



12 May 1975

TO

À

FOR FILE

FROM

DE

CPL. [REDACTED]

Comments ☐ CommentairesPerusal—No Action Required ☐ Pour information—aucune suite requiseExamination and Action ☐ Pour examen et suitePrepare Reply ☐ Réponse à rédigerPrepare Brief ☐ Exposé à préparerSee Sender ☐ Voir l'expéditeurMake File(s) ☐ Dossier(s) à ouvrirReturn with Current File ☐ Retourner avec le dossier courantCheck Records ☐ Vérifier les archivesInstructions ☐ Directives

REMARKS

COMMENTAIRES

"C" Services presently evaluating and looking at equipment capable of covering VIP departure and arrivals ^{during 76 Olympics}. The equipment is expensive but provides low-light capability. This is needed due to 16hr. capability requirement. They want high quality, rugged equipment that is compatible with existing equipment in "C" Services. They also feel this equipment will be absorbed by "C" Services after Olympics. Telephoto lenses can provide facial identifications up to 1250 ft. and would be primarily for use in O.P.'s. Also shown were motion detectors which free the investigator from regarding a static image on monitor. The video tape automatically activates when motion is detected and time and date are recorded on the video tape (cannot be erased). Present operations (video) are restricted due to equipment, but it is felt that this new equipment would add a new dimension to "C" Services video potential for future operations. They are presently developing a portable unit for Olympic use (weight approx. 60lbs.) It is simple to operate and has impressive low-light capability. It uses a Nikon 35 mm 80-200 zoom lens and requires a two man team (pack man and camera man). There are plans to have 20-2 man teams employed on Olympics related ~~duties~~ ^{duties}. It is felt the work will be of general interest rather than exclusively CIB or S.S. The proposed system for the Montreal Forum consists of four units, 2 for VIP seating area, 2 for general scan of crowd - all operated by one man. The portable unit ^{prototype operates} with a video cassette and this is favoured due to ^{time} ~~tape~~ ^{change} ~~time~~.

Reviewed *C. H.*

FEB 17 1976

SECURITY SERVICE
RECORDS 2

000850

Because of the sensitivity of the Part II information, possibly Parts I and III of the package could be put on video tape for later presentation with a brief explanation of Part II given by one of our instructors.

Security clearance would be the same for either presentation.

It is realized that this method would not have the same impact as the original but would assuredly be impressive enough to alert the officers to the terrorist threat and the need for extra vigilance prior to and during the Olympics.

Early confirmation of the dates for the presentations would certainly assist us, in conjunction with Immigration, to arrange meeting rooms at the various locations listed. The proposal that the program be presented at Montreals' two airports at a later date and to greater numbers of officers sounds reasonable in view of the possibility of an increased need at these points and these will be arranged separately on dates to be agreed on.

Travel by your team in early 1976 via auto to present this package to the larger border entry points in South-West Ontario and Quebec sounds excellent. These times and dates could be set up at the beginning of the new year if you would give us a call when you are ready.

If you have any questions regarding the above, please feel free to call me at any time.

Yours truly,



K.M. Burpee,
Acting Chief,
Organizational Development and
Technical Training.



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO: DIRECTOR GENERAL, SECURITY SERVICE
A: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CRIMINAL OPERATIONS

FROM: FEDERAL SECURITY COORDINATOR
DE: FOR THE 1976 OLYMPICS

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
PY 400-42
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
June 27, 1975


SUBJECT: Briefing Program for
OBJET: Foreign Countries

The following policy guidelines, emanating from discussions with the Department of External Affairs, the Deputy Commissioner (Ops) and Security Service representatives, are recommended for your approval:


- (a) The briefings should be prepared in slide form, be standardized and contain only material approved by the Principal Coordinator, after comments from the police Forces participating in the security plan.
- (b) There should be two types of briefings:
 - (i) A general type briefing which could be given individually to any country participating in the Games.
 - (ii) Specific briefings for individual countries dealing with special measures being taken to satisfy the requirements of their delegation, and which would also include (i).
- (c) There should be one main centre for all briefings in Montreal.
- (d) A briefing Sub/Committee should be formed in Montreal to deal with the preparation of the briefing material. Because there may be a need to do some briefings in Ottawa, a member of the "HQ" Olympic Secretariat should be a member of that Sub/Committee.


- (e) The briefings should be given by a "Criminal Operations" member of the Force.
- (f) The briefings should make it absolutely clear that Canadian authorities oppose Foreign Nationals bringing firearms into Canada to protect their athletes.
- (g) An accurate and complete record of each briefing should be maintained in order that Headquarters can keep the Department of External Affairs fully informed.
- (h) The Security Service objective of being present at all briefings is to establish communication links with the Olympic Attaches or their delegates which will continue throughout the Games. These links will enable the Security Service to receive information concerning knowledge of any threat to any particular national team for eventual analysis at Headquarters and transmission to the operational sector. As a result of participation at the time of the briefing, the Security Service representative will be prepared to respond to any general questions on topics which fall within Security Service areas of responsibility, such as level of threat towards a specific delegation from groups within Canada.
- (i) The Security Service will participate to the following extent:
 - (i) Have a fully briefed investigator, for each country or closely related countries, available to take part in each briefing.
 - (ii) The investigator will be familiar with the foreign country itself and the groups from within Canada which might pose a threat to the Olympic team.

- (iii) He will answer questions of a general nature raised by the Attache. In cases of high risk countries given a more detailed physical briefing, the Security Service member will be prepared to respond more specifically.
- (iv) In all cases, he will establish himself as the continuing contact point for that particular Attache should the Attache wish to pass any threat information to Canadian authorities.
- (v) The investigator will develop an association with the Attache and
- (vi) during the period that the Olympic team is in Canada, i.e. July 1 to August 1, 1976, will be available on a continuous basis to act as the transmission link for incoming intelligence information.


 J.R.B. Quintal, C/Supt.
 Federal Security Coordinator
 for the 1976 Olympics

APPROVED:


 Deputy Commissioner (Ops)


 Director General, Security Service

26/6/75
 Date

26 June 75
 Date



MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

D/Commr. (Cr. Ops.)

FROM
DE

Director General
Security Service

SUBJECT
OBJET

Briefing Program for Immigration and
Customs Officers

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION DE SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

OUR FILE / N° DE RÉFÉRENCE

YOUR FILE / V° DE RÉFÉRENCE

HQY 465-24-5

DATE

13 June 1975

You are probably aware that the question of security clearances for customs officers was recently discussed in a meeting between the Federal Security Coordinator, Manpower and Immigration, and Customs, on the 10th of June.

2. In essence, Mr. Hawkins, of Customs recognizes the need and hopes a departmental (Customs) policy ruling can be obtained. Mr. Butroid, Manpower and Immigration, reviewed the policy and procedures of Manpower and Immigration, and stated his department had been pressing Customs for some time to screen Customs officers.

3. As I understand it the type of clearance required, i.e., SECRET, required basically a check of fingerprints and a Security Service records check. Further, that upon request from the Department, the Security Service would have no difficulty in conducting the records checks within a relatively short period of time. Approximately 5,000 name checks appear to be required.

4. The Federal Security Coordinator stated that it was his intention to mention this gap in the Olympic security posture in the memo to Cabinet update due for submission in September 1975. Due to the urgency of the matter he also intends to discuss immediate interdepartmental action at the Minister or Deputy Minister level with you at an early date.

5. I thought this matter should be drawn to your attention for comment.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY D. G.

M.R. Dare

001040



Revenue Canada
Customs and Excise

Revenu Canada
Douanes et Accise

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

C/Supt. J.R.R. Quintall,
Federal Security Co-Ordinator,
RCMP H.Q. Olympic Section,
Vedic Building,
720 Belfast Road,
Ottawa, Ontario.

July 21, 1975.

Dear Sir:


Re: Briefing Program for Immigration and Customs Officers.

This is further to a July 15, 1975 conversation between Carter MacDonald of your Department and Don LaRocque of Customs Training regarding the tentative dates and places for the presentation of the Olympic Briefing Program to Immigration and Customs Officers across the country.

As I understand it, you hope to use the RCMP aircraft for transporting equipment and personnel to the following places, in order of appearance; between October 26 and November 7, 1975.

Winnipeg
Edmonton
Vancouver
Calgary
Toronto
Ottawa
Halifax
Gander

The two presentations you propose per day at these places will not cover all of the officers in each area but with approval from your Department, the following plan would allow the message to be passed on to most of the remainder.



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23.7.75.

Ottawa
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Ottawa
K1A 0L5

① TNSP. GODFREY.


② SIS DIEPOLD

③ C.M. MARD.

Chad 24/7

49.
hpd 229.

PLEASE DISCUSS



IP 210-32-6

July 31, 1975

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. L.R. St. Vincent,
C/O District Administrator, Immigration
Department of Manpower and Immigration
Plaza Alexis Nihon,
1500 Atwater Street,
Montreal, Quebec

Dear Mr. St. Vincent:

Re: Briefing Program for Immigration
and Customs Officers - 1976 Olympics

Attached find a copy of the tentative schedule for the briefing program. You will note that Montreal has not been included in the schedule. Since briefings in Montreal can be easily accommodated from Ottawa, and, due to time restrictions during the proposed two week trip, Montreal will be handled as a special case. Tentative plans call for a one week series of briefings following the "road trip" portion of the program. The Montreal portion will of course be bilingual. Further presentations to key border points such as Lacolle and Windsor can be accommodated later on a priority basis.

To date the first part of the briefing program (the sound and slide presentation by the Olympic Secretariat) has been developed and has been seen by Customs and Immigration officials. The comments and criticisms received concerning the content and style of this presentation have been noted and are assisting us in our present task of modifying and moulding a final product.

The second part of the program (on terrorism), is being developed by the "D" Operations branch of the Security Service and it is expected to be ready in late September or early October 1975.

OA
dy 123
6-2-76


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The third part of the program (bomb and weapons presentation) will be given by [REDACTED] is ready to go on relatively short notice due to his extensive experience in this field. All that is required is permission for use of his services from his superior, [REDACTED]. Tentative agreement for a cost sharing arrangement regarding [REDACTED] expenses has been reached between the Dept. of Manpower and Immigration and National Revenue.

It is hoped the complete package will be ready for viewing by senior Customs and Immigration officials no later than the middle of October, 1975. The possibility of presenting parts 1 and 3 sometime in August does not seem possible at this time due to Manpower difficulties encountered at this time of year due to vacations. It should be possible to preview parts 1 and 3 sometime in early to mid-September, 1975.

Any changes or developments regarding this program will be communicated to you promptly.

Yours truly,


I.W. Taylor, Supt.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

att.

cc: Mr. H. Hawkins
Customs Operations



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A

Supt. J.F. FRIEND
Officer i/c "A" Operations

FROM
DE

G.B. BLAKE, S/Sgt.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE June 12, 1975

SUBJECT
OBJET

Briefing Program for - Immigration and Customs Officers

There seems to be an area of confusion here and before any action is taken to precipitate wholesale screening I would like to express my views on this.

2. The Olympic Secretariat's submission voices concern that Customs Officers do not have nor will have sufficient security clearances to view their proposed Briefing Package. I mentioned to you, I had the opportunity to view a film prepared by the Olympic Group last week and although it may not be our decision to make, if what I saw is what is to be shown, I would question the need for any security restriction. A possible pre-screening caution to potential viewers soliciting discretion would be more in order. The contents of the package dealt with generalizations and to suggest a formal clearance should be obtained for all possible viewers to a "CONFIDENTIAL" or "SECRET" level is not, to my mind, very realistic.

3. As a matter of principle and Governmental policy, we have discouraged Departments from abusing CD35 which clearly states a person must have access to or is being considered for access to classified data before a formal screening is undertaken. To suggest or insist that Customs Officers be now included for the proposed purposes, is not consistent with our mandate or objectives at this moment in time nor with our posture we have previously adopted with other Departments.

4. The rationale expressed in the penultimate paragraph of Sgt. [redacted] memo that Customs Officers are our front line of defense does not alter the fact that they don't normally have access to classified material.

5. As you know, and as pointed out by [redacted] others connected with the Olympics are being subjected to verification of our records under sensible criteria. I see no reason why such a program could not be extended to cover Customs Officers. This to me would be a more realistic approach.

6. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I find the reasons offered in paragraph three, which ^{WAY} Customs Officers are not now cleared, curious to say the least. I agree with the end result that we don't screen them but not for the reasons stated. To have Personal History Forms and fingerprints completed and then not use them illustrates the incongruity of bureaucracy in action.

7. For your information, [REDACTED] phoned while I was preparing this memo and I took the liberty to suggest we have a preliminary meeting to discuss this matter on Monday next. With your permission, maybe we can reach an accord on this at that time.



(G.B. BLAKE) S/Sgt.

CO-OP. "I" OPS



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO
A Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat,
Security Service.

FROM
DE Insp. J.S. Warren


SUBJECT
OBJET Summer Olympics in Montreal, Que.
1976 - Security Service Planning

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
SECRET
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
1A-5C-6-76
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
May 22, 1975.

Reference your letter of May 21, 1975, some form of laissez-aller will be clearly necessary for the members of "I" Operations in the Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal units during the period of the Games and before. In my view Olympic tickets would not suffice in that it could be necessary for our members to obtain access to Olympic facilities not normally open to the public. As well we would not want anything which identified the members of "I" Operations as connected with security. Thirdly, whatever accreditation we do receive should optimunly allow access to any facility regardless of location in Ottawa, Montreal or Toronto areas.

In view of these restrictions I would think that something in the management category which did not identify a particular location would serve our purpose. To be effective, it would be necessary to issue accreditation to our total compliment which is 264 members. If you agree and this can be arranged it would be advantageous to us to have these well in advance of the Games so that our members will have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the sites and favilities before being placed in an actual operational position.

(J.S. Warren), Insp.
Officer i/c "I" Operations



Reviewed
MAY 27 1975
M.W.D.

P15

Branch - Direction

Office or Division - Bureau ou Division

Month - Mois

FACILITATION, ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL

CO-ORDINATION GROUP, OLYMPICS '76

July 1975

Activity & File No. Activité & Dossier no.	Activity Description Description de l'Activité	Status Statut	Target date for Completion Date Prévue d'Achèvement	Remarks Observations
CONTINGENCY PLANS 71-4-8	To plan for the availability of staff to proceed, at short notice, to any place in Canada or the U.S.A. in the event of strikes which would force authorities to close an airport.		Dec. '76	Regional Olympic Liaison Officers will be requested to provide for core of officers who will be available from June 15 to August 1976 to proceed to other ports of entry, at short notice.
	To assess the existing plans to cope with a situation whereby a terrorist or any other violent type was detected at the P.I.L. or in the Immigration Secondary Examination Area. To formulate in co-operation with the R.C.M.P., M.O.T., C. & E. and D.N.D. appropriate counter measures.	On-going	Sept. '76	The M.O.T. pays the R.C.M.P. for security personnel at airports. Customs and Immigration want the presence of additional guards or soldiers in 'mufti' in the Secondary Immigration/Customs Area. Proposed to the Federal Security Co-ordinator in June 1975.

000942

en - Direction

Office or Division - Bureau ou Division

Month - Mois

MITIGATION, ENFORCEMENT AND CONTROL

CO-ORDINATION GROUP, OLYMPICS '76

July 1975

ity & File No.	Activity Description	Status	Target date for Completion	Remarks
ité & Dossier no.	Description de l'Activité	Progrès	Date Prévue d'Accomplissement	Observations
EX OF ICIALS AND LETES 1-3-6	It is important to build up an index of the names of known officials and athletes likely to participate or attend the Games and who will be receiving Olympic Identity Cards. The list would be particularly useful in the case for participants from 'high risk' countries where the Olympic Identity Card might be used fraudulently. This can be done by attending International Sporting Events and gathering information and other intelligence on athletes and officials through all other available sources.			Basic data on athletes, has been gathered from the British Commonwealth games held at Christchurch N.Z., and the Asian Games held at Teheran, Iran. The Mediterranean Games to be held in Algiers in August/September 1975 and the Pan-Am Games, October 1975, will provide the desired basic information.

000927

RCMP Police have already committed eight craft and are making arrangements to rent five more. Negotiations are continuing with other potential sources to bring the total up to the identified requirement. There seems to be a need for greater participation by other federal departments which have that type of resources. Construction of Portsmouth Harbour is progressing well and this facility will reportedly also be available for use during the 1975 CORK regatta. It will also be made available for Olympic use effective June 19, 1976 on which date the Ontario Provincial Police will accept security responsibility.

In Ottawa a security coordinator has been named for the Lansdowne Park Soccer Preliminaries and he has attended a number of meetings in Kingston to discuss matters of common interest.

Meetings have also been held in Toronto between security forces involved with the preliminary events scheduled for that city. Jurisdictional issues there are expected to be resolved in the near future.

Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on Security

No meetings of the Interdepartmental sub-committee were scheduled during the last quarter. Individual contact between members of the sub-committee has continued and the next meeting is scheduled for July, 1975.

Accreditation

The International Accreditation Committee was scheduled to meet in May to study and approve procedures and methods developed for Press Accreditation. This meeting, however, was postponed until June so the expected ratification will not be received until the next quarter.

Our study of the Book of Instructions on Olympic participant accreditation has been completed. Recommended amendments where security aspects are concerned have been forwarded to the Department of Manpower and Immigration for consideration as per their request before the final draft is prepared.

The Coordinator will be represented at all times both in our R.C.M.P. Operations Centre and the Police Operations Centre near the Olympic Village. The only one stipulation is that the Coordinator will represent Montreal Operations only and will not be empowered to call in units from outside the Division area. As mentioned previously, this will remain with the Federal Security Coordinator in consultation with the D.D.G. (Operations).

COMMUNICATIONS:

At the outset, there was considerable discussion concerning a common communications system with teams from other divisions, however, this has mainly been resolved. The basis of the problem was that the teams in each location are licenced by MOT to operate only in one frequency range, complicated by the fact that Montreal equipment is not compatible with the equipment in Ottawa and Toronto. New crystals have been ordered to equip the Ottawa vehicles with a Montreal frequency so that the two teams can operate in "C" Division. Ottawa vehicles now have "C" channel equipment. Some vehicles in Montreal and Toronto will be equipped with "C" channel (seven new sets have been ordered for Montreal, Toronto and the aircraft) which will allow a common communications net. This common equipment will permit the turnover of targets from one unit to another or, in the event of absolute necessity - such as a STAGE 2 situation, the "C" channel equipment could be used for inter-unit communications coordination.

ACCREDITATION:

Important
One item, still under consideration, is the type of accreditation cards to be issued to surveillants. The present system put forward by COJO consists of eight categories identified by different colors. This is, however, presently under review and one suggestion is that the cards will be only one colour and the venues identified by code numbers. From the "I" Ops. standpoint we are seeking to have all our surveillants issued with a card which will permit entrance to all sites, and without being identified as security personnel. As mentioned, this subject is still under discussion, and we are currently in the process of making our requirements known to the Principle Security Committee.

TRAINING:

The subject of training for "I" Ops. personnel has received considerable consideration and is planned for in four separate areas:

- (A) Surveying of Sites. This is an ongoing process and

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cannot be given serious consideration until the completion of the various buildings.

(B) Topography Familiarization. For the sites outside of Montreal, i.e. Bromont, Jolliet and l'Acadie, this will be proceeded within the Summer of 1975, and for the urban environment of Montreal and Kingston, in the Spring of 1976.

(C) Olympics Introduction Course. This two day course has been prepared by Training Branch in Montreal and will be presented in the autumn of 1975. It is designed as a familiarization course for the Olympics, and is presently under review as to our requirements. At very least an Olympic briefing package is required for presentation to all "I" Ops. personnel in "C", "O" and "A" Divisions.

(D) Bombs and Weapons Recognition Briefing. As you are aware Lt. Coté of the MUCP, the leading bomb expert in Canada, is scheduled to join our Customs and Immigration Briefing Program and we are seeking to extend this to a one-day briefing in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and possibly Vancouver, (Human Settlements Conference). This briefing would, in essence, prepare our personnel for the eventuality of unexpectedly seeing a bomb placed etc. Its inclusion is considered most desirable for one-day lectures in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver.

Good

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) That the recommended staged deployment of "I" Operations be approved for use during the Olympic period. ✓

(B) That the authority for the deployment of "I" Ops. resources from one division to another rest with the D.D.G. (Operations) in consultation with the Federal Security Coordinator. ✓

(C) That approval be given to the plan of preparing and deployment of two surveillance teams (24 personnel with 12 vehicles) from "A" Division for "C" Division during the Olympic period. ✓

(D) That approval be given to the contingency plan for preparing one surveillance team (12 personnel with 6 vehicles) from "O" Division for use in Kingston, if required. ✓


(E) That our operational philosophy of retaining our "I" Operations resources for Intelligence Collection Surveillance be stressed insofar as this is possible. ✓

(F) That the operation of surveillance units in "C" Division during the period of the Games be under the overall supervision of one surveillance coordinator, mutually agreed upon by all three forces involved. *on*


(G) That the plan to install common communications equipment between "O", "A" and "C" Divisions be finalized and tested well in advance of the Olympic Games. *yes*

(H) That our training program be accepted as fulfilling the needs of "I" Operations personnel. *yes*

The foregoing is presented as a basic document for "I" Operations participation in Olympic Security. Your consideration of the above recommendations would be appreciated.




J.S. Warren, Insp.
Officer i/c "I"
Operations



I.W. Taylor, Insp.
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

A P P R O V E D:



H. Draper, A/Commr.,
Deputy Director General (Operations)
Security Service

SOLICITOR GENERAL

SOLLICITEUR GENERAL

OTTAWA K1A 0P8
June 8, 1973

Dear Commissioner Higgitt:

RE: Olympic Games, 1976 - Security Planning

On June 1, 1973, the following decision of the Cabinet on Government Operations was confirmed by Cabinet:

- (a) that the government should adopt a strong security posture in relation to Olympics 1976 which would recognize the possibility of a serious security threat, accept the ultimate responsibility of Canada for the safety of participants and others and have its expression in
 - i) control by Canada, not the International Olympic Committee (IOC) of entry by participants, coaches, officials, media representatives and visitors;
 - ii) normal customs examination procedures as opposed to I.O.C. expectations of blanket customs exemption;
 - iii) close cooperation with provincial and municipal police forces which will probably involve federal leadership in security planning and will require delicate negotiations and agreement concerning jurisdiction;
- (b) that the Solicitor General be authorized to instruct the Commissioner, R.C.M. Police,
 - i) to negotiate with provincial and local police forces and COJO in order to clearly determine and agree upon appropriate jurisdictions recognizing always the federal responsibility to safeguard national interests, and the large federal input of security personnel;
 - ii) to appoint within the Force a coordinator of security planning who will include in his responsibilities coordination of federal involvement and liaison with COJO;
 - iii) to direct the coordinator to embark immediately on further detailed discussions with DND, COJO

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Commissioner W.L. Higgitt,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Ottawa, Ontario

SECRET

and the provincial and municipal police authorities concerned with a view to determining and reporting to the Committee of Ministers mentioned in para (e) below the level and nature of security resource requirements based on agreed task sharing;

- iv) to augment R.C.M.P. resources in personnel, material and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended;
- (c) that the Minister of Manpower and Immigration be authorized to augment his resources in personnel and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended;
- (d) that in considering the nature, direction and size of DND support to the 1976 Olympics, priority be given to those security needs which are the responsibility of the Federal government;
- (e) that a committee of Ministers be formed drawn from the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence and consisting of those Ministers having a direct interest in Olympic security which would, subject to Cabinet confirmation, consider and approve, where appropriate, federal involvement in security planning as it develops which might include negotiations with appropriate Ministers in Quebec and Ontario.

In accordance with this decision, I would like you to appoint a senior member of the Force to be Federal Security Coordinator for the 1976 Olympics in Montreal. The terms of reference for the Federal Security Coordinator should reflect the broad range of responsibilities authorized by the Cabinet decision.

As I am sure you appreciate, I will be required from time to time to answer questions, in the House of Commons and in the City of Montreal, about arrangements that are being made for security. It is, therefore, essential from my point of view that I be kept informed, on a regular basis, of the progress made by the Security Coordinator.

I assume you would wish to continue with the normal reporting channels to me for this specific task. As planning develops, however, I have no objection to the Security Coordinator establishing a liaison with Mr. Robin Bourne of the Ministry Secretariat, who can keep me informed and also make arrangements for any support and assistance you might need from the Committee of Ministers mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of the Cabinet decision.

Let me assure you that I will do everything I can to assist you in your negotiations with the provincial and municipal authorities, with COJO and with other federal departments and agencies.

Yours sincerely,

Warren Allmand
Solicitor General

SECRET

"HQ" File: HQY 465-21-5.

D.D.G. (Ops.)

RE: Briefing Program for - Immigration
and Customs Officers

For your information.

The question of security clearance for Customs Officers was discussed in detail at a further meeting between the Federal Security Coordinator, Manpower and Immigration, and Customs on 10 June 1975.

In essence, Mr. HAWKINS, of Customs recognizes the need and hopes a departmental (Customs) policy ruling can be obtained. Mr. BUTROID, Manpower and Immigration, reviewed the policy and procedures of Manpower and Immigration, and stated his department had been pressing Customs for sometime to screen Customs Officers.

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The Federal Security Coordinator stated that it was his intention to mention this gap in the Olympic security posture in the memo to Cabinet update due for submission in Sept. 1975. Due to the urgency of the matter he also intends to discuss immediate interdepartmental action at the Minister or Deputy Minister level with D/Commr. Cr. Ops.

The D.G. may wish to discuss this matter with D/Commr. Cr. Ops.

I.W. Taylor, Insp.

Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

c.c. Federal Security Coordinator
Officer i/c "A" Operations
Officer i/c "D" Operations
Officer i/c "F" Operations

OTTAWA
11 June 1975



MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

TO
A

Insp. I.W. Taylor
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympic Secretariat

YOUR FILE No.
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. HQY 465-24-5
Notre dossier

FROM
De

Sgt. [REDACTED]
Security Service Olympic Secretariat

DATE 6 June 1975

FOLD

SUBJECT
Sujet

Briefing Program for - Immigration
and Customs Officers

As you are well aware, the briefing program package to be shown to Immigration and Customs Officers is well on its way. The type of security clearance required to view this presentation will be at least "confidential" and possibly "secret" depending on the content put in the program by "D" Operations Terrorist Section.

Through discussions with Immigration it was ascertained that Immigration Officers have a security clearance up to "secret". However, Immigration informed that they believed Customs Officers are not all cleared to "secret". After discussions with "A" Ops., it was suggested that we contact Mr. John R. LAROCHE, Security Officer, Customs Dept., of National Revenue in Ottawa.

On p.m. of 5 June 1975, Mr. LAROCHE was contacted by phone concerning the security clearance of Customs Officers at the primary inspection line (PIL). He indicated that 90% of the Customs Officers have no security clearance. Upon engagement, the new employee completes a P.H.F. and is finger-printed. However, there are no verifications being made as the union and most of the supervisors in the field object to a security clearance for fear that an employee with a criminal record may lose his job. Mr. LAROCHE indicated that they are trying to convince the union that a security clearance of all employees is most desirable however with little success up to now. There is a meeting scheduled for 18 June 1975 between his shop and the union and security clearance will be one of the items discussed. Mr. LAROCHE agreed to inform me of the outcome concerning the security clearance discussion. He is, however, not overly optimistic that the problem will be resolved in our favour.

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[Handwritten signature]
6/6/75

C.C. FSC.

001045

MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

TO
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Insp. I.W. Taylor
Officer i/c Security Service
Olympic Secretariat

YOUR FILE No.
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
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
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C.C. FSC.

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9/7/75

As the international airports and border points are our first line of defence against undesirable individuals who may attempt to gain access to Canada and especially since this first line of defence will be manned by Customs Officers, it is somewhat unreasonable to think that Customs Officers have no security clearance. Everywhere else, where a person may be employed, either by COJO or at one of the sites, where athletes and VIP's will be, a full verification of our records is being done on all these persons.

Consideration should be given by higher authority, even up to minister's level, to study and resolve this matter. We must not forget that our security posture will be as good as our weakest link.



Sgt.
Security Service
Olympic Secretariat

PLEASE ADDRESS
CORRESPONDENCE TO:

THE COMMISSIONER
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0R2



HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE

PRIÈRE D'ADRESSER LES
LETTRES COMME SUIT:

LE COMMISSAIRE
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0R2

C O N F I D E N T A L

YOUR NO.
VOTRE NO.

OUR NO.
NOTRE NO.

January 17, 1975

TO: D.D.G. (Operations)

Re: Summer Olympics, 1976
Policy - Security Screening

During the past few months, members of my staff have been developing a process of security screening suitable for the Olympic Games. We have now reached a stage whereby we are prepared to present our final program, after approval, to the Chief Security Coordinator, A/Dir. Toupin, Montreal, and Staff Supt. McBride of the OPP, who is responsible for the sites in Ontario.

The general estimate for security screening is in the area of 65,000 names. Discussions with the Officer i/c "F" Operations have revealed that his staff is capable of coping with this increased work-load, given the time frame of 26 weeks, from January 1, 1976 to July 1, 1976. This estimate is all - inclusive of press, C.O.J.O. employees, caterers and temporary employees. The philosophy here is that every person who has any contact with the players or VIPs or the opportunity to contact them, must be the subject of a security examination.

The general philosophy of the system is to feed all names to Headquarters on KW7 where they will be immediately traced by "F" Operations. The resulting files which are surfaced will be examined by a Task Force made up of representatives of "A", "B", "D" and "G" Operations, and replies will be made on an Approved/Rejected basis. The criteria for this system, which is set out

below, will of course, have been previously accepted by A/Dir. Toupin, and Staff Supt. McBride.

The following criteria was developed from existing Policy, Bill 138, and discussions with the Officers i/c "A", "D" and "G" Operations. We have also discussed the criteria with Supt. Cobb and Insp. C. Vermette, from Montreal, and Insp. Deschenes of "A" Division. The criteria that we have developed is as follows:

- "(1) Any person who is a member of a terrorist organization or any organization that advocates or is capable of acts of violence.
- (2) Any person who by his words or actions shows himself to support any organization or person who publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of violence.

In all cases, any reasonable doubt as to the security status of the applicant will be decided in favor of the peaceful staging of the XXI Olympiad."

This rejection criteria has been developed for and by the Security Service, and CIB are presently developing their own rejection criteria. The next step in our proposed formula, following approval of the rejection criteria, is the formation of a "task force" at "HQ". This task force will be made up of members of "A", "D" and "G" Operations of "HQ" Security Service and their function will be to review the cross references which "F" Operations will surface. It is also proposed that this task force will decide whether or not to reject an applicant as per the rejection criteria with provision for verbal briefings, in exceptional circumstances, to A/Dir. Toupin, or S/Supt. McBride. The volume of name checks will start to increase substantially

during the summer and fall of 1975. Consequently, it is essential that the task force be ready for operation no later than September 1, 1975.


The first step in this process, after your approval, is presentation to A/Dir. Toupin and Staff Supt. McBride, when we will seek letters accepting our program. We would appreciate your approval of, firstly, our proposed criteria, and secondly, the general system of security screening as set out above. The Federal Security Co-Ordinator has requested that our presentations to outside Forces be handled as a total package, i.e., in conjunction with CIB proposals which are now receiving priority attention.


Upon approval of this proposal discussions will be held with appropriate Branches to establish the security screening task force within existing resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) The rejection criteria be approved as outlined.
- (2) The rejection criteria and proposed methodology be presented to A/Dir. Toupin, M.U.C.P., and Staff Supt. McBride, OPP, for their concurrence in writing.
- (3) A Security Service Screening Task Force be established as outlined from existing resources of respective "HQ" Security Service Branches. The Security Service Olympic Secretariat will continue to coordinate the activities of the Task Force.

APPROVED:


H.C. Draper A/Commr.
D.D.G. (Operations)
Security Service


I.W. Taylor, Insp.,
Officer i/c Olympics Secretariat
Security Service

4. Discussion centered around providing service to Manpower & Immigration's requests on any positive hits they may get on COIL. This includes the hours of operation required by "HQ" Security Service "D" and "F" Operations to respond to any such requests. Procedures and policies to be established on how to provide classified information where no alvis facilities exist especially along border points. Access for interviewing by Security Service field personnel of persons who may be detained by M. & I. and subsequently rejected or deported.

5. It was agreed that further consultation between the Security Service and M. & I. officials is required before we can go ahead with more positive planning in respect to manning of our terminal once it is installed. Points to be covered include:

- (a) What procedures, if any, have been established by M. & I. for the guidance of their enforcement officers.
- (b) How long specifically do they intend to hold a suspect on whom a hit has been made.
- (c) Will enforcement officers reject a visitor on the basis of the information received by the terminal or will they request further supporting information (CPIC policy stipulates that police users are not to act on CPIC terminal information without confirming, through originating agency, that the data is current and valid).
- (d) What is their schedule for manning of terminals, i.e. 16 hours, 20 hours, 24 hours per day, and weekends, etc.
- (e) Procedure for getting updated intelligence from Security Service to M. & I. control for updating of data.
- (f) Procedures to be followed for query (to include all available identifying data).
- (g) Suggest "dummy queries" on factual data be made to test equipment, procedures, narrative traffic, etc.

6. C/M [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] Operations has had the CPIC terminal operators course which is of 5 days duration. Our operators do not require that extensive course and C/M [REDACTED] has advised that he could handle our training needs once (a) equipment is available, and (b) personnel have been named.

.... 3

"HQ" File: HQY 465-24-5

① D.D.G. (Ops.)

7/10/75

② 016 F OPS
③

To Note and return
to me please.

RE: Briefing Program for - Immigration
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MA R DARE

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Officer i/c Security Service
Olympics Secretariat

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Officer i/c "A" Operations
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