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YOUR NO.
VOTRE NO

OUR NO.
NOTRE NO

CONFIDENTIAL

"A" DIVISION

OFFICER I/C "A" DIV. SECURITY SERVICE

14 September 1976

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

The following will serve as a final report on "A" Division Security Service Planning/Involvement in the XXI Olympiad. It is in response to the request of the Olympic Secretariat dated the 5 AUG 76 on this file. Topics covered will be restricted to those areas in which "A" Div. was involved.

a) Conflict Games

An excellent problem solving milieu in which Security Service played no major role, but did afford the opportunity for the Service to bring forth the intelligence function it was expected to display during the Games. The Games which were played in Kingston were basically void of any intelligence gathering role, but I understand the final Conflict Game in Montreal (MAR 76) rectified this problem.

It is suggested that any future Games include Security Service personnel as participants in the "Blue" room as only by participatory involvement can Security Service enlarge upon its mandate, which is understood by but to a few. In dealing with other Law Enforcement Agencies it must be remembered that Security Service represents an unknown entity and we must continually outline our function.

There is also an identifiable need for as many members as possible to observe the Conflict Games. Utilizing the Games held in Kingston as an example, there was not enough room for key personnel, (i.e. Shift Commanders) to be present. The reason for this was lack of space and a need to keep the observers to a manageable number. In retrospect, Games of a shorter duration, but an increase in the numbers would have greater advantages for both the players and observers.

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b) Olympic Manpower Resource
Deployment and Establishment

"A" Division functioned as two separate entities (C.I.B./S.S.), but with a very close working relationship. There would be merit in having both groups function as one, as did the Olympic Secretariat. However, as long as Security Service realizes the role it was expected to play, that of keeping the Joint Forces advised, nothing is lost by separate groupings. Allocation of manpower was sufficient to conduct Olympic planning.

Although it was expected that Security Service members would not be required to have an up-to-date knowledge of all matters pertaining to Olympic planning, it was found that participation at meeting and conferences dictated that a working knowledge of all C.I.B. programs is mandatory.

c) "I" Ops Support and Deployment

Within the framework of the "I" Ops "Operational Philosophy" it is felt that they could have functioned as required with no problems. The Stage I and Stage II deployments were recognized as being manageable.

d) Marathon Program

The program as such had no "A" Division involvement. It was shown in three areas of "A" Division; Ottawa, Kingston and Sault Ste. Marie. Feedback was favourable.

However, the audio/visual portion of the Marathon Program was secured from the Olympic Secretariat in January of 1976 and was shown a total of thirty times, the last being on July 16. Incorporated with an overview on the role of the Security Service and coupled with a capsulized version of Security Service Olympic Planning, it emerged as the highlight of our planning. Shown to the various police forces, DND and selected COJO personnel it created an awareness of Olympic planning and the need for continuous dialogue between all Forces.

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e) C.O.I.L.S.

In the early planning stages C.O.I.L.S. was seen as the vital link which would prevent unauthorized persons from entering Canada. As planning progressed it became evident that a false sense of security was being given as this automated system did not live up to its' expectations. Insufficient resources and training were the main problem areas, both of which are DMI responsibility. It is apparent that the Force fulfilled its' objective with COILS input, but for the reasons stated above DMI did not.

f) Attache Liaison Program

"A" Division involvement was restricted to one member, [REDACTED] Nevertheless, the concept and implementation of the program has created dividends to the Security Service which will be of lasting benefit.

One area that must be commented upon was the oversight of members attached to this program, when visiting the Olympic facilities at Kingston to contact Security Service members at that point. With the exception of the member attached to the Israeli delegation, knowledge of visits to Kingston by our members came from the OPP Security branch, after the fact. Not only did this display a lack of communication between the Security Service itself but it left the Kingston members in a position of not being able to comment on any points raised.

g) COJO and Media Screening

OTTAWA: COJO Montreal dictated to the organizing committee in Ottawa (UNOP) as to the screening procedures they would follow. In essence all decisions on the C.I.B. rejection criteria would have been made in Montreal even though the employee would work in Ottawa. This effectively eliminated any input by the local Security Force.

In order to offset this arrangement, it was necessary to have duplicate [REDACTED] checks conducted at this level. Although the number of employees was small it displayed confusion and inconsistency.

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In areas of this nature, it would seem wise to have a binding policy affecting all locations. It is realized that this was the theme of the Olympic Secretariat and that COJO's dismal attitude about the necessity for the screening process was the core of the problem.

KINGSTON: Again, due to an excellent working relationship between the Security Forces and COJO no problems were encountered.

There was an attempt by COJO Montreal during the games period itself to accredit persons who had not as yet been cleared, but this was effectively vetoed. The smaller number of persons to be screened in Kingston as opposed to Montreal placed us at a distinct advantage. The excellent response from "HQ" "F" Ops was also a major factor in eliminating any problem areas.

h) Refugee/Defector Program

The failure of any bona fide defector to materialize negated the opportunity to assess the amount of planning that the R/D program required. "A" Division, as the primary back-up unit to all Olympic locations was forced to commit a large manpower deployment. To a large extent planning was influenced by the 1972 Olympic Games where Munich officials claimed 119 persons sought asylum.

Geographical considerations were discussed vis-a-vis Canada's attractions in an attempt to arrive at a realistic figure.

The overall planning and manpower deployment in "A" Division did not suffer due to the R/D program and in essence the members assigned to this tasking were a reserve for any emergency situation.