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Officer i/c "D" Ops.

I. W. Taylor Security Service Olympic Co-ordinator Olympic Security Planning Threat Estimates

18-10-74

The attached memo dated 11-7-74 from the A/FSC has been held in abeyance pending reorganization of the Secretariat, which has now been completed.

- 2. If have had detailed discussions with Insp. Allen on the several matters raised in his memo. He has also been briefed on the country profile program and the DRAE exercises.
- In essence, the A/FSC is requesting the following additional support from the Security Service:
  - Threat projections for individual responsibility sectors, specifically, vital points, harbours, borders, airports.
  - (ii) Synopsis handouts on known terrorist activities, groups, aims, modus operandi, etc.
- To fully consider this request I recommend a meeting be set up at your earliest convenience to review current and projected threat planning, and to explore the feasibility of additional action. Both Insp. Allen and I would like to attend such a meeting with appropriate members of your staff.

I. W. Taylor Security Service Olympic Co-ordinator

Insp. Allen, A/FSC

Officer i/c Pol. Planning and Co-ordinater

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Insp. Taylor A/F.S.C. (Security Service)

Insp. Allen A/F.S.C.

July 11, 1974

Olympic Security Planning Threat Estimates

In your absence a general meeting of the secretariat was held wherein our role and function was discussed in Olympic Security Planning.

Specific tasks were assigned each responsibility desk to review all files relative to their area; in preparation for a briefing session Monday, July 15, 1974. This exercise is intended to bring the secretariat to date on what has been done in these areas, what needs to be done and generally where we are going.

One issue which was raised and holds considerable merit and requires immediate attention is:

Having Security Service provide a resume of the threat estimate in each of our responsibility areas: ie: Vital Points, Harbours, Boarders, Airports etc.

We believe this is essential to our basic and preliminary security planning. This stage of the threat estimate could include (1) what has happened in the past and (2) what is happening today in the respective areas.

The second stage threat estimate could (1) bring us up to date and (2) with the aid of "games" or "scenarios" you may in a position to tell us what we may reasonably expect in terrorism etc.

Periodic up-dating, as the need arises, would be necessary in some areas prior to the final approval of an operational plan (from the national standpoint); at which time we would again like to have a complete and final assessment prior to implementation.

We should also consider the feasability of producing a general hand-out for all secretariat members which would capsualize known terrorist, militant groups etc., who may conceivably use the

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staging of the games as a vehicle to further their goals. This might include such ready reference material as their general philosophy, numbers aims and mode of achieving public recognition.

Although it will understandably take some time to develop the threat estimates and a hand-out you may wish to set your goals in line with our priorities in planning for policy statements and carry this out unilaterally in order that the secretariat will be in a position to advise the operational units ASAP on the perimeters of security planning at this stage.

I have raised the subject with S/Sgt. of your staff last week and would like to discuss with you and the F.S.C. as soon as conveniently possible.

G.W. Allen, Insp.,
Assistant Federal Security Coordinator
for the 1976 Olympics

cc: F.S.C.

further to our earlier donnersation; I monded like your to attend with new when meeting arronged.

After .

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