


Olympic Games - 1976 - Background

Political intrusion into the Olympic Games

It is generally held  that with the exception of a 1936 Olympics in Berlin, political intrusion into the Olympics is a very recent development, beginning in the 1960's with apartheid in South Africa. Some might feel it began no earlier than the 1950's when the Soviet Union's initiation to the Olympics brought the Cold War to international sports.

Only a hasty scanning of a few books, notes and newspapers, however, reveals that political intrusion in one form or another began as early as the 1908 Games in London, and continued thereafter on so regular a basis that politics might be considered the twenty-second event in the programme of the Games. The record of political intrusion in the past may be difficult to discover, mainly because the people who cover the Games share the IOC's ideals that politics has no place in sports. Consequently, they are more concerned with reporting the achievements of the athletes and exclude political incidents as either embarrassing, disgusting episodes that shouldn't blemish their record of the Games, or as unworthy of note since it does not relate to athletics. Nevertheless, one may mention one incident, and someone else may refer to another. That was how the following thumb-nail sketch of the record of previous political intrusions was developed. Incidentally, it accumulates to the extent that one must conclude that politics in one form or another has been fairly prevalent in the Games. Probably the record below only skims the surface.

New York Times' reports on the Rhodesian issue in 1968, make reference to minor cases of politics entering the Olympics. To what precise extent politics has intruded into the Games is not known, but it would appear that it has to an extent much greater than most people assume or than is listed below.

Political intrusion may be categorized in several different forms and degrees of severity. There is the relatively harmless efforts by nations to boost national prestige by spectacular performances in the Games. The most obvious example of this was the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950's and early '60's to "prove the better system" in the field of sports. It is characterized by medal counts on the basis of countries and while this is harmless, it has been repeatedly condemned by the I.O.C. as contrary to the spirit of the Olympics. The "hosting nations" have as well usually exploited the Games to improve their international image.

A second, more serious form of political intervention is national rivalries carried into the events. Fierce competition that degenerated into open fighting marred the Soviet-Hungarian water polo match in 1956. In the 1974 7th Asian Games which enjoys the official patronage of the IOC, China refused to play Israel.

A third, and so far the most serious form of political intervention has been the threat of a massive boycott of the Games over the racially discriminatory policies of South Africa and Rhodesia. It has ultimately led to the expulsion of ~~both~~ from the IOC.

A fourth, and comparatively new type of political intervention is based on domestic as opposed to international politics. It was initiated in 1968 by the Black Panther athletes of the United States. It would become more prevalent.

In short, politics has and no doubt will continue to intrude into the Olympic Games fairly regularly and in many different forms. Although the IOC has designed a number of rules to try and exclude politics as much as possible, the great ceremonies, the presence of heads of state, and important international figures in sports and politics, the participation of athletes on a country basis with elaborate victory ceremonies with flags and anthems, the tremendous international attention the Summer Olympics receive and the world wide coverage it gets with the media, especially T.V. make the Games a very useful medium to pursue political objectives. Although the IOC steadfastly maintains that its decisions are a-political, nations such as China and black Africa contend they are very political and are themselves prepared to employ political tactics to change IOC decisions with which they disagree.

The Games have been in the past, and no doubt will continue to be in the future, viewed by many countries as a promising means of advancing their domestic or foreign policies.

Listed below are some incidents of political intrusion into the Olympics in the past (China, South Africa and Rhodesia are subjects of individual Background papers and are more fully considered therein than below).
1894 - Most sources agree that Baron de Coubertin revived the Games in order

to promote amateur athletics (which he considered an integral part of education) among the young, and further international understanding and peace. One source however contends that the early origins of the modern Olympics may have been political. Apparently Coubertin was obsessed with the low mental and moral state of France to which he attributed France's defeat in 1871. He saw France's salvation in copying England's educational system in which amateur athletics was an important part. The Olympics were apparently a means of popularizing amateur athletics. (James Coote, History of the Olympics in Pictures, p. 12).

1908 - Russia insisted Finland play under the Russian flag, but the Finns, (London) instead of marching with the Russians paraded separately without any flag. (N. Roxborough, Canada in the Olympics, p. 39). The Irish were upset at having to compete under British colours (John Kieran and Arthur Daley, The Story of the Olympic Games, p. 64).

- The Swedes and the Americans were irate when their flags were not flown.
- In 1908 it was apparent that victory was becoming more important than competition, that nations rather than individuals were reaping the glory (N. Roxborough, p. 45).

1920 - Because national animosities were so pronounced after World War I (Antwerp) and the organizers feared the possible results of war veterans competing against each other, it was decided not to invite Germany, Austria, and their lesser allies (N. Roxborough, p. 53; John Kieran,

p. 87; David Cheater, The Olympic Games Handbook, p. 45, J. Coote, p. 40).

1924 - The Americans made a very concerted effort to put together a winning (Paris) team to regain the national prestige they lost in 1920 (John Kieran, p. 101).

1936 - Hitler uses Olympics blatantly to promote image of Germany; German (Berlin) nationalism also intruded blatantly with Nazi salutes, gigantic flags, swastikas, and uniformed men everywhere; Hitler refused to receive the black champions; (H. Roxborough, pp. 89-98, John Kieran, pp. 152-171, David Chester, pp. 82-84, J. Coote, p. 54).

- Spain and the Soviet Union boycotted the fascist Olympics and sponsored their own counter-games in Barcelona (N. Roxborough, pp. 89-90).

1940 - Tokyo was supposed to hold the 1940 Games, but the Japanese government (Tokyo) decided in 1938 to cancel the Games in order to concentrate attention on trying to complete the war of conquest in China (N. Roxborough, p. 101, John Kieran, pp. 183-184).

- The Finns inherited the 1940 Games, but they came to a sudden demise for a second time when Russia declared war on Finland (N. Roxborough, pp. 101-102; John Kieran, p. 184).

1948 - The IOC's decision not to permit Israel to participate because it did (London) not possess a national Olympic Committee averted an Arab boycott (John Kieran, p. 187).

- Again, the defeated nationals of the war were not invited to participate (J. Coote, p. 68).

- 1952 - The Soviet Union participated for the first time and the nationalistic (Helsinki) rivalry with the United States was evident (John Kieran pp. 219-221). J. Coote, p. 27). The Russian team lived separately in a barbed wire compound (John Kieran, pp. 226-227).
- East Germany applied for recognition by the IOC but the IOC sidled away from that by continuing to recognize only West Germany which had inherited the original German "franchise". (John Kieran, p. 227.)
 - Both the so-called Republic of China and the PRC held separate memberships in the various international federations and the original Chinese Olympic Committee was split in personnel into the two camps. The IOC permitted the "two Chinas" to participate, but the ROC withdrew in protest over the IOC's decision. (John Kieran, p. 227).
- 1956 - The Hungarian uprising influenced the Games. The team insisted on (Melbourne) marching under the Hungarian flag and ripped down a flag adorned with a Communist emblem which the head of their delegation had insisted on using. When a Russian struck and cut a Hungarian player in a brutal game of water polo, a general mêlée began, in which Hungarian fans leaped over restraining lines to join. Several Hungarian players refused to honour victorious Russian competitors. Spain and the Netherlands withdrew in protest over Russian action in Hungary. The Swiss did too, then changed their mind, but they were too late to get back into the Games. (John Kieran, pp. 280-213, 316-317; David Chester, pp. 120-121; J. Coote, p. 78).

- The Suez crisis caused Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq to withdraw in protest (John Kieran, p. 281, David Chester, p. 120).
- Again the "two Chinas" were invited to participate, this time the PRC withdrew in protest over this decision and the raising of the ROC flag. (John Kieran, p. 281; David Chester p. 120).

1964
(Tokyo)

- Indonesia was banned from the Tokyo Games for violating the Olympic Code by prohibiting Israel and the ROC from participating in the 1962 Asian Games scheduled for but not held in Jakarta. The IOC withdrew its sanction and Soekarno held his own Games - GANEFO - in 1963. Two international sports federations did not withdraw their ban on North Korean and Indonesian athletes who had participated at the Asian Games. North Korea and Indonesia strongly but unsuccessfully protested the decision and North Korea ultimately withdrew from the Tokyo Games in protest (John Kieran, pp. 375-377).

- South Africa was not invited because of its apartheid policy.
- Rhodesia was excluded by Mexican governmental action (Department files)
- South Africa's invitation was withdrawn after the threat of a massive boycott (Departmental files).
- American black athletes employed the Black Power salute during American flag raising ceremonial (J. Coote, p. 106).

1972
(Munich)

- South Africa did not participate because it was ~~suspended~~ from the IOC in 1970 (Departmental files).
- Rhodesia was excluded by the IOC at the eleventh hour by the threat of a massive boycott (Departmental files).

- Black Power salutes were again employed by American black athletes (J. Coote, p. 131).
- On September 5 a group of Palestinian terrorists from the "Black September" movement killed two members of the Israeli team and held nine others hostage. Eleven Israelis, one German and five terrorists died violently in subsequent clashes. The Games, however, went on.

Department of External Affairs
Information Division (FAI)

August 1975

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Could the next Olympics be in Pretoria, South Africa?



There's no reason why it couldn't – except that South Africa itself is barred from the Olympic Games.

We were expelled a few years ago at the insistence of some nations who claimed that equal opportunity in sport for the different races did not exist in South Africa.

(In golf, South Africa has more black players competing in professional tournaments than even the United States.)

Responsible voices in the Olympic movement objected to this irrational ouster but were soon drowned.

With our black and white merit teams denied access to the Olympic Games in Mexico City in 1968 and more recently Munich, we had to find another way of providing them with international competition.

In 1973 we staged our own mini-Olympics, attended by more than 2 000 sportsmen from all over the world. In Pretoria they competed for gold, silver and bronze, regardless of race, colour or creed. Since then, we have hosted many other international events and world championships.

There is no reason why South Africa should not host the next real Olympics – providing she is accepted back into the Olympic community.

And why shouldn't she be?

Olympic Games - 1976 - Background

South Africa's participation in the Olympics
before 1976

The Republic of South Africa participated continuously in the Olympics between 1908 (London) and 1960 (Rome). (Erich Kamper, Encyclopedia of the Olympic Games, P. 294). It has had five nationals elected to the IOC: Sydney Farr (1913-1919), Henry Nourse (1920-1943), A. V. Lindburgh (1939-1939), J. Dowsett (1946-1951), and Reginald Honey, 1946-), Mr. Honey is still a member of the IOC despite the suspension of South Africa. He was elected President of the SAOC* in 1930 and since then was elected president for life.

Over the years, South Africa developed an enviable record of success in international sports. Its record in the Olympic Games is impressive: 16 gold medals, 16 silver, and 22 bronze which places South Africa behind the "Great Powers" and Western Europe, but ahead of Eastern Europe, the rest of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Erich Kamper, Encyclopedia of the Olympic Games, P. 323). South Africa's strong interest in participating in international sports competitions is due in part to a natural desire to excel in sports but also to a desire to be accepted in international meets by the world which they interpret as international acceptance of their apartheid policy.

The move to pressure the South African Government into ending apartheid by isolating it from the international community reached the Olympic Movement in the early 1960's. The South Africa Sport Association (established in 1958 to fight racial discrimination in sport in South Africa (Chris de Broglio, South Africa: Racism in Sport (SARIS), P. 3) sent a memorandum to the IOC in May 1959 protesting racism in sport in South Africa (SARIS, pp. 3-4). It was discussed by the IOC but was satisfied with the explanation made by Reginald Honey.

Racial discrimination in South African sport was raised again in 1962 in the Executive Committee of the IOC by the Soviet member and the IOC requested the South African Olympic Committee (SAOC) to explain the situation. At the IOC session in Moscow that year the IOC threatened to suspend the SAOC if discrimination was not ended by the October 1963 session. At Baden-Baden in 1963 the SAOC was notified that if it did not publicly renounce racial discrimination in South African sports (SARIS p. 15; Pretoria to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (USSEA), numbered letter (NL) 292, July 6, 1964) it would be "forced to withdraw from the Olympic Games." As a compromise, however, the SAOC proposed that South Africa field a mixed team at Tokyo, with the agreement of its Government (at least for a brief period). South Africa had sent all-white teams to the previous Olympic Games (attachment to letter from M. Cadieux to J.A. MacDonald, March 6, 1968). The proposal satisfied the IOC to a point, but it still demanded renunciation of racial discrimination in sports, which was more than the Government was prepared to do. The Government rejected the IOC's demand, and also announced its intention not to permit mixed teams to represent South Africa as a whole in international sports competitions.

Even if the IOC had been willing to settle only for the compromise the Government quickly changed its mind on permitting a mixed team to represent South Africa. It was willing to consider a contingent of separate teams representing the different races. After the whole scheme fell through it was revealed that the Government's short-lived agreement to a mixed team had been probably only a bluff (Pretoria to USSEA, NL 307, July 15, 1964). African newspapers supported the Government's decision with righteous indignation at the IOC's attempted interference in South Africa's internal affairs (Pretoria to USSEA, NL 279, June 30, 1964, NL 292, July 6, 1964, and NL 307 July 15, 1964). It was completely out of character for the IOC and Avery Brundage to take such a forthright stand on racial discrimination. But they were faced with a massive boycott that effectively threatened the successful staging of the Games and possibly had little option. However, no evidence has been discovered to reveal what was behind the IOC's Baden-Baden decision. One South African newspaper condemned the IOC for bowing to Communist and Afro-Asian pressure (Pretoria to USSEA, NL 292, July 6, 1964).

The SAOC in the following months and years made numerous representations to the IOC in order to secure participation in the Games in Mexico City in 1968. During that time, in December 1966 in Bamako, Mali, the National Olympic Committees of 32 African nations formed a new international sports organization, the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, (SCSA). It projected, among other things, strong opposition to racial discrimination on the sports policies of South Africa and Rhodesia (SARIS, p. 18; letter from Mr. Cadieux to J. A. MacDonald,

March 6, 1968). A resolution was unanimously passed informing the IOC that the African NOC's would reconsider participation in Mexico City if South Africa was invited while racial discrimination was enforced in South African sports.

It was decided by the IOC in Tehran in April 1967 to establish a commission (comprised of Lord Killanin of Ireland, Reginald Alexander, a white Kenyan, and Ade Ademola, a black Nigerian) to investigate the sports situation in South Africa, (which it did in late summer 1967). It reported its findings at the IOC session in Grenoble in 1968.

The report, according to James Worrall, the I.O.C. Canadian member, was factual, made no recommendations, and was based on a thorough investigation (memorandum from FAI to GAA, March 25, 1968). A second source contends the report confirmed that sports was conducted on a racially discriminatory basis but argued for the acceptance of South Africa at the Olympic Games because the SAOC was doing the best it could under the circumstances to meet IOC demands, and because the majority of the country's sportsmen and officials favoured participation (SARIS, p. 18). The Canadian Ambassador in Cape Town reported that Vorster had persuaded the Commission to report favourably on South Africa (Cape Town to USSEA, NL 105, February 19, 1968).

The report was circulated to the members of the IOC and it was decided to hold a vote by mail on South Africa's participation in Mexico City since attendance at the Grenoble session of the IOC was expected to be too low for a fair settlement by a vote there. In fact, two-thirds of the membership were at Grenoble and a heated debate took place on whether to vote at Grenoble instead of by mail. The decision to vote by mail

was sustained. The members of the IOC voted for a resolution in which the IOC:

- noted with concern the racially discriminatory sports policies of the South African government that prevent the SAOC from completely adhering to fundamental Principle One of the Olympic Code;
- was nevertheless encouraged by the intention of the SAOC to select on merit a multi-racial team;
- resolved that the SAOC could enter a team which conformed with fundamental Principle One of the Olympic Code provided that it vigorously continued to have all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport removed;
- would reconsider the question by the end of 1970 (SARIS, pp. 18-19).

The SAOC had promised to field a completely integrated team which would travel and live together, dress with the same uniforms, and march as one team. This time the South African government agreed, except that selection trials, in South Africa, to choose the team were to be held separately. Committees of equal members of whites and blacks were to appraise performances and select athletes for the team on the basis of merit alone. In cases of blacks and whites being judged equally good, run-offs between them were to be held outside the country. (New York Times, 23 February, 1968; Cape Town to USSEA, NL 1071, 22 September, 1967). The resolution was accepted in February, 1968 with 37 voting in favour, 28 against, and six abstentions.

The African nations reacted immediately. The SCSA called a special session and announced its decision to withdraw all of Africa from the

Mexican Games. They were supported by a large number of Asian countries. Black athletes in the United States intended to boycott the Games and were joined by numerous white athletes as well. The Soviet Union merely urged the IOC to hold a special session and reconsider the matter and it was supported by Italy and France (Ottawa Citizen, 28 February, 1968; PRMNY to External, T.970, 8 April, 1968). Cuba withdrew, but the rest of Latin America was indifferent (letter from M. Cadieux to J. A. MacDonald, 6 March 1968). Altogether, more than forty countries threatened to withdraw (Toronto Globe and Mail, 23 April, 1968).

The Mexicans officially abided by the decision of the IOC but the Canadian Ambassador in Mexico reported they were obviously dismayed at the possibility of a boycott upsetting the games. They placed great value on holding the Games and were greatly concerned that they would lose their international character, involve normally neutral Mexico in contentious international politics, and leave Mexico hosting an all-white Olympics. The heads of the Mexican Organizing Committee and the Mexican National Olympic Committee flew to Chicago to talk with Brundage. The Ambassador suspected that Mexico would insist that a solution be found satisfactory to Black Africa (Mexico to Ext. T.117, 1 March, 1968). The Mexican Ambassador to Canada indirectly suggested **that the Canadian Government** try to influence the IOC Canadian member. He stated to an officer in GAA that while he realized the IOC Canadian member was not answerable to the Canadian Government, the decision of the IOC to invite South Africa was of very great concern to the Mexican Government. He noted that the Games if they were held would bring Mexico closer to the world and Canada, while a boycott might force Mexico to surrender the Games causing embarrassment

to Mexico and possibly resentment against Canada and other white countries that might be considered to be well disposed towards South Africa (memorandum from GAA to FAI, 18 March, 1968).

Brundage initially refused to bow to pressure and insisted the Games would be held, even if only he and South Africa attended. The Marquis of Exeter, a senior member of the IOC, maintained that the Games could be a success without the boycotting countries (SARIS, p. 19). However, as the boycott spread, the Mexicans reacted vigorously to have the IOC decision changed (Mexico to EXT., T.234, 22 April, 1968). Ultimately they simply went to the IOC and insisted that it change its decision (Mexico to USSEA (FAI), NL 108, 25 February, 1975).

After denying that he would ever call a special meeting of the IOC to reconsider its decision, Brundage relented under the pressure and called a special meeting of the IOC's Executive Committee in April. It was unanimously recommended to the IOC that the invitation to South Africa be withdrawn (SARIS, p. 19; Toronto Globe and Mail, 23 April, 1968). Brundage stressed that the invitation was withdrawn not because of its racial policies, political pressure, or threat of boycott, but out of concern for the safety of the team, given the "international climate" at the time, which included disturbances, destructive demonstrations, and even assassinations, (New York Times, 8 June 1968; Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 1972, and CIO - 73rd Session, Munich, 1972) and Worrall, the Canadian member of the IOC commented:

"It is possible that the IOC has been forced to yield to pressure, but if there is a precedent, it is a dangerous one. It means that anytime somebody

doesn't like something, he can force a change by threatening a boycott. I think the South African Committee should be given credit for getting as far as it did in a difficult situation. They had been proceeding in good faith under what they considered were the required conditions" (Mexico to Ottawa, T.247, 25 April 1968).

At Mexico, Brundage assured the African members of the IOC that the IOC's position was that which it had adopted at Baden-Baden (i.e. South Africa was banned from Olympic competition until racial discrimination was completely eliminated in South African sports (SARIS p. 19). In April 1969, the South African Government was host to the first international, but not multi-racial South African Games to compensate South Africans for being excluded from the Olympics (letter of John Munro to all Canadian sports associations, 5 October, 1969; Capetown to USSFA, NL 332, 7 May, 1968).

After the 1968 Olympic Games, African hostility to South Africa only intensified and a movement gathered momentum to expel South Africa entirely from the IOC and the Games. At the general meeting of the National Olympic Committees in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia in October 1969, the African nations demanded that South Africa be given until the IOC Session in Amsterdam, May 1970 to end discrimination or face expulsion from the 1972 Olympics in Munich. They rejected South African counter proposals to field an integrated team (Ottawa Citizen, 24 October, 1969).

At the IOC Congress in Warsaw in 1969 there was a strong effort to expel the SAOC from the IOC, but Brundage agreed with Honey, the South

African member of the IOC that a substantial case would have to be presented to the IOC before expulsion could be considered. The question was referred to the IOC session in Amsterdam the following year.

The clock finally ran out for South Africa at Amsterdam in 1970. On May 15 (just three days after Mayor Drapeau had succeeded in winning Montreal's bid for the site of the 1976 Summer Olympics), South Africa was expelled by a vote of 35 in favour, 28 opposed, with 3 abstentions (SARIS, pp. 19-20; Erich Kamper, Encyclopedia of the Olympic Games, p. 356). How the decision was arrived at, what types of cases were proposed, how the resolution was worded, what the conditions for re-admission are, and whether the motivation behind the expulsion was based on concern with the status of sports in South Africa, or on more general political considerations with respect to South Africa is not known.

South Africa may be out, but not down. True, it hasn't made any significant moves to secure re-instatement by the IOC, nor has it significantly changed its policy of racial discrimination in sports. (We understand from COJO that South Africans have approached them with their version of why South Africa should participate in 1976 but nothing has come of that contact.) Nevertheless, GAA reports that South Africa is "obviously increasingly anxious to expand its very minimal sports contacts." (USSEA (GAA) to Pretoria, T. 356, August 10, 1973). Two South African women who competed (as individuals) at the 91st Metropolitan Toronto Police Games in 1973 visited the Montreal Olympics site and, on their way home, the site of the first Olympic Games in Greece. A South African

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sportswriter who accompanied them thought South Africa's chances for re-instatement might be improving since South Africa began holding racially mixed competitions, and international tournaments attended by up to 28 countries, including representatives from governments hostile to South Africa (Toronto Globe and Mail, July 30, 1973). The key to South African participation is whether it can win the few votes necessary to reverse the 1970 decision, although that won't end the problem of massive boycotts that would no doubt threaten the Games and South Africa's participation in the Games, if it was re-admitted to the I.O.C.

In recent conversation with Lord Killanin, President of the I.O.C., he stated flatly that South Africa would not be invited to the 1976 Games nor could he foresee any imminent change in its status in the future.

Despite such firm talk the South Africans continue to signal their interest in the Olympics as demonstrated most recently in the quarter page advertisement (copy attached) which appeared in the Herald Tribune (Paris) March 19, 1975.

Department of External Affairs
Information Division (FAI)
Ottawa

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Rhodesia's participation in the Olympics

From the point of view of attendance at, and performance in, the Olympic Games Rhodesia's record is hardly worth noticing. It has participated only three times (in 1928, 1960 and 1964), and apparently has never won any medals. (1). Rhodesia's National Olympic Committee (NOC) was recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1959, but no Rhodesians were elected to membership in the IOC. (2).

The prominence of the Rhodesian question in the Olympic Movement is a result of Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965. Most African nations have objected to Rhodesia's participation in the Olympic Games since UDI, ostensibly on the grounds that discrimination in sports is practiced in Rhodesia in contravention of the IOC Rules. (3). In fact, this opposition is very much fuelled by general political considerations (i.e., hostility to the white minority government). (4).

Little comprehensive information could be located originally in the Department's files, in books, or in newspapers to explain how or why Rhodesia was prevented from appearing at the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. However, additional information was acquired and showed that the Marquis of Exeter, a prominent member of the IOC announced June 2, 1968 that Rhodesia had accepted an invitation to participate in the Mexican Games.

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1. Erich Kamper, Encyclopedia of the Olympic Games, pages 294 and 323.
2. Olympic Directory 1973.
3. Rule 3 of the Olympic Rules and Regulations 1974.
4. Lagos to USSEA, numbered letter 337, October 7, 1971;
Organization of African Unity (OAU) press release, August 11, 1972.

He added that there was no segregation in sports in Rhodesia and that the IOC was only interested in sports. (5). Five days later, on June 7, the Mexican Organizing Committee (MOC) announced that Rhodesia would be unable to participate because of Resolution No. 253 passed by the United Nations Security Council on May 29 which forbade U.N. members from admitting anyone travelling on a Rhodesian passport. In view of the binding nature of the resolution, the MOC stated, Rhodesia's delegation would be barred from attending. It added that the invitation to participate had been sent before the U.N. resolution was cast. (6). Avery Brundage, President of the I.O.C. commented that there was nothing the IOC could do about a "politically-caused" denial of participation by Rhodesia in the Olympic Games. He continued, "Here we have another case of throwing the Olympic Movement into the middle of an international controversy when the cause is political and has nothing at all to do with sports. (7).

It may seem peculiar that the MOC should have announced the barring of people entering the country, since this would normally be the responsibility of the Mexican Government. Logically, it had to be the Mexican Government which barred the Rhodesian entry not the MOC. It would appear that the MOC announced the decision only because the Mexican Government "constantly endeavoured to maintain a very low profile concerning political problems which cropped up in connection with the Games, asking the National Organizing Committee to seek solutions for all political problems and only to check out proposed solutions with the Ministry (Foreign Affairs) prior to implementation... it was the constant duty of the President of the

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5. New York Times, June 3, 1968.
6. New York Times, June 8, 1968.
7. New York Times, June 8, 1968.

Organizing Committee to shield the Mexican Government from any involvement in the embarrassing situations which arose, especially in connection with countries' participation in the Games." Nevertheless, the Government clearly had a word, and probably the final word in the settlement of political problems.

The MOC apparently exercised extraordinary powers, and threatened the withdrawal of KIM's privileges in Mexico if the airline flew the Rhodesians to Mexico. Similar pressure was brought to bear on shipping companies. (8). In short, it is difficult to determine definitively responsibility for Rhodesia's exclusion from the 1968 Games, because the Mexican Government worked with and through the MOC in order to camouflage its intervention. Certainly, the primary decision to bar Rhodesia must have been made at the Government level.

Furthermore, between February and April, when the success of the Games, to which the Mexican Government attached great value, was threatened by a boycott over South Africa's participation, the Canadian Ambassador was fairly certain that the Mexican Government was acting "vigorously" behind the scenes. (9). Presumably, the Mexican Government acted again to protect the Games when the prospects of Rhodesian participation surfaced with the attendant possibility of another threatened boycott. Although no public threat of a boycott is known to have influenced the Mexican's decision to exclude the Rhodesians, African nations did request the IOC to withdraw its recognition from the Rhodesian NOC. The IOC in general and Avery Brundage in particular refused to do this. An OAU

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8. Mexico to USSEA (FAI), NL108, February 25, 1975.
9. Memo from D. McCashin to E.A. Skrabec on S.A.'s participation in the Olympic Games, March 14, 1975.

press release states a compromise was reached by which Rhodesia was refused participation through "Governmental action while leaving it to the IOC and Africa to solve the basic complex problems later." This was "very fortunately endorsed" by the Mexican Government. (10). This suggests that more serious steps were being contemplated by African nations to prevent Rhodesian participation, and that the Mexican Government by excluding Rhodesia was carrying out a compromise agreement reached by it, the IOC, and numerous African countries.

The compromise also indicated that the conflict between the IOC and African nations on Rhodesian participation in the Olympic Games had not been settled. The process began again when an invitation to participate in the 1972 Games in Munich was sent to Rhodesia in March 1971. (11). The West German Government (FRG) was worried about a boycott if Rhodesia participated. While the FRG felt bound to observe the U.N. Resolution 253, at the same time an iron-clad guarantee had been given to the IOC to accept all entry documents for all NOCs invited by the IOC (which included Rhodesia). Unsure about the factions within the IOC, the West Germans feared that a declaration to refuse Rhodesians entry under the U.N. Resolution 253 might cost them the Games. It was hoped that the IOC would act to exclude the Rhodesians. If the IOC failed to act, the FRG was uncertain what it could do to satisfactorily resolve the problem. (12). Uncertainty, delay, a low profile in the controversy and hope for a favourable solution by the IOC, characterized the FRG's policy on the Rhodesian issue.

10. OAU press release, August 11, 1972.

11. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 20, 1972.

12. Bonn to USSEA, NL 201, April 27, 1971 and NL 322 May 5, 1971.

On April 30, 1971 the U.N.'s Committee of 24 passed the resolution which urged the IOC to suspend the Rhodesian Olympic Committee (ROC) and annul its invitation to the Games in Munich. The 71st IOC session held in Luxembourg in September 1971, received representations from the Supreme Council for Sports in Africa (SCSA) a body established in December 1966 and comprised of 32 NOCs of African countries which shared, among other things, a strong opposition to the sports policies of Rhodesia and South Africa. (13.). The SCSA proposed the same resolution to the IOC. (14.). The IOC was also considering the resolution of a committee it had established in 1970 to review Rhodesia's participation in the Olympics. The resolution was authored by Abraham Ordia, (President of the SCSA and also a member of the IOC and the Nigerian Olympic Committee), who believed that racial discrimination was practiced in Rhodesian sports and who wanted to bar Rhodesia. He decided not to base the resolution on a recommendation for the exclusion of Rhodesia: (a) because Avery Brundage would have vehemently opposed it and (b) because the likelihood of organizing an effective boycott of Rhodesia was too limited.

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- 13. South Africa: Racism in Sport, by Chris de Broglia, page 18; letter of M. Cadieux to J.A. MacDonald, March 6, 1968.
- 14. OAU press release, August 11, 1972.

Basing his rationale upon the best interests for international sports, rather than of politics, Ordia's claimed, the resolution would have permitted Rhodesian participation at Munich, provided that participation was as a British Colony, under British colours. It was argued that since the IOC was not competent to resolve the dispute over Rhodesian independence, the basis of Rhodesian participation should be that in which it participated in the last Games before the dispute arose (i.e., Tokyo, 1964, where it participated as a British colony prior to UDI in 1965). Ordia believed that this formula would satisfy those Africans opposed to Rhodesian participation. He also believed that Rhodesia would refuse to participate as a British Colony, but that if it did, this would still constitute a victory, from both the athletic and the political point of view.

The IOC was divided over the resolution. Those who adopted a purely apolitical point of view believed that Rhodesia should be accepted as an independent state. On the other hand, were those who wanted Rhodesia excluded as a rebel state banned by the U.N. Nevertheless, the resolution passed with 76 in favour and 6 abstentions. (15). It was also agreed that the problem of entry (i.e., invalidity of Rhodesian passports under the U.N. Resolution 253) would be circumvented by using Olympic I.D. cards originally designed to permit East German entry into West Germany for the Games. (16.). The I.D. cards were

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- 15. Lagos to USSEA NL 337, October 7, 1971.
- 16. Bonn to External Affairs (GAA), telegram T 1200, August 17, 1972; memo from GAA to File, August 28, 1972.

inscribed with "Rhodesia (British)." (17). The SCSA also accepted the Resolution. (18).

However, the Secretary General of the OAU was bitterly critical of the compromise, arguing that it yielded too much to Rhodesia. Ordia stated that the Secretary General was more interested in scoring political points by demanding nothing less than the withdrawal of IOC recognition of the Rhodesian Olympic Committee unless discrimination was ended. (19). Apparently, the OAU went along with the SCSA until Rhodesia decided to meet the IOC's conditions of participation. Then, various African governments gradually began publicly criticizing Rhodesian participation. It became increasingly apparent in 1972 that despite the SCSA's original acceptance of the compromise, opposition was growing among African governments.

The British Government notified the FRG that it too was unhappy with Rhodesia's decision to attend the Games. Although it was not a formal protest, the British argued that participation would be a morale booster for the Smith regime, that the U.N. did not recognize Rhodesia's independence, and that Britain did not think it fitting that Rhodesia should participate under a British or any other flag. A senior official in the FRG's Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed that the British approach was low-key and pointed out that U.N. Resolution 253 took precedence over any guarantee the FRG might have given the IOC on entry and that the FRG would be justified in refusing entry to Rhodesians. Subsequently, the British Government remained

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17. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 22, 1972.
18. Memorandum of GAA to File, August 28, 1972.
19. Lagos to USSEA, NL 337, October 7, 1971.
20. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 20, 22, 1972.

strictly neutral and did not try to influence the FRG Government. (21).

The Munich Organizing Committee and the FRG accepted the IOC's invitation to Rhodesia and the IOC's conclusion that no racial discrimination existed in Rhodesian sports. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeated that the FRG had no choice but to accept Rhodesian participation since Munich's bid to stage the Games had been supported by a governmental statement that all countries invited by the IOC would be permitted entry into West Germany. (22).

On August 4, three weeks before the Games were to begin, the OAU openly dissociated itself from the position of the SCSA by appealing to Chancellor Brandt to intervene and prevent Rhodesia from participating as Mexico had done in 1968. (23). Reports are confusing as to what action the SCSA had taken, but there are some reports that it may also have changed its mind and called for the exclusion of Rhodesia. (24). On August 9, the SCSA met with Willie Daume, the West German Vice-President of the IOC to discuss Rhodesia's participation in the Olympic Games, the meeting lasted five hours. After renewed assurances from the IOC and the Organizing Committee that Rhodesia would participate as a British colony, the SCSA called upon all African countries to participate in the Munich Games. (25.).

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- 21. Bonn to External Affairs (GAA) August 17, 1972.
- 22. Toronto Globe and Mail, July 22, 1972.
- 23. OAU press release, August 11, 1968.
- 24. Toronto Globe and Mail, August 10, 1972.
- 25. Toronto Globe and Mail, August 10, 1972.

On August 11, the OAU issued a press release that declared there was ample evidence of racial discrimination in Rhodesian sports. It regretted that Brandt had not replied to their message of August 4. The press release further described the FRG's contention that their guarantee to the IOC of unrestricted entry to all participants recognized by the IOC as a legalistic quibble that ignored political realities, that declared the FRG was devoid of sympathy for African problems, and that the FRG's response in general was unacceptable. It was therefore understandable that African countries felt obliged to withdraw. The OAU appealed to all countries of goodwill to bring the competent authorities in the German Government and the Munich Organizing Committee to reason (i.e., to take the necessary measures to exclude Rhodesia). The OAU warned that should Rhodesian participation be confirmed at the August 19 meeting of the IOC the African teams and the teams of countries that wished to support Africa should withdraw from the Olympics. (26).

On August 14, the President of the SCSA appealed to all African countries to participate in the Games, because Africa would lose face by a withdrawal after agreeing to the terms of Rhodesian participation. The divergence of positions between the SCSA and the OAU reflected a divergence of opinions between the African sports organizations and their governments on how and who was to handle the problem. The governments acting separately and through the OAU simply over-rode the SCSA's accommodation with the IOC for Rhodesian participation as a British Colony. The OAU and the

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26. OAU press release, August 11, 1972.

governments were opposed to Rhodesian participation under any formula. (27).

Even within the OAU, opinions on withdrawal were divided.

Ethiopia, which set great store on participating, was most tardy in withdrawing. (28). Nigeria decided to stand by the SCSA and honour its accommodation with the IOC. (29). Trinidad was also very reluctant to withdraw from the Games in support of the OAU and was the last of the Caribbean countries to do so. (30). The boycott included countries from Africa, and the Caribbean, as well as athletes from the United States. Significantly, the Soviet Union and the East European countries only went as far as threatening to withdraw. (31). On August 17, the Executive Committee of the SCSA sent telegrams to all African countries recommending participation at Munich. (32).

Brandt finally replied to the OAU. He argued that because the FRG had "ceded authority" in entry to the IOC, he was powerless to prevent the Rhodesians from entering Germany or from participating in the Games. He suggested that the OAU seek satisfaction from the IOC at its August 19 meeting. (33). However, the Secretary General of the United Nations warned the FRG, as well as the IOC that U.N. Resolution 253 applied to all organizations, private or governmental, and that acceptance of any kind of Rhodesian identity cards would be a violation of the Resolution. (34).

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- 27. Bonn to External Affairs (GAA), T 1200, August 17, 1972.
- 28. Addis to External Affairs, (GAA) T 670, August 5, 1972.
- 29. Lagos to External Affairs (GAA), T 1013, August 22, 1972.
- 30. Port of Spain to USSEA, NL390, September 5, 1972.
- 31. Ottawa Citizen, August 21, 1972; Toronto Globe and Mail, August 21, 1972.
- 32. Yaounde to External Affairs (GAA), T 957, August 17, 1972.
- 33. Bonn to External Affairs (GAA), T 1200, August 17, 1972.
- 34. GAA memo to File, August 28, 1972.

The Canadian Government's policy was to remain out of the controversy, arguing that the Canadian member of the IOC did not represent the Canadian Government nor was he subject to the Government's direction. A spokesman for Sport Canada advanced his personal opinion on a television programme that participation by Canadian athletes in a boycotted Olympic Games would be a matter for the individual athlete to decide. (35).

On August 22, four days before the Games were to begin, despite protest from Avery Brundage, the IOC conceded and withdrew Rhodesia's invitation.

After Munich the IOC established a committee (composed of a Dane, a Brazilian, and a Pakistani) to investigate sports in Rhodesia. The report was submitted to Lord Killanin, President of the IOC, in Vienna in October 1974. Lord Killanin said it would take two to three months to study and translate it before it was sent out to the NOCs. (36). Rhodesia was supposed to have been discussed at the IOC session held in Lausanne in February 1975. (37).

At the 76th Session of the IOC, May 21 to May 24, 1975 in Lausanne, the IOC voted 41 to 26 to withdraw recognition of the Rhodesian National Olympic Committee until its policies of apartheid in sport are put aside. As a result Rhodesia is not a member in good standing of the Olympic Movement and it is not eligible to be invited to the 1976 Olympics.

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- 35. GAA memo to File, August 28, 1972.
- 36. Memo from FAI(Miss Hardy) to GAA, October 25, 1974.
- 37. Memo from FAI(Skrabec) to PDQ, January 10, 1975.

Department of External Affairs
Information Division, FAI.

August 1975.

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U.N. Resolution 253 (1968) May 29, 1968

1. Christian Science Monitor Aug 5/73 - "The Rhodesian team did not take part in the 1968 Olympics either. Mr. Brundage says that this was not because they were ineligible, but because of some confusion over visas!"
2. N.Y.T. June 8, p. 38:7 UN action on Rhodesia Bars Participation in Olympic Games.

Mexico City, June 7, (UPI) - Rhodesia will be unable to participate in the 1968 Olympic Games here next October, the Olympic Organizing Committee said today.

The reason given was a resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council on May 29 that provided, among other things, that United Nations member states should deny admittance to any person travelling under a Rhodesian passport.

The organizing committee distributed copies of the resolution and in an attached note added that in view of the binding nature of the resolution Rhodesia's delegation would be barred from attending.

The Committee noted that the invitation to participate in the Games, had already gone out to Rhodesia before the resolution was passed.

3. Avery Brundage Deplores Ban Chicago, June 7, (AP) - Avery Brundage, President of the IOC, said today there was nothing the Committee could do about a "politically caused" denial of participation by Rhodesia in the Olympic Games.

CONFIDENTIAL

Olympic Games - 1976 - Background

PRC-ROC Participation in the Olympic Movement

This memorandum attempts to provide a summary of the major developments and issues in the twenty-five year struggle between the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC) the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Sports Federations (ISFs) over the issue of participation in international sports, primarily in the Olympic Games. (Because of the often confused and conflicting versions of this subject sources are identified in parenthesis; even then "fact" is elusive.)

2. Before 1949, China participated in the Olympic Games from 1932 (with one athlete) to 1948 in spite of the revolution and the war with Japan (Erich Kamper, Encyclopedia of the Olympic Games, p. 293). The Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) was a member in good standing in the IOC and three Chinese began terms on the IOC itself before 1949: Dr. C.T. Wang (1922-1957), Dr. H.H. Kung (1939-1955) and Mr. Shou-Yi-Tung (1947-1958). Significantly, the 1973 Olympic Directory refers to them as representatives of the IOC to "China." The Official Report of the 1948 Games (London) refers to the Chinese delegation as the representatives of "China." Aside from the listing of the gentlemen listed above that was the last time the name "China" appears in IOC records available to us without various modifiers, i.e. Formosa, PRC, ROC, etc.

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Footnote to Page 1.

(Otto Mayer, who was Chancellor of the IOC, states in his book "A travers les Anneaux Olympiques", p. 288, that in 1946 the "Comite Olympique Chinois" (The Chinese Olympic Committee) was located in Shanghai. 19 of the 25 "dirigeants" of the Committee moved to Taiwan in 1951 along with the archives while of the 6 remaining three names are shown as being IOC members in "Chine". Of the latter only Shou-Yi-Tung figures in Olympic matters until 1958. In 1952 the IOC decided to let both Chinese groups which had delegates at Helsinki participate in the Games there, even though the Peking Committee was not recognized by the IOC. The PRC did and the ROC didn't. The Committee which moved to Taiwan continued to be recognized by the IOC under the original name (above) although at the Games from 1952 until 1968 various qualifiers were used such as ROC, Formosa, Taiwan, nationalist China, the Committee of Formosa, etc. In 1954 the IOC recognized "Le Comite olympique de la Chine Democratique et Populaire" with its seat in Peking. In 1958 the PRC withdrew from the Olympic Movement and this was officially acknowledged by the IOC which removed its Committee from the list of National Olympic Committees. The Committee based in Taipei continued to use the appellation "Chinese Olympic Committee" but had "The Republic of China Olympic Committee" accepted in 1959 by the IOC, with qualifications on its use which were all lifted by 1968.

The use of "Formosa", "Taiwan", "ROC", "Committee in Taiwan", by the IOC and other sources are often used interchangeably in this paper and the source's usage is employed.)

3. In 1946 the Chinese Olympic Committee (Comité olympique chinois) was located in Shanghai. In 1947 it moved to Nanking (with Professor Shou-Yi Tung as secretary). In 1951, the Committee moved to Formosa with its archives but without Shou-Yi Tung (A Travers les Anneaux Olympiques, Otto Mayer, p. 288 - Mayer was the Chancelier du Comité International Olympique; in this paper the volume will be identified by Mayer). On May 13, 1952 in Oslo an Attaché of the PRC Embassy called on the President of the IOC stating that he was a delegate from the "All China Athletic Federation" and wished the IOC to recognize an Olympic Committee of China ("d'un Comité olympique de Chine") to permit PRC athletes to participate at the 1952 Helsinki Games. The Attaché's "arrogance", and obvious ignorance of "sport" contrasted to his "political" attitude, infuriated the President who indulged in a favourite habit: crashing his cane across the desktop and stalking out. The Attaché at least had conveyed to him the details on how to proceed to obtain recognition of a National Olympic Committee. (Mayer, p. 208).

4. According to Mr. Kuo Lei, a senior member of the All China Sports Federation (ACSF), the PRC had notified the IOC in 1952 that the ACSF had been "re-organized" and that it was the "equivalent" to the China Olympic Committee. (A report made by Dr. T. Bedeckl, Sports Canada entitled "Sino-Canadian Exchange of Views on International Sports, Autumn, 1973, identified by BR in this paper). At the 47th Session of the IOC in Helsinki in 1952,

the President reminded the members that the sole Committee recognized by the IOC was that of "la Chine nationaliste" which had its seat in Taipei (Taiwan). As far as he was concerned, the Olympic Committee of Democratic China (le Comité olympique de la Chine démocratique) having its seat in Peking, pretended to be the sole Committee representing all of China. The Executive Committee of the IOC proposed that neither of the two Chinas should participate at Helsinki. (PRC athletes were in Leningrad waiting for the call.) The President of the "Olympic Committee of Taiwan (Formosa)" made an enthusiastic presentation but his "political" comments were not well received. He made the point that of 25 China Olympic Committee members 19 were in Formosa. The PRC Attaché at the Legation in Stockholm committed the cardinal error of being even more "political" than the latter and apparently left a negative impression. A vote was taken: 22 voted that no Chinese team participate in the Games; 29 voted that both take part. A secret ballot was then called by the Executive Committee which proposed that neither participate. A counter-proposition by the French member was introduced: that the Chinese teams which belonged to, and were accepted by, International Federations could participate in those sports. There were 33 votes in favour of the latter and 20 for the Executive Committee's proposition. Mr. Avery Brundage stated his view that it seemed necessary to issue a statement to the effect that the IOC recognized no Chinese Olympic Committee. Despite the above the IOC did permit Chinese athletes (PRC) to participate, contrary to IOC Rules (the PRC had no recognized NOC) but in the Olympic spirit. The Formosans left

in protest over the IOC decision to recognize neither claimant and to invite both to participate, citing its "illegality and impropriety" . A sidelight to the above is the IOC President's insistence that if Shou-Yi Tung was alive he should present himself at the IOC Sessions. "Sa place est ici, faites-le venir", were his reported words to the PRC Attaché. Tung appeared within three days accompanied by an interpreter from the PRC Stockholm Legation who was asked to depart but he refused insisting he had to translate for Tung. The IOC, President, knowing Tung spoke English well, repeated his famous cane demonstration and put them both out! Tung did, however, attend the Games with two Legation members. (Mayer p. 211, 212).

5. At the 48th IOC Session¹⁹⁵³, in Mexico City, Avery Brundage the IOC President, is cited as saying that while the Chinese participated at Helsinki their NOC was not yet recognized. (Mayer, p. 230).

6. On May 15, 1954, at the IOC Sessions in Athens "Le Comité Olympique de la Chine Démocratique et Populaire", having its seat in Peking, was recognized by the IOC by a vote of 23 to 21, of 48 members present. (Mayer, p. 288). This information was conveyed to the ACSF and a Hsinhua article, May 20, 1954 stated in part "In a letter to the All-China Sports Federation (Chinese Olympic Committee) on May 26, 1954, the IOC Secretary-General said, 'I have pleasure to inform you that at our Athens Session which took place at the beginning of this month your Committee has been recognized by the IOC'." (Peking telegram 848 of May 23 to GPL). (Presumably the bracketted Chinese Olympic Committee is a PRC insert as the title given in Mayer, p. 288 is the full one, i.e., the Olympic Committee of the People's Republic of China).

7. The delay in the IOC coming to grips with the admission of the PRC is attributed by Mayer to the alleged fact that the delegates who presented the PRC case were always "politicians" and not "des sportifs".
8. At the IOC's 1955 Session in Paris, Avery Brundage noted that while China had been recognized at Athens "the IOC also recognizes Taiwan."
9. Shou-Yi Tung requested the IOC, at its 51st Session in Cortina d'Ampezzo in 1956, to strike off "Formosa" from the list of NOCs. The President of the IOC considered the intervention to be "political" but asked Tung to submit his views in writing for consideration at a subsequent Session. The President noted that there would be no question of excluding athletes from "Formosa" for a political reason and the same consideration applied to athletes from the PRC.
10. Mr. Tung made a similar intervention at the Session prior to the 1956 Melbourne Games and the IOC reaction was that, because of the "political" nature of the request, consideration was "out of the question". The Formosans made similar complaints about the presence of the PRC which were treated in the same way. The upshot was that the PRC withdrew and did not participate at Melbourne while the Formosans fielded a 46 man team. The Official Record for the Melbourne Games lists the "ROC" and the "PRC" as participants, noting that the PRC withdrew.
11. As in 1956 the 53rd IOC Session at Sofia in 1957 heard

Mr. Tung once again raise the issue of the presence of the "Committee from Formosa." The IOC reaction remained the same, i.e. they were not prepared to address "political" matters, only sport.

12. On August 25, 1958 the "Olympic Committee of the People's Republic of China" officially communicated to the IOC its decision to withdraw from the Olympic Movement. This was accepted by the IOC which also accepted the resignation of Shou-Yi Tung and the Olympic Committee of the PRC was removed (rayé de) from the list of the Committees recognized by the IOC. The Chinese communiqué was apparently heavily laced with uncomplimentary comment about Avery Brundage and Mayer, taking his distaste for "politics" to its usual degree, noted that as his reason for not reproducing the Chinese statement. The PRC also withdrew simultaneously from the following International Federations: athletics, basketball, soccer, wrestling, weight-lifting, swimming, shooting and tennis. (Mayer, p. 288-290).

13. The PRC was officially "out" of the Olympic Movement and the "Chinese Olympic Committee", with its seat in Taipei, Formosa, remained.

14. Although the PRC was no longer in the Olympic Movement they were still concerned about their status as demonstrated by the intervention of one of the two IOC members from the USSR at the 55th Session in Munich in 1959. The latter declared that the IOC should recognize the PRC as having the sole Olympic Committee for all of China. He claimed that the Committee in Formosa had arrogated to

itself powers which in reality it never had. The Marquis of Exeter responded by agreeing that the Committee in Peking was the sole representative of China but gave as his view that a sports organization existed in Formosa. The PRC had withdrawn from the IOC in 1958. His comments led the IOC to decide to recognize the existence of "un organisme sportif" in Formosa providing the word "China" did not appear in its title. It was noted that the "Committee from Peking" had, on its own, withdrawn from Olympism (Mayer, p. 293). The "Committee from Formosa" continued in effect to be called the "Chinese National Olympic Committee" (Mayer, p. 296).

15. The USSR returned to the attack a couple of days later on May 28 putting to the IOC a proposal stating that the Committee in Formosa did not control sport in "Chine continentale." The IOC USA representative believed the matter could be resolved by asking the Committee in Formosa to change its name which was the cause of the confusion. The IOC engaged in a long and confused debate during which it was noted that the Committee in Formosa did not administer sports on the mainland, and that the Committee in Peking, having withdrawn from the Olympic Movement and numerous federations could not be considered as being able to be reintegrated in Olympism. The USSR delegates (Andrianov and Romanov) then called for the removal of the name of the Committee of Formosa from the IOC official list. However, by a large majority vote the following decision was taken:

"The Chinese Olympic Committee having its seat
in Taipei (Taiwan) will be notified by the Chancellor

of the IOC that it is not able to recognize it under the name given as it doesn't administer sport in China, and its name will be taken off the official list. If a request for recognition is submitted under another name to the IOC the question will be examined by the latter." (Mayer, p. 297).

After the Session two delegates from the Committee of Formosa came to Lausanne to negotiate with Avery Brundage. Some time later in 1959 the former put forward a new name: "Republic of China Olympic Committee" (Comité olympique de la République de Chine).

16. Considerable confusion arose over an invitation to the "nationalistes chinois" in 1959 to participate in the 1960 Winter Games at Squaw Valley. Avery Brundage made clear that, by its May 28 vote (above) the IOC did not expel or eject the "Comité de la Chine nationaliste" from the Olympic Movement. The IOC merely sought to identify athletes who were under the control of the "Comité olympique de Taiwan" taking part in the Games. Also, to confirm again the decision taken by the International Athletic Federation in 1954 (representing about 100 countries) that the Chinese Nationalists did not direct sport in mainland China.

17. Interestingly enough, Lord Killanin, now IOC President, sought to have the IOC strip Taiwan of the right to call itself the Republic of China. However, at the 57th Session in Rome in 1960 the IOC recognized the "Republic of China Olympic Committee" by a vote of 35 to 16 with 2 abstentions but insisted that the ROC participate in the 1960 Games (Rome) as "Formosa." (Mayer, p. 318). The ROC threatened to boycott the Games over this decision, but the IOC would not be moved, and the ROC gave in. Nevertheless, as the ROC team

paraded before the reviewing stand in the opening ceremonies the head of the delegation, who followed the man bearing the placard entitled "Formosa", whipped out a second placard that read "Under Protest" (David Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook, p. 134; John Kieran and Arthur Daley, The Glory of the Olympic Games, p. 335).

18. At the 1964 Games (Tokyo) the Taiwan athletes were allowed to have "Republic of China" on their equipment and in 1968 (Mexico) they got full use of the title of ROC officially.

19. From 1958 the PRC has protested against the usurpation of its rightful place in the IOC by the ROC. However, since 1973 the PRC stopped waiting for the IOC to come round to the PRC view and began actively to seek return to international sports and the IOC. The PRC is now pursuing its complete return to international sports, by direct negotiations with the international governing bodies, when this approach works, and when it does not work by lobbying with "friendly" countries with members on the more resistant federations, to get them to overturn policy unfavourable to China. The PRC still base their return on the prior expulsion of the ROC.

20. The first major coup of this drive to re-enter international sports was China's admission to the Asian Games Federation (AGF) and to the 7th Asian Games held in Tehran in September 1974. This is a regional competition that enjoys the patronage of the IOC. Because

of the manner in which the PRC joined (i.e. Taiwan was first expelled) the Asian Games nearly lost that patronage and risked censure by several irate international federations. According to the Chinese, Iran led a number of Asian countries in expelling the ROC and inviting the PRC to represent China in the AGF. The IOC remains unhappy over the procedures used to admit the PRC.

21. In September 1973, in Bangkok, the Executive Committee of the AGF approved for submission to the AGF Council by a vote of 5-0 with one abstention the resolution that "the All China Sports Federation should represent China in the Asian Games Federation." (7th Asian Games, Bulletin No. 5). On November 16, 1973, the Council, after heated debate, passed the motion 38 for, 13 against, with 5 abstentions (Thailand and Laos were not present). Although the PRC made known its wish to participate in the Asian Games (Tehran 1974 Newsletter No. 1 (July - August 1973), (Peking telegram 2700 to FAI, November 7, 1974), it is not known if it formally applied for admission. It appears that the PRC did not. Rather, they relied upon "friends" to expel the "illegal usurper" and "restore" to the PRC the right to represent China in the AGF (Peking Review, November 23, 1973). The Chinese singled out Iran as the prime mover, but also publicly thanked Japan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Burma, Hong Kong, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Singapore, as well as "other friends". (Peking Review, November 23, 1973).

22. Nine Asian sports associations also expelled the ROC and recognized the PRC (Peking to USSSEA, letter No. 771, September 18, 1974). These decisions led to a confrontation with the IOC and

several international sports federations (ISF). The IOC threatened to withdraw its patronage, while the ISFs threatened to boycott the Games. After negotiations the Iranians got the IOC to approve the Games if the ISFs would go along with the new China policy of the AGF too. After more negotiations, the ISFs finally consented and the AGFs escaped censure (Montreal Gazette, June 23, 1974; Sports Illustrated, September 16, 1974; BR). Nevertheless, the President of FIFA (Soccer Federation), declared the regional associations' decision to expel the ROC and recognize the PRC as "illegal" (FAI telegram 3738 to Peking November 7, 1974).

23. The extent of China's participation in the Games depended on the number of international federations to which it belonged. In 1972 the PRC belonged to four or five. In 1973 it began a drive to join the federations of 14 of the 16 sports in the Games, and ultimately all international sports federations (Toronto Globe and Mail, July 30, 1974; Tehran 1974 Newsletter, No. 11, July 19, 1974). The PRC continues to demand that the ROC be expelled before it joins any federation. Sources differ on the number of ISFs to which the PRC belongs; six (rowing, fencing, weight-lifting, archery, ice-skating and ice-hockey (letter 462 from Peking to USSEA, June 12, 1974)), seven (the above six and volleyball (Sports Illustrated, October 27, 1974)), or nine (the above seven plus basketball and table-tennis, (Toronto Globe and Mail, July 30, 1974)). Although table-tennis is not an Olympic sport, the PRC still have membership in at least five federations thereby meeting one of the IOC's requirements for securing recognition of an NOC and participation in the Olympic Games. Furthermore, in those federations where the PRC was not extended membership, the federations adopted a rather radical change of policy by permitting a non-member to participate against members. Three

federations (I.B.F.-badminton), FIFA, and IAAF (Amateur Athletics in Track and Field), have made it a rule that on prior request non-members and members may compete against each other (Toronto Globe and Mail, July 30, 1974).

24. The soccer federation (FIFA) stated that no decision on PRC membership can be made until its session in Montreal in 1976 (FAI telegram 3738 to Peking, November 7, 1974). The swimming federation (FINA) will accept the PRC as a member on payment of fees but any decision on the ROC could be made only after the PRC, as a member of FINA, raises it for consideration (telegram 500 from Cairo to FAI, September 17, 1974). Canadian members of the IAAF have stated that the PRC can apply, but the issue of the ROC should not be raised, particularly since the ROC has been a member in good standing for many years and possesses an impressive track and field promotional programme that was very much in keeping with IAAF objectives (telegram 1257 from Rome to FAI, September 9, 1974). At least one federation, weight-lifting, has agreed to the PRC's condition, and expelled the ROC first (Sports Illustrated, September 23, 1974). Significantly, according to the Ambassador in Peking and Sports Illustrated, so anxious was China to enter the swimming sports at the Asian Games, that at the eleventh hour, in a second letter of application to FINA, it did not demand the prior expulsion of the ROC as a condition of PRC membership (letter 771 from Peking to the USSEA, September 18, 1974; and Sports Illustrated, September 16, 1974). This is surprising since it controverts fundamental Chinese policy before and since.

25. Although China has broken one hundred world sports records since 1949 (Peking letter 462 to USSEA, May 22, 1974) and it did place second (to Japan) in Tehran, apart from several individual performances, its overall performance at the Asian Games was well below world standards (Sports Illustrated, September 16, 1974 and September 23, 1974; Toronto Globe and Mail, October 20, 1974). Nevertheless, China's participation in a major international sports competition for the first time since 1966 has implications that extend well beyond Tehran. China's concerted efforts to secure membership in fourteen international sports federations and to participate and do well in the Asian Games indicates the seriousness of the PRC's intention to secure membership in all international sports federations and competition. The long term goal and climax of these efforts, observers believe, will be readmission to the IOC (Toronto Globe and Mail, July 30, 1974). The importance the Chinese Government attached to entry into the Asian Games was underlined by a reception for the team attended by nine members of the Politbureau and a send-off at the airport by a large group of senior officials led by Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Not only was the Government taking seriously China's first participation in the Asian Games, it was talking sports competition on all fronts at the time (letter 771 from Peking to USSEA (GPL), September 18, 1974).

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26. China's performance at the Asian Games may not have been impressive, but that was not for lack of effort. The level of competition by China was extremely high. China apparently is interested in participation for more reasons than purging the name of the ROC from international sports. The PRC also appears to be seriously committed to "winning" for its own sake and for reasons of strong nationalist pride. They were taking great nationalistic pride in performing well, as medal victories were reported in glowing terms at great length in the press, with little interest shown in the often superior successes of other nationals (letter 771 from Peking to USSEA (GPL), September 18, 1974).

27. Yet for a nation which aspires to full representation in all international sports organizations and competitions its deliberate and blatant injection of politics into the Asian Games, in flagrant opposition of the rules and ideals of those sports governing organizations that specifically forbid the intrusion of politics into sports, is somewhat surprising. At Tehran, aside from the issue of expelling Taiwan, China joined the Arabs in refusing to compete with Israel. A Chinese refused to fence with an Israeli (and was banned from the Games); the Chinese refused to face the Israelis in the tennis finals; and they acted quite discourteously at the podium when the Israeli national anthem was played during the basketball award ceremony. A Chinese official explained that politics is inseparable from sport, a policy that could not be more in conflict with the rules and ideals of the IOC and sports

federations which expect politics to be scrupulously kept out of sports (letter 771 from Peking to the USSEA, September 18, 1974; notes on the 7th Asian Games from file 7100-2 of Sport Canada). Willie Daume, an IOC Vice-President, gave China little chance of taking part in the 1976 Olympics: "At the Asian Games in Tehran, the Chinese recently caused some problems that did them the most damage. I hope that before the meeting in Lausanne next year (February 20 - 22, 1975), things will be straightened out" (FAI telegram 3467 to Peking, October 17, 1974). The Canadian Ambassador, Peking, contends that "politics is still the name of the game for the Chinese authorities." They are interested in returning to the international sports scene and in using sports "to promote their international legitimacy and establish themselves as a Third World leader in yet another field" (letter 771 from Peking to the USSEA (GPL), September 18, 1974). It also appears to be considered a useful, if minor venue by which to further advance foreign policy objectives (i.e. reject the Israelis and curry favour with the Arabs and Third World countries).

28. China relied on its "Asian friends" to get into the Asian Games and sports federations. Ambassador Small perceived China's approach to the Asian Games as also constituting the cultivation of an Asian/Third World lobby for an all-out assault on the Olympics (letter 771 from Peking to the USSEA (GPL), September 18, 1974). A reporter for Sports Illustrated also reports that Tehran also represented the development of an Afro-Asian bloc to get China into the IOC (Sports Illustrated, September 23, 1974).

29. Another major move occurred at the IOC's 74th Session at Varna, on September 30, 1973. A strong demarche by the Japanese Olympic Committee urged the IOC to give "the seat to the People's Republic of China, which really represents China in every sense." The ROC outlined its "basic position" which appears to be that there is one-China and one-Taiwan insofar as sports are involved. The ROC delegate said "As far as the ROCOC is concerned, it now effectively controls sports activities within the territories under the effective control of the Republic of China, and it does not claim jurisdiction over any sports activities beyond its reach. No other national authority can exercise such control over the sports activities in our areas. While my Committee does not object to any other qualified national sport authority joining the international athletic community, it does inexorably oppose anyone joining the community at our expense. For this reason we can never accept the attempts now afoot to treat the China problem in international sports merely as a question of representation. We firmly believe that it is rather a matter of membership." (The Japanese and ROC statements are appended.)

30. The Japanese Olympic Committee was severely criticized for its intervention. According to the Toronto Globe and Mail of October 5, IOC President Lord Killanin:

"expressed great distaste for the actions of the Japanese Olympic Committee in bringing the pro-China matters to the floor... 'I don't think there is any question of our taking sanctions against the Japanese', he said, 'but in my view all they did was get the backs up of most of the IOC and the federations.'"

31. On November 1, 1974 in Peking during a meeting between representatives of the ACSF, Sport Canada, and the Embassy, the Chinese, through Mr. Kuo Lei made known their expectations that Canada following the example of Iran at the Asian Games will arrange for their participation in the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal and for the expulsion of the ROC. It was suggested that Canada's failure to do so would be "regrettable for Sino-Canadian relations"; the implication was that Sino-Canadian relations would be adversely affected. The Chinese would not believe that either the City of Montreal or the IOC were beyond the effective influence of the Canadian Government. Although it was suggested to the Chinese that the proper course would be for them to approach the IOC and apply for admission, it appeared that they were not prepared to apply but rather preferred the matter to be raised with the IOC by another power, in this case Canada (Peking telegrams to FAI 2699 and 2700, November 7, 1974; Peking telegram 2767 to GPL, November 15, 1974; memorandum to GPL from E.A. Skrabec, November 15, 1974; memorandum to file by E. Morse, December 18, 1974; and memorandum from A.J. Fraser, Sport Canada to R.J. Giroux, November 20, 1974).

32. It is not surprising that the PRC would prefer to seek the assistance of others to influence the IOC indirectly. Their experience with the Asian Games undoubtedly served as a standing precedent. However, it is likely that the PRC was forced to make a direct approach to the IOC in April 1975, at the urgings of its partisans, e.g. Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Tanzania. That approach, which Lord Killanin dubbed "somewhat short of a formal application" was

accompanied by a pre-condition to PRC return to the IOC , namely the prior expulsion of the ROC. Presumably it was along the lines expressed by Kuo Lei:

"It is not a question of China applying for membership; but rather one of restoring membership usurped by Chiang Kai-shek... it was through the mistakes made by past officials that a situation developed whereby 700 million Chinese people had been deprived of the right to participate in international sports." (BR). (The question of which "officials", IOC et al., or Chinese, is outstanding.)

33. At the May 21 - 24 Session of the IOC in Lausanne the issue was raised by Iran, supported by Japan and Tanzania, at least, and it had sufficient potential to split the IOC down the middle. As a result, the IOC decided to further "study" the matter and Lord Killanin will visit both Taipei and Peking in that connection. He suggested the IOC would address itself to the problem again just before the Innsbruck Winter Games in February 1976.

34. If it were simply a matter of accepting the PRC claims to membership in the IOC that would be possible with a minimum of dialogue over the tidying up of technical details relating to the structure and workings of the ACSF and whatever ceremonies are necessary to install the PRC. However, the root of the difficulty is not whether a Chinese NOC exists, nor is it really a question of who is responsible for the PRC's estrangement from the IOC and the

Olympic Movement. The heart of the problem is the PRC's traditional insistence that Taiwan is an integral part of China and, as such, has no other legal status. There should, therefore, be only one China recognized by the IOC and the PRC should be recognized as its government. Since 1958 the IOC has just as adamantly refused to meet that condition as outlined in this paper. Decisions made since 1952 have, over the years, achieved a legitimacy in IOC eyes that will be exceedingly difficult to reverse, or at least to defend if it is reversed. Partly, it is a question of not wanting to throw the Taiwanese out of international sport. After all these years they have established a respectable and respected image in sports. They have attracted friends in the Olympic Movement who are impressed with its commitment to, and promotion of, amateur athletics. The Chinese counter that all this is merely a pretext for ignoring their own legitimate claims and argue that they too are concerned about the promotion of amateur sport, in the all-China context.

35. Another difficulty in jettisoning the ROC is finding a legitimate reason. The only legal grounds (within the IOC's concept of legality) for expulsion of an NOC from the IOC and the Olympics is violation of the IOC Rules (Rule 25, Olympic Rules and Regulations, approved at Varna, 1973 appended). The ROC, however, has been a model member of the IOC, at least since the 1960 Games. However, the PRC reply that "usurping the PRC's place in sports is a very serious violation" which falls a bit short of the ambit of Rule 25.

36. Finally, for the IOC to expel the ROC and install the PRC would be in violation of Rule 8, one of its own sacred laws (appended).

The IOC has recognized the ROC Olympic Committee not as the NOC of "China" but of the "Republic of China" with as much right to membership and existence as the NOC of Canada or Costa Rica, providing it does not violate the IOC Rules. This holds regardless of whether there is one China or another China.

37. It appears that, because of the failure of the IOC and the PRC to resolve these differences over the past 17 years, and because of the growing number of countries like Canada who have recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, the PRC have changed their approach to the issue of re-engagement with the IOC. That is, instead of arguing interminably and waiting patiently for the IOC to come around to the PRC's point of view, the PRC now apparently believes that a more promising route to achieving its objectives lies in getting the increasing number of countries who recognize it, and who belong to the sports governing bodies, to influence their nationals in those organizations to ram PRC membership through (the PRC does not accept that the IOC is composed of private individuals who do not represent countries). This seems to have been the rationale behind China's approach to Iran for the Asian Games, and to Canada for the 1976 Games, and was demonstrated at the recent Lausanne Sessions by clear Japanese, Iranian and Tanzanian efforts on the PRC's behalf.

Department of External Affairs
Information Division (FAI)
Ottawa

August 1975

000104



Mr. Chairman,
Ladies,
Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Japanese Olympic Committee, I would like to make a brief comment on the issue of the representation of China.

There are two motives behind our appeal regarding China's seat in the international sports arena.

First, we find it a shame that a country with one fourth of the world population is excluded from the world of sports, the Asian sports scene in particular.

Second, we believe it is not well understood that the China issue is completely different in nature from that of divided countries already recognised by the IOC. Unfortunately, there seems to be no possibility of the "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan", because the People's Republic of China will never accept this proposition.

I know that a number of our colleagues including our good friends from Taiwan say that "we welcome the People's Republic of China, but there is no justification for expelling the Republic of China (Taiwan), which has been such a good member of the various international sports organisations".

Indeed, our good friends from Taiwan have been polite, well-liked and law abiding members.

However, Ladies and Gentlemen, a good boy or a bad boy is not the issue.

The real issue is who should occupy the seat of China. There can only be one

seat. The contending occupants are two. We are compelled to choose one to take it.

This is a very important issue for the Asian Games to be held in September next year in Tehran, Iran. Because, without deciding on this question properly, the Iranian Organising Committee of the Games may find it almost impossible to organise the Games.

Both the People's Republic of China with the population of 750 million and Taiwan with 15 million are insisting that China is one. This is a fact. We have to face up to it, and ask: "What is China?"

So, we must find a way to put this reality into practice in the world of sports, by giving the seat to the People's Republic of China, which really represents China in every sense.

At the same time, I sincerely hope that the day will not be far off when a détente between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan is brought about, and the youth of all China will be able to take part in world sports.

I thank you.

K. H.

Mr. Thang-Sou Chiu

Joint Secretary General of the
Republic of China Olympic Committee



Mr. President,
Honourable delegates,
Ladies,
Gentlemen,

I am T. S. Chiu, Deputy Secretary General of the Republic of China Olympic Committee. On behalf of my committee, I have the honour to convey our warm greetings to all participants in this congress and to congratulate the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and all National Olympic Committees for the success of their joint efforts which have brought this August assembly to fruition. We wish particularly to express our sincere thanks to the Bulgarian Organising Committee not only for the excellent preparatory work it has so laboriously undertaken, but also for its kind arrangements which made it possible for the delegation of my committee to come to this beautiful town of Varna, regardless of the great political differences between the two countries. Indeed, this gesture of Olympic solidarity serves as a good example of the great principle of the Olympic movement that politics can have no place in sports.

Mr. President, I wish, on behalf of my committee, to draw the attention of this congress to a grave danger to the integrity of the Olympic charter and the future of the Olympic movement. This danger lies in the growing incidence of political interference in sports. I regret to have to say that the Republic of China Olympic Committee has suffered, twice in

two international sports organisations which are either affiliated to or under the patronage of the IOC. The recent incident occurred only two weeks ago in the Asian Games Federation, but the end has not yet been reached. We shall see the final result in the special meeting of the AGF Council to be held in Manila in November. I do not intend now to dwell upon these unpleasant happenings, because my committee has already provided all sports leaders in the world with the necessary information. Nor will I hurl specific charges against the perpetrators of these offenses, for we know full well that such un-Olympic behaviour cannot prevail in the end.

However I do want to point out that the remarks which have just been given by our friend from the Japanese delegation are purely political. We can't help but say that we deeply regret that the Japanese Olympic Committee, purely for political considerations, should see fit to declare openly and repeatedly this kind of logic, namely that sport and politics can't be kept separate, or in order to accommodate a country with a population of 750 millions for political reasons we shall not hesitate to kick out a member country of 15 million people.

It is true that we have often heard that some politicians have claimed there is only one China. But let us ask ourselves: is it true? Certainly not!

Furthermore, we are gathered here not as politicians in the United Nations but as sports leaders in the Olympic congress. If we start to follow the thinking of those politicians, then we would be violating the fundamental principles of our Olympic charter. As sports leaders, God forbid, we cannot!

However, I do wish to put on record here in the Olympic congress the firm opinion of my committee that if such politicking in world sports should be allowed to go on unchecked, our Olympic movement will undoubtedly face a very bleak future or even total destruction!

Mr. President, I ask you to allow me now to outline to the congress the basic position of my committee in the face of these assaults on our Olympic movement as a whole. Our basic position is as follows:

1. China is in a divided condition, with the two separate sports authorities govern-

in the two parts of the country, just as in the case of the other divided countries. As far as the Republic of China Olympic Committee is concerned, it now effectively controls sports activities within the territories under the effective control of the Republic of China, and it does not claim jurisdiction over any sports activities beyond its reach. No other national authority can exercise such control over the sports activities in our areas and my committee will resist to the end any attempt to deprive the youth of my country of their rightful opportunity to take part in international sports activities.

2. While my committee does not object to any other qualified national sport authority joining the international athletic community, it does inexorably oppose anyone joining the community at our expense or at the expense of the integrity of our international community. For this reason, we can never accept the few attempts now afoot to treat the China problem in international sports merely as a question of representation. We firmly believe that it is rather a matter of membership.

3. The International Olympic Committee, as the head of our big Olympic family, has recognized my committee for many years as the only national authority for the areas under the effective control of the Republic of China. The IOC also decided in 1968 that my committee should be known as ROC in the Olympic Games. Therefore, we are firmly of the opinion that, for the sake of Olympic solidarity, any such important matters involving the entire Olympic family should be referred to the IOC for prior decision.

T. S. C.

III - THE NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES

24 A - Only National Olympic Committees recognized and approved by the International Olympic Committee can enter competitors in the Olympic Games and the qualifying rounds. Therefore, in order that contestants from a country or geographical area can participate in the Olympic Games, there must be a National Olympic Committee in that country which must be composed of at least five National Federations. These Federations in turn must be active members of the International Federations governing their sport on the Olympic programme. The National Olympic Committees must also conduct their activities in accordance with the Olympic Rules and Regulations and the high ideals of the Olympic Movement in order to be recognized by the International Olympic Committee.

B - National Olympic Committees have as their purpose the development and protection of the Olympic Movement and of amateur sport. They shall co-operate with the national amateur sport governing bodies (National Federations), affiliated to the International Federations recognized by the International Olympic Committee, in guarding and enforcing the eligibility rules. It is their duty, in co-operation with the National Federations, to organize and control the representatives of their country at the Olympic Games. They arrange to equip, transport and house these representatives.

They are organizations formed not for pecuniary profit, but devoted to the promotion and encouragement of the physical, moral and cultural education of the youth of the nation, for the development of character, good health and good citizenship.

C - National Olympic Committees must not associate themselves with affairs of a political or commercial nature.

D - The Rules and Regulations of the International Olympic Committee shall be incorporated in the Rules and Regulations of National Olympic Committees and shall be enforced by them in their respective countries or areas.

E - The I.O.C. will consult the National Olympic Committees on the basic problems concerning the Olympic Movement in general and the activities of the N.O.C.s in particular. The latter can make proposals to the I.O.C. concerning the progress of the Olympic Movement and the sound organization and operation of the Olympic Games. All important problems connected with the N.O.C.s will first be discussed with them and then submitted to the Sessions of the I.O.C.