c "D" Operations

FROM
DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT
OBJET

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/REFERENCE

YOUR FILE - V/REFERENCE

DATE

25 February 1975

I am attaching for your information copy of memo dated 25 February 1975, to Insp. G. Godfrey and S/Sgt. [redacted] of my staff which deals with several requests from the Federal Security Coordinator relating to Security Service Threat Intelligence.

A somewhat similar request from the A/Federal Security Coordinator dated 11 July 1974, copy of attached, was forwarded to you on 18 October 1974 for consideration. I subsequently had a general discussion with Insp. Hugo when it was agreed that the Terrorist Briefing would be given to the Olympic Secretariat at a suitable time. This briefing was delayed on several occasions due to the absence of key people of the Secretariat. It was carried out on 17 February 1975.

You will see from the attachments that we intend to develop a suitable weekly briefing based on relevant extracts from Guidelines, The Terrorist Bulletins and other available material, which should adequately meet the first request of the Federal Security Coordinator. His other requests are somewhat broader in scope and I would like to discuss them with you at your convenience. Subsequently it may be useful to arrange a meeting with the Federal Security Coordinator to review current and projected "D" Ops. threat related programs.

I.W. Taylor
I.W. Taylor, Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

MAY 15 1975

SECURITY SERVICE
45

00165 FEB 17 76

20: ROUTINE TOR 2 KK 17-2-76

TO: OTT 3 "D" OPS

MSG NO: SS (D) 295/270

RE: GENERAL CONDITIONS AND SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES AMONG NEGROS - TORONTO

All replies or references to this message must
the security classification stamped herein,
unless declassified by proper authority.

YOUR TELEPHONE IS NOT SECURE

The content or any portion of this message
irrespective of classification is NOT to be
discussed over the telephone.

THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS AN ESTIMATE OF THREAT EXISTING
TOWARDS THE OLYMPIC GAMES FROM WITHIN THE BLACK COMMUNITIES AND
THE WAY IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN COUNTERING SAME. THIS SHOULD BE READ
IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR REPORT THIS FILE DATED 30-1-76.

2. WE FORESEE A THREAT FROM A DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY WITH
THE POSSIBILITY, AS IN MANY DEMONSTRATIONS, OF CONFRONTATION
WITH THE POLICE OR SOME OTHER SEGMENT OF OUR SOCIETY. THIS THREAT
IS CALCULATED FROM TWO POINTS OF VIEW, RACIAL AND POLITICAL.

THE RACIAL POINT OF VIEW:

3. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF EMBARRASSMENT TO BLACK ATHLETES.

WE HAVE
FOUND THAT THE WESTERN GUARD OF LATE WERE APPARENTLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR HATE MAIL RECEIVED BY VARIOUS BLACK PERSONS IN TORONTO. THERE
IS NOT NECESSARILY A FEAR BUILDING UP, BUT A DEFINITE CONCERN AS TO
WHAT FOR EXAMPLE THE WESTERN GUARD WILL DO NEXT. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE
NO CONCERTED EFFORT FROM WITHIN THE VARIOUS BLACK COMMUNITIES HAS
BEEN INITIATED TO COUNTERACT SUCH AN ORGANIZATION, OR TO COUNTERACT
RACIST SITUATIONS IN GENERAL.

THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW:

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF SIT-INS OR MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS DOES
EXIST FROM FACTIONS WITHIN OUR AREA OF CONCERN. THIS AGAIN COULD
CAUSE CONFRONTATIONS, AS IN OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS, WITH THE AUTHORITIES
OR SOME OTHER SEGMENT OF SOCIETY. THIS CONCERN IS OF COURSE
A POLITICAL CONTEXT COVERING ISSUES RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES.
THE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES PERTINENT TO THEIR POLITICAL SITUATIONS
ARE EXAMINED HEREUNDER, FOLLOWING WHICH IS A BRIEF SUMMARY.

SECRET

Reviewed..... 1286
MAY 14 1976
SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS

000088

FEB 18 1976

GRENADA: -

THE ONLY PROBLEM THAT COULD ARISE FROM THE ANTI-GAIRY FACTION HERE IN TORONTO IS IF THE GRENADIAN PRIME MINISTER DOES MAKE AN APPEARANCE AT THE GAMES OR HERE IN TORONTO.

THIS WOULD MOST LIKELY BE ONLY IN THE FORM OF A DEMONSTRATION. WE FORESEE LITTLE OR NO TROUBLE FROM THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: - AS IN MOST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES THERE IS STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT GOV'T.

ANY ACTIVITY WOULD VERY LIKELY TAKE THE FORM OF A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION. A MINOR THREAT OF DEMONSTRATION CATEGORY, XSIS FROM THE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF MOVEMENT POPULAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA. THIS COMMITTEE, HEADED BY ROSIE DOUGLAS IS VERY UNHAPPY WITH THE FACT THAT TRINIDAD GOV'T HAVE NOT PERMITTED CUBAN AIRCRAFT, BOUND FOR ANGOLA TO REFUEL IN THEIR COUNTRY. TRINIDADIAN GOV'T OFFICIALS VISIT COULD TRIGGER DEMONSTRATIONS.

JAMAICA: - JAMAICA HAS BEEN DESCRIBED

AS MOST POLITICAL COUNTRY IN THE CARIBBEAN.

THERE ARE TWO VERY STRONG PARTIES IN THE COUNTRY THAT ARE CONTINUALLY AT ONE ANOTHER'S THROATS. THERE IS CURRENTLY A PROBLEM HERE IN TORONTO WITHIN THE JAMAICAN NATIONAL LEAGUE IN THAT SOME MEMBERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THE JNL APPRECIATIVELY TO THE LEFT. THIS IS OF COURSE CONTRARY TO THE ORIGINAL SITUATION IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER MANLEYS SUPPORTERS IN THE JNL WERE FOR THE MOST PART POLITICALLY CENTER LINE. THE SAME SITUATION EXISTS IN THE GOVERNING PARTY IN JAMAICA. WE CAN PERHAPS EXPECT A SITUATION IN THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY FROM THESE ADHERENTS DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMAICA PRECEEDING, AND AT THE TIME OF THE OLYMPICS.

BARBADOS: -

BARBADOS GOV'T RECENTLY VOTED AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH ISREAL REGARDING THE ZIONIST ISSUE. THEREFORE WE FEEL THERE IS A REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION POSSIBLY OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY FROM SOME ARAE FACTION. WE HAVE NO DEFINITE INDICATION OF SUCH A THREAT

A VISIT BY BARBADOS GOV'T OFFICIALS COULD TRIGGER RETALIATORY ACTION.

COMPLA: - AN ORGANIZATION FORMED IN DEC 75 IN SUPPORT OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN ANGOLA. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A COALITION IT DOES HAVE SUPPORT FROM SUCH GROUPS AS THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS A C.P. OF C. FRONT, AND THE COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIES AS WELL AS THE REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST GROUP.

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SECRET

SECRET

SS(D)295/270

SECRET

PAGE THREE

IT HELD A DEMONSTRATION IN JANUARY 1976 AT THE TRINIDAD TOBAGO TRADE OFFICES IN TORONTO, IN PROTEST OF TRINIDAD'S REFUSAL TO LET CUBAN AIRCRAFT REFUEL ON THERE WAY TO ANGOLA. THERE WAS A SLIGHT DISTURBANCE AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS INVOLVEMENT WILL GO BEYOND THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY.

5. AS INDICATED ABOVE WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY AT THIS TIME. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED HOWEVER THAT POLITICAL SITUATION MENTIONED COULD CHANGE, TROUBLE COULD ERUPT IN COUNTRIES NOT MENTIONED, AND THE RACIAL SITUATION COULD BECOME A FACTOR. WE WILL CONSTANTLY MONITOR THE SITUATION AND PROVIDE WHAT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AND NECESSARY. IN ALL AREAS WE FEEL THE MOST PEOPLE THAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION, IS IN THE 40-50 RANGE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL WITH THE CAPABILITIES OR PERHAPS THE DESIRE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT THROUGH SUPPLY OF ARMS, COVER ETC., OR OF INDIVIDUALS HERE OR ABROAD WHO ARE PLANNING AN ACT OF VIOLENCE.

CPL

TOR 2

PSE ACK MSG TKS KKK

DE OTT 3 ACK

SECRET

000090



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Memo for file

FROM
DE

S/Sgt. [redacted]

SUBJECT
OBJET

C.C.S.I. Olympics Security
Planning - Threats


SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE 30 June 75

On the 25-6-75 Insp. Taylor and myself attended a "D" Ops meeting at 9:30 a.m. in the Office of Supt. Begalki. The purpose of the meeting was to identify the areas of threat which might have bearing on the peaceful staging of the Olympics. The areas were outlined and the desk heads were to submit brief written assessments of these areas with supportive data to P.P. & C. by Thursday. P.P. & C. were responsible for assembling and re-writing the information for inclusion in a paper which will be used as the basis of discussion and briefing between Mr. Dare, the Prime Minister and Mr. Basil Robinson of External Affairs.

On the 26-6-75 Insp. Godfrey and I were present in Mr. Dare's Office where the final threat summary was reviewed and discussed. Messrs. Begalki and Draper were also present. The D.G. expressed concern over the threat to the Queen, the Indian Activism and Labour problems in Montreal. The Cyprus-Greek-Turkish situation was briefly touched upon. Mr. Dare stated that this was only the first of such papers and discussions and their intent and style would develop as time goes on. He seemed satisfied with this first effort.

[redacted] S/Sgt.
Olympics Secretariat

cc: [redacted]



CONFIDENTIAL

Officer i/c "D" Ops.

I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator
Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

18-10-74

The attached memo dated 11-7-74 from the A/FSC has been held in abeyance pending reorganization of the Secretariat, which has now been completed.

2. I~~4~~ have had detailed discussions with Insp. Allen on the several matters raised in his memo. He has also been briefed on the country profile program and the DRAE exercises.

3. In essence, the A/FSC is requesting the following additional support from the Security Service:

(i) Threat projections for individual responsibility sectors, specifically, vital points, harbours, borders, airports.

(ii) Synopsis handouts on known terrorist activities, groups, aims, modus operandi, etc.

4. To fully consider this request I recommend a meeting be set up at your earliest convenience to review current and projected threat planning, and to explore the feasibility of additional action. Both Insp. Allen and I would like to attend such a meeting with appropriate members of your staff.

[Signature]

I. W. Taylor
Security Service
Olympic Co-ordinator

✓ cc: Insp. Allen, A/FSC
CC: Officer i/c Pol. Planning and Co-ordinator^{ion}

*Noted
J. Allen
21/10/74*

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CONFIDENTIAL

Insp. Taylor A/F.S.C. (Security Service)

Insp. Allen A/F.S.C.

July 11, 1974

Olympic Security Planning
Threat Estimates

In your absence a general meeting of the secretariat was held wherein our role and function was discussed in Olympic Security Planning.

Specific tasks were assigned each responsibility desk to review all files relative to their area; in preparation for a briefing session Monday, July 15, 1974. This exercise is intended to bring the secretariat to date on what has been done in these areas, what needs to be done and generally where we are going.

One issue which was raised and holds considerable merit and requires immediate attention is:

Having Security Service provide a resume of the threat estimate in each of our responsibility areas: ie: Vital Points, Harbours, Borders, Airports etc.

We believe this is essential to our basic and preliminary security planning. This stage of the threat estimate could include (1) what has happened in the past and (2) what is happening today in the respective areas.

The second stage threat estimate could (1) bring us up to date and (2) with the aid of "games" or "scenarios" you may be in a position to tell us what we may reasonably expect in terrorism etc.

Periodic up-dating, as the need arises, would be necessary in some areas prior to the final approval of an operational plan (from the national standpoint); at which time we would again like to have a complete and final assessment prior to implementation.

We should also consider the feasibility of producing a general hand-out for all secretariat members which would capsule known terrorist, militant groups etc., who may conceivably use the

..... 2

staging of the games as a vehicle to further their goals. This might include such ready reference material as their general philosophy, numbers aims and mode of achieving public recognition.

Although it will understandably take some time to develop the threat estimates and a hand-out you may wish to set your goals in line with our priorities in planning for policy statements and carry this out unilaterally in order that the secretariat will be in a position to advise the operational units ASAP on the perimeters of security planning at this stage.

I have raised the subject with S/Sgt. [redacted] of your staff last week and would like to discuss with you and the F.S.C. as soon as conveniently possible.

G.W. Allen, Insp.,
Assistant Federal Security Coordinator
for the 1976 Olympics

cc: F.S.C.

S/Sgt. [redacted]

Further to our earlier conversation, I would like you to attend with me when meeting arranged.

G. Allen

[Handwritten signature]

R-143

In estimating the possible support to the RCMP, which may be required from the Canadian Armed Forces, it is again necessary, to ensure that resources will be available, to plan for the worst foreseeable situation. Otherwise, Armed Forces resources will be committed to other than security tasks and will not be available to support the RCMP when and if they are required.

For internal security requirements to support the RCMP, the total resource requirement can only be re-evaluated at regular intervals in relation to the threat estimates. Support to the internal security forces is presently estimated as follows:

- (a) A main operational headquarters, based in Montreal with a detachment in Kingston, to coordinate DND support.
- (b) Air Transport: 12 helicopters
 - 2 C-130's on standby - 5 hours notice
 - 2 additional C-130's on 8 hours notice
- (c) 30 jeep-mounted communication sets with operators for a 24-hour day.
- (d)
 - (i) Up to 300 Military Police in plain clothes equipped with revolvers.
 - (ii) Up to 50 snipers prepared for operations in Montreal and 25 in the Kingston area.
 - (iii) 24-hour guard of 50 vital points.
 - (iv) A force of approximately 2,000 men trained to assist in supporting the police for crowd control.
 - (v) A mobile reserve of 1,000 men at 4 hours notice to move.
 - (vi) DND marine assistance - 6 harbour launches and crews at Kingston.
- (e) Ground transport based at St. Hubert to move and lift 300 to 500 men.
- (f) 12 APC's on 5 hours notice based at St. Hubert plus 6 wheeled AFV's.

There will be a certain amount of joint RCMP-Canadian Armed Forces training required for internal security duties. An efficient command and control

The Department of National Defence has estimated that the operational manpower requirement to meet these needs would amount to approximately 5,100 men. This does not include logistic personnel whose numbers have not yet been determined.

ALTERNATIVES:

There are two alternatives open to the government:

1. "The German model" which would be to take the risks of sacrificing effective security in order to play up Olympic ideals of international cooperation, brotherhood and freedom. The memorandum has discussed the consequences of this approach which would include relatively free entry and no customs check, and concludes that the resultant danger of losing effective security control is not acceptable.
2. A strong and effective level of security which would make it clear nationally and internationally that Canada intends to control entry to Canada for the games, and to ensure the safety of participants and others to the fullest extent possible. An essential requirement will be an agreement as to jurisdictional responsibilities. Every effort will be made to accommodate I.O.C. expectations providing that strong and effective security is not compromised. Special legislation to be brought forward closer to 1976 may be desirable to permit, for the few weeks surrounding the games, immediate removal from Canada of persons not admissible. Such a security posture would also require normal customs inspection procedures. This posture may well invite considerable criticism from the I.O.C. and its federations, but at the same time will likely be understood and accepted by most countries. On the other hand, an incident at Montreal like that at Munich could draw even greater criticism.

below, will of course, have been previously accepted by A/Dir. Toupin, and Staff Supt. McBride.

The following criteria was developed from existing Policy, Bill 138, and discussions with the Officers i/c "A", "D" and "G" Operations. We have also discussed the criteria with Supt. Cobb and Insp. C. Vermette, from Montreal, and Insp. Deschenes of "A" Division. The criteria that we have developed is as follows:

- "(1) Any person who is a member of a terrorist organization or any organization that advocates or is capable of acts of violence.
- (2) Any person who by his words or actions shows himself to support any organization or person who publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of violence.

In all cases, any reasonable doubt as to the security status of the applicant will be decided in favor of the peaceful staging of the XXI Olympiad."

This rejection criteria has been developed for and by the Security Service, and CIB are presently developing their own rejection criteria. The next step in our proposed formula, following approval of the rejection criteria, is the formation of a "task force" at "HQ". This task force will be made up of members of "A", "D" and "G" Operations of "HQ" Security Service and their function will be to review the cross references which "F" Operations will surface. It is also proposed that this task force will decide whether or not to reject an applicant as per the rejection criteria with provision for verbal briefings, in exceptional circumstances, to A/Dir. Toupin, or S/Supt. McBride. The volume of name checks will start to increase substantially

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Insp. YAWORSKI
Insp. MUMBY ✓
Insp. HUGO

FROM
DE

The O. i/c "D" Operations

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

4 September 1974

SUBJECT
OBJET

Security - 1976 Olympic Games, Montreal

The Munich Games are a grim reminder of the extent to which terrorist/dissident groups will go in using international events as stages from which they can focus world attention upon their disapproval of a particular regime or government. As there is every indication that this trend will continue we have been tasked with the project of preparing a threat assessment for the next Summer Olympics to be held in Montreal during 1976.

2. ~~To be in a position to supply a sound intelligence base upon which a strong police security program can be formulated for these games, the threat assessment will take the form of a comprehensive country-by-country profile on all countries of the world.~~ This profile shall contain a thumbnail historical sketch, political assessment, special events area focussing attention upon past histories of crisis situations i.e., rebellions, liberation or terrorist activities and social-economic-cultural developments that reflect the organization's potential or probability of perverting the games for their own purposes. The format and headings in the attached samples are to be followed; Organizational profiles being made up on each terrorist/dissident group operating from a particular country. These will form part of the overall profile for that country and simplify the mechanics of updating. Four levels of threat potential have been designated; maximum, medium, moderate, minimum.

3. All members of "D" Operations will participate in the preparation of these profiles utilizing all our resources (internal and external), covering their areas of interest commencing immediately with profiles of those countries that have a more turbulent and unstable political situation. Our General Conditions files should be reviewed and during slack periods at certain desks, Directing NCOs should enlist their members to prepare profiles on those countries with a lesser degree of threat. Once these files are completed, continued up-dating by the analysts will be required governed by the inflow of intelligence.


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4. S/Sgt. Eric RUD and Sgt. [REDACTED] are the Project Managers for these profiles. These members will be responsible for putting the final product together, ensuring that it is kept up-to-date along with co-ordinating submissions where overlapping of interest is concerned and to avoid duplication of requests from the various desks [REDACTED]. They will also delegate responsibility for profiles on the countries of the world to the sections.

5. [REDACTED] has been opened for the threat assessment with supplementary files for each country. Original profiles are to be sent to S/Sgt. RUD, who will retain these files. Copies of these profiles should be placed on the General Conditions files of the countries concerned by the respective analyst.

6. Please have all Directing NCOs apprised of this project immediately in order that they may have these first run profiles from existing information completed by 1 November 1974.

7. Copies of our product will be sent to applicable Divisions for the use of their planners.


G. BEGALKI Supt.
Officer i/c "D" Ops.

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Government
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du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Officer i/c "D" Operations

FROM
DEOfficer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE

DATE

14 April 1975

SUBJECT
OBJETSummer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec
1976 - Threat Assessment - General

The Federal Security Coordinator has been asked and has accepted the role of keynote speaker at a Canadian Forces Annual Explosives Ordinance Disposal Conference at C.F.B. Shearwater. He has been asked to speak on the subject:

"An assessment of the terrorist threat and the potential terrorist use of improvised explosives devices during the 1976 Summer Olympic Games and the related threat to national security in the future."

on Monday 5 May 1975 from 10:40 a.m. to lunch.

The Federal Security Coordinator has requested assistance from the Security Service to provide material relative to the topic which he wishes to incorporate into his speech. Along these lines we wondered if the Terrorist Desk could provide us with information concerning:

Any other related items the Terrorist Desk might feel is pertinent would be appreciated.

As the speech must be prepared and drafted for the 5th of May could we please receive your reply by the 25th of April.

(J.W. Taylor) Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat



Government
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du Canada



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat



FROM
DE Officer i/c "D" Operations

SUBJECT
OBJET Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -
Threat Assessment

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ	
<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>	
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE	
	
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE	
	
DATE	March 27, 1975

This has reference to your correspondence of 25 February 1975 with attachments and in particular memorandum dated 25 February re 76 Summer Olympics - Threat Assessment - (General). As discussed in recent meetings between Olympics Secretariat and "D" Operations personnel the following pertains to your submission:

- (a) Organization Threats - Information on organizations of interest has been made available to you in material compiled on country profiles. Updatings and changes in the threat potential of such organizations will be forwarded to you as and when received.



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Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -
Threat Assessment


- (c) New Weaponry - Any new devices being used or should an upsurge in past methods such as letter bombs reoccur, the information will be shown in our weekly intelligence bulletins. Should there be any possibility that such weapons or explosives might be utilized to disrupt the Olympics you will be advised directly by correspondence.
- (d) Documentation - Over the past 4 or 5 years there have been numerous cases of false travel documents having been used by terrorists. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] An area which could create problems is the possibility of terrorists using lost, stolen or forged Canadian passports to enter Canada, this being the easiest way to enter this country. Another major problem is that visas are not required for Japanese or British visitors to Canada thereby making it easier for Japanese terrorists or possibly I.R.A. members to enter this country if they decide on a target.
- (e) General Threat Intelligence - Any Developing trends on the national and international scene will be followed closely with any relevant material supplied to you. In this regard we are currently monitoring the present crisis in the Middle East as a breakdown in negotiations would in all probability result in an increase of terrorism around the world.

2. With reference to page 2 of your submission and the threat projections for individual security functions, S/Sgt. [REDACTED] has ascertained that the Protection of Property Branch, "P" Directorate have surveyed various vital points and other key security functions in Canada and projected threat assessments for major events such as the

CONFIDENTIAL

Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -
Threat Assessment

Olympics. A review of their material along with ongoing intelligence from the Security Service should provide the information necessary to assist in overall threat projections. Regarding items (b) and (c), concerning individual and organization terrorist profiles, these have been covered in items (a) and (b) above.



G. Begalki, Supt.
Officer i/c "Ops."

D.G., D.D.G. (Ops.)

Security Service Coordinator

3 July 1974

Summer Olympics 76 - Security Service
Planning - General

I accompanied the Federal Security Coordinator, C/Supt. Ouimet, and members of his staff to "C" Division "HQ" for discussions with the "C" Division Secretariat and the Officer i/c Security Service on 25 and 26 June 1974.

2. On Wednesday 26 June 1974 both the Federal Security Coordinator and the Division Security Coordinator presented revised organizational proposals to the C.O. "C" Division and the Officer i/c CIB. At the conclusion of this briefing Supt. Cobb, Insp. Vermette and I presented an informal outline of the Division and "HQ" role for the Security Service and the steps being taken to meet our responsibilities. This presentation was well received and I believe gave the C.O. "C" Division and Officer i/c CIB a clear picture of Security Service Operations.


3. I also had discussions with Supt. Cobb and Insp. Vermette in the remaining time available. A number of significant points emerged during the briefing sessions and subsequent discussion, as follows:

(A) Threat Projection - DRAE War Games

4. This was mentioned during the Security Service briefing. The C.O. "C" Division stated that he agreed with the program and hoped it was intended to involve operational representation from both the Q.P.F. and M.U.C.P. as well as Regional DND. The C.O. "C" Division further mentioned that last year the provincial Government initiate a somewhat comparable program related to Airport Security, terrorist scenarios and sky jacking games in which there had been joint participation. In the C.O.'s view the exercises were quite professional and developed considerable expertise which should certainly be taken ~~an~~ advantage of for Regional Olympic planning. I advised the C.O. "C" Division that I would inform the D.G. of his views and recommendations.

(B) Development and Preparation of Security Service Global Threat Assessment

5. During the Security Service briefing we gave an overview of the way it was presently visualized our threat intelligence would develop. From the general discussions which followed it became very clear that the Security Service is expected to supply timely, relevant and highly professional intelligence on all dimensions of the internal and global threat, for dissemination to an integrated operational command structure of the three



Reviewed
27-5-75
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principal police forces in Quebec, and DND. As I understand it, to date the Service has developed or conceived the following:

- (i) A quarterly threat paper which could be produced at more frequent intervals during the final pre-games phase.
- (ii) Weekly information bulletins on National and International Terrorism [REDACTED] which could be stepped up to a daily bulletin at the final stage. I am not currently aware of the total distribution of this bulletin and how it is intended to permit dissemination to other operational forces.
- (iii) Global country profiles and threat assessments. I am aware that Officer i/c "D" Operations has undertaken to produce these and the mechanics remain to be developed.

6. In summary I believe the total intelligence preparation is a substantial and vital undertaking. Quite frankly, I wonder if sufficient resources are being assigned and see the need for a small professional task force to review existing capabilities, establish total requirements and be assigned primary responsibility for production and dissemination. Scheduling, frequency of issue, dissemination and related issues must be logically identified, recommendations approved and initiated without delay if the Service is to meet the expectations of its customers. Both Officers i/c "C" Division Security Service and CIB are concerned over the question of dissemination of threat intelligence to other forces with significant primary operational roles.

(C) Audio Visual Olympic Briefing

7. Supt. Cobb stated he perceives a priority need to quickly develop a professional bilingual total threat briefing package with both "HQ" and "C" Division input, suitable for presentation to senior Federal Committees as well as appropriate Quebec Committees. Some of the Quebec Committees are the Principal Committee, Joint Operations Committee, Joint Policy Committee, Public Safety Committee, COJO and selected media representatives. As seen the briefing unit would develop a flexible threat package in compatibility with the total Olympic program of the Service, including the DRAE exercises. I advised Supt. Cobb that I was aware that the briefing requirement was not being overlooked and that I would bring his point of view to notice at "HQ".

(D) Screening

8. Insp. Vermette informed that he had recently been advised by COJO that they would be employing 30,000 persons in all categories from day one of the games. This has considerable implications for our screening resources and I intend following this aspect up very shortly with both "A" Operations and Foreign Services.

(E) Global Threat Studies

9. Further to item (B) Supt. Cobb enquired as to the intended involvement of other Departments and Agencies in our total threat develop-

May 21st, 1975

4. It was pointed out by Insp. BELL that should Security Service [redacted] Services resources be fully deployed on terrorist targets who pose a threat to Olympic security, then the situation would have reached almost crisis proportions. At such a stage we could presume that all available resources of the RCMP in Montreal would be directed towards Olympic security. Insp. BELANGER indicated that while they expect an increase in crime activities he recognizes the fact that 80% of the C.I.B. strength will be engaged on Olympic security. He foresees no real problem in C.I.B. providing the marginal Services resource should the situation warrant.

5. A general discussion ensued as to exactly how C.I.B. could provide the back-up resources to [redacted] Services. Two (2) methods were identified. They could use their present procedures on [redacted] operations using warrants under 16(3)(e) of the Official Secrets Act. This would not implicate Security Service regular arrangements. The second method would be [redacted] operations again using warrants under the same justification. The C.I.B. representatives agreed with our reasoning in this matter, however it was generally agreed that C.I.B. use of warrants under the Official Secrets Act while the only way they could operate against terrorist target was a major policy question which would have to be resolved at the Headquarters level.

ADMINISTRATION

6. OFFICE SPACE

The question of additional translation office accomodation was raised and two options were suggested:

- (a) Security Service provide space within their own premises with proper security arrangements for up to 12 casual translators from within the RCMP or outside.
- (b) This office accomodation be provided at the old building which will also be the site of other Olympic-related office and lodging accomodation.

We are recommending option (a).

...../3

THREAT ASSESSMENT

During this period, information on potential threats to the safety of participants and/or visiting dignitaries was developed both in Canada and abroad. Threat Intelligence was analyzed, assessed and disseminated as required to the various Government Departments and Police Organizations involved in Olympic security. A situation reporting system was developed and arrangements were made for operational personnel to function on a twenty-four hour basis to provide action and response capabilities and daily assessments for the period 6 July 1976 through 3 August, 1976.

Extensive investigations in Canada, which necessitated the expenditure of many man-hours, were conducted to confirm or refute the threat information developed. In addition, Liaison Personnel and Allied Agencies were tasked in several important investigational areas. As a result, it is felt that the Olympics were in fact, faced with several real threats and that more than one individual and/or group were planning some type of disruptive action. It is difficult to determine whether investigations or the hard security posture which was assumed directly, caused plans of an attack to be aborted, prevented major demonstrations and resulted in the peaceful staging of the XXIst Olympiad.

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Reviewed <i>John</i>
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SECURITY SERVICE
000211 RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

May 25th, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Privy Council Office Secretariat Duties
re: Possible Habitat/Olympics Emergencies

The international events which will take place in Canada during the summer pose the possibility of a threat or incident which could require rapid attention and response from the federal government and hence the involvement of the Cabinet Secretariat. Contingency planning has been underway for some time by those departments and agencies with "lead" responsibilities in the fields of security, intelligence, and emergency preparedness, and it is important to ensure an efficient flow of information from these locations to Ministers and senior officials to facilitate decision making.

To assist in this process, arrangements have been made by the Security, Intelligence and Emergency Planning Secretariat of the Privy Council Office for an officer to be on duty on a continuing basis during the period from Friday, May 21st, to Wednesday, August 18th, 1976, to serve as a point of contact between the Cabinet Secretariat and the lead departments outside normal working hours in the event of an emergency. The arrangements are for officials in these departments to contact, as necessary, the Prime Minister's switchboard (2-4211, 232-4244) which, in turn, will alert the duty officer. The duty officer will then assist in establishing communication between the lead department and appropriate members of the Cabinet Secretariat, and to offer other support as may be required by the latter. While the duty officer will provide such a communication link, departments which are likely to have responsibilities in the resolution of emergencies will be required to make their own arrangements to maintain facilities to contact their Ministers during this period.

.../2

MAY 27 1976

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PAGE ~~THREE~~ ^{ACE}

IN OBTAINING INFORMATION. WE FEEL, HOWEVER, IN FUTURE SITUATIONS OF THIS TYPE THAT SIMILAR EFFORT IN OTHER DIVISIONS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AT THE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. SUCH COORDINATION SHOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE TO ENSURE EACH DIVISION CARRIES OUT THEIR DEFUSION AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT INFORMATION DEVELOPED IS FREELY EXCHANGED, PARTICULARLY THAT WHICH IS OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTEREST.

THE DEFUSION PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED US WITH MANY VALUABLE LONG-TERM "CONTACTS" IN THE VARIOUS ETHNIC COMMUNITIES. WE ARE BETTER INFORMED OF ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN TORONTO THAN EVER BEFORE AND PLAN TO CONTINUE TO UTILIZE THESE CONTACTS.

THREAT ASSESSMENT: THIS AREA IS IN OUR OPINION, DIVIDED INTO TWO AREAS; 1) THE THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND 2) THE COUNTRY PROFILE BOOKS PREPARED BY THE "D" SECTION, SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECTION. THESE BOOKS WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES FOR COUNTRY BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHEN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING DEFUSION. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN USED WHEN PLANNING VIP SECURITY. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RETAIN AND UP-DATE THE INFORMATION IN THE BOOKS.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS WERE A VALUABLE TOOL FOR KEEPING OLYMPIC COMMANDERS, OTHER OFFICES AND OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS ADVISED OF DEVELOPING SITUATIONS.

OLYMPIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: NO COMMENT.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER FORCES TO THE JOINT SECURITY SERVICE COMMITTEES:

OUR MAJOR DEALINGS WITH OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS CONSISTED OF LIAISONING OF INFORMATION WITH METRO TORONTO POLICE, PEEL REGIONAL POLICE AND ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE.

RELATIONSHIPS AND COOPERATION WITH THE METRO TORONTO POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS FELT TO BE EXCELLENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY WORKED DIRECTLY WITH SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS AND AFFORDED EVERY ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE. INFORMATION LIAISED WAS TREATED IN A RESTRICTED MANNER.

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE WAS SUPPLIED WITH INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THEM AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE TORONTO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE, IN THE TORONTO AREA, WAS RESTRICTED. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THEIR MAXIMUM EFFORT AFFORDED TO THE KINGSTON SITE. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN METRO TORONTO POLICE AND O.P.P. MERELY METRO ASSUMED SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TORONTO AREA DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH O.P.P. WERE GENERALLY HANDLED THROUGH THE KINGSTON POST.

AN AREA OF CONCERN WAS THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM USED BY O.P.P. IN TORONTO. THE PURPOSE OF THEIR OPERATIONS CENTRE WAS NEVER CLARIFIED TO EITHER THIS FORCE OR APPARENTLY TO THE METRO TORONTO POLICE. THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE AN OPERATIONS CENTRE IN TORONTO WAS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN UNTIL LATE IN THE PLANNING STAGES AND DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD WAS NOT UTILIZED IN THE TORONTO AREA. AS A RESULT METRO USED OUR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR CONTACTING SUCH POINTS AS KINGSTON FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. IT WAS NOTICED THAT ON ABOUT TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS THE O.P.P. AT KINGSTON WERE

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Government
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du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat



FROM
DE Officer i/c "D" Operations

SUBJECT
OBJET Summer Olympics, Montreal 76 -
Threat Assessment

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE March 27, 1975

This has reference to your correspondence of 25 February 1975 with attachments and in particular memorandum dated 25 February re 76 Summer Olympics - Threat Assessment - (General). As discussed in recent meetings between Olympics Secretariat and "D" Operations personnel the following pertains to your submission:

- (a) Organization Threats - Information on organizations of interest has been made available to you in material compiled on country profiles. Updatings and changes in the threat potential of such organizations will be forwarded to you as and when received.



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
- (c) New Weaponry - Any new devices being used or should an upsurge in past methods such as letter bombs reoccur, the information will be shown in our weekly intelligence bulletins. Should there be any possibility that such weapons or explosives might be utilized to disrupt the Olympics you will be advised directly by correspondence.
- (d) Documentation - Over the past 4 or 5 years there have been numerous cases of false travel documents having been used by terrorists. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] An area which could create problems is the possibility of terrorists using lost, stolen or forged Canadian passports to enter Canada, this being the easiest way to enter this country. Another major problem is that visas are not required for Japanese or British visitors to Canada thereby making it easier for Japanese terrorists or possibly I.R.A. members to enter this country if they decide on a target.
- (e) General Threat Intelligence - Any Developing trends on the national and international scene will be followed closely with any relevant material supplied to you. In this regard we are currently monitoring the present crisis in the Middle East as a breakdown in negotiations would in all probability result in an increase of terrorism around the world.

2. With reference to page 2 of your submission and the threat projections for individual security functions, S/Sgt. [REDACTED] has ascertained that the Protection of Property Branch, "P" Directorate have surveyed various vital points and other key security functions in Canada and projected threat assessments for major events such as the

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Olympics. A review of their material along with ongoing intelligence from the Security Service should provide the information necessary to assist in overall threat projections. Regarding items (b) and (c), concerning individual and organization terrorist profiles, these have been covered in items (a) and (b) above.



G. Begalki, Supt.
Officer i/c "Ops."

00165 FEB 17 76

20: ROUTINE TOR 2 KK 17-2-76

TO: OTT 3 "D" OPS

MSG NO: SS (D) 295/270

RE: GENERAL CONDITIONS AND SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES AMONG NEGROS - TORONTO

All replies or references to this message must
the security classification stamped herein,
unless declassified by proper authority.

YOUR TELEPHONE IS NOT SECURE

The content or any portion of this message
irrespective of classification is NOT to be
discussed over the telephone.

THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS AN ESTIMATE OF THREAT EXISTING
TOWARDS THE OLYMPIC GAMES FROM WITHIN THE BLACK COMMUNITIES AND
THE WAY IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN COUNTERING SAME. THIS SHOULD BE READ
IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR REPORT THIS FILE DATED 30-1-76.

2. WE FORESEE A THREAT FROM A DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY WITH
THE POSSIBILITY, AS IN MANY DEMONSTRATIONS, OF CONFRONTATION
WITH THE POLICE OR SOME OTHER SEGMENT OF OUR SOCIETY. THIS THREAT
IS CALCULATED FROM TWO POINTS OF VIEW, RACIAL AND POLITICAL.

THE RACIAL POINT OF VIEW:

3. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF EMBARRASSMENT TO BLACK ATHLETES.

WE HAVE
FOUND THAT THE WESTERN GUARD OF LATE WERE APPARENTLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR HATE MAIL RECEIVED BY VARIOUS BLACK PERSONS IN TORONTO. THERE
IS NOT NECESSARILY A FEAR BUILDING UP, BUT A DEFINITE CONCERN AS TO
WHAT FOR EXAMPLE THE WESTERN GUARD WILL DO NEXT. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE
NO CONCERTED EFFORT FROM WITHIN THE VARIOUS BLACK COMMUNITIES HAS
BEEN INITIATED TO COUNTERACT SUCH AN ORGANIZATION, OR TO COUNTERACT
RACIST SITUATIONS IN GENERAL.

THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW:

4. THE POSSIBILITY OF SIT-INS OR MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS DOES
EXIST FROM FACTIONS WITHIN OUR AREA OF CONCERN. THIS AGAIN COULD
CAUSE CONFRONTATIONS, AS IN OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS, WITH THE AUTHORITIES
OR SOME OTHER SEGMENT OF SOCIETY. THIS CONCERN IS OF COURSE
A POLITICAL CONTEXT COVERING ISSUES RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES.
THE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES PERTINENT TO THEIR POLITICAL SITUATIONS
ARE EXAMINED HEREUNDER, FOLLOWING WHICH IS A BRIEF SUMMARY.

SECRET

Reviewed..... 1286

MAY 14 1976

SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS

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FEB 18 1976

GRENADA: -

THE ONLY PROBLEM THAT COULD ARISE FROM THE ANTI-GAIRY FACTION HERE IN TORONTO IS IF THE GRENADIAN PRIME MINISTER DOES MAKE AN APPEARANCE AT THE GAMES OR HERE IN TORONTO.

THIS WOULD MOST LIKELY BE ONLY IN THE FORM OF A DEMONSTRATION. WE FORESEE LITTLE OR NO TROUBLE FROM THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: - AS IN MOST CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES THERE IS STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT GOV'T.

ANY ACTIVITY WOULD VERY LIKELY TAKE THE FORM OF A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION. A MINOR THREAT OF DEMONSTRATION CATEGORY, XSIS FROM THE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF MOVEMENT POPULAR FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA. THIS COMMITTEE, HEADED BY ROSIE DOUGLAS IS VERY UNHAPPY WITH THE FACT THAT TRINIDAD GOV'T HAVE NOT PERMITTED CUBAN AIRCRAFT, BOUND FOR ANGOLA TO REFUEL IN THEIR COUNTRY. TRINIDADIAN GOV'T OFFICIALS VISIT COULD TRIGGER DEMONSTRATIONS.

JAMAICA: - JAMAICA HAS BEEN DESCRIBED

AS MOST POLITICAL COUNTRY IN THE CARIBBEAN.

THERE ARE TWO VERY STRONG PARTIES IN THE COUNTRY THAT ARE CONTINUALLY AT ONE ANOTHER'S THROATS. THERE IS CURRENTLY A PROBLEM HERE IN TORONTO WITHIN THE JAMAICAN NATIONAL LEAGUE IN THAT SOME MEMBERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THE JNL APPRECIATIVELY TO THE LEFT. THIS IS OF COURSE CONTRARY TO THE ORIGINAL SITUATION IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER MANLEYS SUPPORTERS IN THE JNL WERE FOR THE MOST PART POLITICALLY CENTER LINE. THE SAME SITUATION EXISTS IN THE GOVERNING PARTY IN JAMAICA. WE CAN PERHAPS EXPECT A SITUATION IN THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY FROM THESE ADHERENTS DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN JAMAICA PRECEEDING, AND AT THE TIME OF THE OLYMPICS.

BARBADOS: -

BARBADOS GOV'T RECENTLY VOTED AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH ISREAL REGARDING THE ZIONIST ISSUE. THEREFORE WE FEEL THERE IS A REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION POSSIBLY OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY FROM SOME ARAE FACTION. WE HAVE NO DEFINITE INDICATION OF SUCH A THREAT

A VISIT BY BARBADOS GOV'T OFFICIALS COULD TRIGGER RETALIATORY ACTION.

COMPLA: - AN ORGANIZATION FORMED IN DEC 75 IN SUPPORT OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN ANGOLA. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A COALITION IT DOES HAVE SUPPORT FROM SUCH GROUPS AS THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS A C.P. OF C. FRONT, AND THE COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COLONIES AS WELL AS THE REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST GROUP.

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IT HELD A DEMONSTRATION IN JANUARY 1976 AT THE TRINIDAD TOBAGO TRADE OFFICES IN TORONTO, IN PROTEST OF TRINIDAD'S REFUSAL TO LET CUBAN AIRCRAFT REFUEL ON THERE WAY TO ANGOLA. THERE WAS A SLIGHT DISTURBANCE AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS INVOLVEMENT WILL GO BEYOND THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY.

5. AS INDICATED ABOVE WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE DEMONSTRATIVE CATEGORY AT THIS TIME. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED HOWEVER THAT POLITICAL SITUATION MENTIONED COULD CHANGE, TROUBLE COULD ERUPT IN COUNTRIES NOT MENTIONED, AND THE RACIAL SITUATION COULD BECOME A FACTOR. WE WILL CONSTANTLY MONITOR THE SITUATION AND PROVIDE WHAT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AND NECESSARY. IN ALL AREAS WE FEEL THE MOST PEOPLE THAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION, IS IN THE 40-50 RANGE. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL WITH THE CAPABILITIES OR PERHAPS THE DESIRE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT THROUGH SUPPLY OF ARMS, COVER ETC., OR OF INDIVIDUALS HERE OR ABROAD WHO ARE PLANNING AN ACT OF VIOLENCE.

CPL

TOR 2

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