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
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SECURITY SERVICE OLYMPICS FINAL REPORT



PREFACE

Due to the variety and number of programs in which the Security Service was involved, this report, in the interest of clarity, is divided into the following sections:

1. Organization - organization of the Secretariat and its objectives.
2. Intelligence Support - tactical programs designed to assist physical security forces.
3. Neutralization- programs designed to neutralize violent social protest groups.
4. Strategic Support - techniques to augment overall security efforts.
5. Resource Allocation - an explanation of the financial and manpower expenditures.

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1.

ORGANIZATION

1. Organization

Introduction

In a letter dated November 16, 1972 the Director of Criminal Investigations, on behalf of the Commissioner, appointed a Chief Supt. to the position of the Force's representative on the Federal Government Interdepartmental Committee on the 1976 Olympics. Insp. G. Begalki of the Security Service was appointed to assist in matters of intelligence.

On August 16, 1973 C/Supt. J.T.J. Ouimet, who by then had been named Federal Security Coordinator, submitted an establishment requirement report. From this Insp. M. Spooner was named to replace Insp. Begalki and to work full time on the Olympics and Insp. C. Vermette was appointed "C" Division Security Service Olympic Coordinator.

On November 8, 1973, the Director General of the Security Service, M.R. Dare set down the terms of reference for the Headquarters Security Service personnel attached to the Olympic Secretariat. The Olympic Unit of Security Service was not to be so divorced from the service as to become dated, but the unit had to continue to be actively involved in the milieu so as to maintain a state of currency and be in a position to tender Security Service advice when

required, based-on current and ongoing information.

It was also the duty of the Olympic Secretariat Security Service unit to maintain an "observer-advisor" role on selective committees and the like, allowing its members to keep abreast of the various plans and organizations, monitoring their progress and proffering advice and guidance in areas unique to its interests and goals.

At the same time "C" Division set up a joint Secretariat including one member of the Intelligence Sections of the Montreal Urban Community Police, (M.U.C.P.) the Sureté du Quebec (S.Q.) and the Canadian Armed Forces (C.A.F.). Their objectives and guidelines were the same as stated for the Ottawa Secretariat.

In "A" and "O" Divisions the Security Service member concerned with Olympics became involved with most Olympic planning committees in his geographical area.

Implementation

During its three year existence, the "HQ" Olympic Secretariat, Security Service grew in size to a complement of eleven, participated in joint ventures of planning and developed specific Security Service programs for the peaceful staging of the Olympic Games. (See Org. Chart Fig. 1 Page 7)

In Montreal the Secretariat, Security Service, numbered 22 including 3 members from the other forces previously mentioned and 5 secretaries. This secretariat was very heavily involved in a large number of committees and their participation, both as active members, and, in some cases, as observers was instrumental in the creation of vital and workable security plans. (See Org. Chart Fig. 2 Page 8)

The Security Service member from "A" Division was a member of the Joint Security Service Committee (Kingston) which was composed of members from each of the four Security Forces in Ontario. This was only one of several committees on which he served.

The member from "O" Division also served on a number of Committees in the Toronto region.

Assessment

The fact that the Security Service personnel were so heavily involved in planning committee work created problems of coordination and cohesiveness. This was overcome by the creation of a series of monthly meetings, between the Ottawa and Montreal Security Service Secretariat members and the members from "A" and "O" Divisions. At these meetings we discussed every program in which we had

involvement and brought everyone up to date on the progress achieved during the month. It was also necessary to hold weekly meetings within the Ottawa Secretariat to keep each other informed as to what occurred in the past few days. This may sound unnecessary with a small group such as ours but we found that our commitments were so heavy at times that we needed these meetings to keep abreast of the changes in security planning.

The Montreal Secretariat was very pleased with the joint intelligence group approach and recommended that it be used again if the need arises. They also pointed out that the Security Service, by virtue of its size and nature played a more prominent role in the planning stages than the other forces. This was also attributed to the fact that although the Federal Government had decided upon a low key leading role, the Force through its organization and resource commitments took on the bulk of responsibility for planning the security of the Games. The Force, as an agency of the Federal Government, had greater access to certain areas of information and resources which the other forces did not have.

The Ottawa Secretariat felt that the joint C.I.B./Security Service approach was beneficial to both groups. The Security Service members tried to be as definite as possible in outlining the threats which we felt were evident. We also realized that some of the interest areas we discuss routinely needed further clarification for C.I.B. members who had not had the benefit of exposure to terrorist or political ideologies and philosophies. By contrast the C.I.B. members gave us their patient attention and a better understanding of the very real difficulties one must overcome to provide the best physical protection possible to both people and placed and the type of information they required to effect these measures.

Conclusion

"A" Division made the comment that "Although it was expected that Security Service Members would not be required to have an up-to-date knowledge of all matters pertaining to Olympic planning, it was found that participation at meetings and conferences dictated that a working knowledge of all C.I.B. programs is mandatory"

The Olympics provided the Security Service with the opportunity to strengthen its ties, increase its involvement and renew its contacts with other Government agencies, security forces of other countries and with our own Force. The organizational concept employed for the Olympics worked well and should be utilized as frequently as possible.

PROJECT COORDINATOR - SR. NCO
- S/SGT. (002)

DESK/FILE COORDINATION
BUDGET ESTIMATES
STAFFING - TRAINING
GEN. OLYMPIC BRIEFINGS COORD.
COORD. F.S.S. (S.S.)
E.O.C. PLANNING
LIAISON OPS.

OFFICER I/C - SUPT. I.
W. TAYLOR (001)

MANAGEMENT
COORDINATION
INTER-DEPT. EXEC.
LIAISON

A/OFFICER I/C - INSP. G.E.
GODFREY (007)

LIAISON & COORDINATION
"B", "D", & "I" OPS., S.S.
"HQ", & "A", "C", & "O" DIV.
GEN. OLYMPIC BRIEFINGS

MRS. (003)
SEC 1 SB 151
SECRETARY

MRS. (004)
STN 1 SB 152
STENO

MRS. (005)
STN 1 SB 363
STENO

SGT. (003)

LIAISON FOREIGN SERVICES
M. & I./CUSTOMS COORD.
(COILS & MICRO-FICHE)
ORAE GAMES
COMMAND POST EXERCISES

SGT. (010)

LIAISON "A", "F"
SCREENING (MEDIA, COJO & CUS-
TOMS)
CPIC COORD.
BRIEFINGS (BILINGUAL)
BILINGUAL AUDIT
ROYAL VISIT COORD.

SGT. (011)

OLYMPIC THREAT ASSESSMENT
COUNTRY PROFILES
BRIEFING THREAT DEVELOPMENT
BRIEFING THREAT PAPERS
SITREP PROCEDURES
SPECIAL PROJECTS (SPEECHES)
MEDIA MONITORING

CPL. (009)

M. & I., CUSTOMS BRIEFING
SECURITY FILMING PROGRAMS
LIAISON TRAINING BRANCH
OVERHEAD/SLIDE PRODUCTIONS
GENERAL OLYMPICS BRIEFINGS

CPL. (012)


ASST. LIAISON "A" & "F"
SCREENING COORDINATION

TELEPHONE 995-9755
720 BELFAST RD.
VEDIC BLDG.

APPROVED: AUG 5, 1975
(M.S. Sexsmith) C Supt.
D.D.G. (OPS.)

000988

FIGURE 2



MONTREAL OLYMPIC SECRETARIAT
SECURITY SERVICE

2.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

2.1 Attache Liaison Program

Introduction

The objectives of this program were to establish a link with Foreign Security and Intelligence personnel to facilitate incoming intelligence, to create a point of contact with the Security Service on matters of security interest, to assess the Foreign Intelligence Officers and any potential operational opportunities which might arise.

The policy was part of an overall Physical Security Briefing Program approved jointly by the D.G. Security Service and the Deputy Commissioner Criminal Operations on June 28, 1975. The Security Service was to participate to the following extent:

- i) Have a fully briefed investigator, for each country or closely related countries, available to take part in each (sic; physical security) briefing.
- ii) The investigator will be familiar with the foreign country itself and the groups from within Canada which might pose a threat to the Olympic Team.

- iii) He will answer questions of a general nature raised by the Attache. In cases of high risk countries given a more detailed physical briefing, the Security Service member will be prepared to respond more specifically.
- iv) In all cases, he will establish himself as the continuing contact point for that particular Attache should the Attache wish to pass any threat information to Canadian authorities.
- v) The investigator will develop an association with the Attache and
- vi) During the period that the Olympic team is in Canada, i.e. July 1 to August 1, 1976, will be available on a continuous basis to act as the transmission link for incoming intelligence information.

Implementation

The program was to commence with the first Physical Security Briefing on May 1, 1976 but in actual fact commenced earlier than that because of contacts initiated by Cuban, Israeli and Yugoslavian Olympic Attaches. The program

terminated at the close of the Games and when the Olympic Attaches departed Canada. Some of the Attaches, of course, are Canada-based and the relationship may continue although Olympic context will be absent.

There were 24 regular members and special constables taking part in the program. Of these 16 were from "C" Division, 4 from "O" Division, 1 from "A" Division and 3 from "HQ". The members employed were chosen for their language capabilities and/or knowledge of the background of the country(ies) to which they were assigned.

These members were introduced or introduced themselves to identified Foreign Olympic Security Attaches. They presented themselves as being available to pass on any information which could have a bearing on the safety of the Olympic Delegation concerned and at the same time would welcome any intelligence that the Attaches could provide. The theory being, that some of the nations being liaised with could provide our security forces with up-to-date information which we ourselves did not have access to. We also felt that a contact of this nature would be reassuring to the foreign delegates and more personalized than dealing with an unknown quantity. It would also facilitate transmission of information during an emergency.

Assessment

A number of countries did not want to be bothered with the program because they were disinterested, too busy, lacked interest in security matters or were leary of such contact. It had been anticipated that some countries would react negatively.

Another area that must be commented upon was the oversight of members attached to this program, when visiting the Olympic facilities at Kingston to contact Security Service members at that point. With the exception of the member attached to the Israeli delegation, knowledge of visits to Kingston by our members came from the O.P.P. Security Branch, after the fact. Not only did this display a lack of communication within the Security Service but it left the Kingston members in a position of not being able to comment on any points raised.

We did not receive any high grade intelligence but that may be because there was none to be had. The cooperation of the Attaches was in general very good and apparently genuine. Their comments about the programs were favourable. From this it is concluded that we reached our objectives and may have poineered a new, more open contact between Security Service in the different political spheres around the world. Acts of terrorism have given the Security Community a common meeting ground.

According to the table found on pages 26 and 27 of the "C" Division report there were 391 Attache/Liaison meetings, 40% were one-time contacts, 25% occasional contacts 23% frequent contact and 12% were more or less permanent contacts.

Conclusion

This was probably the most successful and smooth running Security Service program in the Olympic context due largely to the abilities of the members involved. Their experience and expertise was evidenced in their personal deportment and the professional manner in dealing with their assigned attaches. Of special note is S/Sgt. [REDACTED] of "O" Division who was the contact for the Israeli Attaches. He handled this most difficult area with great credit to himself and the Force. We heard nothing but praise for the way he performed his duties.

Without hesitation it is recommended that this program be reinstituted at every conceivable opportunity. The program in our opinion, should be seriously considered for the 1978 Commonwealth Games, Edmonton, on a reduced scale.

2.2 Quiet Diplomacy

Introduction

The objective of this program was to gain maximum cooperation from Canada's Official Overseas Personnel, their diplomatic contacts and foreign diplomats in Canada, to help prevent incidents or pass on information concerning the Olympics.

The policy consisted of two parts the main portions of which were as follows:

- a) The Quiet Diplomacy Program in which all Heads of Missions of Foreign Countries on Canadian soil would be asked by External Affairs, to keep in mind the intention and spirit of the Olympic Games and request their support and aid in keeping the Games free of political incidents and terrorist acts.
- b) The Overseas-Canadians Involvement Program would be one in which all Heads of Posts would request their Canadian staff to keep alert to any intelligence that they pick up either socially or through work, which could influence the Olympic Games.

Implementation

The letter from the Olympic Secretariat requesting that this plan be discussed with External Affairs by the D.G. was dated September 24, 1975. A telex message from External Affairs to all Posts requesting that their overseas personnel be alert to any information they might pick up concerning the Olympics was dated September 26, 1975.

Policy, Planning and Coordination drafted a letter, on behalf of the D.G., direct to the Canadian Forces requesting the assistance of their Military Attaches. The letter was sent October 20, 1975.

It was also decided not to further pursue portion (A) of the policy because of unexplained difficulties which External Affairs had had involving foreign missions in Canada.

Assessment

No problems were encountered in the anticipated workings of the program. We expected some return from External Affairs but received none. The program did not appear to produce any tangible results from our point of view.

Conclusion

We are unable to accurately determine the benefits derived from the "Quiet Diplomacy" Program but in terms of expense or consumption of time there was no cost involved.

It may well be worth the effort to attempt this program again should the opportunity arise.

2.3 Summer Olympics Security Screening

Security screening was a requirement identified by all police forces involved in security for the 1976 Olympics. This requirement evolved from the possibility of a serious security threat to the Games. The basic philosophy was that all persons who would have access to any of the sites during the Games, had to have a security screening check. This was the foundation for the accreditation of C.O.J.O. employees and Press/Media.

With these possibilities, the R.C.M.P. developed a security screening system which would effectively satisfy our requirements. The approved policy was signed by the D.D.G. (Ops) on January 17, 1975.

The system devised was one which was based on a pre-determined criteria. The advantages of the system was standardization and efficiency. The system basically consisted of 2 sub-systems:

1. screening names through Security Service indices, including [REDACTED] as required for detection of;
 - a) any person who is a member of a terrorist organization or any organization that advocates or is capable of acts of violence;

- b) any person who by his words or actions shows himself to support any organization or person who publicly or privately advocates or practices the use of violence;
 - c) in all cases, any reasonable doubt as to the security status of the applicant will be decided in favor of a peaceful staging of the XXI Olympiad.
2. screening names through the C.P.I.C. "wanted persons" file and "synopsis" (F.P.S.) file, for detection of; convictions involving crimes of violence, robbery, offensive weapons or mental instability.

Implementation

The program was in operation from January 1975 until July 30, 1976. The workload greatly exceeded expectations. C.O.J.O. statistical predictions indicated we would receive a total of 49,000 applications. Adding the final figures, we came up with 80,792 C.O.J.O. applications, 3,000 concessionnaires, and 10,175 press accreditations for a grand total of 94,147 applications. Predictions of workload peaks and curve by C.O.J.O. were also inaccurate. Less than 3% of the projected workload was submitted prior to April 15, 1976, 97% of the entire workload had to be processed between April 15, 1976 and July 30, 1976.

The total rejections surfacing from screening the applicants against our criteria was 185 rejections, 136 for C.I.B. and 49 for Security Service reasons.

A Security Service "Task Force" was set up under "F" Ops supervision. With the assistance of "A", "B", "D", and "H" Ops personnel, it was responsible for making recommendations relating to the security status of applicants as outlined by the screening criteria. With the magnitude of the program and the delays encountered concerning receipt of applications from C.O.J.O., extra manpower and financial resources had to be located and added to the original plan.

Assessment

A few problems were encountered with this program. One problem was the delay, by C.O.J.O., in submitting the applications. If the original critical path had been followed, by May 1976, 97% of the workload would have been completed.

A binding policy should have been created for all locations, i.e. Kingston, Ottawa, Montreal, regarding screening procedures to follow, mainly on C.I.B. rejections, where in this case, some decisions on C.I.B. rejections were made in Montreal, while the applications were from Ottawa or Kingston.

Duplications of checks had to be made by Ottawa and Kingston City Police. Although the number of employees in this case was small, it displayed confusion and inconsistency.

The 10-day turnaround agreement of the application forms caused some problems as well. The agreement was that we had 10 days to screen the applicant, prior to his acceptance by C.C.J.O. for the position. The delay at C.O.J.O. Montreal of 2 or 3 days, with the application forms, left us with very few days in order to complete the screening and returning the forms to C.O.J.O. under the 10-day period.

The hiring of employees by C.O.J.O. prior to receiving our recommendation was a serious problem. This should be an area where a binding policy, by the parties concerned, should be drawn up to avoid misunderstandings.

The lack of coordination by C.O.J.O. of the application forms, caused the unnecessary duplicate screening of some applicants. The flow of screening requests forwarded by C.O.J.O. were not spaced out sufficiently within the time frame originally agreed to.

Conclusion

With a program of this magnitude, the problems were minor, mainly because of the planning done and because of the determination and open-minded approach taken by the

members of the "Task Force" and the excellent cooperation received from everyone in "F" Ops.

2.4 Summer Olympics Press Accreditation

Introduction

The program was instituted to do security checks on all of the anticipated 8,000 media persons coming to Montreal for the coverage of the Summer Olympics.

From the point of view of Security Service, it was a desirable requirement, in order to ensure detection of known or suspected terrorists or extremists, support staff or sympathizers of terrorist or extremist organizations, members of front organizations or pressure groups, individuals having an effect on national security, and also information on underworld figures.

Implementation

Between April and November 1975, the C.O.J.O. accreditation centre forwarded to the World Press and their substitutes the preliminary application forms to be filled out and returned to C.O.J.O.

Upon their return to C.O.J.O. Montreal, the forms were then given to the R.C.M.P. for screening. The time frame for completion of the screening was November 15, 1975 to February 15, 1976 for regular press, and for their substitutes till May 1976. Screening was completed by R.C.M.P. and the forms then returned to C.O.J.O. in Montreal. C.O.J.O. would then forward the application forms to all the

different National Olympic Committees for distribution to their respective Press/Media.

At the same time in Montreal, the Official Accreditation Card would then be prepared for the Press, so that upon their arrival in Montreal for the Games, they would exchange their preliminary card for the Official Press Card at the Accreditation Centre.

Assessment

Even though problems were encountered as a result of C.O.J.O. not meeting the deadlines that they had set, and the number of screenings done was greater than predicted (predicted 7,200 applicants - actual numbers 10,175 screened), the program worked well. This was the result of good planning and preparation and the excellent cooperation of the "HQ" "F" Ops. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Conclusion

No program of this type should be undertaken unless we have more control of the mechanics of the application procedures or can be given assurances that the organization we are assisting will stand by any agreements made in advance of the commencement of the program.

2.5 Marathon Briefing Program For Immigration And Customs Officers

Introduction

Following a request in October, 1974 by the Department of Manpower and Immigration (M.&I.) and the Customs and Excise Branch of Revenue Canada, the Marathon Briefing Program was developed to provide M. & I. and Customs enforcement officers with a terrorist briefing. The program format was developed and coordinated by the Security Service Olympic Secretariat and consisted of a three-part presentation which lasted approximately three hours.

The first part of the program was a sound and slide presentation produced by our Olympic Secretariat. It was approximately fifteen minutes in length and served as an introduction to the next two segments in the program. The second part was a presentation by Security Service personnel on terrorism and it also included a section on fraudulent passports. It was delivered in English by "D" Operations personnel from "HQ" Division or "en français" by a member from the Montreal Security Service Olympic Secretariat and was followed by a question period. The third and final segment was a presentation on bombs and weapons given by Lt. Robert Côté of the Montreal Urban Community Police (M.U.C.P.), an acknowledged expert in the field.

Consultations were held with the M. & I. and Customs Olympic Steering Committee concerning comments and criticisms of the content and style of the presentation. Discussions were also held with other concerned parties, namely; "HQ" Division Security Service "D" Operations, "C" Division Security Service Olympic Section, and Lt. Robert Coté.

Implementation

The program began in October, 1975 by visiting the international airports (which had been designated as priority areas). The use of the R.C.M.P. "King-Air" aircraft from the Uplands Air Detachment allowed the Marathon team to exercise adequate security over Lt. Coté's exhibits while at the same time permitting a flexibility in scheduling which would have been impossible if commercial air services had been used.

The second phase of the program involved major border crossing areas in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The third and final phase saw a return to key areas in Quebec and Ontario as well as a series of briefings to R.C.M.P. Airport Commanders in Montreal, Fredericton, and Regina; a briefing for the National Civil Aviation Security Meeting in Ottawa; and three briefings for a "J" Division Border Security Course at Camp Gagetown.

Both "A" and "C" Divisions supplemented coverage by the Marathon team with programs of their own.

"A" Division used a copy of the Marathon sound and slide presentation to introduce the Security Service and its Olympic programs to other police forces, Department of National Defence (D.N.D.) personnel, and selected C.O.J.O. employees. The presentations often included a question and answer session on the subject of terrorism. The briefings began in January, 1976 and terminated in July, 1976. More than 1300 people were briefed during this period and "A" Division feels the program created an awareness of Olympic planning and the need for continuous dialogue between all Forces.

"C" Division Security Service Olympic Section supplemented the two Quebec Tours by the Marathon team with a modified presentation. It consisted of a presentation on terrorism and was occasionally supplemented by Lt. Coté's bomb and weapons display. The modified program was presented to more than five hundred personnel from various police departments and D.N.D. Comments received on the effectiveness of the program were favourable.

"O" Division Security Service feel that the Marathon program assisted them in establishing contacts with Customs and Immigration officials and make them aware of our responsibilities in relation to Olympic security Planning.

The Marathon team gave 53 separate presentation and briefed a total of 1,773 people, most of whom were Customs and Immigration personnel. Combined with the modified programs of "A" and "C" Divisions, more than 3,500 people involved in Olympic security were briefed.

Time and manpower constraints prevented the Marathon program from reaching even more Customs and Immigration personnel. This problem was resolved to a large extent by the development of a training package by Customs training section, which received extensive distribution to Customs and Immigration personnel. Based on the success of the Marathon program, Customs modeled their training package after the Marathon format. They were assisted in their efforts with material supplied by the Olympic Secretariat, "D" Operations, and Lt. Coté. They were also provided with handout material on bombs (supplied by the Canadian Bomb Data Center) and on weapons used by terrorist organizations (supplied through P.P. and C. Branch).

The effectiveness of the program was assessed at the completion of each of the three phases. Positive feedback in the form of enthusiastic comments received from those who saw the briefings confirmed the value of Marathon and were the main factor in deciding to continue with the program.

In addition to the Marathon briefings, members of "A", "C", "O" and "HQ" Division involved in Security Service Olympic planning, participated in a series of lectures, seminars, and

briefings. They included Security Service input in Olympic training courses, briefings to various organizations involved in Olympic planning, and daily executive briefings conducted in "HQ" during the games.

Assessment

The program did encounter some difficulties; the most noteworthy being the difficulty in getting security clearances for Customs officers. Delays in screening procedures led to disappointing turnouts at some locations. Fortunately, the Customs training package afforded adequate coverage for those Customs personnel who did not get to see the Marathon presentation.

Based on the feedback received from the various departments, the program can be considered a success. This was due in large part to the cooperation and helpful assistance of many people. It would be impractical to list them all here but special mention should be made of the efforts of Lt. Coté of the M.U.C.P. A letter was sent to the Director of the M.U.C.P. under the Director General's signature thanking him for his cooperation in allowing us the use of Lt. Coté's services throughout the program. Mention should also be made of the cooperation received from our "C" Division Olympic Section, "HQ" Division "D" Operations, and Air Services Section.

The Marathon program and the series of lectures, seminars and briefings were, of course, time consuming and costly. We feel, however, that they contributed significantly to the high degree of security consciousness developed by the Olympic Security Forces.

Conclusion


It is recommended that a program of this type be used for events such as the Olympics. It provides an occasion to introduce the Security Service to various departments interested in security planning while at the same time providing a briefing for personnel involved in both on-the-spot and peripheral security duties.

2.6 Threat Assessments (Situation Reports)

Introduction

The broad objectives of the Security Service role vis-à-vis Olympic Security were: 1) Gathering intelligence on perceived and real threats to Olympic participants and visiting dignitaries; 2) Analyzing and/or confirming the intelligence gathered, and 3) Providing threat estimates to various levels of planners, policy and decision-makers as required. The specific additional objective of this multi-faceted program was to ensure that the proper attention was paid to Olympic-related threat intelligence, not only during the Olympic period but also during a long lead-in period in which potentially valuable information could be received.

The magnitude of this problematic program area is best evidenced with the following list of sometimes inter-related and othertimes unrelated files:



- Country Profiles - Threat Estimate
- "C" Division Planning
- (Report dated 23 April 1976 Re -
Threat Evaluation Quantified)
- Olympic Secretariat Situation
Reports
- Threats - General
- Royal Visit - Threats
- Threats General - Extracts Only (HQ)

Security Advisory Committee -
Reports

Quarterly Reports

Threat Coordination and
Assessment to Upper Level
Government Bodies

Implementation

Keeping tabs on threats to the Olympics and producing threat evaluations began in July 1975, and continued on a sometimes sporadic but later on a scheduled basis until 2 August 1976, the day after the closing ceremony.

An accurate accounting of the man-hours used in the gathering and analyzing of threat intelligence for this period is not available. Security Service personnel across Canada and Foreign Service Officers abroad were tasked from time to time to assist in investigations. The analysis of intelligence was done by personnel not only at the Division level but also at the various "HQ" Operations Branches. More specifically, however, the "D" Ops. Special Events Section, consisting of three men, worked almost exclusively on Olympic related material. The Montreal Olympic Secretariat (Security Service) had a 6-person research and analysis staff employed in this program and the Ottawa Secretariat employed one member fulltime in the threat area.

Ideally, all Olympic-related threat intelligence was to funnel into a central repository where analyses could be done, projections could be made and possible courses of action or countermeasures could be plotted. As intelligence was developed, the Federal Security Coordinator, personnel from the various security forces involved in Olympic security and concerned government departments were to be up-dated on the information.

Assessment

In July 1974, a memorandum from the C.I.B. A/Federal Security Coordinator, outlining their needs in relation to threat estimates in the various functional areas. By early September 1974, a new two-man unit had been established in "D" Operations to produce, among other things, a major compilation of wide-ranging information on the nations of the world (Country Profiles - Threat Estimate). The various "D" Operations Desk personnel wrote the initial profiles and estimates using material gleaned from general conditions files and other pertinent open and guarded sources. A continuing series of amendments and up-datings was then necessary to keep the country profiles as current as possible. These were the basis for threat assessments provided to "P" Directorate

to be considered in the planning of V.I.P. Security, to the C.I.B. Secretariat to be considered in the planning of police and other protective functions and to other police forces for their information and consideration in planning. When asked to assist in placing the various countries in amicable surroundings in the Olympic Village the country profiles again proved their value. "O" Division made the following comments with respect to the Country Profile Books:

"These...were found to be of assistance for assessment purposes for country background information when planning and conducting defusion. They have also been used when planning V.I.P. security. Every effort should be made to retain and up-date the information in the books."

Additional assessments and estimates were produced by the Operational Branches and the Olympic Secretariat as dictated by developing intelligence or on request from involved government agencies and/or other R.C.M.P. Directorates/Divisions. As planning progressed, the need for formalization of reporting procedures and schedules was recognized. As a result, submissions to the Security Advisory Committee and Quarterly Reports to the Interdepartmental Committee on Olympic Security

were produced by the Secretariat and approved by "D" Operations. Evaluations of the threat to Habitat, the Royal Visit and the Olympics were produced from time to time by "D" Operations and afforded the necessary dissemination. A less formal format to channel Olympic-related intelligence, the Sit Rep, was implemented in October 1975 to keep the Security group apprised of developments. (See pp. for details of this program).

The complexity of various factors having potential for producing problems during the Olympic period and the sheer volume of developing and developed intelligence surfaced the first difficulties. Given the need to keep the Federal Security Coordinator current on potential or real threats, a "Threats - General" file was opened by the Secretariat. It soon became apparent that such a file was a "Pandora's Box" of operational information that only the operational branches should handle, but were hesitant to do so because the file was retained by the Secretariat. Consequently, the Operational File was transferred to "D" Operations for operational matters and an extracts file was opened to keep the Secretariat abreast of developments. The field divisions apparently saw the threats general file as a panacea for reporting all Olympic or quasi-Olympic

threat information. The file became a morass of unrelated information from widely diversified interest areas. This, in turn, necessitated a further classification of the information contained on the file and there was, for a period, no central point from which speedy evaluations could be derived. During the period of the Games these problems were substantially eliminated when "D" Operations ran a Mini-Operations Centre and produced daily threat assessments.

Geographic separation of the Secretariat and the Operational Branches provided additional difficulties. During the long period prior to the Games in which the Secretariat not only had responsibilities but also was probably more attuned to and/or focused on threats to the Olympic Games, it was sometimes difficult to elicit the desired degree of enthusiasm from operational personnel who had, understandably, more immediate priorities. The Secretariat sometimes did not receive, or received late, information or papers of interest. This proved to be an embarrassment on several occasions.

In addition, the physical separation meant that Secretariat members had to make a conscious effort to liaise with operational personnel to ensure that the combined Secretariat was in receipt of any information related to Games Security. The separation, combined

with the requirement of "Clearing" threat estimates, caused occasional delays in the transmission of estimates but this never became a crucial problem.

The production of threat estimates took on a different perspective in Montreal proper, where the Officer i/c of Athlete Security requested a simplification of the entire Country Profile Book and threat estimate, together with a numerical value for threat designations to the athletes' groups so that priorities could be established. The Montreal Secretariat answering the request, utilized empirical methodology to produce a Quantification of the Threat. Following further study, and several meetings, adjustments to the original draft were incorporated. The revised evaluation was used during the period to establish the degree, and priority, of security to be afforded to athletes from different countries. In addition, the results were a useful guide for the personnel involved in the security of visiting dignitaries.

The Montreal Olympic Secretariat encountered a few problems with this project but does feel that the objectives were met, notwithstanding the fact that the results may have differed had they been supplied

with the information contained in Security Service Operational files held at Headquarters.

"C" Division recommends that the diverse possibilities of this program be examined, because the functional, precise and concise formula is considered at that point, the best method of passing information in an organized and methodological fashion to police forces.

"O" Division commented that the Threat Assessments were a valuable tool for keeping Olympic Commanders, other offices and other Police Departments advised of developing situations.

Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, the objectives of this program were met. A much fuller understanding of the benefits and limitations of intelligence gathering has been conveyed not only to various Directorates within the Force but also to other Police Organizations without whom the success of the Security net would have been impossible. Even though a program of this nature contains many pitfalls, it is imperative that such a program be developed for any major event. A greater degree of centralized coordination in similar ventures would be desirable.

Olympic Secretariat Situation Reports - OS Sit Rep

Introduction

The objective of the Sit Rep Program was to provide an additional communication channel for Olympic-related intelligence between the Security Service and the various Forces who were committed to provide security at the Games. The "HQ" Olympic Secretariat's contribution was to be the English language edition of "C" Division's "Rap Sit" but would include the national overview and items of interest from overseas agencies.

A policy letter dated October 14, 1975, outlines the format, information based to be used, anticipated contributors, circulation list, the caveat and the schedule of editions. The OS Sit Rep Program was initiated in late October 1975 and a member of the Secretariat travelled to Kingston, Toronto and Ottawa to explain the Program to the provincial and municipal authorities involved.

Implementation

The Program was implemented on October 17, 1975, upon receipt of agreement of the A/D.D.G. (Ops) to October 14, 1975 Police letter. The first Sit Rep was forwarded to the consumers on October 24, 1975.

The final item was published on 3 August 1976. The Program employed on a part-time basis, one member of the Secretariat. Material for the SitReps was culled from operational reports, analyses, and open sources. It was then verified at the various operations desks for accuracy and authenticity prior to final editing and forwarding by mail to the recipients. In the later stages of production, when SitReps were to be produced every two weeks or sooner, they were to be transmitted by Telex. During the Games period, four Senior N.C.O.s were to be employed in the production of the "HQ" SitRep and the intelligence portion of the Commissioner's Briefing.

Assessment

Following reports of receiving Sit Reps late, under the existing mail system, and since the reports were being produced every two weeks, a decision to advance the transmission via Telex was made at the end of February, 1976. Concurrently, a new focus and format were introduced in the March 4th, 1976 telex. The focus was centred on direct or indirect threats to the 1976 Olympics and the SitRep was formulated to reflect both domestic and international threats.

In May 1976, it became apparent that a duplication of effort and misapplication of manpower would exist if the anticipated Secretariat team produced the Sit Rep, and "D" Ops. also produced daily threat estimates. A proposal eliminating this duplication was accepted by "D" Ops. and the functional responsibility for Sit Reps was turned over to that Branch after the production of Sit Rep #12 on June 2, 1976.

Sit Rep#13 appeared on July 5, 1976 and daily reports followed from that date until the Games terminated. By July 9, 1976, a further change had been initiated to streamline the SitRep process. The sanitized Sit Rep which was to be sent out at 2:00pm each day, was replaced by the material given at the Commissioner's morning briefing. Restrictions on the dissemination of certain items, necessitated for a variety of reasons, caused some problems in the field. The objectives of the Program were fully reached.

Divisional assessments of this program pointed out, not only good points, but also a few problems which occurred. In "A" Division, Sit Reps were viewed as a basis for dialogue on threat situations, with other Security Forces. It was also seen as a useful tool to educate and indoctrinate other agencies not intimately acquainted with terrorist groups. "A" Division also found that other

Police Forces looked on the Sit Reps as the official threat assessment and in some cases planning was influenced. "O" Division advised that "Headquarters and other Division Situation Reports were found to be of considerable assistance in projecting possible threat areas as well as an aid in assessing local situations and issues".

The French Language counterpart of the Sit Rep was produced by the Montreal Secretariat and was envisaged, at that point, as a necessary functional dissemination to the Joint Security Forces of information vital to ensuring safety. The Rap Sit established a format and a channel of communication which was utilized throughout the Olympic operation. As far as the Montreal Secretariat is concerned, their objectives were met even though some modifications were necessary. During the course of the Olympics, one hundred and twenty-four Rap Sits were produced by "C" Division. Of that number, fifty-six contained information for which circulation was considered necessary.

The two problems that were specifically mentioned, together with recommendations, are as follows:

"A" Division

Confusion did materialize in the early operational stages with the production of three separate Sit.Rep ("C", E.O.C. and "D" Ops.). This was partially resolved with the termination of the E.O.C. Sit Rep and the continuance of the Daily Threat Assessment. In retrospect, it is felt that one daily report, emanating from "HQ" E.O.C., would have been better tailored to the needs of the Security Forces. The format of the Daily Threat Assessment was one which was favourably looked upon by other agencies.

"O" Division

The one point of concern was the receipt of French Language Situation Reports. While "O" Division has a number of individuals who are capable in the French language, none are officially Bilingual. It was necessary to draw resources from other assigned duties for translation purposes. It is recommended that, in future, Situation Reports directed to other Divisions, be supplied in English which will be time saving for the recipients.

Conclusion

A necessary and valuable Program, unhesitatingly recommended, in all future undertakings. However, the writers of the material to be disseminated should be fully cognizant of the raison d'etre and of the distribution list. In addition, steps should be taken to ensure the Sit Reps or Intelligence Reports (Int Reps) during such a time are as concise as possible. Sit Reps and/or Int Reps are designed to inform and update in general terms. Details should be kept to an absolute minimum, operational details should be eliminated to ensure as all-inclusive a distribution as necessary.

2.7 Overseas Liaison

Introduction

Early in the planning stages, the spectre of international terrorism was perceived as the major threat to the Olympic Games. Information exchanges between the Force and Foreign agencies became all the more important in light of the vast security undertaking involved in hosting an event of this magnitude.

Implementation

Foreign Services posts were directed to improve and expand existing channels of liaison, using concern for Olympic Security as the vehicle. Any information pertinent to Olympic Security arrangements was to be forwarded to "HQ" without delay. Requests for Security Checks on world media personnel were handled through "HQ" Foreign Services Branch beginning in September, 1975 and terminating in July 1976.

Assessment

Comments received from our overseas posts indicate that we received excellent cooperation from foreign agencies both prior to, and, during the Olympic Games. The Force has received praise from our foreign counterparts for the successful results of our Olympic security planning.

The L.O. Washington expressed appreciation for the daily intelligence briefs and for the manner in which the "D" Ops. communication center coordinated and expedited their many calls. He felt that perhaps greater use could have been made of the direct telex link [REDACTED] and expressed the wish that this link will continue to be used in future for routine matters. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The L.O. London commented on the fact that some requests from Ottawa for urgent agency comment seemed, in retrospect, relatively trivial or even unnecessary. The impression gained in London at times in dealings with contacts was one of "Look, we know what R.C.M.P. requirements are and if anything pertinent emerges then we'll be sure to let you know without prodding". Although it was acknowledged that we really had no choice but to check out every possible lead, the point which needs consideration is whether or not there was always sufficient homework done before referring questions abroad. It is felt that advance discussions with foreign agencies had the

desired effect in terms of impressing upon them our requirements for any and all intelligence relating to potential threats.

Conclusion

In short, the Olympics enabled our overseas posts to strengthen and expand contacts with foreign agencies. Problems were generally minimal and, based upon comments received, the R.C.M.P. was universally congratulated for their role in Olympic Security.

3.

NEUTRALIZATION

3.1 Defusing Program

Introduction

Beginning in 1975, a program was implemented by "D" Operations of the Security Service designed to defuse Canadian activist groups which might be a threat to the Games. Dissident groups and selected ethnic organizations were contacted by investigators across the country to solicit aid in keeping their militant elements under control during the Olympic period.

Implementation

In some centres, this was an intensification of an established concept, but, by and large, it was implemented in the connotation of the Olympics in the autumn of 1975.

In Montreal, approximately 600 persons were contacted by the combined investigative forces of the M.U.C.P., S.Q. and Security Service. These included some 310 interviews relating to ethnic groups, with the remainder divided among Asian and Far East groups, black organizations, natives, Quebec nationalists and local terrorists, and Marxist-Leninists. The program in Toronto included interviews of members of the Croatian and Serbian groups, the Western Guard Party, and Arabs and other groups.

Assessment

The general concensus is that this program was one of the most successful of those implemented during the Olympic period. The lack of any major demonstrations or violent acts speaks for itself. In Montreal, for example, only 3.3% of the persons contacted declined to meet with the investigator. One organization, La Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, complained to the media but later rejected an opportunity to publicly discuss the issue with the authorities. The program was later explained in a C.B.C. interview by the Officer i/c Security Service.

In Toronto, the program was considered to have been effective [REDACTED]

in the various ethnic communities. Our members are now better informed than ever before on ethnic problems [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The one point raised by "O" Division was that in future a program of this nature should be coordinated at the Headquarters level. This coordination is considered necessary so that each Division carries out its defusing at the same time, and that there is a free flow of information between Divisions relating to any one specific organization.

Conclusion

There seems little doubt but that this was our most valuable Olympic effort. The Olympics provided a definite rationale for using defusing, but its success suggests that, depending on the circumstances, it might have a broader use in continuing operational tactics.

**Pages 1034 to / à 1035
are exempted pursuant to section
sont exemptées en vertu de l'article**

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

4. STRATEGIC SUPPORT

4.1 Micro-Fiche Lookout System

Introduction

A large portion of our Olympic planning involved the support of other Government Departments, particularly in the area of entry controls to Canada. These controls were of course the basic responsibility of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, however, we participated to a significant degree in support of their programs. One of the most important segments of these controls implemented specifically for the Olympics, was the modernized Micro-Fiche Lookout System containing approximately 16,000 names and alias' of undesireables, criminals and terrorists who were of interest to Canadian authorities.

Implementation

This Micro-Film reading system was placed at the primary inspection line at International Airports and large border entry points and was operated by Customs personnel. It could be read by a trained operator within 10 seconds of receiving a name. Our contribution, in addition to being a back-up organization, was the placement of 1,000 identities of national and international terrorists in the system. In the event that a name of an immigrant or visitor was discovered by the Micro-Fiche,

the individual was immediately referred to a secondary examination and additional scrutiny.

Assessment

This system proved to be well worthwhile during the Games and is still in place and operating at major points of entry to Canada.

Conclusion

Recommended that the Force continue its cooperation with Customs and Immigration in maintaining our input to the Micro-Fiche system.

4.2 Computerized Olympic Integrated Lookout System (C.O.I.L.S.)

Introduction

On March 4, 1974, the Commissioner authorized the Department of Manpower and Immigration to use the C.P.I.C. computer for the C.O.I.L.S., subject to the following criteria: that the data put on the system would concern only undesirable persons; that input into the C.P.I.C. computer be handled by Immigration Department Headquarters (I.D.H.Q.) personnel only; and that, the entire agreement terminates with the end of the 1976 Summer Olympics.

The system was implemented so that officers at points of entry into Canada would have rapid access to information on persons prohibited from coming into the country.

Implementation

C.O.I.L.S. became operational on November 10, 1975, and finally ceased operation on August 18, 1976.

Basically, the system was an aid to the men at the Ports of Entry. There were terminals set up at these points where they could query their own Headquarters (I.D.H.Q.) and received information on a person they were checking. Any query received from a Port of Entry by I.D.H.Q. was immediately fed into the C.P.I.C. computer. The computer would automatically respond to

the query and send the "HQ" Security Service terminal an unsolicited message (copy of the query). If a "hit" response was received and additional information was required for confirmation purposes, the Port had to query again. The Security Service would respond and the additional data, if available, would be passed on to the I.D.H.Q. by secure means.

It was up to I.D.H.Q. to make a decision on the data provided by us, and to issue the appropriate directions to their enforcement personnel in the field. I.D.H.Q. was to advise the Security Service of the action taken.

A total of eight "F" Ops. staff were employed full time maintaining the C.O.I.L.S. from a Security Service standpoint, as well a number of the members from our "D" Operations.

Priority was placed on keeping C.O.I.L.S. up to date. Additions, amendments and/or deletions were sent to Manpower and Immigration on a daily basis for input into the C.P.I.C. computer. The Security Service had no further control over the input. Further, there was no data available to indicate Department of Manpower and Immigration turnaround time in getting our material into the computer, or in fact if it was updated on a daily basis at all.

Assessment

The C.O.I.L.S. was implemented and intended for use during the Olympic period only. There have been a multitude of problems and complications. For example, C.O.I.L.S. could not identify all known terrorists due to the fact that many were not put into the system because of lack of identifying data. Also, travel by known terrorists on false documentation, or documents which had been stolen and not reported, could not be entered in the system, and as such, this created another loophole in the system.

Something which had to be kept in mind was the fact that an average of only one out of every four people arriving at Ports of Entry were checked through the system. It was not possible to check every visitor through the system as it was set up.

A considerable problem arose out of the lack of control Security Service had over additions, modifications or deletion of data from the C.P.I.C. bank. Up-dated material was sent to the Department of Manpower and Immigration (D.M.I.) daily, however, there were delays in getting these actual up-dates of data in the computer, as I.D.H.Q. was responsible for this, and it was out of our hands. On top of this, Security Service had no

control over what action may or may not be taken by D.M.I. enforcement officers at Ports of Entry should a possible "hit" be made.

Quite often, D.M.I. tended to believe that the Security Service would make the decisions for them, and D.M.I. had to be told it was their task of doing this as we were only advisors, not the actual decision makers.

It was quite evident that D.M.I., who were responsible for the entire system, had received service for which they were not accountable for paying for. The Security Service responded to D.M.I. requests on a 24-hour basis, while D.M.I. staff were not necessarily scheduled or required to be available on other than an 8-hour, 5-day a week basis. From a cost/benefit standpoint, the Security Service and the Force generally paid a very high price for the operation of the system.

"O" Division feel that generally the C.O.I.L.S. units were found to be an asset to Security Service members checking for possible international terrorists. The one weakness, from a Security Service point of view, was the limited number of names on the system, caused by the identifying factor requirements. It is their opinion that all names and aliases should have been included regardless of known

particulars, with any possible "hits" being clarified by the investigating members. Their feeling is that every effort should be made to continue with a C.O.I.L.S. type operation, both from a Security Service, criminal and immigration point of view. Such a system could be patterned after the United States Customs Computer system which contains the names of all international terrorists. National warrants on wanted persons or persons of special interest from an international criminal point of view and persons of immigration interest who are not admissible to Canada due to previous rejection or deportation. With the United States system, every person wishing to enter the United States, is subjected to a computer name check which is compared to physical documentation at the time of entry. All "hits" are processed on the spot and rejections made at that time. In the cases of wanted persons, arrests are made at the border points, once the individual is on United States soil. All United States Customs and Immigration Officers are ex-officio peace officers, which would necessitate similar requirements for Canadian Customs and Immigration Officers, should such a system be implemented. Such a system would require more units than were available at Toronto International Airport, if a complete on-the-spot

check were to be made. No exact statistics were maintained as to the number of "hits" or possible "hits" that were made during the period of operation. Any time Immigration had a possible suspect, members of Security Service stationed at Toronto International Airport or elsewhere assisted in clarifying the individuals status, however, no known terrorists were identified through the system.

"A" Division feel that a false sense of security was created with the C.O.I.L.S. because the system did not live up to its expectations. They cited insufficient resources and inadequate training as the main problem areas, both of which were a Department of Manpower and Immigration responsibility. They do feel that the Force fulfilled its objective and commitment by supplying names for the C.O.I.L.S. data bank.

"C" Division, based on the limited information available regarding the operation of C.O.I.L.S., feel that the delays encountered in getting the program operational left them with a feeling of reserve rather than enthusiasm.

Conclusion

If this sort of system were proposed in the future, it would be necessary for D.M.I. to take full responsibility

and accountability for the project right from its inception.

The Security Service role should be that of support only, with the overall responsibility for manning of terminals, responses to Ports, etc., placed on D.M.I.

4.3 Special Entry Procedures

Introduction

A number of special entry programs were instituted because of a requirement to tighten our front line at ports of entry. These programs were extra safety measures developed in concert with the Department of Manpower and Immigration and Customs and Excise, in preventing undesirables from entering Canada. Two of the major programs were Disembarkation Cards and a Lost and Stolen Passport system.

Implementation

Canada was, as you know, one of the few countries in the world which lacked a disembarkation card system. In order to fill this void, at least for the Olympic period, a card was implemented in accordance with procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization (I.C.A.O.) requiring visitors, except those arriving from the United States, to list identifying personal data. The use of this card provided easy verification at the Primary Inspection Line (P.I.L.), a 100% search of C.O.I.L.S. during the quiet hours, and a very valuable source of post-arrival information for investigation purposes. The system terminated on August 1, 1976.

Passport control has been a recognized problem in Canada for many years, and of course, we were concerned with this issue for the Olympics. It was therefore, necessary to implement a system for our lost and stolen passports to act in concert with the Micro-Fiche and C.O.I.L.S. As a result, a procedure was set up whereby approximately 13,000 Canadian and 1,200 Foreign passports were included in the lost property file of the Canadian Police Information Centre Computer, in Ottawa. Slightly less than 100 of the foreign passports are of interest to the Security Service and were also placed in the system. This information is available to all Police Departments who have access to the computer and to terminals located at ports of entry. The system is updated once every month.

Assessment

The Disembarkation Card was mainly used by "C" and "O" Divisions. "C" Division is in favor of retaining this system, and possibly improving it. The system was used extensively prior to and during the Games to check and search for suspected undesirables or terrorists. Also, Immigration airport employees have voiced opinions in favor of retaining the system. "O" Division is of the opinion

that the disembarkation system, in its present form, is too time consuming, cumbersome to work with, and of marginal value at best.

It would appear from the comments, gathered by members, that some sort of check point or card system, or report check should be continued at all international arrival points. It would be to the benefit of all concerned - Customs, Immigration and Security Forces.

The lost and stolen passports system was queried frequently by the Forces' Immigration and Passport Section and the C.O.I.S. and Micro-Fiche users. There were a number of "hits" but they were on incorrect data which had been placed in the data bank. This meant that some of the information which had been received from External Affairs was outdated and should have been changed. None of the "hits" were genuine or necessitated enforcement action.

Conclusion

The Disembarkation Card was the key to several successful investigations in Montreal and its necessity for a future event of this magnitude is unquestionable. In fact, it is very regrettable that the program has since been suspended.

The second program, Lost and Stolen Passports, is somewhat more difficult to evaluate, but time may prove its usefulness.

4.4 Conflict Games

Introduction

The overall objectives of the program were two fold, firstly, to give the security forces involved in the security arrangements for the 1976 Summer Olympics the opportunity to evaluate the competence of their planning when tested against possible threats and, secondly, to adapt their plans accordingly and make the necessary modifications to the communications systems between the various forces involved in Kingston, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal.

These exercises were the result of a joint venture between the Olympic Secretariat and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (O.R.A.E.) of D.N.D. The theme was to develop and conduct a series of seven conflict games with scenarios made up to depict situations involving threats against the security arrangements that could arise during the 1976 Summer Olympics.

Implementation

The first of these exercises was held on January 21, 1975, and subsequent games ran through till April 8, 1976, at which time the final exercise "Mount Olympus" (Command Post Exercise) was held. The "Mount Olympus" exercise was held over a four day period and tested communications

and command and control procedures within the Force, the Provincial and Municipal Police organizations and all Federal Departments concerned with Olympic Security. The representation for these games consisted of members of the various security forces involved with the security arrangements for the Games.

This exercise gave the coordinators and their assistants a chance to engage their security networks and to determine how they would operate in the over-all security plan.

Assessment

The basic difficulties which arose during the conflict gaming exercises, were procedural in nature. This is inevitable in exercises of this magnitude, but the general lack of common perception of roles and jurisdictional responsibilities exacerbated the problem. Pre-exercise discussions between the various security forces and government agencies relating to their specific tasks and areas of responsibility could have alleviated this problem.

"A", "C", and "O" Divisions were unanimous in their endorsement of conflict gaming as an effective exercise; both in terms of verifying their Olympic

planning, and in the interaction and cooperation that occurred between the various security forces and government agencies involved.

In spite of this general approval, "C" Division felt that the military structure of the exercises made it difficult to adapt to police operational procedures. They also felt that even with the extensive technical resources which were made available to ensure the smooth operation of the games, there was always the difficulty of maintaining an atmosphere of realism in the scenarios.

Both "A" and "O" Division felt that the early games did not include adequate Security Service involvement; both in terms of participation in the game play, and in an appreciation by the players of the intelligence function. These problems could be rectified by the inclusion of an intelligence officer in the conflict role playing and by the indoctrination of other players to the role and capabilities of the Security Service. "A" Division also recommended that any future exercises of this nature be shorter in duration and allow for more security personnel (i.e. Shift Commanders) to take part in the Games.

Conclusion

Preliminary assessments of the games found them to be extremely beneficial to the overall security measures and provided the stimulation necessary for meaningful communication links between the various forces.

It is recommended that exercises of this sort be used again for events of a similar nature.

4.5 Emergency Operations Centres

Introduction

It had been decided early on in the planning that the major role in the E.O.C. would rest with the C.I.B. who had operational responsibility for the protection of V.I.P.s and athletes in transit. The Security Service would provide intelligence support to them and other security forces involved.

Implementation

"C" Division, Montreal Security Service ran a joint Operations Centre with intelligence representatives from the Montreal Urban Community Police (M.U.C.P.), Surête du Quebec (S.Q.) and Canadian Forces. Their centre was well equipped with communications equipment, telecom machines, video recorders and monitors and telephonic equipment.

"A" Division, Security Service operated two centres, one in Ottawa and the other in Kingston.

"O" Division, Security Service operated out of, and as a part of the C.I.B. Operations Centre.

In "HQ", "D" Ops. opened up a mini-ops. Centre, staffed by their personnel, to handle the operational demands created by the Olympics. The Olympic Secretariat, Security Service members, staffed a number of positions

in the "HQ" E.O.C. and provided a 4-member Security Service Advisory Team.

As originally conceived, this position was one of being the contact point between the E.O.C. staff, the Divisional E.O.C.s and the Security Service "HQ" Operations. The setting-up of the "D" Ops. Mini-Ops. Centre changed this role by largely eliminating the contact with the Divisional E.O.C.s. The function was re-directed to provide contact and coordination with the Mini-Ops. Centre and E.O.C. and keeping the Federal Security Coordinator and E.O.C. staff informed of Security Service Olympic related operations. The advisors also coordinated all incoming Security Service Olympic related operational and threat reports.

Assessment

The "C" Division Centre met all of their expectations and facilitated total control of all Security Service Operations and activities in and around Montreal. They also had, at all times, people who controlled specialized activities such as surveillance, Attaché Liaison Program and the Dialogue Program sitting in the centre.

"A" Division experienced no problems with the Ottawa Operations Centre, however, a shortage of office space in Kingston and the need to install secure telex facilities in the Security Service office, made for a very cramped situation. The members were prepared, and accepted the need to work under these conditions on a short term basis. In future operations of this type it is emphasized that proper space be secured.

Although it was not intended, a great deal of effort was expended by the "HQ" Security Service advisors on last minute C.O.J.O. employee security screenings and press accreditation screenings. This carried on right up to the last day of the Olympics and detracted from the purpose of the position.

Under most conditions, one Security Service advisor per shift is adequate. The position is necessary and served a worthwhile purpose during the Olympics. Its importance was diminished by the implementation of the Mini-Ops. Centre, but had that Centre not come into being, more Security Service representatives would have been required for each shift to compensate for the workload carried by the "D" Ops. Mini-Centre.

Conclusion

An Operations Centre is a necessary and vital part of any major operational undertaking. It should be clearly defined, however, which centre is in control of the operation. We had a proliferation of centres for the Olympics and fortunately, we had no major incidents. Had one occurred, we could have experienced a great deal of confusion and duplication, the very things Operations Centres are designed to control.

There is also a distinction between an Operations Centre such as the "C" Division Centre and a communication and coordination centre, such as the "HQ" E.O.C. This distinction must be clear in everyone's mind.

5. RESOURCE ALLOCATION

5.1 Finance, Establishment and Manpower

Introduction

Originally the Olympic Secretariat was a part of "P" Directorate. However, it later became a separate entity and in fact, became "W" Division with its own establishment and budget. Estimates were prepared for 4 fiscal years, up to and including the Olympic year. The main guideline used in planning was the Cabinet Decision of June 1, 1973, which stated that the Federal Government would be responsible for the safety of the participants and others at the Olympic Games and that we should adopt a strong security posture.

On the basis of the Cabinet desire for unparalleled large scale security, the Treasury Board approved a budget of approximately 22 million dollars for security purposes. This was an all-inclusive sum for not only the Divisions concerned, but the Security Service and C.I.B. Olympic Secretariat in "HQ".

Implementation

As can be imagined, a great number of financial and manpower estimates were made without benefit of previous experience in an event of the size of the Olympics.

Every conceivable security arrangement had to be considered, its importance, and what resources would be required. This was in itself a large task, made even larger by the fact that it also encompassed Federal Departments, with which the Force would have involvement, as well as two Provincial Police Forces and numerous Municipal Police Departments. Within the Force alone, we had to consider the requirements of 5 Divisions, "A", "C", "O", "J" and "HQ", as well as C.I.B. and Security Service operational needs.

Although one budget was approved, this in fact included the monies required by "C" Division, and "HQ". "A", "J" and "O" Divisions did not have separate Olympic funding. The Divisional Officers i/c retained their normal authority to expend money on Olympic planning, but if the cost of an item extended beyond their normal authority, a request was made to the Olympic Secretariat "HQ", where authority could be obtained. This also was the case when the Divisions required additional manpower on a temporary basis.

The Security Service did not have a separate budget and operated from the common funds available. This allowed a great deal of flexibility in the implementation of the operational needs for the Security Service.

Assessment

It is still too early to make a proper assessment from a financial management point of view, but it would appear that we will come in under our allowable expenditures in most areas and may have a small surplus. It appears that we underestimated in the area of overtime payments, and may need supplementary funds for this.

The following, however, is a breakdown of Security Service Olympic expenditures, including salaries for the fiscal years indicated, up to the end of August 1976:

"HQ" Division		\$17,926.00
	1973/74	
"C" Division		28,654.00
"HQ" Division		319,790.00
	1974/75	
"C" Division		223,731.00
"HQ" Division		543,527.00
	1975/76	
"C" Division		291,062.00
"HQ" Division		152,037.00
	1976/77	
"C" Division		155,372.00
	TOTAL	<u>1,732,099.00</u>

Conclusion

The consensus of opinion is that the system employed in budgetary control worked as well as could be expected, and in fact was probably the only system that could be employed in an operation of this size which cuts across so many operational lines of authority. The system allowed the commanders to retain their operational authority, and in areas of the Olympics gave them additional financial scope if and when required.

6. CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The occasion of the Olympics provided an opportunity for the Force and the Security Service to participate in the planning and implementation of the largest security operations ever known in this country. On behalf of the Secretariat, considerable satisfaction was gained from developing and coordinating that input, but moreso in the realization that the Security Service was successful in completely fulfilling its mandate to provide intelligence support for the physical security at the Games.

The view from within the Secretariat indicated, at times, that an insurmountable load was being placed upon us, but this was soon overcome by the characteristic teamwork displayed when "zero hour" was approaching.

The members of the Secretariat have stated that, without exception, the cooperation received from everyone connected with the Olympics, was exceptional. We would be remiss though, if we did not single out the Montreal Security Service Olympic Secretariat, Sgt. [REDACTED] of "A" Division and Sgt. [REDACTED] of "O" Division, all of whom worked hard and long, and demonstrated initiative and dedication to their task. It was a pleasure for us to have been associated with them, and contributed to our feeling that the Olympics has been the most gratifying experience of our careers in the Force.

- 77 -

The final point to make is that in the whole context of the Olympics, the Security Service discharged all commitments with distinction, both within the Force and to Canadians generally.

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COPIES OF FINAL
OF "H" & "O"

Forwarding Minute to memo dated 13 Sept 1976

FINAL REPORT
"A" DIV

- 7 -


CONFIDENTIAL

DDG (OPS)

Attn: Officer i/c Olympic Secretariat

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

FORWARDED 14-9-76. Olympic Planning for the "A" Division Security Service was handled by Sgt. [REDACTED] initially alone, and in the later stages with the assistance of Cpl. [REDACTED] and S/Cst. [REDACTED] in Ottawa, and Cpl. [REDACTED] in Kingston. Sgt. [REDACTED] acted as Security Service "Co-Ordinator" throughout. His job required that he deal effectively with the Kingston City Police, Ottawa City Police, Ontario Provincial Police and DND, also with our own CIB. At times this was not an easy task and he is to be congratulated for having done it so well. His pleasant personality and tact were obvious assets, as was his willingness to work long and hard to accomplish his job.


(R.A. Vaughan), C/Superintendent,
OIC "A" Division Security Service.

400 Cooper St.
Ottawa, Ont.
K2P 2E8



YOUR NO.
VOTRE NO

OUR NO.
NOTRE NO

CONFIDENTIAL

"A" DIVISION

OFFICER I/C "A" DIV. SECURITY SERVICE

14 September 1976

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

The following will serve as a final report on "A" Division Security Service Planning/Involvement in the XXI Olympiad. It is in response to the request of the Olympic Secretariat dated the 5 AUG 76 on this file. Topics covered will be restricted to those areas in which "A" Div. was involved.

a) Conflict Games

An excellent problem solving milieu in which Security Service played no major role, but did afford the opportunity for the Service to bring forth the intelligence function it was expected to display during the Games. The Games which were played in Kingston were basically void of any intelligence gathering role, but I understand the final Conflict Game in Montreal (MAR 76) rectified this problem.

It is suggested that any future Games include Security Service personnel as participants in the "Blue" room as only by participatory involvement can Security Service enlarge upon its mandate, which is understood by but to a few. In dealing with other Law Enforcement Agencies it must be remembered that Security Service represents an unknown entity and we must continually outline our function.

There is also an identifiable need for as many members as possible to observe the Conflict Games. Utilizing the Games held in Kingston as an example, there was not enough room for key personnel, (i.e. Shift Commanders) to be present. The reason for this was lack of space and a need to keep the observers to a manageable number. In retrospect, Games of a shorter duration, but an increase in the numbers would have greater advantages for both the players and observers.

13 Sept., 1976

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

b) Olympic Manpower Resource
Deployment and Establishment

"A" Division functioned as two separate entities (C.I.B./S.S.), but with a very close working relationship. There would be merit in having both groups function as one, as did the Olympic Secretariat. However, as long as Security Service realizes the role it was expected to play, that of keeping the Joint Forces advised, nothing is lost by separate groupings. Allocation of manpower was sufficient to conduct Olympic planning.

Although it was expected that Security Service members would not be required to have an up-to-date knowledge of all matters pertaining to Olympic planning, it was found that participation at meeting and conferences dictated that a working knowledge of all C.I.B. programs is mandatory.

c) "I" Ops Support and Deployment

Within the framework of the "I" Ops "Operational Philosophy" it is felt that they could have functioned as required with no problems. The Stage I and Stage II deployments were recognized as being manageable.

d) Marathon Program

The program as such had no "A" Division involvement. It was shown in three areas of "A" Division; Ottawa, Kingston and Sault Ste. Marie. Feedback was favourable.

However, the audio/visual portion of the Marathon Program was secured from the Olympic Secretariat in January of 1976 and was shown a total of thirty times, the last being on July 16. Incorporated with an overview on the role of the Security Service and coupled with a capsulized version of Security Service Olympic Planning, it emerged as the highlight of our planning. Shown to the various police forces, DND and selected COJO personnel it created an awareness of Olympic planning and the need for continuous dialogue between all Forces.

13 Sept., 1976

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

e) C.O.I.L.S.

In the early planning stages C.O.I.L.S. was seen as the vital link which would prevent unauthorized persons from entering Canada. As planning progressed it became evident that a false sense of security was being given as this automated system did not live up to its' expectations. Insufficient resources and training were the main problem areas, both of which are DMI responsibility. It is apparent that the Force fulfilled its' objective with COILS input, but for the reasons stated above DMI did not.

f) Attache Liaison Program

"A" Division involvement was restricted to one member, whose tasking did not include any Soviet or Bloc Countries. Nevertheless, the concept and implementation of the program has created dividends to the Security Service which will be of lasting benefit.

One area that must be commented upon was the oversight of members attached to this program, when visiting the Olympic facilities at Kingston to contact Security Service members at that point. With the exception of the member attached to the Israeli delegation, knowledge of visits to Kingston by our members came from the OPP Security branch, after the fact. Not only did this display a lack of communication between the Security Service itself but it left the Kingston members in a position of not being able to comment on any points raised.

g) COJO and Media Screening

OTTAWA: COJO Montreal dictated to the organizing committee in Ottawa (UNOP) as to the screening procedures they would follow. In essence all decisions on the C.I.B. rejection criteria would have been made in Montreal even though the employee would work in Ottawa. This effectively eliminated any input by the local Security Force.

In order to offset this arrangement, it was necessary to have duplicate CNI and Wants checks conducted at this level. Although the number of employees was small it displayed confusion and inconsistency.

13 Sept., 1976

Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

In areas of this nature, it would seem wise to have a binding policy affecting all locations. It is realized that this was the theme of the Olympic Secretariat and that COJO's dismal attitude about the necessity for the screening process was the core of the problem.

KINGSTON: Again, due to an excellent working relationship between the Security Forces and COJO no problems were encountered.

There was an attempt by COJO Montreal during the games period itself to accredit persons who had not as yet been cleared, but this was effectively vetoed. The smaller number of persons to be screened in Kingston as opposed to Montreal placed us at a distinct advantage. The excellent response from "HQ" "F" Ops was also a major factor in eliminating any problem areas.

h) Refugee/Defector Program

The failure of any bona fide defector to materialize negated the opportunity to assess the amount of planning that the R/D program required. "A" Division, as the primary back-up unit to all Olympic locations was forced to commit a large manpower deployment. To a large extent planning was influenced by the 1972 Olympic Games where Munich officials claimed 119 persons sought asylum.

Geographical considerations were discussed vis-a-vis Canada's attractions in an attempt to arrive at a realistic figure. Unfortunately, it would appear that the [redacted] had a special significance, but no mention or information was available to indicate for how long the [redacted] were of interest [redacted]. In the absence of such detail it was assumed that a high percentage of the [redacted] required "safe housing". Viewed in terms of Canada a figure of 4-6 appeared reasonable, and the number of "Safe-houses" acquired and manpower allocation were based on this tabulation.

The overall planning and manpower deployment in "A" Division did not suffer due to the R/D program and in essence the members assigned to this tasking were a reserve for any emergency situation.

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Re: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

i) Sitreps - Division and H.Q.

In dealing with other Security Forces, SITREPS formed the basis for any dialogue on threat situations. As a tool to educate and indoctrinate other agencies not intimately acquainted with terrorist groups, SITREPS achieved their objective. To a large extent their publication was looked upon by other Police Forces as the official threat assessment and in some cases it influenced planning.

Confusion did materialize in the early operational stages with the production of three separate SITREPS ("C", EOC and "D" OPS). This was partially resolved with the termination of the EOC SITREP and the continuance of the Daily Threat Assessment. In retrospect it is felt that one daily report, emanating from H.Q. EOC, would have been better tailored to the needs of the Security Forces. The format of the Daily Threat Assessment was one which was favourably looked upon by other agencies.

j) Defusing

This function is an on-going requirement and the Olympics were only used as the vehicle to initiate dialogue. The short-term advantage (information) is only equalled by the long-term advantage (source development) and the latter will take time to assess.

k) Joint Security Service Committee (Kingston)

The Intelligence Sub/Committee (I.S./C.) was composed of representatives from the four Security Forces. It was responsible to the Chief Security Committee and met with this group as required.

During the Olympic period the I.S./C. continued to function but in an ad hoc manner. No need materialized which required the members to meet as a group.

The I.S./C. operated as an effective unit and the co-operation received from each department was apparent. There was no doubt that the Security Service was looked to as the main instrument of guidance and direction. This I feel was accomplished.

13 Sept., 1976

RE: 1976 Summer Olympics - Montreal, Quebec
Security Service Planning - General

1) Operational Centres:

Ottawa

No problem areas.

Kingston

A shortage of office space and the security need to install the KW-7 in the Security Service office made for a very cramped situation. However, for a short term basis, members were prepared and accepted the need to work in this milieu.

For future operations of this type it is emphasized that proper space be secured.

2. Throughout the Olympic planning period and continuing with the operational phase the co-operation, advice and guidance received from the Security Service Olympic Secretariat at "HQ" was of tremendous value. The same is equally true of the assistance received at the Divisional level by Supt. YELLE and his staff.

3. Within "A" Div. Security Service there were three members whose involvement and contribution to the 1976 Games made the task of planning easier and enjoyable. Cpls. [redacted] and S/Cst. [redacted] participation in no small way contributed to the success of the programs embarked upon.

[redacted]
Sgt.

Olympic Co-Ordinator
"A" Div. Security Service

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FINAL REPORT
"O" DIV

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TO: OTT 3 "D" OPS (ATTN: INSP. J. DIEPOLD - OLY. SEC.)

MSG NO: SS(D) 1782/49

RE: SUMMER OLYMPICS - MONTREAL 1976
SECURITY SERVICE PLANNING - GENERAL

00164 SEP1576

THE FOLLOWING HAS REFERENCE TO HQ MESSAGE OLY (SS) 1085 DATED THE
5 AUG. 76 CN THIS FILE.

OF THE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS UNDERTAKEN BY SECURITY SERVICE, FOR THE
OLYMPICS, "O" DIVISION WAS INVOLVED IN THE FOLLOWING:

(1) CONFLICT GAMES:

"O" DIVISION MEMBERS PARTICIPATED IN ONE KINGSTON CONFLICT GAME, WITH
OBSERVER STATUS, EARLY IN THE PLANNING STAGES. THIS PARTICIPATION, WHILE
LIMITED, AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSIST US IN THE PLANNING OF OUR OWN
OPERATIONS CENTRE AND DETERMINING THE ROLE THAT VARIOUS COMMANDERS WERE TO
PLAY.

THE MAJOR CRITICISM OF THE GAME OBSERVED WAS THE LIMITED INVOLVEMENT
OR TASKING OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCING BODIES. PROBLEMS WERE GENERALLY
RESOLVED BY RE-ACTION RATHER THAN SEEKING ADDITIONAL INPUT BY INTELLIGENCE
WITH THE VIEW OF FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF A GIVEN SITUATION AND/OR A
RECOMMENDATION AS TO HOW TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC GROUP ON WHAT THE POTENTIAL
WAS FOR A REACTION IN A CONFRONTATION SITUATION.

IT IS FELT THIS PROBLEM WAS A RESULT OF A BASIC LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF
WHAT AN INTELLIGENCE UNIT HAD TO OFFER. IN FUTURE SITUATION, WHEN PLANNING
OF THIS NATURE IS UNDERTAKEN IT MAY BE EXPEDIENT TO CARRY OUT AN INDOCTRINATION
OF NON-INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF AN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN CONFLICT ROLE PLAYING.

(2) OLYMPIC MANPOWER RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT:

"O" DIVISION SECURITY SERVICE EXPERIENCED NO MANPOWER PROBLEMS,
PRIMARILY DUE TO EARLY ARRANGEMENTS AND COMMITMENT THAT ONCE OUR AUTHORIZED
STRENGTH WAS REACHED, WE WOULD NOT ASK FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES PROVIDED
WE WERE NOT REQUIRED TO COMMIT SUCH RESOURCES BEYOND OUR DUTY AREA, EXCEPT
UNDER EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

FOUR MEMBERS, HAVING SPECIALIZED SKILLS, WERE SECONDED TO "C" DIVISION
FOR THE ATTACHEE LIAISON PROGRAM, HOWEVER, THESE CAUSED NO HARDSHIPS.

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SECURITY SERVICE MANPOWER WAS FULL TAXED THROUGHOUT THE OLYMPIC PERIOD AND AT TIMES WE WERE HARD PRESSED TO MEET COMMITMENTS. IN RETROSPECT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT WERE WELL BALANCED.

(3) "I" OPS SUPPORT AND DEPLOYMENT:

"O" DIVISION "I" OPS WAS RETAINED WITHIN THE DUTY AREA WITH PRIOR ARRANGEMENTS MADE THAT SHOULD THEIR SERVICES BE REQUIRED IN KINGSTON THEY WOULD BE DISPATCHED TO THAT POINT. NO SUCH REQUEST WAS MADE.

"I" OPS WAS EMPLOYED ON ONE (1) OLYMPIC ORIENTED INVESTIGATION FOR A PERIOD OF 4 DAYS. THE REMAINDER OF THE OLYMPIC PERIOD THEY AFFORDED NORMAL TARGET COVERAGE.

MARATHON PROGRAM:

THE MARATHON BRIEFING TEAM VISITED "O" DIVISION ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASION. THE TEAMS PRESENTATION WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED BY BOTH CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION PERSONNEL, SERVING THE PURPOSE OF STIMULATING THEIR INTEREST AND AWARENESS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

0122

*Left to Telecenter
at 4:30. Jb.*

SS(D)1782/49

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AS THE BRIEFING PROGRAM CO-INCIDED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MICRO-FICHE AND COILS PROGRAM, OUR SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT FOLLOW-UP CONTACTS WITH CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION TO ESTABLISH LIAISON TOWARD CARRYING OUT FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS AND ASSISTANCE WHEN POSSIBLE "HITS" DEVELOPED. AS A RESULT OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION DEVELOPED TO A VERY GOOD LEVEL AND SHOULD CONTINUE FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME TO COME.

A SIDE ISSUE IS THAT BOTH CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION ARE MORE AWARE OF SECURITY SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THEIR CONTACTING MEMBERS WITH SPECIFIC SITUATIONS OF WHICH THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS. IN THE PAST THREE ISSUES ON SITUATIONS EITHER WENT UN-REPORTED OR WERE MENTIONED IN PASSING TO MEMBERS OF THE R.C.M. POLICE LEADING TO CONSIDERABLE DELAY.

COMPUTERIZED OLYMPIC IMMIGRATION LOOKOUT SYSTEM (C O I L S):

PLEASE REFER TO OUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE RE: COILS AND DISEMBARCATION CARDS DATED THE 14 SEPT. 76.

MISSION 80:

DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS EXERCISE.

ATTACHE LIAISON PROGRAM:

001075

C.O.J.O. & MEDIA SCREENING:

"O" DIVISION WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ACCREDITATION OF C.O.J.O. AND MEDIA PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS DID PARTICIPATE IN MEDIA SECURITY/LIAISON ROLE FOR THE SOCCER GAMES HELD IN TORONTO. MEMBERS EXPERIENCED NO DIFFICULTY AND FOUND THAT ACCREDITATION WAS COMPLETE. COOPERATION WITH C.O.J.O. PEOPLE WAS GOOD.

QUIET DIPLOMACY:

DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS EXERCISE.

REFUGEE/DEFECTOR PROGRAM:

FOR THE OLYMPICS "O" DIVISION HAD A REFUGEE/DEFECTOR PROGRAM. HOWEVER SAME WAS NOT PUT TO USE.

WHILE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MONTREAL OLYMPICS, MEMBERS OF THE REFUGEE/DEFECTOR PROGRAM DEALT WITH NO DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED. OUR RELATIONSHIP AND LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION ON THESE MATTERS WAS FOUND TO BE EXCELLENT.

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INCARCERATED TERRORIST RESEARCH PROJECT:

DID NOT INVOLVE "O" DIVISION.

SITUATION REPORTS - DIVISION AND HEADQUARTERS:

"O" DIVISION EXPERIENCED NO DIFFICULTY IN PREPARATION OF SITUATION REPORTS INVOLVING LOCAL SITUATION. HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER DIVISION SITUATION REPORTS WERE FOUND TO BE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE IN PROJECTING POSSIBLE THREAT AREAS AS WELL AS AN AID IN ASSESSING LOCAL SITUATIONS AND ISSUES.

THE ONE POINT OF CONCERN WAS THE RECEIPT OF FRENCH LANGUAGE SITUATION REPORTS. WHILE "O" DIVISION HAS A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CAPABLE IN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE, NONE ARE OFFICIALLY BI-LINGUAL. FOR TRANSLATION PURPOSES IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRAW RESOURCES, FROM OTHER ASSIGNED DUTIES FOR TRANSLATION PURPOSES. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN FUTURE SITUATION REPORTS DIRECTED TO OTHER DIVISIONS BE SUPPLIED IN ENGLISH WHICH WILL BE TIME SAVING FOR THE RECIPIENTS.

001076

DEFUSING:

BY MID-1975 "O" DIVISION HAD UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM OF SOURCE AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN VARIOUS AREAS, WITH THE VIEW OF HAVING CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION IN AND OUT OF THE VARIOUS ETHNIC AREAS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PROGRAM WE TOOK THE ADDED OPPORTUNITY TO CARRY OUT AN ONGOING DEFUSING PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM INCLUDED THE INTERVIEWING OF SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE PROMINENT IN KNOWN "LEFT" WING AND NEO-TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. OF PARTICULAR NOTE WERE THE PROGRAMS CARRIED OUT IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

YUGOSLAVS: AN EXTENSIVE INTERVIEW PROGRAM WAS CARRIED OUT IN BOTH THE CROATIAN AND SERBIAN COMMUNITY. WE FELT THIS PROGRAM WAS PRIMARILY INSTRUMENTAL IN THESE TWO COMMUNITIES NOT BECOMING INVOLVED IN ANY OVERT ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS BEING OF ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING DESIRED INFORMATION DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD.

WESTERN GUARD PARTY: THE WESTERN GUARD PARTY WAS SUBJECTED TO A DIRECT DEFUSION IN LIGHT OF ADVANCE INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO SMOKE BOMB VARSITY STADIUM DURING AN ISRAELI SOCCER GAME, AS WELL AS CARRYING OUT OTHER DISRUPTIVE TACTICS.

ARABS & OTHER GROUPS: AN INTERVIEW PROGRAM WAS CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE ARAB & JEWISH COMMUNITIES WITH THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING ANY DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES THEY MAY HAVE BEEN PLANNING.

GENERALLY WE FEEL OUR DEFUSION PROCESS WAS EFFECTIVE IN BOTH GAINING INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE ACTIVITIES AND HAD THE DESIRED RESULTS OF EASING OUR EFFORTS

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IN OBTAINING INFORMATION. WE FEEL, HOWEVER, IN FUTURE SITUATIONS OF THIS TYPE THAT SIMILAR EFFORT IN OTHER DIVISIONS SHOULD BE COORDINATED AT THE HEADQUARTERS LEVEL. SUCH COORDINATION SHOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE TO ENSURE EACH DIVISION CARRIES OUT THEIR DEFUSION AT THE SAME TIME, AND THAT INFORMATION DEVELOPED IS FREELY EXCHANGED, PARTICULARLY THAT WHICH IS OF GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTEREST.

THREAT ASSESSMENT: THIS AREA IS IN OUR OPINION, DIVIDED INTO TWO AREAS; 1) THE THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, AND 2) THE COUNTRY PROFILE BOOKS PREPARED BY THE "D" SECTION, SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECTION. THESE BOOKS WERE FOUND TO BE OF ASSISTANCE FOR ASSESSMENT PURPOSES FOR COUNTRY BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHEN PLANNING AND CONDUCTING DEFUSION. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN USED WHEN PLANNING VIP SECURITY. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO RETAIN AND UP-DATE THE INFORMATION IN THE BOOKS.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS WERE A VALUABLE TOOL FOR KEEPING OLYMPIC COMMANDERS, OTHER OFFICES AND OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS ADVISED OF DEVELOPING SITUATIONS.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY OTHER FORCES TO THE JOINT SECURITY SERVICE COMMITTEES:

OUR MAJOR DEALINGS WITH OTHER POLICE DEPARTMENTS CONSISTED OF LIAISONING OF INFORMATION WITH METRO TORONTO POLICE, PEEL REGIONAL POLICE AND ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE.

RELATIONSHIPS AND COOPERATION WITH THE METRO TORONTO POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS FELT TO BE EXCELLENT. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THEY WORKED DIRECTLY WITH SECURITY SERVICE MEMBERS AND AFFORDED EVERY ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE. INFORMATION LIAISED WAS TREATED IN A RESTRICTED MANNER.

PEEL REGIONAL POLICE WAS SUPPLIED WITH INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THEM AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AT THE TORONTO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

OUR DEALINGS WITH THE ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE, IN THE TORONTO AREA, WAS RESTRICTED. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THEIR MAXIMUM EFFORT AFFORDED TO THE KINGSTON SITE. ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BETWEEN METRO TORONTO POLICE AND O.P.P. MERELY METRO ASSUMED SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TORONTO AREA DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS WITH O.P.P. WERE GENERALLY HANDLED THROUGH THE KINGSTON POST.

AN AREA OF CONCERN WAS THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM USED BY O.P.P. IN TORONTO. THE PURPOSE OF THEIR OPERATIONS CENTRE WAS NEVER CLARIFIED TO EITHER THIS FORCE OR APPARENTLY TO THE METRO TORONTO POLICE. THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE AN OPERATIONS CENTRE IN TORONTO WAS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN UNTIL LATE IN THE PLANNING STAGES AND DURING THE OLYMPIC PERIOD WAS NOT UTILIZED IN THE TORONTO AREA. AS A RESULT METRO USED OUR COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR CONTACTING SUCH POINTS AS KINGSTON FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS. IT WAS NOTICED THAT ON ABOUT TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS THE O.P.P. AT KINGSTON WERE

0122

TASKING T.I.A. WITH ENQUIRIES, NOT HAVING ROUTED THE REQUEST THROUGH EITHER THEIR TORONTO OPERATIONS CENTRE, OR THE RCMP "O" DIVISION COMMAND CENTRE. WHILE THE ISSUE IS NOT SERIOUS SUCH ACTION SERVES TO COMPLICATE MATTERS AS WE WERE UNAWARE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ENQUIRIES AND MADE COORDINATING OF INFORMATION DIFFICULT.

IN FUTURE IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EACH OPERATIONAL CENTRE'S RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLE BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND INTEGRATED WITH ONE ANOTHER. THAT TASKING OF RESOURCES BE DONE THROUGH OPERATIONAL CENTRES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERST AREA.

WHILE ON THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, DURING THE MOUNT OLYMPICS EXERCISE IT WAS FOUND THAT MANY ROUTINE MATTERS WERE TRANSMITTED. IT WAS FOUND THAT THE SYSTEM BE TASKED TO THE LIMIT WHEN ALSO HANDLING PRIORITY TRAFFIC. THIS MATTER WAS BASICALLY RESOLVED DURING THE ACTUAL OLYMPICS HOWEVER THERE WERE CERTAIN INSTANCES WHEN THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.

FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SYSTEM BE KEPT FREE DURING PEAK PERIODS FOR PRIORITY TRAFFIC ONLY, THAT ROUTINE INFORMATION BE HELD FOR SLACK TIMES AND/OR INCLUDED ON THE DAILY SITUATION REPORTS.

AN AREA OF PRIMARY CONCERN WAS REACTION, AND PERIODIC OVER REACTION, TO INFORMATION RECEIVED. A CASE IN POINT WAS THE INFORMATION RECEIVED ABOUT A "BROWN BERET" GROUP HEADING INTO CANADA FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS INFORMATION WAS ORIGINALLY RECEIVED, VERBALLY, BY O.P.P. IN KINGSTON, WHO IN TURN COMMENCED A LOOKOUT. WHEN THE INFORMATION WAS CHECKED, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT SOME WAS RECEIVED ABOUT FOURTH HAND THROUGH SEVERAL DIFFERENT U.S. POLICE AGENCIES AND WAS MADE KNOWN TO KINGSTON. WHEN OFFICIALLY CHECKED WITH U.S. AUTHORITIES IT WAS DETERMINED THE SITUATION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE ERRONEOUS BY THE TIME THE SITUATION WAS CLARIFIED THE PRESS HAD PICKED UP THE STORY AND BLOWN THE SITUATION OUT OF PROPORTION.

IT IS FELT THAT IN FUTURE WHEN INFORMATION IS RECEIVED IT SHOULD BE CHECKED THROUGH PROPER AUTHORITIES BEFORE BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO OTHER CENTRES. THIS WOULD ALSO APPLY TO INFORMATION THAT IS LIMITED IN THE INITIAL INSTANCE. IF SUCH INFORMATION IS DEEMED SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT IMMEDIATE DISEMINATION, SOME SHOULD BE QUALIFIED AS UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION, WITH PRIORITY INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE SAME.

H.G. BRADLEY, INSP.
"D" OPERATIONS

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S.S. Final Report

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R.S.
Clerk

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