

The DG

The O i/c P-P & C

Proposed DND Weapons Display

① DDG ops
OIC "D" ops

I think Terrorist Section "D" ops? Do you agree?

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N° REFERENCE IP 210-36
YOUR FILE - VIREFFÉRENCE
DATE 6 December 1974

Attached please find C/M [redacted] report covering his visit to Camp Borden. A suitable display could be arranged to show the various "families" of weapons. Although arrangements can proceed, in view of DND budgetary restrictions, it is unlikely that it could be prepared before 1 April 1975.

The general format should be an integrated Security Service/ DND presentation of approximately three hours.

Hour one -- Security Service or International Terrorist Briefing

Hour two -- DND presentation on weapons and their capabilities

Hour three - questions and handling of weapons by audience.

The presentation should be made at Camp Borden (for Toronto), Ottawa, Montreal, Vancouver, Kingston and Regina. The audiences would include RCMP (all units), DND, Customs, local, provincial harbour and railway police, and possibly Post Office personnel.

The presentation should be video-taped for general training purposes.

In view of the nature of this program, I would suggest that it be handled either by Security Service Training & Development or by the International Terrorist Section of "D" Ops. The Terrorist Section will certainly be involved in the presentations (hour one).

I have had preliminary discussions with Herb BRADLEY regarding the likely involvement of Training and Development personnel.

[Signature] Insp.,
George H. Powell,
i/c Policy-Planning
and Co-ordination.

c.c. - O i/c Training & Development
"D" Operations

PROPOSED OUTLINE PLAN FOR WEAPON DISPLAY

Objectives of the display

One of the main objectives of such a display would be to familiarize the personnel of various police forces and government agencies such as the R.C.M.P. (all units), DND, Customs, provincial and municipal police forces, harbour and railway police and possibly Post Office authorities with the types of weapons being employed by International Terrorist groups. A secondary objective would be to demonstrate the ease and the various methods by which these weapons can be transported and concealed.

Presentation Format


In discussion between DND and RCMP Security Service personnel it has been agreed that such a display should be an integrated RCMP Security Service/DND presentation of approximately three hours in length. The actual display would consist of three phases:

- (A) The first hour would consist of a general threat presentation provided by the RCMP Security Service International Terrorist Section of "D" Ops and it would be concerned with the tactics employed by terrorist groups in recent years.
- (B) The second hour would consist of a presentation by Canadian Forces personnel on the actual weapons and their specific capabilities.
- (C) The third session would be a more informal question and answer period at which time those in attendance would be given the opportunity to examine and handle the weapons made available.

Input from the Canadian Bomb Data Centre should be included in either (A) or (B).

Reproduction interdite sans autorisation écrite du Coordonnateur de la Sécurité des Jeux.
 No part of the plan may be reproduced in any manner without written permission from the Security Coordinator of the Games.

chapitre / chapter 23	page 1
date d'émission / date issued	
annule / cancels	



Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS PARCELS

I. DEFINITIONS

A. BOMB

A device carrying an explosive charge and fitted with a detonator.

B. SUSPICIOUS PARCEL

Any object or container which might, because of its appearance, location or the sounds it produces, indicate dishonest intentions or constitute an immediate threat to public safety.

C. DANGER AREA

An area in which public safety is threatened by the assumed or confirmed presence of a bomb or suspicious parcel.

D. THREAT

Words, gestures or acts which signify the existence of a bomb or suspicious parcel.

II. PRINCIPLES

A. The operations centre must be NOTIFIED immediately.

B. It is essential to AVOID doing or saying anything which might lead to panic or disorder.

C. All threats will be CONSIDERED founded until proven otherwise.

III. TACTICAL PLAN

The tactical plan will be implemented in five (5) phases, as follows:

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

PHASE I: RECEIVING THE CALL

The operations centre will take the following steps:

- A. Alert the tactical units which may eventually be called upon (ALPHA, DELTA, etc...).
- B. Alert the STRATACUR coordination centre and give all information regarding the threat.

Policemen will take the following steps:

- A. Attempt to obtain the information described below:
 1. Location of the threatened area and the bomb or suspicious parcel
 2. Description of the bomb or suspicious parcel
 3. Time and date
 4. Description of the informer (sex, language, physical appearance, attitude, telephone No., etc...)

NOTE:

1. It may be possible to confirm the veracity of a threat by hinting at the presence of something which does not in fact exist, such as a side door, etc...
 2. Isolate the person who has received the call in order to help him or her remember the exact details and also to avoid spreading panic.
- B. Immediately notify the operations centre and the person in charge of the threatened area, if this has not been done already.

OPERATION STRATACUR

Reproduction interdite sans autorisation écrite du Coordonnateur de la Sécurité des Jeux.
No part of the plan may be reproduced in any manner without written permission from the Security Coordinator of the Games.


chapitre / chapter page

23

3

date d'émission / date issued

annule / cancels



Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS
PARCELS

- C. Cooperate with the person in charge of the threatened area in implementing search tactics and preventive measures.

PHASE II: SEARCH TACTICS AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

The purpose of implementing search tactics and preventive measures is to find a foreign object in a given place, which object has an unusual appearance, is hidden from view or is of dubious origin.

A. SEARCH OF THE THREATENED AREA

1. The most efficient technique for searches is in teams of a minimum of two (2) persons.
2. It is advisable to carry out the search under the supervision of the person in charge of the threatened area assisted by the regular occupants (receptionists, maintenance staff, ushers, security guards, etc...)
3. Policemen on the site should cooperate with the person in charge of the threatened area to supervise the personnel conducting the search.

B. SEARCH OF A BUILDING (OR VEHICLE)

1. Assign 25% of available personnel to search the exterior, 25% to search areas to which the public has access, and 50% to search the rooms thoroughly.
2. If there is a shortage of personnel, begin the search outside, proceed to the public access areas and terminate in the rooms.

C. EXTERIOR SEARCH

The outdoors is of course the easiest place to deposit a bomb or suspicious parcels.

000624

Check the following carefully:

1. All litter, bushes, access roads, manholes, parked vehicles
2. Places where the earth has been disturbed
3. Windows, air conditioning units, signs, architectural decorations, emergency stairways, etc...

D. SEARCH OF PUBLIC PLACES

Proceed from one floor to the next beginning in the basement, and make a careful check of:

1. Reception rooms, waiting rooms, washrooms
2. Utility and maintenance rooms
3. Elevator shafts, light and ventilation shafts and laundry chutes.

E. THOROUGH SEARCH OF ROOMS

Begin in the basement and proceed floor by floor to the roof. In each room, move in a clockwise fashion, and:

1. Immediately check any unusual noises.
2. Make an initial sweep of objects on the walls, on the floor or on furniture (check under the rugs).
3. Make a second sweep, checking objects hanging from the ceiling, as well as furniture, electrical outlets, and heating and plumbing fixtures, etc...

OPERATION STRATACUR

Reproduction interdite sans autorisation écrite du Coordonnateur de la Sécurité des Jeux.
No part of the plan may be reproduced in any manner without written permission from the Security Coordinator of the Games.

chapitre / chapter page

23

5

date d'émission / date issued

annule / cancels



Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS
PARCELS

PHASE III: LOCATING THE BOMB OR SUSPICIOUS PARCEL

When a suspicious object has been found, no one may attempt to touch or move it.

The first policemen on the scene will:

- A. Alert the operations centre at once, requesting the necessary personnel and equipment.
- B. Proceed in a calm and orderly fashion to evacuate the threatened building and any surrounding buildings which might be affected by an explosion.
- C. Establish a sufficiently wide perimeter around the threatened area and seal it off completely.
- D. Avoid covering up the bomb or suspicious object.
- E. Open any windows or air shafts if possible.
- F. Prohibit access to the area which is immediately threatened (do not smoke or produce excessive heat or friction).
- G. Avoid using radiocommunication devices within a radius of 100 feet from the danger area.
- H. Avoid transporting or handling any explosives or suspicious objects.

The operations centre's plan will include the following rules:

- A. Alert the STRATACUR coordination centre.

000625

B. Immediately dispatch to the danger areas:

1. The bomb disposal squad
2. The required number of ambulances
3. The fire department concerned
4. The tactical units required to maintain the perimeters of the emergency zone and evacuate persons from the area. These include:

The commanding officer of the police station concerned, who will act as MCU officer until he is relieved by an officer of higher rank.

The duty officer of the police station concerned, who will:

- a. Replace the C/O in his absence
- b. Supervise the evacuation of persons and the establishment of the perimeters around the emergency zone
- c. Re-assign to regular duty all personnel not needed in the emergency.

The patrol officer, who will:

- a. Replace the duty officer in his absence
- b. Ensure that the threatened buildings are completely evacuated.

The following tactical units will be required:

- | | |
|----------|---------------------------|
| a. ALPHA | d. KILO (if necessary) |
| b. DELTA | e. OSCAR |
| c. GOLF | f. SIERRA (if necessary). |

OPERATION STRATACUR

Reproduction interdite sans autorisation écrite du Coordonnateur de la Sécurité des Jeux.
No part of the plan may be reproduced in any manner without written permission from the Security Coordinator of the Games.

chapitre / chapter 23 page 7

date d'émission / date issued

annule / cancels



Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS PARCELS

- C. Notify the hospital likely to receive the victims in the event of an explosion.
- D. Notify all other public services which may be concerned.
- E. Make arrangements for an emergency route which will allow the bomb or suspicious parcel to be transported in the safest manner possible.

EVACUATION AND CONTROL OF MOVEMENT

The evacuation process should be carried out calmly:

- A. By posting guards, policemen and security agents at the elevators, exits and stairways to control the movements of persons leaving the building (avoid using the elevators).
- B. By starting with the floors in the immediate vicinity of the danger area and then proceeding from the top floors down to the lower floors.
- C. By grouping the persons who have been evacuated in a place sufficiently removed from the danger area and asking the person in charge of the building or site to account for the occupants, if this is possible.


PHASE IV: BOMB DISPOSAL AND INVESTIGATION

- A. The commanding officer of the bomb disposal squad (ALPHA) will have the final decision on how to defuse the bomb.
- B. The investigation concerning the planting of the bomb or suspicious parcel comes under the criminal investigation department of the police station concerned and then is turn **000626**

OPERATION STRATACUR

Reproduction interdite sans autorisation écrite du Coordonnateur de la Sécurité des Jeux.
No part of the plan may be reproduced in any manner without written permission from the Security Coordinator of the Games.

chapitre / chapter	page
23	8
date d'émission / date issued	
annule / cancels	



Sujet / Subject

TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A-1
BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS
PARCELS
(MONTREAL AIRPORT)

The DEFINITIONS, PRINCIPLES and general rules outlined in TACTICAL PLAN NO. 3-A (BOMB THREATS AND SUSPICIOUS PARCELS) apply here so long as the following information is taken into consideration:

I. DETECTION

The RCMP (airport detachment) has one dog at its disposal which can be used for detecting explosives.

II. ISOLATION AREA (dangerous substances)


- A. The authorities at Montréal Airport have set up one (1) isolation area for dangerous substances, such as acid, radioactive materials, bombs, suspicious parcels, etc...
- B. This area is illustrated on the following pages and can be used during an operation STRATACUR with the authorization of the RCMP.
 - 1. The area is surrounded by link fences and has two (2) entrances.
 - 2. The keys for these entrances are in the possession of the RCMP (airport detachment).

III. PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN USING THE ISOLATION AREA

- A. Notify the RCMP and the OC of the MUCPD.
- B. A red light on the fence indicates when there is a dangerous substance in the isolation area.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

- C. RCMP personnel can turn the light on by using a switch located at security post E.
- D. At night, the isolation area is illuminated automatically.




OPERATION STRATACUR

MONTREAL AIRPORT

ISOLATION AREA FOR DANGEROUS
000628

CONFIDENTIAL



OPERATION STRATACUR

ISOLATION AREA FOR DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES

MONTREAL - AIRPORT

JULY 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

000629

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

The Coordinator will be represented at all times both in our R.C.M.P. Operations Centre and the Police Operations Centre near the Olympic Village. The only one stipulation is that the Coordinator will represent Montreal Operations only and will not be empowered to call in units from outside the Division area. As mentioned previously, this will remain with the Federal Security Coordinator in consultation with the D.D.G. (Operations).

COMMUNICATIONS:

At the outset, there was considerable discussion concerning a common communications system with teams from other divisions, however, this has mainly been resolved. The basis of the problem was that the teams in each location are licenced by MOT to operate only in one frequency range, complicated by the fact that Montreal equipment is not compatible with the equipment in Ottawa and Toronto. New crystals have been ordered to equip the Ottawa vehicles with a Montreal frequency so that the two teams can operate in "C" Division. Ottawa vehicles now have "C" channel equipment. Some vehicles in Montreal and Toronto will be equipped with "C" channel (seven new sets have been ordered for Montreal, Toronto and the aircraft) which will allow a common communications net. This common equipment will permit the turnover of targets from one unit to another or, in the event of absolute necessity - such as a STAGE 2 situation, the "C" channel equipment could be used for inter-unit communications coordination.

ACCREDITATION:

Important
One item, still under consideration, is the type of accreditation cards to be issued to surveillants. The present system put forward by COJO consists of eight categories identified by different colors. This is, however, presently under review and one suggestion is that the cards will be only one colour and the venues identified by code numbers. From the "I" Ops. standpoint we are seeking to have all our surveillants issued with a card which will permit entrance to all sites, and without being identified as security personnel. As mentioned, this subject is still under discussion, and we are currently in the process of making our requirements known to the Principle Security Committee.

TRAINING:

The subject of training for "I" Ops. personnel has received considerable consideration and is planned for in four separate areas:

- (A) Surveying of Sites. This is an ongoing process and

.....5

cannot be given serious consideration until the completion of the various buildings.

(B) Topography Familiarization. For the sites outside of Montreal, i.e. Bromont, Jolliet and l'Acadie, this will be proceeded within the Summer of 1975, and for the urban environment of Montreal and Kingston, in the Spring of 1976.

(C) Olympics Introduction Course. This two day course has been prepared by Training Branch in Montreal and will be presented in the autumn of 1975. It is designed as a familiarization course for the Olympics, and is presently under review as to our requirements. At very least an Olympic briefing package is required for presentation to all "I" Ops. personnel in "C", "O" and "A" Divisions.

(D) Bombs and Weapons Recognition Briefing. As you are aware Lt. Coté of the MUCP, the leading bomb expert in Canada, is scheduled to join our Customs and Immigration Briefing Program and we are seeking to extend this to a one-day briefing in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and possibly Vancouver, (Human Settlements Conference). This briefing would, in essence, prepare our personnel for the eventuality of unexpectedly seeing a bomb placed etc. Its inclusion is considered most desirable for one-day lectures in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver.

Good

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) That the recommended staged deployment of "I" Operations be approved for use during the Olympic period. ✓

(B) That the authority for the deployment of "I" Ops. resources from one division to another rest with the D.D.G. (Operations) in consultation with the Federal Security Coordinator. ✓

(C) That approval be given to the plan of preparing and deployment of two surveillance teams (24 personnel with 12 vehicles) from "A" Division for "C" Division during the Olympic period. ✓

(D) That approval be given to the contingency plan for preparing one surveillance team (12 personnel with 6 vehicles) from "O" Division for use in Kingston, if required. ✓

(E) That our operational philosophy of retaining our "I" Operations resources for Intelligence Collection Surveillance be stressed insofar as this is possible. ✓



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
À

The Director of Organization and Personnel

FROM
DE

The Deputy Director General (A & P)
Security Service

SUBJECT
OBJET

Co-operation with DND

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE IP 210-36
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE 27 January 1975

The following memo is in reply to your correspondence dated 15 January 1975 in regard to the proposed joint RCMP/DND project.

The DG and the DCI have both indicated their personal support for this project. Apparently however, the Executive Officer "P" Directorate does not share this view. But in view of the interest and support expressed by the Security Service and "C" Directorate would you kindly reconsider the feasibility of having O i/c Training and Development arrange for such a display as proposed, to be held in the cities of Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston and Vancouver. *Frederickton, Regina*

DND has already taken action and a SAM 7 missile launcher has been located for inclusion in the display. In addition as an example to illustrate the ease by which these weapons can be transported and concealed, they are prepared to display how weapons such as an anti-tank gun can be broken-down and carried in a shoe box. In view of these developments and such recent incidents as the events at Orly airport in France, I hope my suggestion might meet with your approval.

J.O. Gorman, A/Commr.
D.D.G. (A. & P.)

*O'Connell
27/1/75*

Received *J.O.G.*
JUL 17 1975
SECURITY SERVICE
#AEDROS



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
À

OFFICER I/C EDUCATION & DEVELOPMENT

FROM
DE

N.C.O. I/C OLYMPIC TRAINING UNIT

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
G-275-21
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
14 MARCH 75

SUBJECT
OBJET

R.C.M.P. Security Service/D.N.D.
Project Relating to Terrorist Weapons
Display

On 4 MAR 75 the following persons visited Camp Borden for the purpose of determining the content and financial aspects of the proposed D.N.D. presentation:

- Capt. T. St. John, D.N.D.
- Major Donahue, D.N.D. Olympics L.O.
- Cpl. [redacted] S.S. Olympic Secretariat
- C/M [redacted] C.B.D.C.
- C/M [redacted] C.B.D.C.
- S/Sgt. R.M. Henwood, Trg. & Dev. Branch

2. Colonel J. Upton, Commandant of Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security (C.F.S.I.S.) at Camp Borden, stated:

- (a) Camp Borden will not provide resource personnel for this presentation (regardless of previous commitment by D.N.D. to do so);
- (b) Camp Borden will loan the Force specific weapons to use in this presentation between 1 OCT 75 and 7 NOV 75 (this is the only period the weapons will be available in 1975);
- (c) Camp Borden will assist an R.C.M.P. resource person by:
 - providing technical assistance and instruction if the resource person can come to Camp Borden for a 3-4 day period in early April, 1975;
 - packaging the weapons at R.C.M.P. expense, for transit.

...../2

000261

3. We examined thirty weapons under the guidance of W/O G. Oliver. W/O Oliver suggested a presentation as envisaged should consist of approximately nine weapons and two or three grenades. These would belong to seven families or groups of weapons:

1. Small arms - general
2. Handguns
3. Submachine guns
4. Rifles/assault rifles
5. Light and general purpose machine guns
6. Rocket launchers
7. Grenades.

4. I agree with these suggestions and recommend adoption of this outline; if this project is proceeded with.

5. The statement regarding resource personnel (para. 2(a) above) was a surprise to the group from Ottawa. Capt. St. John stated he would:

- (a) discuss this with his superiors at D.N.D. Headquarters; and
- (b) explore the possibility of obtaining a resource person from D.N.D.H.Q.

6. On 10 MAR 75 I met with Capt. St. John and Major R.L. Green at D.N.D.H.Q. The results of this meeting are:

- (a) D.N.D. will advise by 15 APR 75 regarding a resource person. (the two officers would not commit themselves, however, I do not believe a resource person will be supplied by D.N.D.)
- (b) Future contact with the C.F.S.I.S. at Camp Borden to be made through Major Donahue.

7. Preliminary enquiries were made to determine if a resource person is available in the Force to present the weapons package. Insp. P. Austin, Officer i/c Firearms Section stated a member of his section would have the expertise to be a unilingual English resource person and can probably be made available.

...../3

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À

Officer i/c "D" Operations

FROM / DE

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

SUBJECT / OBJET

Summer Olympics in Montreal, Quebec
1976 - Threat Assessment - General

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
[REDACTED]
DATE
14 April 1975

The Federal Security Coordinator has been asked and has accepted the role of keynote speaker at a Canadian Forces Annual Explosives Ordinance Disposal Conference at C.F.B. Shearwater. He has been asked to speak on the subject:

"An assessment of the terrorist threat and the potential terrorist use of improvised explosives devices during the 1976 Summer Olympic Games and the related threat to national security in the future."

on Monday 5 May 1975 from 10:40 a.m. to lunch.

The Federal Security Coordinator has requested assistance from the Security Service to provide material relative to the topic which he wishes to incorporate into his speech. Along these lines we wondered if the Terrorist Desk could provide us with information concerning:

- (a) CUBAN bomb threat relating back to Consulate bombing in Montreal.
- (b) letter bomb incidents and pattern to date.
- (c) Yugoslav bombings and recent seizure of weapons in Hamilton.
- (d) additional items, i.e. IRA.

Any other related items the Terrorist Desk might feel is pertinent would be appreciated.

As the speech must be prepared and drafted for the 5th of May could we please receive your reply by the 25th of April.

Reviewed.....
 JUN 10 1975
 SECURITY SERVICE
 RECORDS

[REDACTED]

(J.W. Taylor) Insp.
 Officer i/c Security Service
 Olympics Sec 000276

Information Provided to G/Sec. 21-4-75

[Handwritten signature]
 26/5/75

28-5-75