

16 February 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECURITY SERVICE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY ON A CONTINUING BASIS TO MONITOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS THAT COULD RESULT IN TERRORIST ATTACKS EITHER IN CANADA OR WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT CANADIAN INTERESTS AND TO TAKE SUCH COUNTER ACTIONS AS ARE POSSIBLE AND APPROPRIATE TO PREVENT THEIR OCCURRENCE. IT IS RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IN SPITE OF THE BEST SECURITY PRECAUTIONS, TERRORIST ATTACKS CAN AND PROBABLY WILL OCCUR. AS A RESULT, THE SECURITY SERVICE IS DEVELOPING EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANS WHEREBY ITS FULL INVESTIGATIVE, TECHNICAL, SURVEILLANCE, ANALYTICAL AND ADVISORY CAPABILITIES MAY BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO BEAR IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS. THESE PLANS WILL BE DESIGNED TO INTERFACE BUT NOT CONFLICT WITH THOSE DEVELOPED BY OTHER RCMP RESPONSIBILITY CENTERS AND CONCERNED GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

THE SECURITY SERVICE REGARDS ITS ROLE AS BEING CONFINED TO PROVIDING ADVISORY AND SUPPORT SERVICES UNLESS THERE IS A REQUEST FROM THE AUTHORITY HAVING PRIME JURISDICTION FOR IT TO PLAY A MORE PROMINENT PART. THIS WILL BE DONE BY:

- (A) PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IF, WHEN AND WHERE REQUIRED.
- (B) MONITORING, TRANSLATING AND TRANSCRIBING CONVERSATIONS OF PERSONS OF INTEREST TO THE INVESTIGATION THROUGH WARRANTS OBTAINABLE UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, SECTION 16(2) AS DEFINED IN SECTION

000444

16(3), AS AND WHEN NECESSARY.

- (C) PROVIDING TRAINED SURVEILLANCE SERVICES IN SUPPORT OF PRIME JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES.
- (D) PROVIDING INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS OF AN ACT, THE LOCATION OF HOSTAGES, IF APPLICABLE, AND SUCH OTHER INVESTIGATIONS CONSIDERED NECESSARY THAT CAN BEST BE CONDUCTED USING SECURITY SERVICE ESTABLISHED SOURCES.
- (E) PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE A PREVIOUS RECORD OF TERRORISM INCLUDING THEIR HISTORY, POLITICAL ORIENTATION, OBJECTIVES AND GOALS, WEAPONRY USED AND TACTICS EMPLOYED.
- (F) PROVIDING ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE PERSONS INVOLVED OBTAINABLE THROUGH SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS OR SOURCES WHICH INCLUDE FOREIGN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, PLACING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON ANY INFORMATION THAT MAY ASSIST A NEGOTIATOR SUCH AS PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS, PREVIOUS TERRORIST RECORD AND TACTICS EMPLOYED, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES AND DEGREE OF WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE LIFE FOR IDEOLOGICAL CAUSE.
- (G) PROVIDING INFORMATION OBTAINABLE THROUGH SECURITY SERVICE LIAISON CHANNELS ON METHODOLOGY USED BY POLICE AND SECURITY AGENCIES AROUND THE WORLD TO DEAL WITH SIMILAR SITUATIONS.


- (H) PROVIDING TRANSLATORS/INTERPRETERS AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITY SERVICE ON REQUEST, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACTING AS COMMUNICATION LINKS BETWEEN NEGOTIATORS AND PERPETRATORS AND PERFORMING OTHER RELATED FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS THAT REQUIRE SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE SKILLS. THE SECURITY SERVICE HAS A POOL OF PERSONS WITH SUCH SKILLS WHICH CAN BE AUGMENTED THROUGH ITS CONTACTS WITH THE ETHNIC AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES.
- (I) ENSURING THAT ALL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, ALONG WITH INFORMED INTERPRETATIONS IS COMMUNICATED ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS.
- (J) PERFORMING OUR NORMAL LIAISON FUNCTION WITH FOREIGN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN AID OF OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS. DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS BOTH SECURE AND INSECURE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH MANY FOREIGN SECURITY AGENCIES FOR USE IN EMERGENT SITUATIONS.
- (K) PROVIDING ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE AS CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE.
- (L) DISPATCHING A LIAISON OFFICER IMMEDIATELY TO THE SCENE TO DETERMINE THE NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS FOR SECURITY SERVICE


- 4 -


SUPPORT AND ADVISING DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
AND HEADQUARTERS OTTAWA IN THIS REGARD. A  
SECURITY SERVICE LIAISON OFFICER WILL BE APPOINTED  
TO ASSIST THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER IN THE  
AFOREMENTIONED AREAS ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

RECOMMENDED:

APPROVED FOR  
SECURITY SERVICE

  
M.S. SEXSMITH, A/COMMR.  
D.D.G. OPERATIONS

  
H.G. DARE  
DIRECTOR GENERAL

APPROVED:  
  
H.J. NADON  
COMMISSIONER

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À Supt. Begalki

FROM / DE Cpl. [redacted]

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE <i>1P-100-3</i>
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE June 27, 1974

SUBJECT / OBJET

I am submitting this memo as an idea/suggestion paper on how "D" Operations can improve their photo identification system across the country. After working on the International Terrorist briefing unit for the past month, I became increasingly aware of our deficiencies in this area. The end product of months of investigation can quite often be no more than a positive ident made on one of our main subjects at a V.I.P. or Special Events demonstration. ~~The positive ident by our members or city police, and subsequent action can effectively neutralize a potentially dangerous situation.~~ However, before an arrest can be affected or close surveillance applied to a subject he must be positively identified. Our job at these demonstrations, V.I.P. meetings etc. has been to advise the C.I.B. members of a subjects presence and then to render assistance.

2. In the past we have been able to accomplish this by having Security Service members, who know the subjects, in attendance at every event. Most events have been centralized and fairly easy to cover. Even Expo 67 was at least held on 3 islands and surveillance could be taken up at the relatively few entrance areas. However, the 76 Olympics is shaping up as a multi-dimensional security nightmare. True, the athletes village will be very secure, but the events themselves are a different matter. For example, the archery events are slated for the Laurentians; soccer for Sherbrooke; handball for Quebec City; water sports in Kingston, etc. In short, any one "threat" country could be in 10 events at 10 different locations around Montreal and area at any one time. All the parks in Montreal are being turned into training fields for the athletes, some of whom are slated to arrive up to 3 months prior to the Olympics. Again any "threat" country could have its athletes spread over 5 different training parks at the same time.

*31.7.74*  
*[Signature]*

Reviewed *J44*  
FEB 17 1974  
SECURITY SERVICE  
00870 RECORDS

3. Given that we only have so many investigators who know the subjects in their own interest area, given the number of locations we will be asked to cover should we learn of a threat to any one team on a given day, I submit that the task becomes impossible unless we have an excellent photo album that we can distribute to our own C.I.B. and their counterparts.

4. At the present time we completely lack this capability. Certain "HQ" desks have national albums but these are bulky, cumbersome, and cover every subject instead of just those that pose a security threat. Some field units have their own albums but again these are in black and white, contain superfluous detail which limit their access and are by no means standardized or adaptable to quick change or a mendment.

5. Through my Montreal grapevine, I learned that "C" Division, "D" Operations, Special Projects had instituted a new photo program and had put one Cst. [REDACTED] in charge of instituting it. As Cst. [REDACTED] is presently in Ottawa on an Induction Course I took the liberty of interviewing him about the project. He has been appointed the Security Service photographer and he alone will photograph the subjects. Each section submits to him the names of the more potentially dangerous subjects. At the present time the sum total for "C" Division is 60 subjects. He has purchased special colour equipment and by taking the photos himself he will be guaranteed a professional and standardized product. He will be preparing a photo bank and slide bank to be used for briefings and in the Ops. Centre, however, he returns the photo's to the section for them to make albums for distribution.

6. Herein lies what I see to be the main drawbacks of this project. They will be neither standardized nor compiled as one complete Security Service album, not to mention either national or international coverage.

7. I would therefore like to make the following proposal, "HQ" "D" Operations should co-ordinate this project and institute it in Toronto and Vancouver. The photos should be taken in those centres by one person using identical equipment and film (Cst. [REDACTED] could travel to the other smaller Divisions to take their pictures for them and aid them in setting up a photo bank). To further standardize the product the "HQ" co-ordinator should set up a standard format so that it is distributable and not restrictive in nature. This will also ensure that all albums have the same subjects on the same pages for easy reference and direction. For example we could put out an y APB on all subjects on pages 10-14 (i.e. CPC (M-L)) if they are the threat of the day. The CPC (M-L) could have pages

10-14 with 15 & 16 in reserve for any additions (similar to CSO's).

8. By having a "HQ" co-ordinator we also simplify the technical problems. At the present time the Force does not have the equipment to print colour photos on paper. The "C" Division project was therefore going to produce various albums with "glued" in pictures. The problems here are obvious; unprofessional, sloppy and a monumental task when you consider we could end up with 200 subjects and 500 albums.

9. My discussions with our IDENT Branch have shown that we could have the album lithographed at a local established print shop for the photos only. The sheets could then be run through our own printing shop for the addition of the biographical data and collation.

10. The end product is a professional colour album produced in final form 3 months prior to the Olympics but easily adaptable to new amendments etc. I believe that this album project could come under direction of the man assigned to the briefing unit of the International Terrorist Section for initial implementation. I would also suggest that the album be broken down into 3 separate volumes. National (those subjects already in Canada), American (those subjects in North or South America that could enter Canada via our Southern border) and International (those subjects that would be arriving by International Flights). This would restrict the size of the album that you would have to supply our Airport security or our Border crossings etc.

11. The cost of this project is minimal when weighed against the fact that a positive identification of a potentially dangerous subject could prevent an international incident. (Munich and Black September, Kosygin and Matri, Nixon and Bremmer, Ghandi and the CPC M-L). In actual dollars and cents I have been advised by Cst. [redacted] that he purchased \$1,500.00 worth of new equipment which, when added to existing facilities gives him all that is required (besides expertise) to produce a very professional product.

12. Proper "HQ" direction and co-ordination early in the preparatory stages will not only guarantee us this professional product but will be welcomed, I believe, by the field.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
Cpl.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE  
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

S E C R E T

Cab. Doc.

January 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET:

Olympic Games, 1976 - Security  
Planning

SUMMARY:

The attached memorandum contains a resume of Olympic Security planning which is being developed toward the attainment of the "strong security posture" adopted by Cabinet on June 1, 1973 in relation to the staging of the 1976 Summer Olympics.

The memorandum points out that the frequency and intensity of acts of international terrorism will not likely decrease between now and the staging of the Olympics and that new areas of potential strife and conflict are continuing to surface on the international scene; noting that a high and visible security posture was adopted at the Seventh Asian Games Tehran 1974 and at the 74 World Cup Series in West Germany.

The memorandum describes the terms of reference of the Federal Security Coordinator as well as the police planning structures in Quebec and Ontario.

The principal security functions identified to date are described in terms of the level of planning, jurisdiction, task sharing and resource requirements. See matrix of manpower requirements (annex 7).

LE PRESENT DOCUMENT EST LA PROPRIETE  
DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

S E C R E T

Doc. du Cab.

le 6 janvier 1975

NOTE A L'INTENTION DU CABINET

Jeux Olympiques de 1976 -  
Planification des mesures de sécurité

RESUME:

La note ci-jointe résume les dispositions prises en vue d'assurer la "situation de force en matière de sécurité", adoptée par le Cabinet, le 1er juin 1973, relativement au déroulement des Jeux olympiques d'été de 1976.

La note souligne que la fréquence et l'intensité des actes de terrorisme sur le plan international ne diminueront probablement pas d'ici les Jeux olympiques et que de nouvelles possibilités de conflits et de luttes font sans cesse leur apparition sur la scène internationale. On y fait également observer que les mesures de sécurité prises en 1974 en vue des Septièmes Jeux asiatiques de Téhéran et des éliminatoires de la Coupe du monde en Allemagne de l'Ouest, étaient très sévères et évidentes.

La note au Cabinet décrit les attributions du Coordonateur fédéral de la sécurité ainsi que la structure de l'organisation policière au Québec et en Ontario.

A ce jour, on a décrit les fonctions principales de sécurité sur les plans du niveau d'organisation, de la juridiction, du partage des tâches et des ressources nécessaires. Voir la charte des besoins en personnel (annex 7).

**SECRET**

001125



The memorandum explains the need for an increase in RCMP expenditures and substantial DND participation to ensure a strong security posture prior to and during the Olympic Games.

In view of the high level of Federal involvement, the memorandum recommends Cabinet reaffirmation of the adopted "strong security posture" early budgetary approval and agreement of the outlined Federal participation in security.

Detailed recommendations are included on page 25 and 26.

La note explique le besoin d'une augmentation des dépenses de la G.R.C. et de la participation considérable du ministère de la Défense, afin d'être en "situation de force en matière de sécurité", aussi bien avant que pendant les Jeux olympiques.

Vu le profond engagement du gouvernement fédéral, la note propose que le Cabinet réaffirme son intention d'autoriser rapidement le budget nécessaire pour être prêt à toute éventualité sur le plan de la sécurité et son acceptation de la participation fédérale, déjà esquissée, du côté sécurité.

Les propositions détaillées se trouvent à la page 25 et 26.

SECRET

*copies sent to A, O, C, E*

OLYMPIC SECURITY ESTIMATE - 1976

*(27-10-75)*

At the moment there is no specific intelligence indicating that any national or international groups intend to use the Olympic Games as a forum to publicize their cause or as a target for violent activity.

Nevertheless, rapidly evolving global events may well have a bearing on the safety of both athletes and spectators at the Games. Groups and issues have been identified which may generate a Security threat.

EXTERNAL

Middle East

The Sinai Accord between Egypt and Israel while reducing the threat of war between the two countries has had a different impact on other Middle East countries and various terrorist groups. Libya, Syria and Iraq have condemned the agreement and can be expected to make various attempts to create a "breakdown". One of the ways to do this will no doubt be to incite and assist the terrorist groups which form the "Rejection Front" in increased activity against Israel and Israeli targets abroad. Egypt itself has now become a target as evidenced by the recent takeover of the Egyptian Embassy in Madrid. Being in accord with the Middle East "settlement" the various "Western" countries may also be targets.

Cuba

Anti-Castro Cuban exiles have in the past committed acts of sabotage against various Cuban establishments throughout the world including Canada. The principal reason for these attacks is the lessening of tensions between the USA and Cuba. Because of Canada's trade relations with Cuba, Canada will continue to be one of the focal points for action against Cuban establishments. At the present time there are no known Cuban exile organizations operating in Canada.

Yugoslavia

Events in Yugoslavia, including the question of leadership after TITO, and the long-standing animosity between Croations and Serbians, coupled with their past history of violent activity, pose a continuing threat to Yugoslav personnel and property. The most violent of these elements are now resident in Europe, Australia and North America and the interaction between these various groups must be continually monitored.

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SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS

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
Cyprus

Outstanding issues in Cyprus will have a direct bearing on the safety of Greek, Turkish and Cypriot athletes.

Trans-national Violence

In addition there is the continuing potential threat from myriad groups such as the Japanese Red Army, the Baader Meinhof Group, the Ulster Defence Association/Irish Republican Army, and national liberation movements in the Third World.

DOMESTIC




Ever present is the threat from the lone psychotic or any group which may wish to use the Games to focus global attention on themselves.

SUMMARY

The potential for terrorists to succeed and to undertake violent activity is enhanced by rapid transportation, the availability of sophisticated weaponry and the instant reporting of terrorist activity by the mass media.

To offset this threat, bilateral links with national security agencies are being strengthened and expanded, the screening of applicants for admission to Canada is being continually reviewed and updated to enable the detection of undesirable elements prior to entry, and contingency plans are being developed to ensure that protection of persons, property and information in relation to the Games.



REQUIRED ASSISTANCE

We are concerned with the current nature of investigative and sensational media reporting focusing on the negative aspects of the Games, which could by itself induce violence. Interviews with extremists, asking specific questions as to their intent relative to their opponents, can only heighten tensions. Any assistance which would ensure a greater degree of responsibility on the part of the mass media would aid overall security.

SECURITY ESTIMATE  
ROYAL VISIT - 1976

There have been several reported threats against Her Majesty which are being investigated.

There is a possibility that various groups could use the occasion of the Royal Visit or the presence of members of the Royal Family as competitors in Games events to draw attention to their cause. Such groups may not necessarily wish to harm members of the Royal Family but could cause embarrassment to them and to the Canadian Government. At this stage, however, this is purely speculative.

The presence of Her Majesty, as Queen of Canada, to Quebec is the greatest concern. In light of the experience at Expo '67, however, it is entirely possible that the separatist element in Quebec will not take exception to Her Majesty's presence so long as it is confined to Olympic events.

SECURITY ESTIMATE  
HABITAT - 1976

There is no indication that any specific group will attempt to create problems for HABITAT '76, however, realistically we can anticipate problem areas to surface as the period 31 May to 11 June 1976 approaches.

Our main areas of concern will probably stem from: Native activism; Third World issues; Right wing extremists and individuals or groups concerned with the environment generally.

OLYMPIC SECURITY  
ESTIMATE - 1976

At the moment there is no specific intelligence indicating that any national or international groups intend to use the Olympic Games as a forum to publicize their cause or as a target for violent activity.


Nevertheless, rapidly evolving global events may well have a bearing on the safety of both athletes and spectators at the Games. Groups and issues have been identified which may generate a security threat.

EXTERNAL

Middle East

Regardless of the outcome of negotiations in the Middle East or at Geneva, the Palestinian problem will be of major significance. Elements within the Palestine Liberation Organization (which is an umbrella organization containing various terrorist organizations) will not accept any such agreement short of the creation of a Palestinian state. As Israel withdraws its troops from occupied territories, shrinking its frontiers and enabling better internal security, Arab terrorists will seek vulnerable Israeli targets elsewhere.


By the same token, pro-Israeli extremist elements will react to any apparent political gains by the Palestinians. This has already become apparent in connection with the UN Conference on Crime Prevention, scheduled to be held in Toronto. The Israeli Embassy has warned that the Jewish Defence League plans acts of violence against Canadian targets in Washington should Canada allow the PLO to attend the Conference.



Cuba

Anti-Castro Cuban exiles have in the past committed acts of sabotage against various Cuban establishments throughout the world including Canada. The principal reason for these attacks is the lessening of tensions between the USA and Cuba. Because

of Canada's trade relations with Cuba, Canada will continue to be one of the focal points for action against Cuban establishments. At the present time there are no known Cuban exile organizations operating in Canada.



Yugoslavia

Events in Yugoslavia and the long-standing animosity between Croations and Serbians, coupled with their past history of violent activity, pose a continuing threat to Yugoslav personnel and property. The most violent of these elements are now resident in Europe, Australia and North America and the interaction between these various groups must be continually monitored.


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DOMESTIC





[REDACTED]

Ever present is the threat from the lone psychotic and diverse groups who may use the Games to focus global attention on their cause.

SUMMARY

The potential for terrorists to succeed and to undertake violent activity is enhanced by rapid transportation, the availability of sophisticated weaponry and the instant reporting of terrorist activity by the mass media.

To offset this threat, bilateral links with national security agencies are being strengthened and expanded, the screening of applicants for admission to Canada is being continually reviewed and updated to enable the detection of undesirable elements prior to entry, and contingency plans are being developed to ensure the protection of persons, property and information in relation to the Games.

[REDACTED]

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1.) Queen - [REDACTED]

HAY-465-24-5

12 June 75

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. G. Pollard  
Manpower and Immigration,  
Home Branch, Admin.  
E.A. Bourque Memorial Bldg.,  
305 Rideau Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0J9

Re: Briefing Program for Immigration and Customs Officers

This is further to our letter of 18 April 75 and the viewing of the Olympics lead in portion of our proposed briefing program held on 10 June 75 and at which Mr. Art. Butroid, Mr. Roger St. Vincent and yourself were present.

Our proposed briefing program is composed of two main segments.

The first part is the Olympic lead in and is now complete. It illustrates the different general threats Olympics 76 may be subjected to and also that the Games could be used to further the aims of any organization, group or individual and as well to obtain international publicity. It will also emphasize the need to provide a strong security posture at points of entry into Canada in order to deny access to undesirable individuals or groups who are determined to endanger the lives of VIP's or athletes and/or to disrupt the peaceful staging of the Games.

The second segment is the international terrorist briefing. Because of the everchanging picture as it relates to world politics and the emergence of new terrorist organizations (e.g. Black April) our "D" Operations would like the presentation to be as current as


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possible and feel that they would prefer to work on developing a package which would be ready in September-October 1975. The terrorist briefing will identify possible threats from specific terrorists organizations, groups or individuals and also from those organizations, groups or individuals capable of violence. You will appreciate the fact that the threats to the Olympics may change often as we get closer to the Games and, for this reason, we will be unable to specify exactly which organizations, groups or individuals will most likely attempt in a violent manner to use the Olympics for its own purposes. Every effort will be made to present a clear picture of the possible threats and project a realistic threat estimate.

Efforts are being made to add a third segment, "Weapons Display" to the proposed briefing program. This weapons display should be most beneficial to all Immigration and Customs Officers and would certainly provide a better knowledge and understanding of how typical terrorist weapons and explosives can be concealed.

Should we be able to add the "Weapons Display" segment we will be pleased to arrange for a viewing together with the Olympics lead in portion for your representatives.

With regards to the briefing program, we are also in the process of preparing a tour schedule for the fall to visit the main cities across Canada. It is our intention to brief as many officers as possible and the itinerary will be arranged to meet this objective. We will keep you informed of any new developments.



I.W. Taylor, Insp.,  
Officer i/c Security Service  
Olympics Secretariat