

S E C R E T

Cab. Doc. 525 /73

Olympic Games, 1976 - Security Planning

SUMMARY:

The attached memorandum discusses anticipated security problems and proposes a strong level of security as the basis for federal involvement in security planning for the 1976 Games. Because COJO and provincial and local police plans are still very indefinite, cost estimating now is very difficult but the memorandum indicates that they will likely be substantial.

The memorandum suggests that there is the possibility that international terrorists, revolutionaries, and violence prone groups will try to create serious incidents within the Olympic milieu and that other criminal elements might well take the opportunity to enter Canada at that time.

The German Experience is examined and the conclusion is drawn that to meet the I.O.C. expectations of free and open entry to Canada is unacceptable if we are to adequately protect participants, officials and the public at large.

The memorandum discusses police jurisdictional problems and recommends early agreement with Quebec, Ontario, Montreal, Kingston and COJO with respect to jurisdictional responsibilities.

Also discussed in the memorandum is the problem of entry control and the eventual need for special legislation to effect the immediate rejection and removal of foreign terrorists, demonstrators and criminals is recommended.

The memorandum suggests that Canada will probably assume leadership in security planning and in any case in the eyes of the public nationally and internationally will be seen to have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Games.

The memorandum recommends that the Solicitor General be authorized to instruct the Commissioner of the R.C.M. Police to appoint within the Force a coordinator of security planning for the Games and also recommends that there be a small committee of Ministers formed to provide continuing ministerial authority for security planning as required.

Detailed recommendations are set out on page 19 of the memorandum.

S E C R E T

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET:

Olympic Games, 1976 - Security Planning

I. PROBLEM:

Holding the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976 poses serious and complex security problems and requires immediate planning and resource allocation to be ready in good time before the games.

II. OBJECTIVES:

To discuss anticipated security problems and to propose and justify a strong and effective level of security as the basis for departmental planning for those aspects which are the responsibility of the federal government. To indicate that costs will be difficult to estimate but to suggest that they will be substantial.

III. FACTORS:

A. THE THREAT

The escalation of acts of terrorism and violence in recent years is anticipated and presents a serious threat to the maintenance of national internal security at the Olympics and to the thousands of foreign dignitaries, athletes, trainers, newsmen and other visitors for whose safety during the games Canada will be responsible. New forms of terrorist organization and tactics may emerge over the next three years which could complicate the dimensions of the threat and, as contingency planning proceeds, the requirements for responding to it. The problem may be illustrated by the growing threat to diplomatic personnel. In the past five years, for example, over two dozen diplomats from various countries have been kidnapped

and six assassinated. While law enforcement authorities are endeavouring to develop effective measures to deal with political violence, the international community remains vulnerable to a variety of tactics and techniques employed by organized terrorist groups with an alarming degree of success, as exemplified by the Lod, Munich, and Khartoum tragedies.

ANNEX I describes this threat and RCMP plans to keep abreast in some detail.

B. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE AT MUNICH

The principal lesson to be learned from Munich is that in the 1970's no country can afford to assume that terrorists, revolutionaries and violence prone groups will not attempt to take advantage of the massive and instant world wide publicity which would result from any incident staged at the Olympics. Despite the possible intentions of the City of Montreal, the Government of Quebec and the International and Canadian Olympic Committees with regard to a reduced security and police profile, in the final analysis, like Germany, it will be the Canadian Government which will be held responsible for failure to prevent any serious breach of the security arrangements at the 1976 Olympics.

The German experience illustrates dramatically what can occur when constraints are placed on police and security authorities for the sake of an acceptable political image.

ANNEX II describes this experience in some detail.

C. JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS

It is clear that from a jurisdictional point of view the responsibility for policing the 1976 Olympics rests with the Montreal Police backed up by the Province of Quebec and, of course, to a lesser extent the Kingston Police and the Province of Ontario. A Montreal Urban Community police officer has recently been appointed the coordinator of police activities for the Olympics 1976 although there has not yet been a public announcement. It is anticipated that he will soon be asking for RCMP assistance. In a recent letter to the Federal Government's Interdepartmental Committee on the Olympics 1976, COJO made the following remarks about security:

"The security aspect is one which clearly takes priority in our planning. As the Games will be held on the territory of the Montreal Urban Community, it seems logical that the police force of that organization should have primary responsibility in the area. It was therefore decided last March 30 that a coordinator of the police forces should be appointed by the Montreal Urban Community in connection with preparations for the Olympic Games. This coordinator, in addition to directing COJO efforts in this area, will be in charge of the sub-committee on security which will be comprised of representatives of all the police forces, including the MUC police, provincial police and RCMP, as well as representatives of the various interested departments or agencies, such as the Canadian Army, Civil Defence, etc. There is no doubt in our minds that the cooperation of

the federal government through the services of the RCMP is essential to the holding of the Games. In this regard, Chief Superintendent Jean Ouimet is already well informed on COJO plans. We are leaving it up to those in charge of security to work out their own plan and to organize their staff in relation to the needs of 1976."

With regard to these remarks by COJO, it should be stated categorically that the RCMP is not yet aware of any security plans nor have any discussions on that score yet been held with the newly appointed police coordinator.

Jurisdictional problems may arise when it is considered that there are several types of security to consider, namely,

(a) Ground Security

This relates to crowd control, traffic control and the investigation of Criminal code offences within the City of Montreal and the Province of Quebec. These duties can be defined as "in house" security and clearly lie within the jurisdiction of the Province of Quebec. The same applies in Ontario vis-a-vis Kingston and other satellite locations yet to be determined.

(b) Internal Security

This relates to terrorism which affects Canada as a whole, e.g. mass demonstrations directed against the Government of Canada, destruction of vital points installations and Federal property which are geographically located within the boundaries of the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario.

(c) Protection of Foreign Government Representatives

Foreign government representatives will be in attendance and will require protection.

(d) Airport Security

The RCMP is responsible under contract with the Ministry of Transport for policing and security of federal airports. While jurisdiction for criminal matters rests with local police forces, by 1976 it may be assumed by the RCMP.

CONCLUSIONS

- (a) COJO's line of thinking at this stage leads one to believe that Montreal is shaping its programme on the Munich philosophy of 1972. If this philosophy were accepted for 1976, the security force, as a combined effort (municipal-provincial-federal) could easily make the same mistakes which were made in Munich in 1972. While the Montreal Urban Community Police does have the jurisdictional responsibility for policing the Olympics in Montreal, the Federal Government cannot depend on the Montreal Urban Community Police to manage the entire security programme. If a serious incident occurs, either a mass demonstration or terrorist attack, the ultimate responsibility will fall on the federal government.
- (b) Jurisdictional problems are complex and have always been sensitive issues in dealings with the provinces. They are especially difficult in the cases of Quebec and Ontario where the RCMP acts only in a Federal capacity.
- (c) The areas of responsibility for security, assigned to local, provincial and federal jurisdictions, must be clearly determined by mutual discussion and agreement before planning for the security programme commences.

It must be made clear that the RCMP as the federal police authority has a clear responsibility to safeguard national interests in this programme.

(d) The RCMP should be instructed to ensure that security arrangements mutually agreed upon are consistent with the threat estimate. For planning purposes it must be assumed that the threat to security at the Olympics will be serious and that a high security profile as recommended below is acceptable to the Government.

(e) The RCMP must be allotted the necessary personnel, material and financial resources for security planning and implementation of the federal portion of the security plan and, at the same time, the RCMP must be supported by a firm Government posture when negotiations are held with Montreal, Quebec and Olympic authorities.

(f) Ministers should be prepared for the necessity of discussions at the political level should official level negotiations fail to make progress. This might be accomplished by the establishment of a sub-committee of Cabinet including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Minister of Manpower & Immigration and the Solicitor General.

D. OTHER SECURITY MATTERS REQUIRING FEDERAL PLANNING

a. Immigration Control

Control over the entry to Canada of citizens, residents, immigrants and visitors is a firmly established federal responsibility. Thus it will be under federal Immigration laws that functionaries, participants, media representatives and visitors will be allowed entry to Canada during the Olympic games. At this time the numbers are largely speculation, however, an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 Olympic participants, officials and the press and some 500,000 visitors will seek admission to Canada specifically for the 21st Olympiad.

Special Olympic Entry Requirements

The official commitment concerning entry for the Olympic games is at this point minimal. In a letter of November 28, 1969, the Secretary of State for External Affairs informed the International Olympic Committee that entry to Canada would be "pursuant to the normal regulations". Despite this limited commitment it is now apparent that the Olympic authorities expect Canadian Immigration Regulations for participants and media to be replaced for purposes of the Olympic games by regulations of the International Olympic Committee regarding passports, visas, entry and free movement across Canada. They expect to issue an Olympic Identity Card which will replace Canadian regulations determining passport and visa requirements for entry into Canada. These Canadian requirements are a combination of regulations and international agreements under which passports are required from citizens of all countries, except the United States. Visas are required from citizens of Soviet Union and East European Communist countries, China, and most countries of Africa and the Middle East, but not from citizens of Western hemisphere countries, the Commonwealth, Japan and certain Western European countries.

NO WAY!

The Olympic procedure involves the issue of a special identity card to facilitate admission of participants, officials and accredited media. The German Government carried this system to the point of virtually abdicating responsibility for entry requirements by accepting the Olympic identity card in lieu of a passport and visa. Control of the document was entirely by the Olympic authorities.



As explained in ANNEX II, the Germans were anxious to use the Olympics to create a national image that would characterize the German nation as free of all forms of authoritarianism. Our national image is also an important consideration although the reasons which induced the Germans to weaken their security posture do not apply to Canada. The Germans allowed groups sponsored by the Olympic authorities virtual free admission to Germany and the system ran completely out of control. German immigration authorities now defend this procedure by saying that illegal entry to Germany could have been gained by easier methods than the use of Olympic identity cards, and thus the imposition of additional controls was not warranted. In this regard it is interesting to note that the Germans did have a control system to maintain immigration security but, in the view of Canadian officials, it broke down because of heavy reliance on Olympic authorities to maintain security of I.O.C. identity documents. The German experience establishes that Olympic authorities will not accept any responsibility for the security of their documents. The use of these documents as the single entry requirement would in effect mean abandoning Canadian immigration security.

There are three considerations that should govern the level of Immigration security required:

1. By virtue of the incidents at Munich, the Olympic games have been established as a vulnerable target for terrorist attack.
2. Although the Government is now adopting policies leading to more Immigration control over visitors to Canada, the Canadian Immigration system is generally recognized as being weak; and

3. The RCMP advises that the Olympic identity card system as used for the Munich Olympiad is a definite security risk that should not be repeated. Police authorities consider identification of persons under the Immigration Act as first line security and this should not be abdicated to COJO and the I.O.C. authorities.

Olympic authorities will likely press for the German system, urge the need for freedom and flexibility and stress the traditional Olympic requirement of free access. While discussions are under way with Canadian Olympic authorities on the basis of the commitment made by the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs that Canadian Immigration Regulations will apply, some modification of Canadian Regulations may be necessary to accommodate the traditional international character of the Olympic games. It is imperative, however, that whatever compromise is achieved, there will be positive identification of all persons allowed entry to Canada in connection with the Olympic games.

#### Immigration Entry Controls for Visitors

While the gaps in immigration security that could be created by unrestricted use of Olympic Identity cards for admission to Canada is serious, there is a second problem of at least equal concern. It might confidently be expected that some persons will come to Canada to engage in illegal activities of various types or to use the Olympic games as a distraction to gain illegal entry to Canada.

Several proposals are now being considered for preventive measures:

- (a) Basic security information might be accumulated over an extended period through the establishment of a special control centre in a suitable location. This centre would screen visa applications from persons who may pose a terrorist threat.
- (b) Work on improved methods of identifying false documents can be advanced.
- (c) Intensified examinations can be conducted to identify possible threats.
- (d) The Immigration Intelligence capability can be expanded and concentrate on identifying threats against the Olympics.
- (e) Work on a computerized system to identify known criminals and security risks can be advanced.
- (f) An Immigration Co-ordinator for the Olympics can be appointed.

None of these steps would require major new resources, and some would be beneficial beyond the scope of Olympic games, immediately and in the future. Additional start-up costs could be in the order of \$2-3 millions, with a continuing annual cost for computer systems in the order of \$800,000. Integration with existing or other developing systems of computerized identification of criminal and security risks could reduce these costs.

Refugees and Defectors

As a part of the security preparations, provision should also be made for dealing with persons who decide to defect and remain in Canada as refugees. The German authorities were faced with some 30-40 applicants for political asylum, mainly from

Communist dominated countries. We can expect that in 1976 the numbers seeking sanctuary in Canada will increase. Such individuals can be moved quickly and quietly to Immigration Accommodation quarters at Champlain Harbour, Quebec, where their applications can be examined.

Removal from Canada

Despite all possible efforts it would be unrealistic to expect that some criminal, or terrorist elements will not gain entry to the country. Once in the capability to remove <sup>them</sup> quickly and effectively is very limited. Even if proposed new Appeals Legislation is in effect there will still need to be full access to the Immigration Inquiry system and the Canadian Courts which can cause long delay. In addition, security information can seldom be used as evidence at an Immigration Inquiry.

To meet the eventuality of a serious threat, it will be proposed later that special legislation be enacted to be effective during the period from June 15 to October 15, 1976, which would grant the Minister of Manpower and Immigration emergency powers to refuse entry or order the removal of persons whose presence in Canada would be detrimental to Canadian interests during that period on the basis of security or criminal reports received by the Minister. These powers would be used to remove from Canada foreign demonstrators threatening to disrupt the Olympic games and to prevent the admission of suspected terrorists. The order for rejection or removal would only apply during the specified period. The preventive effect of such special powers could obviate the need to use them.

The proposed special powers could be added to an omnibus Olympics bill now being prepared or by a subsequent amendment to an Olympics bill. A provision for summary removal or refusal of entry, however, will require an exclusion from the Bill of Rights and most certainly will be attacked as an unwarranted invasion of civil liberties. Furthermore, a new Immigration Act, including a clause that would provide additional powers for removal of security risks from Canada might well be in force in time for the commencement of the Olympic games. Despite these considerations it is imperative to know at this time whether security planning can proceed in anticipation that there will be legislative authority to permit immediate rejection or removal from Canada of such persons as foreign terrorists, criminals and demonstrators without recourse to appeal and inquiry procedures.

b. Customs Clearance

I.O.C. advocates no inspection of baggage or belongings for persons in possession of Olympic Identity Cards. Such conditions appear in the Munich Olympic Booklet of 1972. The danger of following such a procedure is that if such demands are acceded to, persons intent on causing harm would have an open invitation to import the necessary weapons.

There is no basis in Canadian Customs law for exemption from baggage examination, except for accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign governments. Although Customs practices in effect may not entail actual examination of all baggage, this is determined on a selective basis, through the application of certain criteria at the discretion of the examining officer.

In no particular case or types of cases are Customs officers empowered to waive examination on a 100% basis. To eliminate or even lower standards of examination would serve only to enhance the possibilities for a security threat and necessitate the employment of greater numbers of personnel and equipment for detection and protection purposes. Consequently, it is considered extremely inadvisable to entertain any suggestion of a "blanket" exemption from Customs examination for visitors coming to Canada for the Games.

There should be no difficulty in arranging baggage examination procedures that will accommodate Olympic visitors with a minimum of delay or inconvenience and without compromising security. There is sufficient time to review the requirements, devise systems, test procedures and train personnel.

c. Participant and VIP Security

Plans for the protection of participants, coaches officials, etc., must match the estimate of the threat. Understandably, no accurate forecast of the threat can be made for 1976 at this time. All that can be done now is to examine the current trends, project them to 1976 and plan for the worst possible situation such as attempted assassination or kidnapping.

At Munich in 1972 VIP's, athletes, coaches and trainers numbered about 12,000. It seems doubtful that the city of Montreal could provide more than a token effort of personnel protection for this number. As members of Olympic teams, participants are representatives of their respective countries, and therefore some may have to be placed in a high risk category from a security point of view as were the Israelis at Munich.

d. Airports and National Harbours

Plans must be made to increase security forces on a gradual scale until 1976 to meet the expected flow of traffic entering Canada from overseas. Seventy-two per cent of the persons visiting the Olympics in Japan arrived by air. In 1968, Mexico's percentage was sixty-eight. Canada's figure can be estimated as between sixty and seventy per cent.

e. Canada - United States Border Crossings

Ground traffic will be a major problem at border points. The Immigration and Customs services and the RCMP assisted by DND, must develop contingency plans for special border patrols for unmanned border crossings and to control traffic to or at points of examination.

f. Vital points

Depending upon the degree of the threat, the RCMP may very well be required to provide security to protect Vital Points. These number 37 in Quebec and 4 in Ontario. There are also 27 Provincial Peacetime Vital Points located in Montreal.

E. SUPPORT TO THE RCMP FROM THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

DND support has been requested by the RCMP, both in Montreal and Kingston, in a variety of areas such as ground and air transport, communications, guard duty, crowd control, riot control, border surveillance and marine assistance.

Defence Department plans to meet these needs and those requested of it by COJO are detailed in Cabinet Document 454/73 entitled "DND Support to Olympic 1976".

In estimating the possible support to the RCMP, which may be required from the Canadian Armed Forces, it is again necessary, to ensure that resources will be available, to plan for the worst foreseeable situation. Otherwise, Armed Forces resources will be committed to other than security tasks and will not be available to support the RCMP when and if they are required.

For internal security requirements to support the RCMP, the total resource requirement can only be re-evaluated at regular intervals in relation to the threat estimates. Support to the internal security forces is presently estimated as follows:

- (a) A main operational headquarters, based in Montreal with a detachment in Kingston to coordinate DND support.
- (b) Air Transport:
  - 12 helicopters
    - 2 C-130's on standby - 5 hours notice
    - 2 additional C-130's on 8 hours notice
- (c) 30 jeep-mounted communication sets with operators for a 24-hour day.
- (d)
  - (i) Up to 300 Military Police in plain clothes equipped with revolvers.
  - (ii) Up to 50 snipers prepared for operations in Montreal and 25 in the Kingston area.
  - (iii) 24-hour guard of 50 vital points.
  - (iv) A force of approximately 2,000 men trained to assist in supporting the police for crowd control.
  - (v) A mobile reserve of 1,000 men at 4 hours notice to move.
  - (vi) DND marine assistance - 6 harbour launches and crews at Kingston.
- (e) Ground transport based at St. Hubert to move and lift 300 to 500 men.
- (f) 12 APC's on 5 hours notice based at St. Hubert plus 6 wheeled AFV's.

There will be a certain amount of joint RCMP-Canadian Armed Forces training required for internal security duties. An efficient command and control mechanism will also have to be established 000872



The Department of National Defence has estimated that the operational manpower requirement to meet these needs would amount to approximately 5,100 men. This does not include logistic personnel whose numbers have not yet been determined.

ALTERNATIVES:

There are two alternatives open to the government:

1. "The German model" which would be to take the risks of sacrificing effective security in order to play up Olympic ideals of international cooperation, brotherhood and freedom. The memorandum has discussed the consequences of this approach which would include relatively free entry and no customs check, and concludes that the resultant danger of losing effective security control is not acceptable.
2. A strong and effective level of security which would make it clear nationally and internationally that Canada intends to control entry to Canada for the games, and to ensure the safety of participants and others to the fullest extent possible. An essential requirement will be an agreement as to jurisdictional responsibilities. Every effort will be made to accommodate I.O.C. expectations providing that strong and effective security is not compromised. Special legislation to be brought forward closer to 1976 may be desirable to permit, for the few weeks surrounding the games, immediate removal from Canada of persons not admissible. Such a security posture would also require normal customs inspection procedures. This posture may well invite considerable criticism from the I.O.C. and its federations, but at the same time will likely be understood and accepted by most countries. On the other hand, an incident at Montreal like that at Munich could draw even greater criticism.

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Until the problems posed in this memorandum concerning the estimated threat in 1976, jurisdiction and VIP security are solved, and until Cabinet provides direction as to the kind of security posture that should be adopted, it is not possible to estimate security costs at the Federal level with accuracy.

Excluding the costs of possible Canadian Armed Forces support to the police, the following estimate of police costs is provided:

RCMP CIB	- \$11.0 Million
RCMP SECURITY SERVICE	- <u>3.3 Million</u>
	<u>\$14.3 Million</u>

For Immigration requirements additional start-up costs could be in the order of \$2-3 millions with a continuing annual cost for computer systems in the order of \$800,000. Integration with existing or other developing systems of computerized identification of criminal and security risks could reduce these costs.

FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS CONSIDERATIONS:

The situation involves the jurisdictional responsibilities of Quebec and Ontario provincial and municipal police forces. Full consultation will be required so that arrangements for the coordination of these responsibilities with federal responsibilities can be defined and agreed upon. This will probably require consultation up to the ministerial level.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONSULTATION:

This memorandum has been prepared as a result of a broadly based interdepartmental consultation involving all departments and agencies having any responsibility for the security of the games.

PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSIDERATIONS:

No comprehensive or early public announcement or public information program would be necessary. As questions are asked however it would be appropriate for Ministers to stress Canada's ultimate responsibility and to express our intention to maintain, without inhibiting the operation and philosophy of the games, a strong security posture (if Cabinet agrees to this posture) in order to prevent any incident such as that which marred the 1972 games in Munich.

CAUCUS CONSULTATION:

None.

CONCLUSIONS:

(a) The threat to security at 1976 Olympics in Montreal has three principal aspects:

- (i) There is the possibility that international terrorists, revolutionaries or violence prone groups will try to create a serious incident within the Olympic milieu itself, taking advantage of the instant and world wide publicity which will result, to advertise their real or imagined grievances.
- (ii) While the gaps in immigration security that could be created by unrestricted use of Olympic Identity Cards for admission to Canada is serious, there is a second problem of at least equal concern. It may confidently be expected that some persons will come to Canada to engage in illegal activities of various types or to use the Olympic Games as a distraction to gain illegal entry to Canada.
- (iii) Also attempts might be made to try to take advantage of any relaxation of current immigration and customs regulations brought about by the Olympics to introduce into

Canada weapons and other materiel which might increase the internal security problems. (See ANNEX I)

- (b) Despite the jurisdictional responsibilities of various levels of police forces, Canada and not the Provincial or Municipal governments will be held responsible for any failure to prevent breaches of security which could result in an international incident. This must be made clear to the Quebec and Montreal authorities and to the Canadian and International Olympic Committees.
- (c) For planning purposes, it must be assumed that the current trends in international terrorism and the growth of social unrest in many parts of the world will continue to escalate and that security planning must be based on maintaining strong and effective security. If the actual threat is not as serious as current developments indicate it will be, then the initial strong security measures can be modified. The reverse process would be much more difficult if not impossible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That Cabinet agree:

- (a) to a strong security posture which would recognize the possibility of a serious security threat, recognize the ultimate responsibility of Canada for the safety of participants and others and have its expression in
  - (i) control by Canada, not the I.O.C., of entry by participants, coaches, officials, media representatives and visitors,
  - (ii) normal customs examination procedures as opposed to I.O.C. expectations of blanket customs exemption,

(iii) close cooperation with provincial and municipal police forces which will probably involve federal leadership in security planning and will require delicate negotiations and agreement concerning jurisdiction,

LIAISON

(iv) possible legislation to be introduced later to provide, during a period of a few weeks before, during and after the games, for rejection and immediate removal of foreign terrorists, criminals and demonstrators without recourse to inquiry and appeal procedures;

LEGISLATION

(b) that the Solicitor General be authorized to instruct the Commissioner, R.C.M. Police,

(i) to negotiate with provincial and local police forces and COJO in order to clearly determine and agree upon appropriate jurisdictions recognizing always the federal responsibility to safeguard national interests and the large federal input of security personnel,

(ii) to appoint within the Force a coordinator of security planning who will include in his responsibilities coordination of federal involvement and liaison with COJO,

DONE

(iii) to augment RCMP resources in personnel, materiel and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended;

DONE

(c) that the Minister of Manpower and Immigration be authorized to augment his resources in personnel and finances as required subject to Treasury Board approval in order to support the security posture recommended,

(d) that a committee of Ministers be formed drawn from the Cabinet Committee on Security & Intelligence and consisting of those Ministers having a direct interest in Olympic security which would, subject to Cabinet confirmation, consider and approve, where appropriate, federal involvement in security planning as it develops which might include negotiations with appropriate Ministers in Quebec and Ontario.

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Warren Allmand,  
Solicitor General of Canada.

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Robert Andras,  
Minister of Manpower & Immigration.

OLYMPIC SECURITY PLANNINGTHE THREAT:a. General Problem

The escalation of acts of terrorism and violence in recent years presents a serious threat to the maintenance of national internal security at the Olympics and to the thousands of foreign dignitaries, athletes, trainers, newsmen and other visitors for whose safety Canada will be responsible. The problem may be illustrated by the growing threat to diplomatic personnel. In the past five years, for example, over two dozen diplomats from various countries have been kidnapped and six assassinated. While law enforcement authorities are endeavouring to develop effective measures to deal with political violence, the international community remains vulnerable to a variety of tactics and techniques employed by organized terrorist groups with an alarming degree of success, as exemplified by the Lod, Munich and Khartoum tragedies.

b. Terrorist Activities

The activities of terrorists and urban guerrillas have developed in response to various issues which may not be resolved by 1976 and, therefore, must be considered in the formulation of security plans for the Olympic Games. Those causes and groups which, at the present time, appear to be most relevant to forecast of the security problem in 1976 are described. These include:

(1) The Arab/Israeli Dispute

The task of seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab/Israeli dispute has become more complex due to the activities of the Black September Organization and other terrorist groups. For example, the recent establishment of a new Al Fatah training base in South Yemen indicates that the number of skilled terrorists is likely to increase.

In the light of the complexity and protracted duration of the dispute, it is difficult to foresee whether and when a viable Arab/Israeli settlement in the area can be reached. Even if an inter-state settlement were reached, it is still possible that disaffected Palestinian groups would undertake international terrorist actions and in such circumstances the threat would have to be regarded with some degree of seriousness. Should the dispute remain unsettled in 1976 there would continue to exist a much more serious threat of international terrorist actions by these groups.

(2) The British/Irish Question

As in the case of the Arab/Israeli dispute, any settlement of the British/Irish question must contend with hard-line minorities such as the I.R.A. provisionals who are unwilling to accept compromise solutions and are prepared to deploy terrorist tactics until they are victorious.

While they have, until now, looked to North America primarily for financial and material support and have not extended their terrorist activities beyond the United Kingdom and Ireland, a switch in tactics which could involve North America in this fashion must be borne in mind.

(3) Quebec Separatism

Currently, the leadership of the Front de liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) projects a public posture that violence and terrorism is inappropriate. However, depending on the results of the next Quebec provincial election, it is possible that there will be a reassessment of the F.L.Q.'s position vis-a-vis Quebec independence and a re-evaluation of the organization's tactics. A situation could then arise where the F.L.Q. might gain strength from



radical elements disillusioned with the prospects for achieving an independent socialist Quebec, through democratic means.

(4) Black Extremism

Since his return to the United States in September 1972, Stokely CARMICHAEL, head of the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party has made many speeches predicting that America is headed for armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare. Similar calls for intensification of revolutionary activity are detected in the activities of the Black Liberation Army, De Mau Mau, with the support from non-Black groups such as Venceremos. There is a serious possibility of a spill-over from the United States by Black Extremists who choose to utilize the Olympic Games as a focal point in drawing attention to their cause.

(5) Red Power

As the recent incident at Wounded Knee demonstrates, advocates of Red Power are becoming more active and vocal in soliciting support for their cause. The interaction of Canadian and American Red extremists is showing continued developments.

(6) Urban Guerrilla Activity

In recent years, leading revolutionaries in the United States have called for an intensification of urban Guerrilla activity. There were an estimated 195 incidents of urban guerrilla activity (criminal acts with revolutionary motivation) in the United States in 1972.

(7) Liberation and Secessionist Movements

At the conclusion of the Tri-Continental conference in Havana in 1966, a communique was issued implying "no peaceful reform, only revolutionary violence".

The office of the Tri-Continental Conference continues to operate and to lend support to the cause of revolution. A strong possibility already exists that such groups will attempt to utilize the Olympics to draw attention to their grievances through demonstrations and other incidents.

Secessionist groups such as the Croatian nationalists have clearly demonstrated that the battleground for their struggle is not limited by geographical boundaries.

The results of the conference of World Liberation Movements held in March 1973 in Santiago, Chile are as yet unknown to the Security Service.

c. Other Internal Organizations

In assessing our security requirements for the Olympic Games we must also consider internal groups other than those mentioned above. Security problems could arise from the activities of left-wing organizations such as the Maoists, Trotskyists and New Left. Right-wing groups and national extremists such as the Jewish Defence League, Western Guard, Ku Klux Klan, Nazi Supporters, Serbians and Croatian emigre groups are also a cause for concern.

d. Conclusion

(1) Most recent studies of international terrorism indicate that both the scope and the intensity of terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare will continue to present serious unsettled problems for the maintenance of law and order within the international community. The fact that members of these groups adhere to numerous causes and include a multiplicity of national origins is of primary importance in the formulation of security

plans for the safe conduct of an international event such as the Olympic Games.

- (ii) The RCMP Security Service will require added resource allocation commencing in 1973-74 to support effectively the police plans for security for the Olympic Games in 1976. The following additional activities will be required: establishment of a separate secretariat within the RCMP to produce intelligence threat estimates in cooperation with other agencies and departments concerned for the Olympics; expansion of existing liaison with friendly intelligence agencies and the utilization of any necessary additional security intelligence links which may also require additional supporting staff; development of new security intelligence links where possible; establishment of secure and rapid communications links with major centres around the world; expansion of existing communications in major Canadian cities; increased penetration of groups or organizations in Canada which are prone to violent protest; establishment and maintenance of penetration of subversive groups with revolutionary aims; increase of resource personnel to dialogue with groups likely to demonstrate or cause other security problems as part of a continuing "diffusing" program.

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE AT MUNICH

In the month of December 1972 a Canadian Police delegation composed of members of the RCMP, the Quebec Provincial Police and the Montreal City Police visited Munich, Germany. The purpose of the visit was to obtain as much information as possible about the problems that were involved in policing of the 1972 Olympic Games by the German police authorities. Additionally, the delegation examined the circumstances of the "Munich Massacre" - the killing of eleven Israeli athletes, five Arab terrorists and one policeman as a result of a series of acts committed by the Black September Organization during the Munich Olympics.

Unlike the other West German states, Bavaria appears to regard itself as a separate state and jealously guards and protects its autonomy. The people consider themselves to be "Bavarians" first and "Germans" second. As an example, when the games were given to Munich by the International Olympic Committee, the Bavarian Government decided it would maintain a tight control over the staging of the games by exhibiting a distinctive Bavarian image, placing very little emphasis on the role being played by the Federal Republic of Germany. Bavaria agreed to accept 50% of the financing by the Federal Government but it reserved the right to control its own operation which included both police security measures as well as matters concerning immigration. The net result was that both of these important functions were organized by the State of Bavaria on a very "low key" basis. The intention was to convey to the nations of the world that Munich was a free state. In short, Bavaria wished to portray the City of Munich as an open city in an effort to erase the past impressions of a police state which had been created by Hitler at the 1936 Olympic Games.

The State of Bavaria, because of the size and population of its five main cities and its own border (immigration) guards, had no difficulty in assembling a combined police strength of some 16,000 men. Apart from those who performed traffic and investigative duties within the City of Munich, the presence of uniformed police in and around the Olympic Village and the Olympic site was sparse. On the site the police were clothed in powder blue blazers and trousers and did not carry arms. This was in keeping with the "low profile" image of the police as decided upon by the Bavarian Government.

The Bavarian Government appointed a Police Coordinator but total police responsibility for operations was placed in the hands of the Director of Munich City Police. He was assisted in this task by two Assistant Police Directors and no less than seven to ten police committees which were formed to coordinate specific policing tasks connected with the Games.

The Olympic Village was built to lodge 12,000 athletes, trainers and a number of other officials. A special police guard body was formed to carry out security duties in the Village. This, at best, was a loose arrangement as there was little or no control exercised over persons entering and leaving the Village. In the final analysis, security precautions were lax, passes were not checked, persons were not challenged for their identity. As a result the Black September terrorists were able to enter the Village undetected on the morning of September 5, 1972, and seize and hold the Israeli athletes as hostages within the apartment allotted to the Israeli team.

It is known that plans to kidnap the Israelis were made well in advance without the knowledge of security authorities. The police were caught completely off guard, ill prepared, ill equipped and not properly trained to handle such an incident. The "low key" profile which had been decided for police and security authorities by the Bavarian Government contributed to the success of the Black September operation and its tragic outcome. It was Germany, however, not the State

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of Bavaria or the City of Munich which has been held accountable by the international community.

Conclusion

The principal lesson to be learned from Munich is that in the 1970's no country can afford to assume that terrorists, revolutionaries and violence prone groups will not attempt to take advantage of the massive and instant world wide publicity which would result from any incident staged at the Olympics. Despite the possible intentions of the City of Montreal, the Government of Quebec and the International and Canadian Olympic Committees with regard to a reduced security and police profile, in the final analysis, like Germany, it will be Canada which will be held accountable for any serious breach of the security arrangements at the 1976 Olympics.

The German experience illustrates dramatically what can occur when constraints are placed on police and security authorities for the sake of an acceptable political image.