


ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO
BE ADDRESSED:

THE COMMISSIONER
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
OTTAWA 7, CANADA



PIÈRE D'ADRESSER LES
L'ETRES COMME SUIV:

LE COMMISSAIRE
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA
OTTAWA 7, CANADA

HEADQUARTERS - DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE

YOUR NO.
VOTRE N°

OTTAWA 7, CANADA

OUR NO.
NOTRE N°

HQY 465-4-6

August 10, 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

Col. M.D. Kearney,
Project Manager Olympics,
Department of National Defence,
Room 400-B, Militia Stores Bldg.,
Cartier Square,
Ottawa, Ontario.
K1A OK2


Dear Col. Kearney:

Re: OLO-RCMP- Final Report

1. Enclosed is my final report on my employment with the RCMP Planning Secretariat including comments and recommendations on various aspects of security planning and operations.
2. As there will be other reports prepared on the overall Olympic security operations, I have restricted my observations to salient points which I feel should be considered for improvement.

3.

Yours truly,


J.J. Donahue,
Major,
OLO-RCMP

Encl.

cc:- A/Comm'r Quintal
- Supt. Taylor ←

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FINAL REPORT

DND OLYMPIC LIAISON OFFICER - RCMP

OPERATION GAMESCAN 76

INTRODUCTION

1. This report has been prepared in two parts as follows:
 - a. PART I - Comments and recommendations with respect to the position of DND Olympic Liaison Officer - RCMP (OLO-RCMP) in the RCMP Planning Secretariat and PM Olympics during the period June, 1974 to August, 1976.
 - b. PART II- Comments and recommendations, where applicable, in the areas outlined in NDHQ message DGMPO 1204 of 191725Z July, 1976.

PART I

GENERAL


2. The OLO-RCMP position was established June 1, 1974. The Liaison Officer officially assumed his duties with the RCMP Planning Secretariat on July 8, 1974. The Secretariat was the planning staff for the Federal Security Coordinator.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

3. The agreed Terms of Reference for the OLO-RCMP are attached at Annex A.

4. The Terms of Reference were adhered to as closely as possible throughout and proved to be adequate with respect to Olympic matters.

5. The Terms of Reference were developed by the OLO-RCMP which was acceptable, however, prior discussion between the two forces in general terms and specifically with respect to financial responsibilities was warranted.



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6. In order to prevent a recurrence in the future, guidelines for liaison officers permanently attached to other departments or agencies should be established. This should cover all aspects that should be considered in developing actual terms of reference for employment including financial responsibilities if applicable. This could be in line with existing regulations with respect to secondments.

7. It is recommended that any liaison officer to other departments or agencies with respect to Internal Security duties be restricted to combat arms.

EMPLOYMENT

8. In addition to the advisory duties with the RCMP, the liaison officer also performed other functions as a member of the RCMP Planning Staff. A major function was the development of the Air Security Policy for the Olympic period. Although these functions were of a secondment nature, they were assumed in accordance with the Terms of Reference.

9. For the period September 1974 to October 1975, the Liaison Officer was the DND member of the Chief Security Committee, Kingston. He was then replaced by the operational representative from 2 Combat Group, LCol D. Ells, CO 3RCR. From December 1974 onwards, operational representatives were kept informed by attendance at meetings and by written reports on meetings provided by the Liaison Officer. This proved to be effective and although the Kingston operation was on a smaller scale than Montreal, the planning for DND employment in this area was carried out in a much more efficient and conclusive manner than the Montreal operation. A great deal of credit is due LCol Ells and his staff.

10. As directed, all requests for DND assistance to the security forces for the Olympics were made through the Federal Security Coordinator. This was the main function of the Liaison Officer in assisting the RCMP in evaluating these requests and forwarding them to DND.

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11. The Liaison Officer's membership on the planning committee in Kingston was of great assistance in evaluating requests from Ontario. The same was not true of the requests from Quebec which required much more work in the evaluation process. This was due in part by the size of the Quebec operation and, also, by the fact that the Liaison Officer had no direct contact with the DND representatives on the Montreal Security Committee. The filling of the Liaison Officer's position, as approved, for the RCMP "C" Division Secretariat would not necessarily have totally remedied this situation but it certainly would have been of great assistance. The liaison situation in Montreal and Kingston will also be covered in Part II.

12. The employment of the Liaison Officer permanently with the RCMP Planning Secretariat was a definite advantage to the individual. It is believed that the RCMP made good use of this fact which was borne out by their openness towards the Liaison Officer in all aspects of their operations. It was rather disappointing and somewhat frustrating for the Liaison Officer that this openness was not always apparent from his own department. Attendance at DND meetings or conferences where security was discussed would have been of value to both the Liaison Officer and to DND in clarifying misunderstandings which arose from time to time. To be effective, a Liaison Officer must be fully informed.

LIAISON/SECONDMENT

13. The question of whether the position with the RCMP Planning Secretariat should have been liaison or secondment was considered frequently in the past two years.

14. Although the Planning Secretariat could possibly have made much more use of the DND expertise in large scale planning by seconding an officer, there were advantages of the liaison position which may have been lost. The major advantage of the liaison position is the continual direct contact between the two departments which enhances the advisory function. A secondment tends to break this contact as the officer becomes more involved with the new department functions. A Liaison Officer serves two masters, so to speak, whereas a seconded officer must only serve one.

15. It is strongly recommended that in future operations of this type (internal security) the Liaison Officer concept should be maintained. This does not omit the fact that secondments may be necessary in addition to Liaison Officers.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

16. The administrative support provided to the Liaison Officer by the RCMP and PM Olympics was excellent at all times.

PART II

GENERAL

17. The comments and recommendations in the areas outlined in NDHQ message, DGMPO 1204 of 191725Z July 1976, will be confined mainly to the planning period for the Olympics and where applicable to the operational period. The Conduct of Operations will be covered more aptly by the Operational reports.

18. The comments and recommendations are intended to be constructive in nature and are applicable to both DND and the RCMP.

INTELLIGENCE

19. Each security force has its own intelligence branch or cell. Whether small or large in operational capability, the system used by each force must have the confidence of operational commanders and must be respected by other forces for their efficiency and integrity.

20. These are some of the ingredients which will foster the smooth operation of joint intelligence and which was necessary in the Olympic security operations.

21. Joint Intelligence operations are not consummated overnight but take time to be fully productive. The overcoming of inter-departmental and federal/provincial/municipal differences is one of the major hurdles to cross. This was evident in comparing the joint operations in Quebec and Ontario. The Quebec forces had been operating more closely since the 1970 crisis and the resulting cooperation for the Olympics was much more noticeable than in Ontario. The improvement of productive relationships in the Intelligence community probably is and should continue to be a priority project.

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22. One of the most delicate and useful operations was the DND assistance to the RCMP in the Mission 80 program. Unfortunately, the request for additional support in this field was fumbled a few times before being agreed to. There are certain factors which may have contributed to the delay and which may have been an embarrassment to both forces. First of all, in the original discussions in Montreal, a member of COJO was included. Secondly, after the initial setting up of the program, there were too many people involved in the request for additional resources. The final request which was forwarded to DND by COJO, without any security classification, included a statement that the RCMP were also anxious to have this request filled. Such a breach in the security of this operation could have had an adverse effect on the usefulness of the personnel assigned to this duty. It is strongly recommended that future assignments of this type be handled entirely by the Intelligence community with assistance from only key people on the operational side.

ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS

23. The Orders and Instructions put out by the military were probably quite an eye-opener to many police force members who had not had the opportunity to see them before. If not overwhelmed by the volume and detail of these documents, it is hoped that the style and format will be of value to the police forces involved.

24. It is the writers opinion that the security forces were fortunate that no emergency situation arose where the STRATACUR document had to be used. The latter part of the document which dealt with MUCP operational plans was good, but the first part was, in a practical sense, confusing and, in an operational sense, useless. It is agreed that DND were not necessarily affected or, for that matter, concerned, however, if any force has a great deal of expertise in joint operations, it is DND, and it is felt that we could have provided more guidance in this area. The continual and sensitive problems of jurisdictional responsibilities are fully recognized and, perhaps, it is too much to hope that the Olympic security operation would have come up with a document on joint emergency measures procedures acceptable in all areas of Canada. The Olympic Operation should be a good basis for continuing the development of sound emergency procedures applicable throughout the country.

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ADEQUACY OF FORCES ASSIGNED

25. See Operational Reports.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

26. The procedure set up for handling requests for DND assistance to the security forces for the Olympics was based on the legal considerations of providing armed assistance.

27. With DND support being provided to the provinces through the RCMP, all requests were passed through the RCMP Olympic Secretariat, through PM Olympics to NDHQ. In addition for Quebec, the requests also had to pass through the RCMP "C" Division Secretariat. This system is too cumbersome and too susceptible to misunderstanding.

28. Add to this, the fact that the security committee in Montreal had a representative from PM Olympics in the OLO Montreal, who also was the Liaison Officer to COJO, and a representative from the operational side who reported to Mobile Command Headquarters. For an organization who ostensibly has good procedures for operations of this type, the DND organization for the planning period was pitifully weak and confusing.

29. It is questionable whether PM Olympics should have been involved in the security planning and particularly at the operational level. The OLOs, Montreal and Kingston, should not have been involved with the security committees as their tasks as Liaison Officers to COJO were demanding enough and there may have been conflict of interest involvement which is unacceptable in security operations.

30. The procedure should have been for requests to come directly from the provincial security coordinator or committee, through the RCMP Olympic Secretariat to NDHQ. RCMP Divisions involved were represented on the committees and, therefore, were automatically aware of these requests. As it turned out, "C" Division rarely commented on the requests. This procedure was used in Ontario, except for the inclusion of PM Olympics in the chain.

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31. The link for the DND members on the committees would have been to the operational headquarters with a working link to the OLO RCMP for clarification purposes only.

32. The roles and functioning of the Committee of Directors and the CSSO will be more adequately covered in other reports.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

33. Each force has its own command and control system which is adequate for any operation in Canada. Each operation for the Olympics was handled within jurisdictional boundaries with assistance being provided where required on an as-agreed basis. Once this was made clear to the Principal Coordinator, there were no apparent problems during actual operations.

34. With the heavy federal involvement in the security planning and operations, it is surprising that the Federal Security Coordinator did not have a more definite role in the command and control structure for operations in particular. It is conceivable that the Solicitor General would have heard about an emergency before the Federal Security Coordinator. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to an operational role for a Federal Security Coordinator in any future operation.

OPERATIONS

35. See Operational Reports.

ADEQUACY OF CF TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

36. Quick Reaction Capabilities

- a. In preparation for the Olympics, many police forces have developed special squads with special weapons and tactics capabilities. These squads, in most cases, contain sniper capabilities. They do not, however, contain the range of weaponry available within DND.

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- b. The DND concept of support in this area is still valid, however, it is recommended that the concept and doctrine be reviewed in light of the advancement of police skills.
- c. A misconception exists within police circles since the Olympics, that the quick reaction capabilities includes an assault capability which, it is believed, was not envisaged. This should be cleared up.

37. The Internal Security concepts and doctrine developed for the Canadian Forces are adequate for the roles envisaged. There are, however, various types of support which police forces require and which became apparent in security planning for the Olympics. Unit oriented operations, EOD, and special weapons and equipment concepts have been considered but individual manpower support is a continual requirement. Border security and VIP, were two areas where this was exemplified. DND policy on maintaining the tactical integrity of organizations providing support to civil police agencies is recognized, however, manpower, as with any force, is a common shortage in a security situation.

38. There is no requirement for the dedication of manpower resources to this individual support concept. It is recommended that more emphasis be placed on individual knowledge of what "peace officer" status entails as part of the overall DND Internal Security training. In this way, it is felt that the DND personnel will be better equipped to provide more flexible support in security operations. Continued and perhaps increased exchange of ideas between DND and police forces through the medium of lectures, seminars, command post exercises and field operations is strongly recommended.

COMMUNICATIONS

39. The only worthwhile comment on communications was the inadequacy of the "GOLIATH" system.

40. If DND request other departments or agencies to use special equipment or procedures, it is recommended that more detailed instructions be issued to ensure proper use.

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JOINT OPERATIONS COORDINATION

41. Coordination during the planning stages for Olympic security was an important aspect in the development of the overall security plan.

42. Since Olympic Security Operations were structured along jurisdictional lines, it is questionable whether there was a requirement for a Joint Operations Coordination Centre such as was depicted in Montreal. Although the terms of reference developed for this centre stipulated coordination rather than operation functions, they were still ambiguous to a certain degree. The authority to declare an emergency and to have direct access to governmental levels in an emergency was outside jurisdictional lines which could have been troublesome. This aspect should be considered very closely in any future operations.

CIVIL/MILITARY COOPERATION

43. The civil/military cooperation at the operational level, from all reports, appeared to be excellent.

44. Other aspects under this heading have been covered in other parts of this report.

ADEQUACY OF CURRENT CF ORDERS AND REGULATIONS

45. The basic concern in considering the adequacy of current C.F. Orders and Regulations in regard to the provision of Armed Assistance and Internal Security Operations is the legal considerations.

46. Since there is no apparent requirement for new legislation for DND to provide armed assistance to another Federal Department, and since all requests for assistance come through the RCMP, the question arises as to the necessity for the Order-In-Council for the Games. If it was necessary, then the need for an Order-In-Council for any large scale Internal Security Operation should be considered.

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47. The Order-In-Council PC 1975-1735 of July 6, 1976, approved "the employment of the Canadian Forces in 1976, in the provinces of Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick, in support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other federal law enforcement agencies on 1976 Olympic Games Security tasks". Does this cover the term "Armed Assistance to Civil Authorities" which was used in "OPERATION GAMESCAN 76" instructions?

48. Since no request was made by or through the RCMP or other federal law enforcement agencies for "warships" to be used in Olympic security duties, were they covered "legally" if they had been used?

49. These are some of the questions which come to mind from the Olympic security operations. It is recommended that the current CF Orders and Regulations be reviewed in the legal context.

SECURITY OF DND INFORMATION

50. It is a known fact that federal departments tend to over-classify material in the normal day to day operation. Most Gamescan material was classified SECRET by DND and in some cases by habit rather than content. This made it difficult at times when dealing with federal departments other than the Solicitor General's Branch who don't have many "workers" security cleared, to that level. It was even more difficult when dealing with provincial and municipal police agencies who tended not to use any security classification. This was pointed out several times through RCMP channels.

51. As a result, some classified DND information was disseminated by organizations such as the CPSPJO as unclassified material. The dissemination, however, was within the security forces. DND should take this into account when dealing with other agencies.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

52. Public relations for the military and the other security forces was generally handled well, and the resulting coverage appeared to be favorable.

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
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53. There were a few instances, however, where comments were made by DND members outside press conferences on security operations. An example of this was the comments made on the Air Security Plan which, in effect, gave the weaknesses of the system. As DND was in support of police forces, questions on security should have been referred to those forces responsible.

CONCLUSION

54. The comments and recommendations in the preceding paragraphs are based on the two years spent by the Liaison Officer on Olympic security planning with the RCMP and on observations of how plans were developed, coordinated and executed.

55. There have been gains made in military/police cooperation in this large scale operation which should be of value for the future. There are still areas for improvement to overcome the lingering elements of distrust between forces.



J.J. Donahue
Major
OLO-RCMP

TERMS OF REFERENCEDND OLYMPIC LIAISON OFFICER - RCMPAUTHORIZED ESTABLISHMENT DETAIL

1. The establishment details are:
 - (a) title of position: DND Olympic Liaison Officer - RCMP (OLO-RCMP)
 - (b) establishment code and position number: 1519AA-2097
 - (c) rank: Major
 - (d) classification: Land (CBT A)

PRIMARY FUNCTION

2. The DND Olympic Liaison Officer (OLO-RCMP) is charged primarily to effect liaison with the RCMP in security planning in support of the preparation for and the staging of the XXIst Olympiad, Montreal - Kingston, Canada, 1976.

RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The OLO - RCMP will be employed as a liaison officer to the staff of the RCMP Olympic Secretariat. In this capacity he will be responsible for the following:
 - (a) advising the Federal Security Coordinator and his staff on -
 - (1) Canadian Forces (CF) operational procedures for internal security operations,
 - (2) CF capabilities - specialist personnel, training, equipment, etc., and
 - (3) CF organization;
 - (b) assist the Federal Security Coordinator in the evaluation of security requirements which affect DND and in the preparation of requests for DND assistance in the development and implementation of the National Security Plan;
 - (c) attend, as required, meetings, conferences, symposia, etc., pertaining to security matters affecting the Olympics and other amateur games;
 - (d) advising the DND PM Olympics and his staff on -
 - (1) RCMP operational procedures in Olympic security matters,

- (2) RCMP capabilities - specialist personnel, training, equipment, etc.,
- (3) RCMP organization, and
- (4) RCMP security assessments;
- (e) report to the DND PM Olympics on all matters affecting security planning for the 1976 Olympics and associated events; and
- (f) perform other related duties as agreed by the Federal Security Coordinator and PM Olympics.