An effective communications system is vital for any successful security operation. Equipment used at the 1976 Olympics has since been distributed and is in operational use across Canada. It has been necessary to modify much of it so that it would no longer form a compatible system even if all the components were retrieved. Time will not permit total remodification to provide a system identical to the one in use in 1976. The only remaining alternative would be to set up a "patchwork" system which would provide service of only limited quality. This is, without a doubt, one of the most serious problems which would have to be faced, and would require priority attention at the outset of planning.

There are of course numerous other problem areas of a less significant nature that we would have to face. These include such aspects as training and familiarization of the total security force, lodgings and logistics in general. I do not consider these to be insurmountable but the cumulative effect of the make-shift solutions that would be necessary would further reduce security effectiveness.

The budget will, by necessity, have to be "open-ended". However, based on the previous expenditure trends during 1976, normal inflationary increases and requirements in the areas of travel, accommodation and meal costs, the total incremental funding requirements should approach $18 Million Dollars. The Department of National Defence has provided us with an approximate cost of $100 Million Dollars for the same number of personnel to carry out security duties as in 1976.

In summary and again based on the premise my earlier assumptions are valid, we have come to the conclusion that, if necessary, we will be able to develop and implement a security program for any Olympic event. However, in our collective opinion, it will fall far short of the level of effectiveness we will consider necessary for such an event. Further, because of the demands it will impose on our manpower resources, it will have a serious debilitating effect on our enforcement obligations across Canada. Federal enforcement particularly will be crippled.

I trust that this response will prove adequate for your needs.

R.H. Simmonds,
Commissioner
MEMORANDUM

TO

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (C.P.S.)

FROM

DIRECTOR, PROTECTIVE POLICING

SUBJECT

1980 Summer Olympic Games

At 2.30 p.m. 80.01.22 the Commissioner chaired a meeting attended by the following:

Alan Darling, P.C.O. and his assistant, Commodore J. Rodocanachi, D.N.D. and two assistants,
Deputy Commissioner D.J. Beiersdorfer
Deputy Commissioner J.R.R. Quintal
Director General, Mr. M.R. Dare
Assistant Commissioner J.U.M. Sauve
Chief Superintendent D.W. McGibbon

The Commissioner advised that the meeting was called to discuss the hosting of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games and asked Mr. Darling to speak specifically on the request made by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Darling stated that President Carter of the United States had adopted, as a minimum, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, but would prefer the I.O.C. find a new site or alternately cancel the Games. The P.M., while realizing that any decision on re-siting the Games was up to the I.O.C., had asked government officials to consider what was involved to have Montreal as the site. P.C.O. was asked to identify the problems and propose possible solutions. One problem area was security and the Commissioner was asked to examine this requirement closely with the restraint of doing so with no contact with outside law enforcement agencies.

The Committee you recommended was drawn together and was made up as follows:

Reviewed... 23

FEB 5 1980

SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS 001164
In order to validate our feasibility review, the Committee recognized the need of assuming a number of propositions, as hereunder listed, based on past experiences flowing from the 1976 Games and projected data supplied by Government officials.

1) Federal, Provincial and Municipal Departments, Police forces and agencies will accept and ratify functions and responsibilities as per 1976 Games agreements.

2) Availability of open-ended budgetary resources.

3) Full Olympic Games to take place in Montreal and other venues as per the 1976 Games.

4) Estimated athletic community set at 7900.

5) Availability of key operational personnel possessing considerable experience acquired during the planning and staging of the 1976 Olympic Games.

6) Availability of all 1976 Games competition sites and venues.

7) Decision to host the Games in Canada expected no later than 19 FEB 80.

The Committee commenced its evaluation of its task by making a general review of the National Security Plan and the final report for the 1976 Summer Olympics and in addition certain aspects of the Security Plan for the 1978 Commonwealth Games. We limited our outside contact to L/Col. J. Ellard of D.N.D., who participated in our deliberation for a short period.
As a result of our discussions with L/Col. Ellard, we were provided with the following position of DND with respect to their possible involvement in a 1980 Olympic Security Force. In presenting DND's position, L/Col. Ellard explained that it was based on limited information and did not necessarily reflect the official view of his department.

1) That DND would probably be able to provide manpower to security in the order of the number supplied for the 1976 Games (Approximately 9,000 personnel) but at a significantly higher cost both in terms of dollars and the effect on total DND operations. The latter reflected cancellation of leave and suspension of their rotation and training programmes.

2) DND based their commitment on the assumption that Federal security responsibilities would again have first priority over other tasking.

3) That DND was willing to provide the same types of services as those performed in 1976.

4) That each additional increase of police personnel to perform security functions conducted by DND in 1976 would result in a corresponding reduction on a ratio of 1 police member to 1 1/3 DND members.

5) That DND's evaluation of their 1976 Security functions surfaced no concerns which would warrant policy changes.

6) That DND would attempt to re-assign key personnel who participated in 1976 Olympic Security.

7) Their major problem area was perceived as being one of logistics.

8) In terms of costing, DND advised that their contribution to security in 1976 was $21,000,000. exclusive of salaries. Their total costing which included salaries and support to COJO was approximately $100,000,000. DND projects an incremental security cost of $40,000,000. for a similar security role in 1980. Their total anticipated costs, including incremental and salaries, in terms of supplying resources to
both games support and security for 1980 is estimated at in the neighbourhood of $200,000,000. as a result of a perceived greater participation in non-security assistance.

THREAT ASSESSMENT - 1980 OLYMPICS

Attached as Appendix "A" is a related threat assessment as supplied by the Security Service, which as indicated is not based on hard intelligence.

In this respect, this Committee is of the opinion that the global threat forecast pertaining to the Proposed Games in Montreal should be at least equal to the threat level identified in relation to the 1976 Olympics, and quite likely, will be significantly higher. This belief is based upon the following observations:

a) Escalation of East/West tension.

b) High political character of the proposed Games.

c) Contrary to the spirit of the Olympic movement, the proposed Games would be staged within a context of political confrontation.

SECURITY FUNCTIONS

A review of the various security functions which were incorporated in the 1976 National Security Plan disclosed that, in all probability, certain functions could be re-implemented with very minimal updating. These were identified as:

- Airport Security
- Harbour Security
- Air Security
- Vital Points
- Postal Security
- Public Relations
- Site Security
Our position with respect to the foregoing is based on the fact that:

- Existing facilities which would be used had been previously surveyed.
- Previous procedures and policies were acceptable.
- Previous plans had been tested.
- Only minimal review and updating would be required.

However, there would be serious problems to overcome. For example, there are major operational security plans that would have to be extensively modified. Of even greater consequence are concerns that affect the effectiveness of the security structure as a whole. The concerns we identified as being the most significant are individually discussed in the following paragraphs.

**PROBLEM AREAS**

**Compacted Time Frame**

The 1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal had the benefit of approximately 3½ years of Security Planning. If a decision is reached by the government to hold some form of abbreviated games it will not come until after February 18, 1980, which leaves us with a planning and implementation period of less than 4 months at the very best. This impacts on every one of our Security plans to the extent of weakening them or causing modifications to facilitate them.

**Organization**

The Command Structure, as it previously existed, caused problems in as much as most, if not all, decisions required consensus and/or compromise. This in itself is not bad but in an area as critical as Security, and responses to emergency situations, a single commander is the most desirable way of operating. This problem is compounded by the fact of the compacted time frame which does not lend itself to prolonged discussion between co-ordinators to effect plans. There is serious doubt amongst some previous Olympic Planners and operational personnel that the contingency plans for the 1976 Olympics would have been effective because of the proliferation of coordination centers and coordinators. We do
not believe the best possible Security can be put in place in the short time available without one person in absolute command but since this is not a realistic objective we see no alternative but to operate and cope with a structure similar to the one employed in the 1976 Olympics.

**Athlete Village(s)**

A single athlete village is the best answer to security problems encountered in protecting both the persons therein and the buildings themselves. It also allows for a more controlled transportation service from the village to the competition sites. With pre-determined secure corridors the security forces can make maximum use of their manpower. If the village becomes fragmented then the athletes are more vulnerable in transport and at their villages unless you drastically increase the forces to provide the same amount of protection enroute and at each residence. We will require more men, equipment, buses, secure corridor checking and coverage. Sufficient secure communications equipment to equip the increased number of buses will still be a major problem. Fragmentation beyond three villages for the main body of athletes in one specific area would make security virtually impossible.

**Communications**

Communications, as was illustrated in the 1976 Olympic Games, plays a major role in the effectiveness of the security posture which can be maintained. Without adequate integrated communications, the close liaison between security contingents and their respective command structure does not exist.

In preparation for the 1976 Games, approximately 1500 portable radios, 25 base stations, several repeaters and diverse other equipment was purchased and installed to provide security communications systems for Montreal and Kingston. A major command control center was established in "C" Division HQ to provide communications co-ordination between the various game venues, the various security forces (Q.P.F., M.U.C., DND, RCMP, etc.), and the operational members performing the various duties. A smaller center was established in Kingston to provide a similar service for the sailing events. In addition, command centers were established in "A" Division HQ and the HQ Building to provide communication links between Senior Management and the Games sites.
After the conclusion of the Games, the Control Centers in Montreal and Kingston were dismantled and the equipment purchased was disbursed Force-wide against identified operational requirements. Rental equipment (Telephones, Facsimiles, etc.) contracts were terminated. Temporary frequency allocations obtained for the duration of the Games were released back to the Department of Communications.

The following facts have been surfaced in the review which would affect the re-implementation of a comparable command and operational communication system for Olympic Games if they were held under the above noted assumptions:

a) The COILS System (Immigration information on the CPIC host) comprised 32 terminals in 1976 located at U.S.-Canada border crossings. This was reduced to 17 terminals during the Commonwealth Games and again to 6 terminals at present. The Immigration Department are currently developing their own system, with anticipated on-line operation by 80-04-01, to provide the same service as COILS, thus negating the need to reactivate this system.

b) Reactivating rental systems on short notice (6 to 10 weeks) would be possible, assuming sufficient circuit capacity is still installed at the Games locations and in the area of our command center locations. This would include systems such as telephones, telex, secure teleprinters, facsimile, closed circuit television (CCTV), CPIC, etc.

c) Reactivating of the control centers in Montreal and Kingston could raise major logistic problems. These two centers constitute the heart of the communications systems. During the 1976 Games, an entire floor of the Kingston Detachment Building and the 4th floor of "C" Div. HQ Building were utilized to accommodate these centers. To rewire the two centers would require concerted effort by several technical personnel for approximately 4 weeks, not including lead time required by suppliers of telephones, etc. to prepare for the Games. Equipment placed into operational
use elsewhere (such as the control console presently installed in Quebec City), would have to be withdrawn from operational service and relocated. There is insufficient time available to purchase new compatible equipment.

d) Radio base station and repeater equipment, installed for the duration of the Games and subsequently disbursed to operational use, would have to be recalled and refurbished to provide compatible systems operation. An additional period could be required for installation, renegotiation of space, and approval by D.O.C. for frequency utilization.

e) Portable and mobile radio equipment utilized during the 1976 Games, was, with the exception of the "C" and "A" Division operational complement, disbursed to other Divisions to meet operational requirements. Frequency configurations were changed to facilitate use in the individual Division operational environment. The crystals, withdrawn from Olympic use, were, for the most part, reworked to the required frequencies. Based on the assumption that we would recall all of the required portable equipment, approximately 1000 units, requiring 16 new crystals each for full 8 channel capability, would have to be reinstated to provide system compatibility approximating the 1976 Games System. Based on previous experience with suppliers, a lead time, prior to delivery, of a requirement such as stated above would be in the order of 60 to 120 days after receipt of order. This would even tax the capabilities of our largest suppliers if they dedicated their entire production to our use. The alternative would be to utilize equipment in the frequency configuration presently utilized in the respective operational areas and concentrate on training the user on equipment use. This would, however, create a non-compatible, patchwork system which will reduce the overall effectiveness of our security profile and could make the security system vulnerable in a crisis situation.

The time element involved is the main problem associated with providing a suitable communications facility for the security of the Games. Planning of the communications system cannot be finalized until location of venues, village
(or villages), V.I.P. security posture, etc. have been finalized. We were hard pressed to complete arrangements and installations in time for arrival of the athletes even with concerted effort of training and technical personnel from October 1975 to June 1976. To attempt to compress this same effort into the time available would entail the reallocation of all available resources to the detriment of all other operational system work. Even with the solution of all problems surfaced the best we could hope for would be a patchwork system. Consequently a system comparable to the 1976 system cannot be provided.

Vetting of Employees

Because of the short time frame and the anticipated volume based on our previous experience we would be unable to carry out as extensive a program for the 1980 Games as we did in 1976. It is possible to vet all employees but not deny them employment based on the previously approved criteria. This will amount to giving the Security forces the knowledge of where potential trouble makers may be working. This was a very problematic area during and after the 1976 Olympics and caused some members of the Force to have to appear before the Quebec Human Rights Commission to explain the reasons for dismissal of two female COJO employees on the basis of affiliation with a subversive organization. The preventative ability was not worth the problems encountered so the problem may not be that great.

We will not have time to screen all Media prior to their arrival in Canada and therefore will have to devote extra manpower to arrival or selective screening. We doubt if this type of screening is as effective as pre-screening and will no doubt cause numerous public relation problems.

Accreditation of the Athletic Family

Accreditation and identification of athletes is an absolute necessity for security at sites, in transport and at the village(s). There will be organizational problems because of time frame and volume. However, we can implement a modified version of the system employed at the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton which does not require extensive lead time.

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Lodging and Meals for Security Forces

This will be a significant problem area which does not directly affect security but will add to the overall logistical costs and organizational problem. This has been identified as a problem area for DND as well as the RCMP. Even when we know where the Games may be held, we will have to expect to pay premium prices for suitable accommodation if any can be found. Meal services will also be costly because we will be at the mercy of what can be made available on short notice. Both these problems, we suspect, can be overcome with the availability of funds. If we can pay the price we can get the service.

Transportation of security forces to and within the city in which the Games may be held will be costly but should not be a problem.

For the purpose of lodging and feeding Security Personnel we should rent all necessary existing dormitory space at large colleges and schools. Other possible options are:

1) Modular housing such as ATCO provides or is provided at large construction projects. Messing facilities can be provided as well.

2) Leasing of several large passenger ships to be anchored in Montreal Harbour. The capability to feed large numbers is built in.

V.I.P. SECURITY

For the 1976 Summer Olympics, the Government of Canada avoided officially inviting Heads of State to attend. This facilitated our security responsibilities to a significant extent. However, if the 1980 Summer Olympics were held in Canada, it would be reasonable to assume, in our view, participating nations would want to indicate maximum support to the American initiated boycott. This support could well be manifested by having senior representatives of the nations in question attend. In that regard, a likely visit by a member of the Executive Office of the United States or a top Presidential Candidate would tax resources available for security to the point where the assured safety of the dignitary would be in question or alternatively satisfied at the peril of other security functions.
TRAINING

For the 1976 Summer Olympics, 4796 police and military personnel were given training courses or briefings on security related matters. This factor greatly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of all security resources involved. Irrespective of any effort made to deploy resources with previous Olympic Security experience, the fact remains that within the limited time frame available, the degree to which new personnel could be trained would be substantially lower than in 1976, resulting in an overall decrease in general effectiveness. We see as a partial solution an earlier than normal start of operations for on-site familiarization and briefing.

MANPOWER

Manpower requirements, by function, utilized in 1976 Olympic Security were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R.C.M.P.</th>
<th>D.N.D.</th>
<th>*OTHER</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Accreditation</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Relations</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sites</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>2111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.I.P.</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
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<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
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<td>Aerial Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postal Security</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingency Plans</td>
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<td>1039</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>9085</td>
<td>4037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Provincial, Municipal Police Forces and Federal Enforcement Agencies.
The diversion of manpower toward Olympic Security would have a general negative effect on Federal Law Enforcement across Canada and specifically in the Province of Quebec effectiveness would be substantially reduced during the pre-Olympic planning period and operations. In addition the post Olympic period of clearing back-logged work and the taking of annual leave or lieu time off would entail a full year to return to normal operations.

In 1976, the RCMP utilized 1,376 personnel drawn mainly from Federal positions across the Force. However, any reduction in the contribution by DND or an escalation in the threat would no doubt require the Force to use some provincial contract positions across the force. This, along with the normal manpower constraints on the force for the past several years would affect normal operations in the contract divisions.

**BUDGET COSTS**

Due to the limited time frame available to complete the Olympic Security Planning and deploy operational personnel to the various athletic venues, the budgetary costs will increase dramatically. For this reason, an "open-ended budget" is a necessity. Previous expenditure patterns from 1976 have been utilized to provide an estimate of the total cost, these figures have been augmented by an inflationary factor to cover the four year period to 1980 plus the increases which will be required in the areas of resources and equipment. Although Telecommunications Equipment will not be purchased in large quantities, approximately $2.1 Million will be required to re-crystalize existing equipment and install rented equipment and services. Lodging costs for security personnel will be in the vicinity of $5.4 Million, while transportation of operational personnel will significantly inflate the overall costs. Overtime based on the 1976 Games will increase, depending upon the final establishments, and will likely be in the area of $2 Million Dollars. The total budget includes an amount to cover the salaries of the Planning group for a period of six months, but does not include the salaries of security personnel seconded to duties during the Games.

In terms of 1980 dollars the total outlay for RCMP Security will most probably approach $18 Million Dollars, which is significantly lower than the total $22 Million required for 1976 Games. However, these costs were spread over a four year period, while the above funding covers a time frame of only 6 months and presumes that most of the equipment and planning from 1976 can be utilized in 1980.
SUMMARY OF COSTING

RCMP Olympic Costs -
April to September $6,088,000
Inflation Factor + 50%
10% compounded per annum 3,044,000
Additional Communications 2,100,000
Additional Lodgings 5,400,000
Additional Transportation 900,000

$17,532,000

CONCLUSION

It is our understanding that I.O.C. regulations prohibit the fragmentation of the Olympics, but we do not know what interpretation is placed on the word "fragmentation". It is a fact that in 1976 events were held at a number of different locations in Canada and perhaps this prohibition is splitting the events between a number of countries. If this was done and Canada was selected to host only a portion of the event, i.e. Track and Field events or Equestrian events, then the overall security responsibilities would be accordingly reduced and become more manageable. Because of such a reduction a higher degree of security proficiency could be guaranteed and could be drawn together in the short time period available. It speaks for itself that this could be done with the expenditure of less person years and dollars.

On the other hand, if consideration was given to further fragmentation of the Olympic Games within Canada than was done in 1976, it would be possible to provide acceptable security because of the involvement of other major municipal police departments. It would follow that venue security would be necessary but because different major municipalities with their own police departments would be involved added resources would be injected and this is not seen as a serious problem.
In summary and again based on the premise our earlier assumptions are valid, we have come to the conclusion that, if necessary, we will be able to develop and implement a security program for any Olympic event. However, in our collective opinion, it will fall far short of the level of effectiveness we would consider necessary for such an event. Further, because of the demands it will impose on our manpower resources, it will have a serious debilitating effect on our enforcement obligations across Canada. Federal enforcement particularly will be crippled.

Attached is a memorandum from the Commissioner to whomever is charged with the responsibility of briefing the Prime Minister. You will note that we have left the address and signature areas blank.

J.U.M. Sauve, A/Commr.,
Director
Protective Policing