

Most of these countries are close to the permanent Canadian representation and could be serviced adequately. Almost without exception, the participants from these 49 countries would be transiting through the country of the accredited permanent Canadian Missions abroad. Based on Munich statistics, these 1,500 persons represent 11.3% of the total (10% if we have recourse to the services of the British Missions in some countries).

We should seek the co-operation of the British Embassies or High Commissions, without imposing much of a burden on the latter, inasmuch as they could assist with the validation process in the following countries:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total Representation at Munich '72</u>
Afghanistan	17
Lesotho	7
Madagascar	24
Malawi	27
Nepal	6
Swaziland	6
*Panama	14
*British Honduras (Belize)	4
*Nicaragua	17
*El Salvador	15
*Surinam	8
*Netherlands Antilles	6
*Soudan	<u>50</u>
	201

* These totals are included in the previous paragraph and, if included here, the previous percentage would be reduced to 10%.

Canada has not officially recognized East Germany (G.D.R.) and North Korea. These two countries are full members of the I.O.C. and had agreed to send 472 and 192 participants respectively to the Munich Games. The Olympic Identity Card resolves the question of their admission. North Korean Olympic participants may have to apply at one of our Missions, possibly Peking, for the validation of the Olympic I.C.'s.

Rhodesia may not be recognized by our Government by 1976, unless there is a change in the U.D.I. Government. Olympic participants should be allowed into Canada on the basis of the Olympic Identity Card validated by the British Mission. However, there is every indication that the Secretary General of the African Sport Association, Mr. A.A. Ordia, will again hang the threat of a boycott of the Montreal Olympic Games by all African countries, if Rhodesian participants are allowed to take part in the Games. Although COJO has no option but to invite the Rhodesians, the latter may well decide to accept the invitation but fail to send athletes, to prevent a recurrence of the embarrassment suffered at Munich when they had to withdraw their team, as a result of pressure by the African Sports Association to boycott the Games.

WORKLOAD

Attachment I shows the number of competitors and officials who were to represent their country at the Munich Olympics. The number of participants for the 1976 Olympics may be slightly higher for some countries while, in the case of others, the number of competitors may be less, due mainly to the transportation costs involved.

There were larger teams sent to Munich from most European countries and likewise, most African countries were present. The more affluent countries may not appreciably reduce the number of athletes for the Montreal Olympics. Attachment I is meant to provide the Canadian and British Missions with some indication of the possible number of Olympic I.C.'s which would require validation based on the 1972 Munich Olympic statistics.

MODUS OPERANDI

APPROACH TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

The Olympic Identity Card has been accepted, and received final approval by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, Solicitor General (R.C.M.P.) and COJO in its final form, as a travel document, enabling the rightful holder to enter Canada for the purpose stated, subject to an amendment to the Regulations.

It may be appropriate, for the Canadian Missions to apprise the participating Governments of the intention of the Canadian Government to recognize the Olympic Identity Card, issued to athletes and officials entitled to same under I.O.C. rules, as a valid travel (national) document and seek their agreement to recognize the Olympic document for re-entry of the holder without hindrance. (This procedure would not apply to U.S.A. citizens or legal resident of that country) Our missions would be expected to send formal numbered letters to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and, based on the replies received, COJO would be provided with the official reaction of each government as appropriate.

It should be expected that Foreign Ministries may wish to receive and study a facsimile of the Olympic Identity Card. Anticipating such requests, we should provide them with photocopies of a cancelled unnumbered Olympic Identity Card.

Even at this early stage, the formal numbered letters could contain references to our desire to respect and conform with the Olympic rules and offer equal treatment to all athletes and officials of participating countries. It would also be appropriate to mention, that it is the intention to have every Olympic document validated by a Canadian or British Mission representative and lack of such validation would invalidate the document and that the holder could not be permitted entry into Canada, unless he travelled on his national passport and complied with the usual requirements i.e. non-immigrant visa where applicable, funds, character, etc.

OLYMPIC KITS

Through the Foreign Branch, officers of the M. & I., External Affairs, (also British Missions via Canada House/Foreign Office) and I.T. & C. Services would be given the following:

- a) Brief instructions on the validation procedures;
- b) Facsimile of the Olympic Identity Card and explanation of the color codes;
- c) List of the addresses and names of the President and Secretary General of each participating National Olympic Committee, International Sport Federations and I.O.C.;
- d) WORLD INDEX. - Addresses of Missions abroad and accredited countries;

- e) Copy of Section 27.33 and 37 of the Olympic Rules and Regulations for their information and guidance;
- f) Program of events.

MISSION LIAISON OFFICER

It will be suggested that it would be preferable to appoint a member of the Mission staff as Liaison Officer, so that he may familiarize himself fully with the procedures and meet with the President or Secretary General of the National Olympic Committee and the International Sport Federations, to impress upon them the need to cooperate in the interest of the participants, since Rule 33 of the I.O.C. is very specific concerning deadlines and the need to have the athletes' particulars reach COJO ten days before the event in which they intend to participate.

REFERENCE TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES

We will, in fact, be much more concerned about certain countries where special procedures may not permit a relaxed posture. For these countries, the Mission Olympic liaison officer should make a special effort to obtain from the N.O.C. and I.S.F.'s all information on participants at least 3 weeks in advance and not 2 weeks as stated in the rules of the I.O.C. Specific reference is made to the following countries:

(Participation, Munich 1972)

<u>Countries:</u>	<u>Athletes:</u>	+	<u>Officials:</u>	=	<u>Total:</u>
Saudi Arabia	12	+	9	=	21
Irak	—	+	—	=	—
Jordan	—	+	—	=	—
Kowait	6	+	7	=	13
Lebanon	28	+	18	=	46
Lybia	7	+	9	=	16
Algeria	3	+	5	=	8
Syria	8	+	9	=	17
Egypt	39	+	000190	=	57

H.B. Computer facilities may ease the delay period.

Manpower and Immigration Foreign Branch would have to make suitable arrangements with External Affairs to service applicants in Roumania and Bulgaria. Likewise for the East German team, through the Berlin office, if the situation remains unchanged concerning the C.D.R. by May 1976.

CONCENTRES

COJO would wish to make use of the available extensive External Affairs communication network, to receive the required details on the participating athletes, at least 10 days before the event in which the latter wish to take part. The validation procedure mentioned previously, requires participants who intend to travel with the Olympic Identity Card to submit details 10 days before their intended arrival in Canada. This would, of course, satisfy the COJO requirements. However, where athletes or other participants cannot or do not wish to use the Olympic Identity Card for that purpose, details of their arrival will also need to be sent by telex 10 days before their scheduled participation in the selected event.

External Affairs have agreed to the use of their Concentres for the purpose of sending details of the athletes, officials, etc., to a central receiving point in Ottawa. Since mail services would at best be unreliable under such circumstances, 73 Canadian Posts would be affected by this event.

Although there are no available statistics on the number of media representatives by country who attended the Munich Olympics,

A total of 5,000 representatives is said to have attended the games. Likewise, 1,200 delegates to the Youth Camp were present at Munich from 40 participating countries. All these persons must have a valid passport (except U.S.A. citizens and legal residents of that country) and some will require a non-immigrant visa. It is expected that upwards of 500 applicants will be subject to the special measures i.e. telex clearances before N.I. visas may be issued.

Visitors from those countries under "special procedures" may number as many as 5,000. This would impose an additional workload on the Comcentres for the Missions concerned.

We will need to have recourse to the British Missions, for assistance in sending telegrams on athletes and officials from those countries where we have no permanent Canadian Mission. It is also possible that we may ask the British Missions to use their Diplomatic Bag to send the required information to a close Canadian Mission, for instance London, England, and have the Canadian External Comcentre at London relay the information by telex from there. This is a flexible arrangement, which can be reviewed in the light of further information which could be obtained in due course, of the feasibility of this proposal.

The External Affairs Comcentre would relay incoming telexes, coded for that purpose, to the Immigration Enforcement Centre, Home Branch, and the special Canada Immigration Olympics

Comcentre (CIOC) Montreal, in order that the latter would be in a position to provide COJO with the desired details of the officials, athletes, etc., as agreed. The Enforcement Centre, Home Branch, would feed into the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC - RCMP Computer) the names of those persons subject to index checks.

ENFORCEMENT & CONTROL

Responsibilities in these areas include:

- (a) Computer checks of participants, officials and athletes, as well as certain visitors from selected areas, through terminal facilities at major ports of entry;
- (b) Procedures concerning persons requesting asylum or defecting;
- (c) Assignment of additional personnel, i.e., Customs, Immigration, RCMP and DND, to ensure adequate coverage at unmanned border ports, or increase the staff at key ports of entry where appropriate.

HOST: Lloyd ROBERTSON

ROBERTSON Organizers for the 1976 Olympics in Montreal consider the possibility of terrorist action in this country a real one. At least, that's what security preparation would suggest. Details of those preparations have been leaked to the CBC's French network in Montreal and Ron LaPLANTE has a report.

LaPLANTE The specter of another Munich which claimed 17 lives, 11 of them members of the Israeli team, has haunted Montreal planners from the moment this city was awarded the responsibility of staging the '76 games. Except to say that there is a security plan, COJO, for obvious reasons, will not talk about it. But radio Canada reporter Francois TERRAULT (ph) has been cultivating sources for three months and has obtained access to the basic plan. Security for the five sites in and around Montreal will cost \$35,000,000, 25 of that to be born by Federal forces, the Army, the R.C.M.P. and Immigration officers. The total complement will consist of 10,000 men. On the Island of Montreal 935 Militia men will be stationed at 187 points considered vital and strategic. The Olympic Village is where the athletes will live. Most of the responsibility for protecting this sensitive area falls upon the Army. There will be round the clock patrols around an 8 foot high barbed wire fence. The guards will wear combat dress with full armament. Other built in features include almost 300 policemen and more than 400 militia men assigned to that area. The village compound will contain a heliport. Both the police and the Army

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will use helicopters. There will be armed check points at every entrance and a closed circuit surveillance system with 12 channels. The Village operation includes a squad of 25 sharpshooters and a 500 man anti-riot squad on stand by at a nearby position. The plan calls for 600 R.C.M.P. officers. Their main areas of responsibility are border points and points of entry, both air and sea. International police forces have programmed a computer with hundreds of known and suspected terrorists. There will be plain clothesmen sitting in the seats at every athletic event, and if there's trouble, big trouble like a kidnapping, a hijacking, or an attack on an Olympic facility, there's an emergency plan that moves into action. It's a strike force that has 7 tactical units. These include snipers and a heavily armed force equipped with machine guns and artillery force ammunition. It all adds up to a lot of people, a lot of effort, and a lot of money. And everyone hopes it will all be for nothing.

Ron LaPLANTE, CBC news, Montreal.

JM 17-4-75

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE AT MUNICH

In the month of December 1972 a Canadian Police delegation composed of members of the RCMP, the Quebec Provincial Police and the Montreal City Police visited Munich, Germany. The purpose of the visit was to obtain as much information as possible about the problems that were involved in policing of the 1972 Olympic Games by the German police authorities. Additionally, the delegation examined the circumstances of the "Munich Massacre" - the killing of eleven Israeli athletes, five Arab terrorists and one policeman as a result of a series of acts committed by the Black September Organization during the Munich Olympics.

Unlike the other West German states, Bavaria appears to regard itself as a separate state and jealously guards and protects its autonomy. The people consider themselves to be "Bavarians" first and "Germans" second. As an example, when the games were given to Munich by the International Olympic Committee, the Bavarian Government decided it would maintain a tight control over the staging of the games by exhibiting a distinctive Bavarian image, placing very little emphasis on the role being played by the Federal Republic of Germany. Bavaria agreed to accept 50% of the financing by the Federal Government but it reserved the right to control its own operation which included both police security measures as well as matters concerning immigration. The net result was that both of these important functions were organized by the State of Bavaria on a very "low key" basis. The intention was to convey to the nations of the world that Munich was a free state. In short, Bavaria wished to portray the City of Munich as an open city in an effort to erase the past impressions of a police state which had been created by Hitler at the 1936 Olympic Games.

The State of Bavaria, because of the size and population of its five main cities and its own border (immigration) guards, had no difficulty in assembling a combined police strength of some 16,000 men. Apart from those who performed traffic and investigative duties within the City of Munich, the presence of uniformed police in and around the Olympic Village and the Olympic site was sparse. On the site the police were clothed in powder blue blazers and trousers and did not carry arms. This was in keeping with the "low profile" image of the police as decided upon by the Bavarian Government.

The Bavarian Government appointed a Police Coordinator but total police responsibility for operations was placed in the hands of the Director of Munich City Police. He was assisted in this task by two Assistant Police Directors and no less than seven to ten police committees which were formed to coordinate specific policing tasks connected with the Games.

The Olympic Village was built to lodge 12,000 athletes, trainers and a number of other officials. A special police guard body was formed to carry out security duties in the Village. This, at best, was a loose arrangement as there was little or no control exercised over persons entering and leaving the Village. In the final analysis, security precautions were lax, passes were not checked, persons were not challenged for their identity. As a result the Black September terrorists were able to enter the Village undetected on the morning of September 5, 1972, and seize and hold the Israeli athletes as hostages within the apartment allotted to the Israeli team.

It is known that plans to kidnap the Israelis were made well in advance without the knowledge of security authorities. The police were caught completely off guard, ill prepared, ill equipped and not properly trained to handle such an incident. The "low key" profile which had been decided for police and security authorities by the Bavarian Government contributed to the success of the Black September operation

of Bavaria or the City of Munich which has been held accountable by the international community.

Conclusion

The principal lesson to be learned from Munich is that in the 1970's no country can afford to assume that terrorists, revolutionaries and violence prone groups will not attempt to take advantage of the massive and instant world wide publicity which would result from any incident staged at the Olympics. Despite the possible intentions of the City of Montreal, the Government of Quebec and the International and Canadian Olympic Committees with regard to a reduced security and police profile, in the final analysis, like Germany, it will be Canada which will be held accountable for any serious breach of the security arrangements at the 1976 Olympics.

The German experience illustrates dramatically what can occur when constraints are placed on police and security authorities for the sake of an acceptable political image.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET:

Olympic Games, 1976 - Security Planning

I. PROBLEM:

Holding the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976 poses serious and complex security problems and requires immediate planning and resource allocation to be ready in good time before the games.

II. OBJECTIVES:

To discuss anticipated security problems and to propose and justify a strong and effective level of security as the basis for departmental planning for those aspects which are the responsibility of the federal government. To indicate that costs will be difficult to estimate but to suggest that they will be substantial.

III. FACTORS:

A. THE THREAT

The escalation of acts of terrorism and violence in recent years is anticipated and presents a serious threat to the maintenance of national internal security at the Olympics and to the thousands of foreign dignitaries, athletes, trainers, newsmen and other visitors for whose safety during the games Canada will be responsible. New forms of terrorist organization and tactics may emerge over the next three years which could complicate the dimensions of the threat and, as contingency planning proceeds, the requirements for responding to it. The problem may be illustrated by the growing threat to diplomatic personnel. In the past five years, for example, over two dozen diplomats from various countries have been kidnapped

and six assassinated. While law enforcement authorities are endeavouring to develop effective measures to deal with political violence, the international community remains vulnerable to a variety of tactics and techniques employed by organized terrorist groups with an alarming degree of success, as exemplified by the Lod, Munich, and Khartoum tragedies.

ANNEX I describes this threat and RCMP plans to keep abreast in some detail.

B. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE AT MUNICH

The principal lesson to be learned from Munich is that in the 1970's no country can afford to assume that terrorists, revolutionaries and violence prone groups will not attempt to take advantage of the massive and instant world wide publicity which would result from any incident staged at the Olympics. Despite the possible intentions of the City of Montreal, the Government of Quebec and the International and Canadian Olympic Committees with regard to a reduced security and police profile, in the final analysis, like Germany, it will be the Canadian Government which will be held responsible for failure to prevent any serious breach of the security arrangements at the 1976 Olympics.

The German experience illustrates dramatically what can occur when constraints are placed on police and security authorities for the sake of an acceptable political image.

ANNEX II describes this experience in some detail.

C. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS

It is clear that from a jurisdictional point of view the responsibility for policing the 1976 Olympics rests with the Montreal Police backed up by the Province of Quebec and, of course, to a lesser extent the Kingston Police and the Province of Ontario. A Montreal Urban Community police officer has recently been appointed the coordinator of police activities for the Olympics 1976 although there has not yet been a public announcement. It is anticipated that he will soon be asking for RCMP assistance. In a recent letter to the Federal Government's Interdepartmental Committee on the Olympics 1976, COJO made the following remarks about security:

"The security aspect is one which clearly takes priority in our planning. As the Games will be held on the territory of the Montreal Urban Community, it seems logical that the police force of that organization should have primary responsibility in the area. It was therefore decided last March 30 that a coordinator of the police forces should be appointed by the Montreal Urban Community in connection with preparations for the Olympic Games. This coordinator, in addition to directing COJO efforts in this area, will be in charge of the sub-committee on security which will be comprised of representatives of all the police forces, including the MUC police, provincial police and RCMP, as well as representatives of the various interested departments or agencies, such as the Canadian Army, Civil Defence, etc. There is no doubt in our minds that the cooperation of

the federal government through the services of the RCMP is essential to the holding of the Games! In this regard, Chief Superintendent Jean Ouimet is already well informed on COJO plans. We are leaving it up to those in charge of security to work out their own plan and to organize their staff in relation to the needs of 1976."

With regard to these remarks by COJO, it should be stated categorically that the RCMP is not yet aware of any security plans nor have any discussions on that score yet been held with the newly appointed police coordinator.

Jurisdictional problems may arise when it is considered that there are several types of security to consider, namely,

(a) Ground Security

This relates to crowd control, traffic control and the investigation of Criminal code offences within the City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec. These duties can be defined as "in house" security and clearly lie within the jurisdiction of the Province of Quebec. The same applies in Ontario vis-a-vis Kingston and other satellite locations yet to be determined.

(b) Internal Security

This relates to terrorism which affects Canada as a whole, e.g. mass demonstrations directed against the Government of Canada, destruction of vital points installations and Federal property which are geographically located within the boundaries of the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario.

(c) Protection of Foreign Government Representatives

Foreign government representatives will be in attendance and will require protection.

(d) Airport Security

The RCMP is responsible under contract with the Ministry of Transport for policing and security of federal airports. While jurisdiction for criminal matters rests with local police forces, by 1976 it may be assumed by the RCMP.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) COJO's line of thinking at this stage leads one to believe that Montreal is shaping its programme on the Munich philosophy of 1972. If this philosophy were accepted for 1976, the security force, as a combined effort (municipal-provincial-federal) could easily make the same mistakes which were made in Munich in 1972. While the Montreal Urban Community Police does have the jurisdictional responsibility for policing the Olympics in Montreal, the Federal Government cannot depend on the Montreal Urban Community Police to manage the entire security programme.

If a serious incident occurs, either a mass demonstration or terrorist attack, the ultimate responsibility will fall on the federal government.

(b) Jurisdictional problems are complex and have always been sensitive issues in dealings with the provinces. They are especially difficult in the cases of Quebec and Ontario where the RCMP acts only in a Federal capacity.

(c) The areas of responsibility for security, assigned to local, provincial and federal jurisdictions, must be clearly determined by mutual discussion and agreement before planning for the security programme commences.

It must be made clear that the RCMP as the federal police authority has a clear responsibility to safeguard national interests in this programme.

- (d) The RCMP should be instructed to ensure that security arrangements mutually agreed upon are consistent with the threat estimate. For planning purposes it must be assumed that the threat to security at the Olympics will be serious and that a high security profile as recommended below is acceptable to the Government.
- (e) The RCMP must be allotted the necessary personnel, material and financial resources for security planning and implementation of the federal portion of the security plan and, at the same time, the RCMP must be supported by a firm Government posture when negotiations are held with Montreal, Quebec and Olympic authorities.
- (f) Ministers should be prepared for the necessity of discussions at the political level should official level negotiations fail to make progress. This might be accomplished by the establishment of a sub-committee of Cabinet including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of Manpower & Immigration and the Solicitor General.

D. OTHER SECURITY MATTERS REQUIRING FEDERAL PLANNING

a. Immigration Control

Control over the entry to Canada of citizens, residents, immigrants and visitors is a firmly established federal responsibility. Thus it will be under federal Immigration laws that functionaries, participants, media representatives and visitors will be allowed entry to Canada during the Olympic games. At this time the numbers are largely speculation, however, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 Olympic participants, officials and the press and some 500,000 visitors will seek admission to Canada specifically for the 21st Olympiad.

Special Olympic Entry Requirements

The official commitment concerning entry for the Olympic games is at this point minimal. In a letter of November 28, 1969, the Secretary of State for External Affairs informed the International Olympic Committee that entry to Canada would be "pursuant to the normal regulations". Despite this limited commitment it is now apparent that the Olympic authorities expect Canadian Immigration Regulations for participants and media to be replaced for purposes of the Olympic games by regulations of the International Olympic Committee regarding passports, visas, entry and free movement across Canada. They expect to issue an Olympic Identity Card which will replace Canadian regulations determining passport and visa requirements for entry into Canada. These Canadian requirements are a combination of regulations and international agreements under which passports are required from citizens of all countries, except the United States. Visas are required from citizens of Soviet Union and East European Communist countries, China, and most countries of Africa and the Middle East, but not from citizens of Western hemisphere countries, the Commonwealth, Japan and certain Western European countries.

The Olympic procedure involves the issue of a special identity card to facilitate admission of participants, officials and accredited media. The German Government carried this system to the point of virtually abdicating responsibility for entry requirements by accepting the Olympic identity card in lieu of a passport and visa. Control of the document was entirely by the Olympic authorities.

As explained in ANNEX II, the Germans were anxious to use the Olympics to create a national image that would characterize the German nation as free of all forms of authoritarianism. Our national image is also an important consideration although the reasons which induced the Germans to weaken their security posture do not apply to Canada. The Germans allowed groups sponsored by the Olympic authorities virtual free admission to Germany and the system ran completely out of control. German immigration authorities now defend this procedure by saying that illegal entry to Germany could have been gained by easier methods than the use of Olympic identity cards, and thus the imposition of additional controls was not warranted. In this regard it is interesting to note that the Germans did have a control system to maintain immigration security but, in the view of Canadian officials, it broke down because of heavy reliance on Olympic authorities to maintain security of I.O.C. identity documents. The German experience establishes that Olympic authorities will not accept any responsibility for the security of their documents. The use of these documents as the single entry requirement would in effect mean abandoning Canadian immigration security.

There are three considerations that should govern the level of Immigration security required:

1. By virtue of the incidents at Munich, the Olympic games have been established as a vulnerable target for terrorist attack.
2. Although the Government is now adopting policies leading to more Immigration control over visitors to Canada, the Canadian Immigration system is generally recognized as being weak; and

3. The RCMP advises that the Olympic identity card system as used for the Munich Olympiad is a definite security risk that should not be repeated. Police authorities consider identification of persons under the Immigration Act as first line security and this should not be abdicated to COJO and the I.O.C. authorities.

Olympic authorities will likely press for the German system, urge the need for freedom and flexibility and stress the traditional Olympic requirement of free access. While discussions are under way with Canadian Olympic authorities on the basis of the commitment made by the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs that Canadian Immigration Regulations will apply, some modification of Canadian Regulations may be necessary to accommodate the traditional international character of the Olympic games. It is imperative, however, that whatever compromise is achieved, there will be positive identification of all persons allowed entry to Canada in connection with the Olympic games.

Immigration Entry Controls for Visitors

While the gaps in immigration security that could be created by unrestricted use of Olympic Identity cards for admission to Canada is serious, there is a second problem of at least equal concern. It might confidently be expected that some persons will come to Canada to engage in illegal activities of various types or to use the Olympic games as a distraction to gain illegal entry to Canada.

Several proposals are now being considered for preventive measures:

S E C R E T

February 27, 1976


SECURITY ASSESSMENT
1976 OLYMPICS

SUMMARY:

The potential for violence at the Olympic Games, from any one of several groups that are planning to use this occasion to publicize their causes, continues to be of major concern. The Security problem has two aspects; that presented by domestic groups is probably one of controlling large numbers of demonstrators while that posed by international terrorist groups is one of being able to detect and prevent such a premeditated violent act as occurred at the Munich Olympics.

The potential for terrorists to succeed and to undertake violent activity is enhanced by rapid transportation, the availability of sophisticated weaponry and the instant reporting of terrorist activity by the mass media.

To offset this threat a number of steps have been taken. Bilateral links with national security agencies have been strengthened and expanded to enhance the flow of intelligence. The screening of applicants for admission to Canada has been reviewed and updated to facilitate the detection of undesirable elements prior to entry. Contingency plans have been developed to ensure the protection of athletes and official delegates to the Games. Recently instituted security measures that have been developed in concert with the Department of Manpower and Immigration are proving to be effective instruments in detecting suspected terrorists upon their entry into Canada. An ongoing briefing program, given to persons at major entry control points is similarly contributing positive results in detecting suspected terrorists. Coverage has also been stepped up on certain groups in Canada, and where necessary pre-emptive measures are being taken, i.e., establishing dialogue with leaders of various groups to minimize the potential for violent activity.



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