

TO: Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat

FROM: Officer i/c "B" Operations

SECURITY-CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
IP 100 - 5
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
22 September, 1976

SUBJECT: Re: "B" Operations General Policy Olympics 1976

Please refer to your telex OLY(SS)1085 of August 5 under [redacted]

The attached brief contains a resumé of "B" Operations programs in connection with the Olympics.

J.B. James, Supt., Officer i/c "B" Operations Security Service.

Review [signature] OCT 14 1976 SECURITY SERVICE RECORDS

C.C. D.D.G. (OPS.) For info.

please copy to [redacted]

PA Success 2/19/76

[signature] 8-10-76

GOJO and Media Screening

"B" Operations did not have an opportunity to comment on Soviet/Soviet Bloc press officials requesting accreditation to the Olympics.

Insofar as our vetting of Olympic participants and tourists was concerned, it was impossible to prevent the entry of undesirables, partly because of the volume and partly because of the belief that once a person was in possession of an OIC, no action could be taken to retrieve same. However, we were successful in having the Soviets return the OIC which was issued for a Soviet official. This action was taken because of adverse information.

From a "B" Ops. point of view, it was difficult to find any one person within Headquarters that could provide answers to questions dealing with general Olympic policy. As a result, "B" Ops. was continually asking officials with External Affairs to provide clarification of certain policy matters. It is suggested, therefore, that if the Force is faced with an operation of this magnitude in the future, one or two individuals should be tasked with the responsibility of becoming completely conversant with policy matters dealing with the event.

Attache Liaison Program

This program was developed for the principal purpose of providing links between the foreign Olympic delegations and the Security Service for the incoming transmission of intelligence relative to the security of the Olympic participants and V.I.P.'s.

With respect to the Soviet Union, selected Security Service personnel maintained a good working relationship with both the Soviet Olympic Attache in Montreal as well as with a number of security officials who were attached to visiting Soviet delegations. These delegations were concerned with security matters relating to Soviet athletes at the Montreal Olympics as well as being observers with respect to the coming Moscow 80 Olympics. Although nothing of any consequence relating to Olympics security was developed through such contacts, the program worked well and was considered a very necessary part of our overall intelligence monitoring program. There were of course some interesting encounters from a counter espionage perspective but these had no bearing on Olympics security per se.

....2

CONFIDENTIAL


Olympic Attache Liaison Program

This program, in respect of the Yugoslav, Czech and E. German interest areas, was well conceived and of real value to "B" Ops. in that it provided an ideal milieu for face to face informal contact between investigators and designated Mission personnel (who were prepared to talk about "security"). As the program proceeded, the rapport between our members and these Bloc Attaches increased -- to the extent that the Czechs and Yugoslavs have displayed some willingness to engage in post-Olympic liaison. In addition to the personality assessments achieved, we evaluate the situation as possessing substantial potential for exploitation by "B" Ops.


Defusing Program

The defusing program as applied to the Yugoslav emigré community in Canada is considered to have been highly effective. While we can really only speculate as to whether the program was actually instrumental in preventing Olympic violence, we can nevertheless safely assume that it represented a significant disincentive both to the right wing extremists in the emigré community as well as to the Yugoslav government itself, which has been known to engage in acts of pre-emptive violence in order to precipitate repressive measures against anti-establishment elements in the Yugoslav emigré community.

The concept of selective defusing has once again been demonstrated as an effective tool in countering extremist activity. We should probably now look more closely toward a refinement of our defusing techniques and their increased application to confrontation areas, e.g. the running conflict between UDBa and Yugo emigré extremists.



CONFIDENTIAL



Mission 80

In accordance with IOC precepts several Soviet Mission 80 observer delegations visited Montreal both before and during the Olympics. The primary interests of these delegations were (a) sports, (b) technology and (c) relations with IOC, NOC's and ISF's. COJO officials were required to receive and assist these delegations and to turn over to them pertinent documentation of relevance to Olympiad 80.

The extent of Soviet Mission 80 officials hunger for every possible type of COJO documentation became evident earlier this year when one Soviet official virtually snatched a technical manual from the hands of a COJO official and walked off with it. It was necessary to get the assistance of COJO protocol section to retrieve the document. There were numerous

CONFIDENTIAL

.....4

other reports of missing documents during the visits of Mission 80 delegations, to the extent that several COJO directors found it necessary to lock their doors at all times and security had to be tightened considerably during such Soviet visits.

In order to counter any activities inimical to Canada by these delegations the Security Service set up an assessment program directed towards these visiting delegations. This program was carried out successfully through the use of access agents proficient in the Russian language and located at strategic points within COJO (Protocol). These access agents were cognizant of Security Service obligations although their prime interest area rested with foreign delegations, including Soviet Mission 80 officials.

CONFIDENTIAL