

- (a) Basic security information might be accumulated over an extended period through the establishment of a special control centre in a suitable location. This centre would screen visa applications from persons who may pose a terrorist threat.
- (b) Work on improved methods of identifying false documents can be advanced.
- (c) Intensified examinations can be conducted to identify possible threats.
- (d) The Immigration Intelligence capability can be expanded and concentrate on identifying threats against the Olympics.
- (e) Work on a computerized system to identify known criminals and security risks can be advanced.
- (f) An Immigration Co-ordinator for the Olympics can be appointed.

None of these steps would require major new resources, and some would be beneficial beyond the scope of Olympic games, immediately and in the future. Additional start-up costs could be in the order of \$2-3 millions, with a continuing annual cost for computer systems in the order of \$800,000. Integration with existing or other developing systems of computerized identification of criminal and security risks could reduce these costs.

Refugees and Defectors

As a part of the security preparations, provision should also be made for dealing with persons who decide to defect and remain in Canada as refugees. The German authorities were faced with some 30-40 applicants for political asylum, mainly from

Communist dominated countries. We can expect that in 1976 the numbers seeking sanctuary in Canada will increase. Such individuals can be moved quickly and quietly to Immigration Accommodation quarters at Champlain Harbour, Quebec, where their applications can be examined.

Removal from Canada

Despite all possible efforts it would be unrealistic to expect that some criminal, or terrorist elements will not gain entry to the country. Once in the capability to remove<sup>them</sup>/quickly and effectively is very limited. Even if proposed new Appeals Legislation is in effect there will still need to be full access to the Immigration Inquiry system and the Canadian Courts which can cause long delay. In addition, security information can seldom be used as evidence at an Immigration Inquiry.

To meet the eventuality of a serious threat, it will be proposed later that special legislation be enacted to be effective during the period from June 15 to October 15, 1976, which would grant the Minister of Manpower and Immigration emergency powers to refuse entry or order the removal of persons whose presence in Canada would be detrimental to Canadian interests during that period on the basis of security or criminal reports received by the Minister. These powers would be used to remove from Canada foreign demonstrators threatening to disrupt the Olympic games and to prevent the admission of suspected terrorists. The order for rejection or removal would only apply during the specified period. The preventive effect of such special powers could obviate the need to use them.

The proposed special powers could be added to an omnibus Olympics bill now being prepared or by a subsequent amendment to an Olympics bill. A provision for summary removal or refusal of entry, however, will require an exclusion from the Bill of Rights and most certainly will be attacked as an unwarranted invasion of civil liberties. Furthermore, a new Immigration Act, including a clause that would provide additional powers for removal of security risks from Canada might well be in force in time for the commencement of the Olympic games. Despite these considerations it is imperative to know at this time whether security planning can proceed in anticipation that there will be legislative authority to permit immediate rejection or removal from Canada of such persons as foreign terrorists, criminals and demonstrators without recourse to appeal and inquiry procedures.

b. Customs Clearance

I.O.C. advocates no inspection of baggage or belongings for persons in possession of Olympic Identity Cards. Such conditions appear in the Munich Olympic Booklet of 1972. The danger of following such a procedure is that if such demands are acceded to, persons intent on causing harm would have an open invitation to import the necessary weapons.

There is no basis in Canadian Customs law for exemption from baggage examination, except for accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign governments. Although Customs practices in effect may not entail actual examination of all baggage, this is determined on a selective basis, through the application of certain criteria at the discretion of the examining officer.

In no particular case or types of cases are Customs officers empowered to waive examination on a 100% basis. To eliminate or even lower standards of examination would serve only to enhance the possibilities for a security threat and necessitate the employment of greater numbers of personnel and equipment for detection and protection purposes. Consequently, it is considered extremely inadvisable to entertain any suggestion of a "blanket" exemption from Customs examination for visitors coming to Canada for the Games.

There should be no difficulty in arranging baggage examination procedures that will accommodate Olympic visitors with a minimum of delay or inconvenience and without compromising security. There is sufficient time to review the requirements, devise systems, test procedures and train personnel.

c. Participant and VIP Security

Plans for the protection of participants, coaches officials, etc., must match the estimate of the threat. Understandably, no accurate forecast of the threat can be made for 1976 at this time. All that can be done now is to examine the current trends, project them to 1976 and plan for the worst possible situation such as attempted assassination or kidnapping.

At Munich in 1972 VIP's, athletes, coaches and trainers numbered about 12,000. It seems doubtful that the city of Montreal could provide more than a token effort of personnel protection for this number. As members of Olympic teams, participants are representatives of their respective countries, and therefore some may have to be placed in a high risk category from a security point of view as were the Israelis at Munich.

d. Airports and National Harbours

Plans must be made to increase security forces on a gradual scale until 1976 to meet the expected flow of traffic entering Canada from overseas. Seventy-two per cent of the persons visiting the Olympics in Japan arrived by air. In 1968, Mexico's percentage was sixty-eight. Canada's figure can be estimated as between sixty and seventy per cent.

e. Canada - United States Border Crossings

Ground traffic will be a major problem at border points. The Immigration and Customs services and the RCMP assisted by DND, must develop contingency plans for special border patrols for unmanned border crossings and to control traffic to or at points of examination.

f. Vital points

Depending upon the degree of the threat, the RCMP may very well be required to provide security to protect Vital Points. These number 37 in Quebec and 4 in Ontario. There are also 27 Provincial Peacetime Vital Points located in Montreal.

E. SUPPORT TO THE RCMP FROM THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

DND support has been requested by the RCMP, both in Montreal and Kingston, in a variety of areas such as ground and air transport, communications, guard duty, crowd control, riot control, border surveillance and marine assistance.

Defence Department plans to meet these needs and those requested of it by COJO are detailed in Cabinet Document 454/73 entitled "DND Support to Olympic 1976".