


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TACTICAL PLAN NO. 1-B
ASSAULT ON AN ARMED SIEGE

I. DEFINITION

An "assault" is a tactical operation for the purposes of reconnaissance, and search, of persons and premises or which leads to the arrest of someone.

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES

- A. An assault should be carried out under maximum surprise conditions.
- B. Very careful planning should precede an assault particularly if armed aggressors are involved.

The local situation, the time factor and the nature of the objective are essential points to consider, calling for the good judgement and initiative of members of the assault force.

- C. The "assault plan" must be described to all members of the assault force.
- D. The degree of hostilities expected will govern the choice of methods used to overpower the aggressor.

III. ASSAULT PLAN

A. GENERAL

1. It is preferable to place the assault forces in strategic positions and then to communicate with the aggressor and offer him the opportunity of surrendering peaceably.
2. A surprise assault calls for diversion strategies as well as penetration of the emergency zone in several places at the same time.

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OPERATION STRATACUR


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TACTICAL PLAN NO. 1-B
ASSAULT ON AN ARMED SIEGE



- The assault force usually comprises two (2) units. One unit is responsible for completely isolating the inside perimeters and the other is responsible for overpowering the aggressor. A third unit may reinforce the assault or cover the withdrawal of the assault force.

B. ELEMENTS GOVERNING THE ASSAULT

1. THE TIME (or the moment of the assault):

The moment of the assault must be known exactly and it is recommended that members of the assault force synchronize their watches.

- SOUND:** A signal such as a siren, a loudspeaker message, or a gunshot, etc... may be used to give an order or as a diversion. In this case, the signal must be sufficiently audible.

- LIGHTING:** During the day, colored smoke or during the night flares may be used to indicate an assault.

- RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS:** Walkie-talkies will be used by the groups directly penetrating in the armed siege.

- MESSENGERS:** It is preferable to transmit important messages by hand in order to avoid any distortion, indiscretion or misunderstanding of the instructions or orders issued.

C. THE ASSAULT TACTIC ON APPROACHING THE LOCATION OF THE SIEGE

The following points should be considered when approaching the location of a siege:

- The use of gas or smoke bombs is recommended to dislodge a siege or invade the premises where it is taking place.

- All possible escape exits will be watched. The use of special weapons will be concentrated on the places where the degree of hostilities is expected to be greatest.
- Vehicles located within the immediate vicinity of the siege will, as far as possible, be put out of action (disconnecting the battery, the condenser etc).
- Members of the assault force will advance by bounds and zigzagging while keeping as well covered as possible and protecting their flank.
- Any penetration of the entrances to a building will be carried out with an armed cover guarding windows, roofs, doors, etc...
- Once the exact position of the aggressors is known to the assault group, it is recommended that the aggressors be diverted or kept occupied by return fire.
- Any approach from the front requires the use of a bullet proof shield (armored truck, sandbags, etc...)
- A night assault presents an increase in security risks. In this case, use strong floodlighting and portable lamps.
- Controlling gunfire is essential. Any firing must be carried out according to precise instructions against an identifiable aggressor by specially selected members of the assault group.
- Forces on the outside should cease all fire as soon as the assault group have entered the besieged premises.

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D. ASSAULT TACTIC ONCE INSIDE THE BESIEGED PREMISES

The following principles should be considered:

1. Remain under cover when approaching a door.
 2. If the door is locked, burst it open with the help of a heavy calibre firearm or by using a ram.
 3. Use a smoke bomb to force the aggressor into evacuating the site of the siege (does not apply where there are hostages or a similar case).
 4. Members of the assault force will condition their sight to the abrupt change of light at night.
 5. Arms will be ready for firing.
 6. The search of the exact place where the aggressor is located will be carried out by a team of two (2) policemen, one of them covering while the other searches.
 7. During an assault on one room, all the occupants will be captured by a sufficient number of assault forces. If there are too many occupants, they should be forced to evacuate the room by smoke bombs before the forces go in.
 8. The room will be carefully searched. (Including walls, ceilings, floors)
- WATCH OUT FOR BOOBY TRAPS
BE CAREFUL WHEN SEARCHING WARDROBES AND BATHROOMS
9. Any assault on a dark place requires particular caution. Members of the assault force will go in one by one until certain that it is completely safe.

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
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TACTICAL PLAN NO. 1-B
ASSAULT ON AN ARMED SIEGE



10. Any noise or sound will be considered suspect and liable to be covering return fire or a surprise diversion by the aggressor if not his escape in progress. (Noise of a radio, cigarette smoke, regular noise, etc...)
11. If it is absolutely necessary to penetrate an armed siege, the invasion will be carried out rapidly. The members of the assault force will criss-cross one another and walk with their backs against the wall, still keeping their guns aimed on the occupants.

THIS TACTIC IS A GREAT SECURITY RISK FOR THE ASSAULT GROUPS. THIS TACTIC SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESOURCE.


E. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING ASSAULT TACTICS AT NIGHT

The following principles should be taken into consideration during night assaults:

1. A tactical group will cover all possible means of escape.
2. The plan of the site will be studied very carefully by the invasion group.
3. The invasion of the siege will be done silently, patiently, through several entrances of the building. A recognition signal will be agreed upon by the various assault groups to avoid firing unnecessarily.
4. A reasonable time lag (10 mn.) will be given to each assault group to penetrate the siege so as their eyes will get used to the inside lighting.
5. The doors and windows will be cleared quickly and diagonally.
(WATCH OUT FOR ANY SOURC 000608)

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Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 2-A
HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT
 (MONTREAL AIRPORT)

I. DEFINITIONS

A. AGGRESSOR

Any person causing or collaborating in the illegal takeover of an aircraft.

B. HIJACKING

Effective takeover of an aircraft and control over its movement by an aggressor whose action is designed to force a third party or public authorities to meet one or more demands.

C. HOSTAGE

Any person deprived of his freedom and threatened by the aggressor. (Generally the crew or the passengers of the aircraft.)

II. PRINCIPLES

- A. PRIORITY SHALL BE GIVEN to ensuring the safety and release of the hostages without their being harmed.
- B. The airport manager is responsible for the installations and movements at the airport.
- C. The commanding officer has sole responsibility for the safety of his aircraft and for all persons on board.
- D. Police tactics will be coordinated under the general authority of the airport manager or his authorized representative at the airport emergency operations centre.
- E. All security force movements in the aggressor's line of sight must be avoided, except as part of a specific plan.

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CO-OP. "I" OPS



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À: Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat, Security Service.

FROM / DE: Insp. J.S. Warren

SUBJECT / OBJET: Summer Olympics in Montreal, Que. 1976 - Security Service Planning

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
SECRET
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
1A-50-6-76
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
May 22, 1975.

Reference your letter of May 21, 1975, some form of laissez-aller will be clearly necessary for the members of "I" Operations in the Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal units during the period of the Games and before. In my view Olympic tickets would not suffice in that it could be necessary for our members to obtain access to Olympic facilities not normally open to the public. As well we would not want anything which identified the members of "I" Operations as connected with security. Thirdly, whatever accreditation we do receive should optimunly allow access to any facility regardless of location in Ottawa, Montreal or Toronto areas.

In view of these restrictions I would think that something in the management category which did not identify a particular location would serve our purpose. To be effective, it would be necessary to issue accreditation to our total compliment which is 264 members. If you agree and this can be arranged it would be advantageous to us to have these well in advance of the Games so that our members will have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the sites and favilities before being placed in an actual operational position.

[Signature]
 (J.S. Warren), Insp.
 Officer i/c "I" Operations

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
Reviewed *[Signature]*
 JUN 4 1975
 SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS

Reviewed
 MAY 27 1975
 M.W.D.

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Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 2-B
HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT
(STOLPORT - MONTREAL)

The definitions, principles and general responsibilities outlined in Tactical Plan No. 2-A (HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT - MONTREAL AIRPORT) also apply here, except as regards specific physical features and the telephone numbers given below.

I. PHYSICAL FEATURES

A. FENCES

The airfield is completely surrounded by a fence about seven (7) foot high, topped with barbed wire.

B. ACCESSIBILITY

The stolport is accessible by one road only, leading off the Bonaventure Expressway.

C. GATES

Three (3) gates are kept locked at all times:

Gate "A" located on the NORTH side, EAST of the terminal building.

Gate "B" located WEST of the terminal building on the NORTH side.

Gate "C" located at the WEST end of the terminal building.

D. EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS

1. The airport terminal and three (3) hangars.
2. The control tower.
3. Distance measuring equipment - DME (one) located at the centre of the airport on the south side of the runway.

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4. Two (2) microwave landing systems (MLS): one located at the west end of the runway and the other in front of the terminal building.

E. The MANAGER'S OFFICE will be used as the emergency operations control centre for the STOLPORT.

II. OPERATING HOURS

A. Montréal's stolport is operational from 0700 to 2300 hours, Monday through Friday.


B. There are departures every half-hour from 0730 until 2200 hours.

C. There are arrivals every half-hour from 0815 to 2245 hours.

NOTE: On Saturdays and Sundays, there are departures and arrivals every two (2) hours from 0800 to 2200 hours.

III. STOLPORT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

MANAGER	932-3133
CONTROL TOWER	932-5259 or 2675
EMERGENCY	932-8819
POLICE (MONTREAL HARBOR)	283-6911 or 6912 (PAX 335)
PUBLIC RELATIONS	874-7759
SECURITY GUARD	932-4232



OPERATION STRATACUR

STOLPORT MONTREAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À Deputy Director General (Operations)

FROM / DE Officer i/c Security Service Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT / OBJET Summer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec 1976 - Security Service Planning - "I" Operations

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
SECRET
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE 30 June 1975

This is further to my submission of 14 May 1975, concerning the general allocation of manpower for the 1976 Olympics. Of nearly equal importance is the development of a program for "I" Operations who will be one of our most important assets in counter-terrorist efforts. The following proposals have been developed with the "I" Operations National Coordinator and are set out for your consideration.

STAGED DEPLOYMENT:

In the interests of clarity, the functions of "I" Operations during the Olympics is being considered in two stages. These stages are as follows:

STAGE 1. "I" Operations Olympic Program from 1 July 76 to 1 Aug. 76. Leave and Training Courses suspended. Two teams of "A" Division personnel (24 men and 12 vehicles) functioning in Montreal. One "O" Division team prepared to move to Kingston at short notice.

STAGE 2. Condition of Extreme Emergency. This situation would require that all possible manpower and equipment be moved to one centre.

The authority to move from STAGE 1 to STAGE 2 conditions will rest with the D.D.G. (Operations) in consultation with the Federal Security Coordinator.

RESOURCES:

Considerable misunderstanding exists outside of "I" Operations as to the resource capability in terms of man-

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power vis-a-vis targets. Consideration must, of course, be given to the type of target and the degree of coverage desired. In order to avoid any miscalculations, "I" Operations capability in terms of targets of a terrorist nature is set out below:

STAGE 1	(short span coverage 12 hours)	normal coverage 24 hr day-7 days a week
(Olympic Program)	"C" Div. 10 targets	4
	"A" Div. 3 targets	2
	"O" Div. 4 targets	2

(Extreme Emergency) Any point - 17 targets
 This is a maximum effort which can be sustained for only a short time span. *(detail) 78 Hours maximum. ID 2/7*

The STAGE 1 deployment, on behalf of "C" Division, includes the 24 "I" Operations personnel and 12 vehicles from "A" Division. As you are aware, "C" Division originally requested 38 men, however, the Officer i/c Security Service "A" Division feels that to take more than 24 from his complement would sharply reduce surveillance capabilities in the Ottawa area. This same STAGE would involve the stand-by of 12 men from "O" Division "I" Operations to supplement "A" Division in Kingston, if required. This is a contingency plan only which will be facilitated by a relatively brief training exercise in Kingston. Maximum coverage which could be afforded would be against 10 targets in Montreal, 3 in Ottawa and 4 in Toronto but this could only be done for about 12 hours and would require shutting down surveillance totally for a rest period afterwards. Normal coverage which allows normal time off for rest and recuperation could provide target coverage of 4, 2 and 2 respectively.

The STAGE 2 deployment is the maximum target capability should a group of terrorists be centered at any one point. This capability would probably be reduced by lack of area familiarity of some of the teams and communications problems. It must be stressed that such coverage could only be sustained for a short period of time.

ACCOMMODATIONS:

Discussions have also taken place concerning the accommodation of the teams in Montreal and Kingston. In Montreal,

THE PUBLIC OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN RELATION TO THAT SAME

CRISIS. IF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES ARE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THAT BY DAILY OR EVEN HOURLY PRESS CONFERENCES ON DEVELOPMENTS THE MEDIA WILL BE KEPT REASONABLY WELL INFORMED OF WHAT CAN BE TOLD ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON, PERHAPS THE MEDIA WILL AGREE TO

- A) AVOIDING ALLOWING THE MEDIA TO BE USED AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATION OR A MEANS OF CREATING HYSTERIA BY ANY AGRESSOR AND
- B) AVOIDING REPORTING THE NEWS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE OR EXACERBATE PUBLIC ANXIETY, AND POSSIBLY
- C) CHANNEL INFORMATION THAT COULD BE PERTINENT TO RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS TO THE POLICE, FIRST.

5. IN THE EVENT THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THOSE WHO CONTROL MEDIA OUTLETS THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR JOINT MEDIA/POLICE/MILITARY PLANNING TO LAY THE GROUND WORK FOR THE COOPERATIVE ELEMENTS OF THE APPROACH AND, WITHIN THE OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNING APPARATUS, FOR PLANNING OF HOW INFORMATION ABOUT A CRISIS SITUATION WILL BE SCREENED AND THEN CHANNELLED TO A PERSON OR GROUPS WHO WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRIEFING MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AS FREQUENTLY AS CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED MAY DICTATE.

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OPERATION STRATACUR

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
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THE RUMOR PHENOMENON

Circumstances surrounding the STRATACUR EMERGENCY may give rise to rumors. They are started by persons in a state of panic or ill-informed or again endowed with an unusually fertile imagination.

I. DANGEROUS EFFECTS OF THE RUMOR

- A. The rumor represents the opinion of the masses, very often based on information which is incomplete or has not been checked.
- B. Some rumors may aggravate a state of emergency by stirring panic and hostility or seriously affecting the morale of the security forces (e.g. announcement of a policeman's assassination).
- C. One should remember that some rumors are deliberately started by individuals who wish to create a state of confusion or force the authorities to make public statements.

II. COUNTERMEASURES

- A. As a matter of general policy, all members of the security forces should develop a rational attitude towards rumors. They must remember that rumors must be investigated so as to establish whether or not they are well-founded.
- B. It is the information officer's specific responsibility to establish a "rumor analysis centre" which will confirm or deny rumors and suggest appropriate measures to deal with them.

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The tasks of the rumor analysis centre will be the following:

1. Evaluate the rumors.
2. Provide adequate information to the media through the public relations officer.
3. Localize the source of the rumors.
4. Keep a record of the rumors.
5. Prove, if need be, that the rumor is false.

French language. Translated by M.C.R.T. at R.C.M.P. HQ

P-4024
IA-50-6-19

Montreal, 11 March 1975

The Officer i/c
Security Service
Montreal, P.Q.


Re: Surveillance Services Planning
for 1976 Olympics

Our comments are prompted by the January 14, 1975 correspondence from the Olympic Secretariat, on the above-captioned subject.

The aforementioned correspondence revealed that the member i/c Surveillance Planning for the Olympic Games lacked data concerning the Montreal Security Service "I" Operation's possible number of targets to be tailed. We may justly say that Operation "I" comprises 102 members. However, these one hundred and two (102) members cannot all be mobilized for surveillance duty, if we are to continue operating efficiently. Our tailing teams require some operational and administrative support which we cannot relinquish even during the Olympic Games. In order that you may have a brief and clear idea of our situation, following is a breakdown of our establishment as it now stands and will remain even during the Olympic Games, if we are to maintain efficient operations.

<u>Position</u>	<u>No. of members assigned</u>
Officer i/c	1
NCO i/c Admin & Personnel	1
Administrative Support	1
Transport & Communication	1
O i/c Operations	1
Section Chiefs	3
Secretariat	2
Operational Services (including photo lab services)	7
Permanent Observation Post	12
Total:	29

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WJW 229

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The above-listed duties and members assigned to them are absolutely vital and cannot be dispensed with during the Olympic Games.

You must therefore realize that Operation "I" will have seventy-three (73) members available during the Olympic Games, for duties directly related to the Olympics. Of these seventy-three (73) members, seventy-two (72) will be required to form eight (8) teams of 9 members each to take over the physical tailing of designated targets. Kindly note that to conduct discreet surveillance, we absolutely need the services of at least four (4) cars with two (2) men per car. The ninth will be assigned to temporary observation posts required for our operations. We are not taking into consideration the possible difficulties we may have to cope with, such as illnesses and other emergencies. Under normal conditions, there is sufficient staff available, as our teams comprise twelve (12) members.

The remaining member Montreal "I" Operation will be assigned to the Control Centre located at Divisional Headquarters. We plan to assign three (3) representatives of "I" Operation to these duties. The other two (2) members will be borrowed from outside resources. Members i/c Control Centre duties will ensure good liaison between Security Service Operational sections, other police forces and "I" Operation, on a 24-hour basis, seven (7) days a week.

In our manpower planning for the Olympic Games, we find that it will be necessary to make use of temporary help from "I" Operations, Ottawa or elsewhere. We estimate that (38) thirty-eight additional members will be required. These members will be divided into four (4) 9-man surveillance teams, for a total of thirty-six (36) members. The two (2) remaining members will be in charge of the Control Centre as mentioned earlier.

We assume that each shift will work twelve (12) hours. Because of the reports to be prepared and submitted by each member of a surveillance team, it is to be expected any such members will have to work about fourteen (14) hours daily.

In order to tail a target (24) twenty-four hours a day, seven (7) days a week, three (3) teams will be required. The total available resources during the Olympics, including outside assistance, will enable the Montreal "I" Operations to dispose of twelve (12) teams enabling the tailing of four (4) targets on a 24-hour basis, seven (7) days a week. Obviously, it will also be necessary to make certain arrangements with our H.Q. for the temporary loan of equipment to accommodate our additional human resources. The most important type of equipment falls mostly within the category of vehicles, radio and air services.(?)

A temporary transfer of Ottawa "I" Operations establishment members will entail a certain amount of planning by Montreal "I" Operations. We are specially concerned with the training of this extra personnel, which, for all practical purposes, will be limited to familiarizing them with the City of Montreal. This training period, estimated at 3 weeks, is meant to ensure that these members can find their way in the City of Montreal, familiarize them with the City's main arteries, acquaint them with Montreal's strategic points and inculcate a few notions on how our metro system operates. Past experience (1970 October Crisis) has clearly proven that it was impossible to bring in members from a city like Ottawa, for instance, and expect them to operate efficiently in a large metropolis like Montreal, without subjecting them beforehand to a familiarization period.

Lodging accommodation raises a special problem and one way or another, we will have to, solve the task of lodging thirty-eight (38) members from Ottawa. We plan to look into the lodging accommodation that may be supplied through our Montreal "I" Operation members, keeping in mind the data contained in Inspector J.H.O. Vermette's memo of 6 January 1975. Every alternative will be screened.

Needless to say that members assigned to twelve (12) and fourteen (14) hour shifts will accumulate tremendous overtime. I recommend that said overtime be duly paid pursuant to the Olympic Secretariat Code.

Olympic admission tickets are now on sale and seem rather limited in number. I feel it is extremely important that steps be taken immediately to ensure that "I" Operation members will be issued passes, giving them free access to Olympic sites. Targets requiring tailing will definitely lead us to these sites and I feel that this is where tailing will be the heaviest. I believe we should not leave this matter of passes to the last minute. A minimum of one hundred and fifteen (115) passes will be required for our Montreal "I" Operation.

Kindly advise with the least possible delay if we should centre our planning on above-listed objectives.

F.J. Bossé Inspector
Officer i/c
"I" Operation