

Note.

A meeting was held at the Dominions Office on Oct. 8th at which were present Sir John Stephensen, Mr Norman Robertson, Mr Clutterbuck, Mr Neville Butler, Mr Bromley, Capt Liddell and myself. It was agreed that the first step which must be taken was to obtain a decision from Mr Atlee and Mr Mackenzie King and ultimately Mr Truman on the high policy matter as to whether this case should be carried to prosecution or handled without publicity. After discussion it was agreed that the Foreign Office should draft a paper in consultation with Mr Norman Robertson and this paper might then form the basis for discussion with the Prime Minister.

A.D.F.  
9.10.45.

Sgd. R.H. Hollis.

TOP SECRET.  

---

ADDRESS NEW YORK.

9.10.45.

CXG. 931MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. only for 48000 personal decipher yourself.

For R.C.M.P. from HOLLIS.

- A. It was agreed yesterday that the Foreign Office in consultation with Norman Robertson should draft a short paper to form the basis for highest level discussion of policy first here and later in Washington.
- B. The main point for discussion will be whether prosecution with attendant publicity is the course to be followed.
- C. The date and nature of the action to be taken here and in Canada must depend on these decisions which should not be long delayed, though they may not be finally concerted by October 18th.
- D. We can synchronise our examination of PRIMROSE with the date finally chosen by you and F.B.I.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

9.10.45.

CXG. 930.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. only for 48000 personal decipher yourself.

For R.C.M.P. from HOLLIS.

Your telegram 468 paragraph B.

A. We feel that undue delay may imperil the operation first because the Russians may get in first with some trumped up charge and second for the general reason that delay increases the likelihood that the agents will perfect their cover stories and destroy incriminating documents.

B. We are assuming that GRANT is no longer maintaining contact with the agents. Have you any information on this point?

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET. *6115*

8.10.45.

1121 G.M.T.

9.10.45.

1020 G.M.T.

9.10.45.

FEC/MAH

1035 G.M.T.

CXG. 493 of October 8th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only from 48000. Personal decipher yourself. Your telegram 924. *596*

A. R.C.M.P. are and have been ready to take action here since October 7th if required to do so. They are satisfied with date October 18th as set by you but have made preparations to enable them to proceed earlier.

B. They still have to receive agreement to date set by you from F.B.I. and in view of necessity for U.S. to support all action taken in every way possible cannot proceed until they receive an answer.

C. In view the attitude taken by BYRNES as expressed in Halifax's telegram October 7th we feel that strong expression of policy from your end to Americans is essential as for security reasons this case cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely.

D. Please repeat to M.I.5. MACDONALD has seen and agrees.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
 TOP SECRET.

6/11

NEW YORK.

8.10.45.

2321.

JCM/er  
 9.10.45.  
 0930.

9.10.45.

0920.

CXG. 492 of 8th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only from 48000 personal decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram.

C. Halifax's message to CADOGAN 483-84 October 7th refers to question of **publicity in event of arrests**. Our feeling is that if arrests are made short statement should be issued soon afterwards by Minister of Justice to effect that, in view of serious information reaching Government it had been found necessary to detain certain persons suspected of conduct prejudicial to safety of State, that an immediate enquiry was being held into circumstances and that a full statement would be issued as soon as enquiry was completed. If, however, there are simultaneous arrests in United States and United Kingdom it might be desirable to say more after concerting announcements from the three Capitals.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
TOP SECRET.

60A

NEW YORK.

8.10.45.

2321

JCM/er  
1030.

9.10.45.

0930.

CXG. 491 of 8th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only from 48000 personal decypher yourself.

Following for N. ROBERTSON from HUME WRONG.

My telegram 472 - 479.

A. You should perhaps know nature of legal authority prepared here for use against agents in Canada especially since we have not followed suggestion in para. 2 last telegram referred to. Order in Council was passed on October 6th in which it was stated that agents of a Foreign Power were known to have been engaged in a concerted effort to secure secret and confidential information. Order empowers acting Prime Minister or Minister of Justice to authorise interrogation and detention of any persons involved with a view to preventing them from communicating secret confidential information or otherwise acting in any manner prejudicial to safety of State. Order also empowers either of these two Ministers to authorise R.C.M.P. to enter and search premises occupied by persons so detained. Separate orders naming 18 individuals in Canada were signed yesterday by acting

-2-

Prime Minister. It would be unlikely even in event of a general round-up that all these persons would in fact be detained.

B. These preparations were made against possibility of our having to act quickly following action last night in London. No provision was made for a Royal Commission. Since nothing happened last night, while orders issued here remain in effect until repealed we can now supplement or replace them in light of whatever decision on general policy is reached.

My immediately following telegram.

Original in PF.66949 vol 2  
139a

For PF.66960 Supp B

TOP SECRET

Addressed New York

7.10.45.

CXG.924.

Following from C.S.S. personal for 48000 decipher yourself.

A<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> Rendezvous October 7th not repeat not attended by either  
PRIMROSE or contact.

B. No repeat no immediate action therefore called for on your  
side.



NEW YORK

7.10.45.

1503 BS

M.D.

7.10.45.

7.10.45.

2150 GMT.

2130 GMT.

178  
57CXG.483 of October 7th.Most Immediate.

Following is for C.S.S. personal decypher yourself. From 48,000.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from Lord Halifax.

A. On receipt of telegrams 9(?12)/917 I talked with PEARSON and subsequently PEARSON and MACINS saw ACHESON and informed him of latest developments. ACHESON was warned of possibility that urgent security reasons may make an arrest necessary tonight October 7th. PEARSON said that if this happened Canadian authorities would have to proceed against Soviet agents in Canada and request withdrawal of some members of Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. In these circumstances they would probably have to issue a statement and they would wish to (?concert) its terms with United States ?Government and H.M.G.

CXG.484 of October 7th.Most Immediate.

B. ACHESON then called in BYRNES and explained matter to him. Although BYRNES knew about PRIMROSE it was evident that he had not appreciated full extent and implications of affair as regards Canada and U.S.A. and he listened with great attention to PEARSON's account. He at once agreed that security considerations should be overriding but expressed strong hopes that, other things being equal, action should if practicable be avoided. He was concerned about effect at this moment of such a disclosure. He though Russians would try to make out that we had trumped up affair and would link it with proceedings of foreign minister's council.

C. BYRNES was grateful for warning we had given him and asked to be informed immediately if action was taken. He then instructed ACHESON to get latest information from F.B.I. on American end of case.

D. PEARSON has reported to Ottawa where he understands they are now considering question of public statement.

**TOP SECRET**TELEGRAM

From: New York

Date: 6.10.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following for Sir Orme Sargent from Malcolm Macdonald.

No. 481  
309a

1. Thank you for your very helpful telegrams 412 to 417. Hume Wrong and I with our colleagues here are in accord with your analysis of situation. Some of our answers to questions you ask are contained in full or in part in my telegrams 472 to 475. Other points, e.g. possibility of getting some agents to turn King's evidence, have also been very much in our minds and will be pursued to the utmost possible extent.
2. R.C.N.F. are now in a position take action here if PRIMROSE should be arrested on October 7th and if circumstances force them to do so. They hope however, that it would not be necessary for them to act immediately, but that circumstances would permit them to wait for at least a few days.
3. They greatly hope that things will turn out so that it is possible to adhere to plans for concerted action on or around October 13th or such subsequent date as may be necessary to fit in with plans of United States security authorities. They have been and are in touch with F.B.I. about this.

TELEGRAM

From: NEW YORK

Date: 6.10.45.

MAT IMMEDIATENo. 478

Following for Norman Robertson from Home Wrong, please pass copy to Sir A. Cadogan.

Reference my preceding message on Corby case. Following paragraphs on legal position and suggested method of procedure are based on draft prepared by Read in consultation with Varcoe following discussion with Minister of Justice R.C.M.P. officials and this department.

1. Department of Justice takes view that, except in three or four instances, there are grave doubts as to whether prosecution would result in conviction by reason of necessity for complying with the strict rules of evidence. Telegrams 908 - 909 from Hollis to R.C.M.P. explain intentions in essential regarding R. King case.

No. 479

2. Tentative plan has been made for action here in the event that instructions are received from you to proceed against persons concerned.

- (a) A draft order has been prepared enabling the Minister to provide for detention of persons implicated.
- (b) Order provides for reference of question as to whether continued detention is necessary to safety and interests of the State to a royal commissioner, and requires Minister to release in the event of a finding by royal commissioner in favour of any person detained.
- (c) It is assumed that royal commissioner will not be bound by strict rules of evidence and that therefore it may be possible to obtain much additional information and procedure could be fitted into later prosecution under criminal code if further evidence were forthcoming.

TW...

THE...

Handwritten initials/signature

REF: ...  
Date: 6/10/...

...

... (Canadian ...)

... (being actively pushed ...)

- 1. Arrest of ... may take place ...
- 2. ... have already advised security authorities in England that they wish to treat matter as intelligence case until all ...
- 3. ... should ... that any fighting here should if possible be synchronized with action in United States ...

- 2 -

concerted with a view to securing proper re-education in United States as well as maximum impact on Soviet authorities.

No. 471

4. Security authorities in evidence report that the A.C.L.F. that they fix a date for commencement of action will have tentatively proposed October 15th which is immediately adjacent to a date fixed for second whisky contact. A.C.L.F. inform me that they could be ready by this date but that they would be inclined to wait a little longer. Their thoughts on this matter are also subject to consideration in para (3) above.
5. It is clear of course that, barring an emergency, no action will or can be taken until Prime Minister either authorizes or instructs public action. Until this happens police can only make a reservation and express their opinion as to most desirable course from their point of view.

No. 475

6. But apart from pure security aspect, decisions are required on diplomatic side. In first place, is our knowledge to be used to bring pressure on Soviet Government without initial public revelation? Even if public exposure is considered desirable or desirable, this would not rule out prior approach at, for instance, a meeting of Big Three if one is called soon consequent on failure of Council of Foreign Ministers.
7. Secondly, what action should we take, if any, to be made towards Soviet Embassy and diplomatic personnel here involved in espionage? It seems certain that Canadian Government cannot remain passive and some sort of protest should be addressed to Soviet Government. It would at least be necessary to declare innocence non-existent to those Soviet officials directly implicated and probably the Ambassador. We should decide on what channel to use and timing of such protest in relation to other action in case.
8. If protest to Soviet Government is to be made by Wilgress, he must be given some warning in advance and should know outline of case.
9. Legal opinion has been slowly veering from position at beginning of week when it was felt that there was no legal evidence to support any charges.

No. 476

-3-

legal opinion follows in a separate telegram, which also suggests possible appointment of a royal commission to investigate Soviet espionage activities in this country. Desirability of such a procedure is again a matter for decision at highest level since main direct result of hearings before a royal commission would be publicity, although commission might be authorized to sit in camera.

No. 477

10. We have been endeavouring to put ours in a position where we will be able to implement whatever decision is arrived at as a result of your talks in London. It is obvious however that once the F.I.'s views are crystallized it will be much easier for us to go forward with a definite objective in view.
11. Malcolm MacDonald has seen this and my immediately following telegram and approves their contents. Both have been reported to Lord Halifax and have earlier important telegrams from MacDonald.

TOP SECRET. *107a*

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 912.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal decipher yourself.

Following for MALCOLM MACDONALD from SIR O. SARGENT (SIR A. CADOGAN is on leave).

Your telegrams Nos. <sup>44a - 47a</sup> 420 - 423 of 30th September and your <sup>50a</sup> 426 of 1st October :

A. Foreign Secretary wishes to discuss whole question with Mr. MACKENZIE KING, but latter will only arrive at SOUTHAMPTON about noon on October 7th. There is a faint possibility that we may catch PRIMROSE redhanded on evening of October 7th handing package to a contact who may prove to be a member of Russian Embassy here. This would in all probability be our only chance of getting hard evidence against PRIMROSE and if the arrest were made, Russian Embassy here might warn Russian Embassy in OTTAWA in which case you would need to decide whether you should take action at your end. We would of course let you know most immediately should such an arrest be made.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

---

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 913.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal, decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram.

B. My immediately following telegram is for your information only to show how our minds are moving on the various questions which you raised. I should make it clear that these views are not repeat not yet approved by the Foreign Secretary, but in view of the remote possibility of an arrest on October 7th mentioned above, I feel that you should know our preliminary views. If, as is probable, nothing happens on October 7th, a further telegram will be sent to you after full discussion with Mr. Mackenzie King.

Ends.



TOP SECRET.  

---

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 914.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal, decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following from Sir ORME SARGENT.

With reference to your telegram No. 420 paragraph 2, our opinion still is that it is desirable to take the normal action and in an espionage case this will mean prosecution if legal evidence is available. The Russians would interpret any action less than this as weakness and the effect of this would not be to improve relations.

Your telegram No. 421 paragraph 3.A. The purpose of the action against the agents should be first to obtain additional evidence for their prosecution and second to obtain further Intelligence information about the net-work and the Russian methods of operation.

Even if you have at present no evidence on which the agents in Canada could be brought into the Court, have you considered whether the products of the questioning of the agents in Canada will not produce material which will allow you to bring the agents to trial possibly in part as a result of some of the agents turning King's evidence. We should like to hear as soon as possible your further observations on possible methods of procedure as regards questioning of these agents.

TOP SECRET.  

---

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 915.MOST IMMEDIATE (PART II).

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal,  
decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram.

- C' D. PRIMROSE's movements on October 7th will be under close observation and, if he should attend the rendezvous and follow out the instructions laid down in the telegram to GRANT, these points will be closely noted and will later be used in the questioning of PRIMROSE. If the rendezvous is kept by some other person, that person will be followed home and identified. Arrests of PRIMROSE and the other person will be made only if it is manifest that a document has passed from PRIMROSE and that that document is known to be a top secret one. This is obviously a very remote chance. In this case a charge would be brought for an offence against the Official Secrets Acts. President TRUMAN would acquiesce in this procedure. If PRIMROSE is not arrested on October 7th we would propose that he should be questioned on a subsequent date agreed in advance with you on which some or all of the Canadian agents should also be questioned.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 916.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. personal for 48000. Decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. Professional opinion here is that there is a reasonable chance that PRIMROSE might be led to incriminate himself during such a questioning. We consider it unlikely that PRIMROSE would commit any further act in the near future apart from possibly handing over a document on October 7th or at some subsequent meeting, though if given a sufficiently long run he might finally commit himself.

E. Your telegram No. 422, paragraph 3,B : if we arrest PRIMROSE on October 7th we shall also arrest his companion who may turn out to be a member of the staff of the Soviet Embassy here.

F. We consider that the right course to be followed, if PRIMROSE is not repeat not arrested is that the Canadian Government should demand on the date to be agreed for questioning the recall of the Military Attache and other members of the Embassy actively concerned in the spy organisation, and that this action should be taken on or immediately subsequent to the agreed date for the questioning of the agents.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.  

---

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 917.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal, decipher yourself.

My immediately preceding telegram:

G. Your telegram No. 423, paragraph A C : this is a possible risk, but in view of what is at stake, we feel that it should be taken. We would prefer not to issue warning beforehand about possible action against PRIMROSE, but if PRIMROSE should be caught handing documents to a contact who, upon arrest, is found to be a member of Soviet Embassy in United Kingdom, we would propose to inform our own and Canadian Embassy in Moscow as well as yourself of what has occurred and warn them of possibility of retaliation. If, as is probable, no arrest is made, this point can be considered again when moment for action against agents as a whole draws near.

ENDS.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.10.45.

CXG. 911.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000. Personal  
decypher yourself. *SSC*

A. Reference my CXG. 912 to 917 of 5th October : Z.P.  
request that these should be shown by you to Lord HALIFAX  
or to Mr. MAKINS together with the telegrams from Mr. MALCOLM  
MACDONALD to which they reply. (?refer).

B. Kindly confirm.

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

PF.Y. 66949 MAY, Alan Nunn.~~1306~~  
53a

With reference to Telegram 420 at <sup>446</sup>~~447~~ to the Foreign Office from Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, I spoke to Mr. Bromley on the telephone and suggested that we should draft the main lines of the answer. I then drafted the reply filed at <sup>52a</sup>~~449a~~ and, after discussing it with Captain Liddell saw C. who approved it. Mr. Marriott and I later went to the Foreign Office and saw Mr. Bromley and Mr. Butler, both of whom agreed that the draft adequately represented the Government's views in all important particulars and would serve as the basis for their reply.

A. D. F.  
2nd October, 1945.

R. H. Hollis.

TOP SECRET*Agent King is submarine WFO*

With reference to your paragraph 2, our opinion is that it is desirable to take the normal action and in an espionage case this will mean prosecution if legal evidence is available. The Russians would interpret any action less than this as weakness and the effect of this would be to worsen and not to improve relations.

Your paragraph 3A. The purpose of the action against the agents should be first to obtain additional evidence for their prosecution and second to obtain further Intelligence information about the network and the Russian methods of operation. Even if you have at present no evidence on which the agents in Canada could be brought into the Court, have you considered whether the products of the questioning of the agents in Canada will not produce material which will allow you to bring the agents to trial possibly in part as a result of some of the agents turning King's evidence? We should like to hear as soon as possible your further observations on possible methods of procedure as regards questioning of these agents.

PRIMROSE's movements on October 7th will be under close observation and, if he should attend the rendezvous and follow out the instructions laid down in the telegram to GRANT, these points will be closely noted and will later be used in the questioning of PRIMROSE. If the rendezvous is kept by some other person, that person will be traced and identified. Arrests of PRIMROSE and the other person will be made only if it is manifest that a document has passed from PRIMROSE and that that document is known to be a Top Secret one. This is obviously a very remote chance. In this case a charge would be brought ~~against both persons~~ for an offence against the Official Secrets Acts. If PRIMROSE is not arrested on October 7th it is intended that he should be questioned on a subsequent date agreed in advance with you on which some or all of the Canadian agents should also be questioned. Professional opinion here is that there is a reasonable chance that PRIMROSE might be led to incriminate himself during such a questioning. We consider it unlikely that PRIMROSE would commit any further act in the near future apart from possibly handing over a document on October 7th or at some subsequent meeting, though if given a sufficiently long run he might finally commit himself.

Your paragraph 3B. If we arrest PRIMROSE on October 7th we shall also

/arrest

arrest his companion who may turn out to be a member of the staff of the Soviet Embassy here. We consider that the right course to be followed, leaving out the possible question of arrest, is that the Canadian Government should demand the recall of ~~the Russian Ambassador~~ the Military Attache and other members of the Embassy actively concerned in the spy organisation, and that this action should be taken on or immediately subsequent to the agreed date for the questioning of the agents.

Your paragraph 3C.

2.10.45



NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

1.10.45.

1341

J.C.M./A.M.G.

1.10.45.

1.10.45.

2215 BST.

2100 BST.

CXG. 426 of October 1st.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. personal decypher yourself, from 48000.

- A. **MACKENZIE KING saw TRUMAN yesterday and he and ROBERTSON spent the night here.**
- B. **TRUMAN did not commit himself as to which course of action he favoured. He wished time to consider but did say that obviously any action contemplated must be concerted London, Washington, Ottawa.**
- C. **King and ROBERTSON now agree that case is Heaven sent opportunity to put the whole world on <sup>X</sup>warning.**
- D. **I pointed out to them that in my view it was of great importance to "play up" the American aspect of case if and when it reaches public (questionnaires relating to movements of specific formations of United States troops, etc.) otherwise the American press or some sections of it might turn their venom on Britain for allowing tube alloy leakages to take place. They fully agree.**
- E. **Please contact NORMAN ROBERTSON at DORCHESTER immediately he arrives. He and King sail to-day Queen Mary. They propose touring battle fields and expect to be away six weeks.**

Please inform CADOGAN.

X as coded could be "trial".

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

RECEIVED BY O.T.P.

471  
472

IZ 9463  
TOO 012351Z  
TOR 020147Z

IMMEDIATE

FROM : J.S.M. WASHINGTON  
TO : CABINET OFFICES

ARC.M 427.

1st October 1945.

Top Secret and Personal.

My ARC.M 426.

Following for Sir A. Cadogan from Lord Halifax.

Acheson has now spoken to the President who said that if immediate and imperative reasons of security required an arrest he would naturally not wish to stand in the way. But if, as he hoped, those imperative reasons were not present he would greatly prefer that action should be deferred pending further consideration and discussion. Acheson told me that the President felt this very strongly.

2. Mr. Mackenzie King, who spoke to me on this matter yesterday, expressed similar views.

TOO 012351Z

Circulation

Defence Office  
Sir A. Cadogan

NEW YORK.

30.9.45.

2135 EST.

1.10.45.

0930 EST.

RAIR.  
1.10.45.  
1015 EST.

~~1470~~  
~~430~~

CAS 424 of September 30th.

OST I WIAA.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal use only for yourself.

NO 48,000.

Immediately received telegram.

5. In order assist consultations between the 73 Governments,

Mr. KING proposes the following

(a.) He will see President Truman Sunday morning in Washington.

Mr. ROBERTSON and Mr. TROTT will also discuss matter with Dean Acheson.

(b.) Mr. ACHESON KING and ROBERTSON will sail on Monday from New York in Queen Mary and expect to arrive in Britain sometime on October 5th.

(c.) In meantime, communication between the 3 capitals can be maintained by cable. Mr. St. LAURENT, the Minister of Justice, and acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Mr. TROTT will be in charge of this affair for Canadian Government in Ottawa.

6. Mr. ACHESON KING and ROBERTSON are already in Washington.

They have seen this telegram and approve its terms.

Copies sent C.S.S. 1.X. D.D.S.P.

TOP SECRET.  

---

NEW YORK.

30.9.45.

2230

J.E.A.C.

1.10.45.

1.10.45.

1040

0955

~~147C~~  
47aCXG. 423. September 30th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself from 48000. My immediately preceding telegram.

c) It is possible that when Soviet authorities in Moscow hear of action taken against PRIMROSE in London and other agents in Canada, they will take some counter action against, say, members of Canadian embassy in Moscow. It is highly desirable that we should consider whether any precautionary measures against this should be taken beforehand.

4. This and other relevant matters need thorough consideration and agreement between United Kingdom, Canadian and U.S.A. authorities. All necessary actions, both police and diplomatic, in every part of case need relating and co-ordinating, so that most advantageous effect possible can be gained. Otherwise, we may reap something less than maximum effect and even given Soviet Government chance to counter our plans.

My immediately following telegram.

NEW YORK

30/9/45

1/10/45

0947 BST

P.S.

1054 1/10/45

~~1470~~  
~~HEC~~

CXG 422 of 30/9/45MOST IMMEDIATE

Following is for C.S.S. ONLY. Personal decypher yourself.

From 4<sup>0000</sup>.

My immediately preceding telegram.

3. Continued. In this connection it would be helpful to us if you could give us further information on your precise intentions with regard to PRIMROSE on or after October 7th. On what grounds and with what purpose would you expect to be able to take action against him? If provisional legal advice referred to above is correct there would be no evidence in Canada on which he could be prosecuted and convicted under Canadian law. Do your legal advisers take a different view as regards English law? Alternately do you expect him to take some further action in future which would make a court case against him?.
4. So far as your end is concerned, action against PRIMROSE would presumably not repeat not involve immediate complications with staff of Soviet Embassy in London. But here situation is different. Action against agents in Canada at once raises question of relations

2

with Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

Canadian, United Kingdom and U.S.A. authorities must clearly reach agreement, before action against agents is taken, as to what action should be taken against Embassy.

My immediately following telegram.

N.Y. CRK.

30.9.45.

2130.

ESS.  
1.10.45.  
1115.

1.10.45.

1.05.

H#7e  
+ SA

Ops. 421 of 30th.

1000-1000.

Following for CSS only. Personal Decypher yours of from 48,000.  
By immediate preceding telegram.

3). In any case, whichever policy is decided on, following points amongst others require careful examination and thought, before final decision is taken.

A. If and when action against H. Rose is taken, it is clearly desirable as you have suggested, that simultaneous action should be taken against all or some of agents here. That should be formed purpose of this action. You suggest arrests and legal proceedings wherever we have a case for such action. Our legal professional advice here is that even with the production of C. Y. himself and his documents we have no evidence either against H. Rose or any of the more than 20 agents involved, which would make a legal case and lead to their conviction is a stretch of law. This advice is professional and should be considered. If on further examination it is upheld we should be thrown back on our own agents for question of their guilt. It is of course a matter of legal procedure and is a difficult. But we are considering this problem and it is not possible

Page 2.

suggest satisfactory method or methods of procedure in course  
of next few days.

by immediately following telegram



CORRECTION.

NEW YORK's CXG. 431 of 1.10.45.

Paragraph D. Last word should read "October 3rd" NOT  
"extremists".

~~1484~~  
51A

TOP SECRET.  

---

NEW YORK.

1.10.45.	P.S.
	2.10.45.
2.10.45.	0944

0830 BST.

CXG. 431 of 1.10.45.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself, from 48000.

Your telegram 884. Following for HOLLIS from R.C.M.P.

A. Since recent indications are to the effect that British authorities may be contemplating police action against PRIMROSE in near future could arrest be made without publicity otherwise action taken may jeopardise whole plan of procedure in Canada and United States.

B. R.C.M.P. authorities to treat this matter as intelligence case until all plans have been carefully worked out with British and American authorities and complete agreement arrived at regarding best general policy to follow. This should also admit of further evidence being obtained against suspects.

C. It will be appreciated that there are many valuable leads to be energetically pursued both in Canada and United States and from a Canadian standpoint precipitate action in England followed by publicity would jeopardise success of major undertaking on this side.

D. R.C.M.P. and B.S.C. representative are arranging to take matter of policy up with F.B.I. at Ottawa on <sup>C.S.S.</sup> extremists.

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

2135 BST

30.9.45.

S.A.J.

1.10.45.

1.10.45.

1010 BST.

0925 BST

CXG. 420 of Sept. 30th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decipher yourself from 48000.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from HUME Wrong and MALCOLM  
MACDONALD.

1. We are glad there is no change in agreed policy to take no action prior to October 7th.
  2. We have shown your message in your telegram 884 to Mr. MACKENZIE King. He much appreciates this. On general policy his mind has been moving in direction of views expressed in my telegrams 388 to 93. He realises however, that your recent contacts with Russians and other information and considerations may well make alternative policy suggested by MR. BEPLE preferable in present circumstances and is fully prepared to be convinced that this is right. He notes that Mr. BEPLE thinks that publicity attending arrests "will have no adverse effect on Soviet policy towards the Americans and ourselves." From negative point of view this would be satisfactory. But Mr. King wonders whether we could not reap positive advantage i.e., some actual improvement in relations with Soviet by judicious and forceful handling of matter. He had been inclined to think this might be achieved by course tentatively suggest in telegram under reference.
- My immediately following telegram.

MOST IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET.

*Following for Malcolm Macdonald from Sir A. Cadyan  
Your 385 to 393 and your 397.*

1. There is no prospect of any action here before October 7th.

2. As regards general policy I have consulted the Secretary of State. He considers that we should follow the normal course in this matter, arrest all the agents against whom we have a case and take normal proceedings against them. We should be quite ready to accept the consequences of any publicity which may result. We feel strongly that the other courses you suggest would lead us into undesirable complications and we do not in fact think that the publicity attendant on the arrests will have an adverse effect on Soviet policy towards the Americans and ourselves.

3. You may inform Mr. McKenzie King of the Secretary of State's views.

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAMDESPATCHED BY O.T.P.

OZ 5935  
 TOO 281935z  
 TOD 282008z

IMMEDIATE

From :- Cabinet Offices.

To :- J.S.M., Washington.

C.NAM 429

28th. September, 1945.

Top Secret and Personal.

My C.NAM 427.

Canadians have shown some anxiety that action may be taken before they are ready. We have told them that there is no prospect of any action here before October 7th.

2. As regards general policy, U.K. High Commissioner in Canada, after some talk with Mackenzie King, has suggested that in view of possible political repercussions this affair should be dealt with in a rather special manner, and possibly some approach made to the Russians. Secretary of State considers, however, that we should follow the normal course in this matter, arrest all the agents against whom we have a case and take normal proceedings against them. We should be quite ready to accept the consequences of any publicity which may result. We feel strongly that the other courses you suggest would lead us into undesirable complications and we do not in fact think that the publicity attendant on the arrests will have an adverse effect on Soviet policy towards the Americans and ourselves.

3. U.K. High Commissioner has been authorised to let Mackenzie King know of the Secretary of State's views.

4. The foregoing is for your information as Mackenzie King may raise the matter during his visit to Washington this week-end.

T.O.O. 281935z

Circulation

Defence Office  
 Sir Alexander Cadogan

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

28.9.45.

CKG. 881.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is from C.S.S. for 48000 personal decypher yourself.  
Following for Malcolm Macdonald from Sir Alexander Cadogan. Your  
number 385 to 393 and your 397-33a.

- A. There is no prospect of any action here before October 7th.
- B. As regards general policy I have consulted the Secretary of State. He considers that we should follow the normal course in this matter, arrest all the agents against whom we have a case and take normal proceedings against them. We should be quite ready to accept the consequences of any publicity which may result. We feel strongly that the other courses you suggest would lead us into undesirable complications and we do not in fact think that the publicity attendant on the arrests will have an adverse effect on Soviet policy towards the Americans and ourselves.
- C. You may inform Mr. Mackenzie King of the Secretary of State's views.

*Confirmation Copy*

S. Form 100.

**SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER** *131*

**From** : ..... RCMP Ottawa ..... Office File No. .... Originator's No. .... MP 50/45  
 ..... Passed for ..... Date of Origin ..... 26.9.45  
 ..... Action to ..... D.B. ..... Date of Receipt ..... 27.9.45  
 Copies to ..... Deciphered by ..... W.K.

Repetition required of MP/48/45 of 24.9.45.

....."to STEVENSON channel, unless there are over-riding reasons against this, Commissioner of External Affairs and Washington Embassy."

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

9456/T/A.7

D.B.

10/10/45

ADVANCE TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM R C M P OTTAWA  
DATED 26.9.45 REFERENCE NO MP50/45

REPETITION REQUIRED OF MP/48/45 OF 24.9.45

..... TO STEVENSON CHANNEL, UNLESS  
THERE ARE OVER-RIDING REASONS AGAINST THIS, COMMISSIONER  
OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND WASHINGTON EMBASSY''.

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION D.B. FOR ACTION

O.T.P.

27.9.45

16.35

L.B.Y.

+++++



CORRECTION.

133d  
JJA

NEW YORK.

CXG. 393 of September 26th.

Paragraph 7. Last line could read

"considerable additional information etc ....."

TOP SECRET. ~~131~~  
382

NEW YORK

26.9.45.

2140

J.E.A.C.

27.9.45.

27.9.45.

0840

0702

CXG. 393.

September 26th. (37a)

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48000.  
My immediately preceding telegram.

7. **Security courses sketched in paragraph 6a, b and c above conform with diplomatic courses sketched in paragraph 3a, b and c respectively. Thus if from diplomatic point of view 3c were adopted 6c would be appropriate security ?action to accompany it. It might present some practical difficulties. For example defence of Canada regulations and censorship arrangements have been rescinded. But** means could almost certainly be devised of achieving our object reasonably satisfactorily. From point of view of getting additional information about spy organisation in Canada (and possibly in some other countries) course 6 ?c would be almost as effective as the more drastic course 6b. On basis of ?information which we have already supplement from CORBY cross-examination of agents could be conducted in such a way that very considerable <sup>additional?</sup> prophetic information was likely to be gained.

8. For your information we have no particular evidence either way to indicate whether or not Russians know or seriously suspect that CORBY is now in hands of Canadian authorities.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK

26.9.45.

AG/AW/er

27.9.45.

27.9.45.

1100

0749

CXG. 391 of 26th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48000.

My immediately preceding telegram. 27a

4. Third alternative seems the proper one at present time. It might help to induce a change of heart in Russians. If it were linked with adoption of some helpful policy about the secret of atomic bomb these two factors together might influence Russians considerably. In addition question of either granting or withholding United States and Canadian credits to Russia could be brought effectively into picture.
5. One advantage of course 3c is that if it fails course 3b can still be adopted with full effect afterwards.
6. Subject to what decision is made on diplomatic alternatives above the following broad alternatives (also liable to modification in each case) for action in sphere of security are possible.

My immediately following telegram.

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.27.9.45.  
1000 BST.AMG.  
27.9.45.  
1030 BST.CXG. 391 of September 26th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself. From  
48000.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Paragraph 6 continued.

- a) Only such action to be taken as would not arouse suspicions of either agents or their Russian masters. Whilst this would probably permit of some agents being discreetly moved to harmless occupations it would mean that generally present spy network was left to carry on.
- b) Principal agents being used by Embassy in Canada should be arrested and brought to trial in cases where legal evidence was available. At the same time Canadian Government should demand recall of Russian Ambassador and of Military Attache and other members of Embassy actively concerned in spy organisation. This would naturally result in full publication of story to world at large.
- c) Principal agents should be detained and thoroughly examined. At the same time Canadian authorities should ask for recall of Russian Ambassador or at least of Military Attache and other members of Embassy who are actively engaged in spy organisation. These steps should be taken however as discreetly as possible in an attempt to avoid publicity.

My immediately following telegram.

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

27.9.45. DL/FS/er  
 27.9.45. 27.9.45.  
 27.9.45. 1035

0730.

CXG. 389 of 26th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
 48000.

a) continued. First it would preclude any effective action to check and break the Russian spy network. Second, the Russians would probably soon realise that in fact we do know something of what is going on and they would conclude that we are afraid to take strong action. Thirdly, general relations with Russian Government in other spheres are such that most serious view must be taken of formidable spy organisation now partially revealed and appropriate action must be taken to neutralise it.

b) The story of what has been discovered in Canada can be published to the world. This should enlighten the public of Western Democracies as to the situation vis-a-vis the Russians which we are all facing. It would lead to discrediting of Communist parties in these countries and would considerably weaken Russia's diplomatic position in world. But the objections to this course seem overwhelming. Publicly the story would probably destroy all prospects of better relations with Russia and would therefore gravely prejudice the chances of establishing world security organisation and peace.

My immediately following telegram.

*Remember!*

~~35A~~  
 35A

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

26.9.45. DL/FS/er  
 27.9.45. 27.9.45.  
 1030.

0747

CXG. 388 of 26th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself  
 from 48000.

Following for Sir A. CADOGAN from MALCOLM MACDONALD.

Following is appreciation of the situation referred to in my  
 immediately preceding telegram.

1. Policy to be adopted cannot repeat not be determined by Canadian authorities alone, but only by them in consultation and agreement with Governments of United Kingdom and United States.
2. The normal security precautions and practices cannot be applied in this case without regard to high political and diplomatic issues which are involved. Indeed political and diplomatic considerations must be paramount. Police policy must therefore conform to policy settled at the top level by political heads of the three Governments.
3. From the political and diplomatic points of view three alternative policies are broadly possible. Any or all of them can be modified to a greater or lesser extent according to circumstances. The broad alternatives are:-

(a) The present case can be dealt with "on the quiet" without revealing to the Russian authorities that we know what is going on. This is objectionable from many points of view.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

26.9.45. DL/FS/er  
 27.9.45. 27.9.45.  
 1055

1000

CXG. 397 of 26th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48000.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from NORMAN ROBERTSON.

1. Our preparations for possible arrest of persons implicated in CORBY case are not complete. Police arrangements for more or less simultaneous arrest of thirty agents in a number of different cities require a good deal preparation particularly since conduct of case has been confined to interrogation of CORBY and examination of his documents on understanding which your police authorities and F.B.I. had urged that no avoidable action would be taken before October 7th.
2. In every case charges that could now be laid depend on CORBY's testimony and on Embassy documents which he took with him. Our police think it doubtful that arrests at this time would produce new and independent evidence espionage or theft of official documents on which charges could be pressed without production of CORBY or his papers.
3. Our Prime Minister who expects to see TRUMAN in Washington on Sunday before sailing for United Kingdom on Monday will I know wish to consider in consulting your Government and United States Government probable consequences of arrests and prosecutions before authorising them unless of course action is absolutely unavoidable in the meantime.

TOP SECRET.

5  
R A

NEW YORK

26.9.45.

e.r.  
27.9.45.  
0950

27.9.45.

0751

CXG. 395 of 25th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
48000.

Following for Z.B. from HOLLIS.

I am definitely arriving at PRESTWICK on Friday morning.

If possible please arrange reservation on a plane to  
London and leave message with S.C.O. Please tell my wife.



TOP SECRET.

~~128~~  
31a

NEW YORK

26.9.45.

J.E.A.C/P.S.  
26.9.45.  
2231

26.9.45.

2206 BST

CXG. 394 of 26.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for G.S.S. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000.

HOLLIS returning for consultation. He carries revisions  
of the preliminaries of report and complete set of exhibits  
addressed to you.

~~TOP SECRET.~~

~~3-11A~~

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

CXG. 868

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. personal for 48000 decypher yourself.

Your CXG. 330 September 17.

- A. ZB do not repeat not consider deception at this stage practicable or desirable.
- B. I concur with this view.

*What a nice decision as seen with hindsight from the post-Pruby period!*

~~TOP SECRET.~~

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

CXG. 871

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. personal for 48000 decypher yourself.

- A. We have discussed with ZB question of investigating CORBY leads into foreign countries.
- B. ZB are most anxious that no repeat no action be taken before PRIMROSE contact for fear of endangering case.
- C. As soon as they are agreeable we will institute discreet enquiries abroad.

TOP SECRET.

~~1276~~  
28A

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

CXG. 867.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48000 personal decipher yourself.

Following from Sir A. CADOGAN for NORMAN ROBERTSON.

- A. In connection with the CORBY case we may have an opportunity shortly of arresting PRIMROSE.
- B. We shall inform the Canadian Government as soon as this is imminent as we assume that they may desire to act simultaneously in regard to those who are implicated in Canada. Please confirm this. We would like to be informed similarly if action is contemplated in Canada.
- C. It is probable that when arrests are made there will be some leakage and publicity. This may have political repercussions in our relations with the Russians. His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept this consequence and they would like to know if the Canadian Government agrees. Similar approach is being made to the United States Government.

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

26.9.45.

1140

26.9.45.

0721.

CXG. 390 of September 26th.

Personal for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48000.  
My immediately preceding telegram.

C. The political heads of U.S. and U.K. could inform STALIN and MOLOTOV secretly at an early meeting that they know what has been going on in Russian Embassy in Ottawa. They could supply them with full facts to convince them of this. They could then say that it would have been possible to publish these facts, and that the result would have been a grave blow at Russia's prestige and diplomatic strength in the world. U.K. and U.S. representatives would say that they did not at present wish to resort to this course because they were sincerely anxious to end the old chapter of mutual suspicion between Russia and Western Democracies. They would therefore keep the story secret on condition that these Russian spy activities were abandoned wherever they existed and that Russian Government reciprocated U.K. and U.S. Governments efforts to establish relations of real confidence and co-operation between the three major Powers etc. etc. (I need not continue the line of argument which is obvious)

My immediately following telegram.

35a

36a

*What a  
work of  
art!*

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

J.E.A.C./P.S.  
26.9.45.  
2223.

26.9.45.

2215 BST.

~~SECRET~~  
26A

CXG. 387 of 26.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is for C.S.S. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000.

5. In the meantime I venture to send in my immediately following telegram a summary of tentative views which I personally have formed as a result of discussions with MACKENZIE KING and others here. These views are of course based upon our local knowledge of situation.

It may be well that in London and Washington you have additional knowledge on broader international situation which would influence and modify the policy suggested in my immediately following telegram. I send the telegram merely for your information as an indication of tentative views, for what it may be worth, which I have formed in the hope that they may be of some assistance in consideration of the matter in London.

My immediately following telegram

TOP SECRET. ~~TOP SECRET.~~  
251

NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

1417

PS/JEAC  
26.9.45.  
2300

26.9.45.

2215.

CXG. 386. September 26th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
48000.

3. **ROBERTSON and I, with small group of others involved in direction of case here, have discussed the matter with MACKENZIE KING. He agrees that three following principles must be basis to our policy:**

(a) **The Canadian authorities should decide their policy only in consultation and agreement with Governments of United Kingdom and United States.**

(b) **The political and diplomatic questions involved must be paramount.**

(c) **Police action from purely security point of view must therefore conform with diplomatic and political policy decided upon by the three Governments.**

4. Mackenzie King and Robertson are now considering the best method of their initiating consultations with London and Washington. They appreciate that time may be of the (? word omitted) essential. From security point of view, for example, the longer the present situation continues, the greater is the danger of leakage to Russians. I therefore expect that Mackenzie King and Robertson will have ready almost ?immediately proposals for consultation. I shall telegraph

(over)

to you again on this as soon as possible.

My immediately following telegram.





TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

1402

PS/JEAC  
26.9.45.  
2230

26.9.45.

2200

~~1750~~  
24ACXG. 385. September 26th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
-48000. Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from MALCOLM MACDONALD.

1. Study of documents and examination of source are now far advanced. The later developments do not alter broad picture of situation in Canada which you already know though they have added large amount of valuable detail. They also reveal some interesting information about organisation in Switzerland. Interim report in C.'s possession is being supplemented by material which HOLLIS is taking to him for communication also to you and others concerned in London. HOLLIS is coming by air leaving Montreal Thursday morning September 27th.
2. Policy pursued by R.C.M.P. and other security authorities working with them has so far been to take no step which might arouse suspicions on part of either individual agents or their masters that Canadian authorities know about Russian spy organisation centred in Ottawa. This means that apart from close surveillance of PRIMROSE, about which you know, and discreet attempts to neutralise one agent in department of external affairs and agent in my office all individuals involved are still free to carry on

-2-

their activities. If this were normal case police authorities would now consider which of two or three more drastic alternative policies would be most appropriate from security point of view. But of course this is not normal case. On the contrary police authorities as well as political authorities here recognise that issues of high political and diplomatic importance are involved and that these must be governing considerations to which straight security considerations should conform.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

95  
~~15~~  
23A

NEW YORK.

26.9.45.

FS/er  
26.9.45.  
1130

26.9.45.

1120

CXG. 383 of 25th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only personal deoypher yourself  
from 48000.

Following for Z.B. from HOLLIS.

Personal for Director General.

MACDONALD is anxious that I should return to London  
immediately for discussion of policy in connection with  
his telegram to CADOGAN which it is hoped to have despatched  
tonight. I imagine this has your approval. Authorities  
here and STEPHENSON agree but STEPHENSON urges early return  
and visit to Washington. I have reservation on R.A.F.  
transport command for September 27th.

TOP SECRET.  

---

C  
THH  
LA

NEW YORK.

25.9.45.

FS/e.r.  
26.9.45.  
1215

26.9.45.

1115

CXG. 381 of 25th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
48000.

D. We appreciate your anxiety to hold but consider choice  
must be taken by highest authority between dangers of leakage  
and public humiliation of Russia. Suggest you make  
representations on receipt of copy of MACDONALD's message to  
CADOGAN.

E. While action here unlikely to be taken before October 7th  
the risk must be (gp. mut. ?increased) of losing evidence if  
searches and interrogations here are postponed until after  
October 27th. Do you set great store by these meetings in  
London? As I see it the meeting if consummated will identify  
the Russian contact but subsequent interrogations of Canadian  
network which cannot be indefinitely delay?(ed will) alarm  
London network so that little is likely to be learned about it.  
I am inclined not to delay interrogations long after October 7th  
if diplomatic policy is settled may I have your comments?

NEW YORK

TOP SECRET.  
& \_\_\_\_\_ &

25.9.45.

BS/er  
26.9.45.  
120026  
25.9.45.

1115

CXG. 380 of 25th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48000.

Following for Z.B. from HOLLIS. Reference your DS/2298/45.

A. **At a meeting with MACDONALD, NORMAN ROBERTSON and others last night it was agreed that diplomatic aspect of CORBY case had over-riding importance. It will be discussed urgently on highest levels in Washington and London. MACDONALD is drafting recommendations for CADOGAN and you will have copy of his message. Security Action will have to fit <sup>decisions.</sup> ~~discussions~~ of diplomatic policy.**

B. Recommendation is likely to be against publicity but may include diplomatic protest and interrogation of known agents here, in United States and England. R.C.M.P. and F.B.I. will synchronise interrogation and London should also synchronise interrogation of PRIMROSE for which all available background material will be supplied in due course.

C. We are therefore strongly opposed to arrest of PRIMROSE unless necessitated by attempt to escape to Russia. In this contingency could he not be charged with attempting to leave country illegally thus avoiding notoriety of official secrets act charge.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

24th September, 1945.

206

PP. 66949/Y. 6408/DB

1. With reference to our conversation last week, I attach herewith a brief note on the Soviet espionage case which has been disclosed in Canada. As you will see from the concluding paragraph we feel that a diplomatic incident involving ourselves, the Canadians, and the Americans is bound to ensue whether action is initiated here, in Canada or in the United States. For this reason you may consider it necessary to obtain in advance the concurrence of External Affairs in Canada and the State Department.

19C

2. Through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, where we now have our own representative, we are in touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington and we hope to obtain their agreement to synchronise action whether it be initiated here or in the Western Hemisphere. Our present request is that no overt action should be taken at least before October 7th when the first meeting between PRIMROSE and the Soviet Agent in London is scheduled to take place.

3. With reference to paragraph 4(e), we have made such arrangements as are possible to prevent PRIMROSE's departure by Soviet aeroplane. There is unfortunately no means of preventing him from leaving

by a Soviet ship without giving very wide publicity to the whole affair and even then it is extremely doubtful whether any measure could be really effective against a determined effort to get away. We are therefore relying on an indirect method of surveillance which so far has proved quite satisfactory. There is every indication that PRIMROSE intends to settle down. He is leaving the hotel where he at present resides and will be staying for the next ten days at the flat of a friend who is away on leave. After that he has made arrangements to take a room in a residential hotel, the address of which is known to us.

Yours sincerely,

Sqd. G.M.L.

The Hon. Sir Alexander Cadogan, G. C. B. G., K. C. B.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE.

G.L/37

TOP SECRET.

20A

CF. 66949/Y. 6408/DB

24th September, 1945.

Dear Commissioner,

I attach a copy of a memorandum <sup>120</sup> which we have handed to Sir Alexander Cadogan. The purpose of it is to obtain the joint agreement of the Foreign Office, External Affairs in Canada, and the State Department in the United States to synchronise action as and when thought desirable since such action must inevitably lead to a diplomatic incident with the U.S.S.R. involving the three Governments. As you will have already noted from our telegrams, we are anxious that no action should be taken at any rate before October 7th and we await the reactions of your Department and the F.B.I. to this suggestion.

Yours sincerely,

Captain G.M. Liddell.

Commissioner J.F. Wood, C.M.G.,  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  
Ottawa.

14/11



TOP SECRET. HTT  
14

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

24.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.CXG. 864.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48,000 personal decipher yourself.

Following for NORMAN ROBERTSON from Sir A. CADOGAN.

- A. Your telegram despatched<sup>165</sup> from New York on 22nd September about informing WILGRESS about the CORBY case.
- B. CLARK KERR who has not yet been informed will probably not return to his post for two or three weeks. I do not know whether you would feel able to wait so long. If not I would be quite prepared to transmit any message that you may consider suitable to WILGRESS by our channels through our Charge d'Affaires if you think that any safer than your own direct channel. We could send it by cypher telegram or personally to the Charge d'Affaires by Foreign Office bag which would take four to five days with instructions to burn after action.
- C. I do not quite understand your second paragraph nor why it is so necessary for WILGRESS to know since Russians will invent excuses if they wish.

*Re: Mr 2/79*

TOP SECRET

Copies in PF 66949 and PF 66960.

Copy sent to SIS

MEMORANDUM

1. In the early part of 1943 a physicist who will be referred to in this memorandum as FRIMROSE left this country for Canada under the auspices of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and in Canada has been working under the National Research Council as a physicist on the Atomic Mission. He returned to this country on the 17th September, 1944, on completion of his work and it is believed that he is about to resume his ordinary academic work in London at King's College, Strand. It is understood that his capabilities are so great that Professor Cockcroft, Head of the Atomic Mission, Canada, has recommended him for further important work in connection with atomic research in this country.
2. On or about the 7th September, 1944, a clerical officer employed in the Department of the Russian Military Attache in Ottawa, sought an interview with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to whom he disclosed details of an extensive espionage network operating in Canada under the control of the Russian Military Attache, Colonel Zabolin. In support of the story which he told, he produced to the R.C.M.P. original documents abstracted by him from the office of Colonel Zabolin, together with copies of other documents which he had seen there. The informant, who will be hereinafter referred to as CORBY, gave information implicating upwards of sixteen individuals in Canada the majority of whom have been identified and who are now the subject of investigation and surveillance by the R.C.M.P. Among them were a Communist A.P. and the National Organizer of the Labour Progressive Party (the name by which the Communist Party is known in Canada). By means of these individuals the Russians appear to have penetrated inter alia the Department of External Affairs, the National Research Council, the Department of National Defence and the Office of the High Commissioner.
3. CORBY has also given information about FRIMROSE. He states that FRIMROSE is a Soviet Agent recruited in London before his departure and first approached by the Russians in Canada about 10 months ago. According to CORBY, FRIMROSE has supplied Colonel Zabolin with useful and valuable information about atomic research and has further provided Zabolin with two samples of uranium 235 and 239, which are alleged already to have been shown to Moscow. It is also alleged that FRIMROSE has supplied Zabolin with information about an electronic device used by the U.S. Army against Japan as suicide aircraft. Apart from CORBY's own statements about FRIMROSE's activities, the R.C.M.P. also possess copies of telegrams exchanged between Moscow and Zabolin which, if they can be accepted as genuine and if CORBY's statement that the individual therein referred to as FRIMROSE confirms that FRIMROSE has provided information about atomic research and has supplied the Russians with a sample of uranium 235. Additionally, they confirm that he has supplied information about the electronic apparatus before mentioned. It is fair to say that, if accepted, the evidence so far produced by CORBY, whether or not it is sufficient to substantiate a charge against FRIMROSE, leaves no doubt as to the accuracy of CORBY's allegations. In addition to documents relating to FRIMROSE's activities in Canada, CORBY has produced copies of telegrams between Moscow and Zabolin which show that on October 7th next and, if necessary, thereafter at intervals of ten days, FRIMROSE may establish contact with a Soviet agent in London.
4. In the light of the foregoing, a decision is necessary as to the present and future action with regard to FRIMROSE and it is submitted that the following considerations are relevant:
  - (a) It is believed that the Russians have not yet discovered that CORBY is in British hands, although they are aware that he has disappeared. It is accordingly believed that there is some possibility that FRIMROSE will on one of the due dates, probably, however, not the first or even the second, make a contact in London with a Soviet agent

Statement of the... at... of... of... of...

the... the... should... should... of...

It is... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

In... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

... of... of... of... of... of... of... of...

...

S. Form 100.

**SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER** *85*

From : RCMP OTTAWA ..... Office File No. PF 66949 ..... Originator's No. MP 48/45  
 ..... Passed for ..... Date of Origin 24.9.45.  
 Action to D.B. ..... Date of Receipt 25.9.45.  
 Copies to ..... Deciphered by NCM .....

**Topsecret from HOLLIS.**

Reference my MP 45/45. High Commissioner is most anxious that we limit communication on CORBY case to Stephenson channel (group corrupt) unless there are overriding reasons against this, (group corrupt) and Washington Embassy have been informed accept this limitation. Everyone this side including Stephenson, assumes that all CORBY case messages are sent you. If this not so and can not be arranged I will cable you duplicate all past and future messages but this seems ridiculous waste of time and effort justifiable only if you are meeting insoluble obstruction in London.

*See 40a*

A 7. note. A repetition of the two corrupt groups has been requested.

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

**O.T.P.**

S. Form 98.

Copy sent to SIS

TOP

**SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER**

OT  
18A

Office File No. PF66949 Section of Origin F2a/JHD

Date 23.9.45. Signed [Signature]  
Capt. G. V. Liddell.

To: Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  
Ottawa, Canada.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Reference your letter No. .... of .....  
our telegram

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Important that action in the United States, Canada and U.S. should synchronise, but difficult to assess relative importance of enquiries in each country.
2. As we see it, but of course we have not got the whole picture, no action should be taken in the United States or Canada which might in any way prejudice the somewhat slender chances of the meeting taking place here on October 7th.
3. Our reasons as follows: (a) FRIMROSE can probably do more damage than anyone else particularly if he should ultimately decide to go to Russia; he must therefore remain a permanent menace unless behind bars; (b) as far as we can see at present there is insufficient evidence on which to base a charge. Hence great importance attached to any opportunity which may provide further evidence, and anxiety that nothing shall be done either here or elsewhere which might arouse suspicion meanwhile.

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

S. Form 98.

Copy sent to SIS.

TOPSECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER ~~SIA~~Office File No PF.66949......Section of Origin DB. *11*Date 23.9.45.....Signed *ZWL*To : R.C.M.P.

Capt. G. Liddell.

Ottawa.MOST IMMEDIATE.Reference your letter No.....of.....  
our telegram~~EXCLUDED~~ Reference 3 (b) our ~~CXC.~~ *DS/2298/45-*

1. No power to detain PRIMROSE in U.K. unless evidence available justifying preferment of Charge.
2. It appears to us that only possible charge would be of an offence against Official Secrets Acts.
3. Please inform us urgently if you have any evidence which can be produced in court supporting charge under Official Secrets Acts.
4. Charge to be preferred would be in outline PRIMROSE being a person holding office under His Majesty communicated without authority information obtained by virtue of such office.
5. Evidence to support such charge would normally consist
  - (a) of a witness or witnesses who can speak to having been present when information was improperly passed.
  - (b) of documents such as a letter in which the information is conveyed and which can be proved to originate from PRIMROSE e.g. to be in his handwriting or bearing his signature.

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

S. Form 98.

# SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

Office File No.....Section of Origin.....

Date .....Signed *[Signature]*

To:.....

Reference your letter  
our telegram No.....of.....

4. Would propose therefore that <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ and United States authorities be asked to withhold any action at any rate until after October 7th on understanding that if we take action on that date we will notify <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ immediately. This would of course necessitate <sup>you</sup> ~~their~~ being prepared to go ahead by that time.

5. Should be glad to have your reactions.

*2298/45*

*23.7.45*

*JJ/NZM*

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

S. Form 98.

TOP

SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

Office File No. PF. 66949. Section of Origin D. B.

Date 23.9.45 Signed [Signature]

To: R. C. M. P.

Capt. G. M. Liddell.

Ottawa.

Reference your letter No. .... of .....  
our telegram

- 2 -

6. Grateful for early reply on these matters with any additional comment which you may be able to make.

7. Have you in your opinion evidence available to enable you to prefer a charge against PRIMROSE in Canada under your Official Secrets Acts or equivalent legislation ?

2299/45  
DJ/RCM

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.



NEW YORK.  
22.9.45.  
2342 BST.  
  
23.9.45.  
1115 BST

G.S.E.  
23.9.45.  
1200 BST

TOP SECRET.

43  
16

CXG. 370 of September 22nd.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from NORMAN ROBERTSON.

Begins: We are very concerned over the complete ignorance of CORBY case of WILGRESS in Moscow. We have not thought it wise to communicate directly with him but feel that we shall have to do so unless he can be promptly informed by some other means.

Apart from general desirability of his being aware of situation before any action is taken vis-a-vis Russians he should be particularly on his guard against possibility of giving any excuse for trumped up charges against his Embassy.

Would you let me know whether you have told CLARK KERR in London about matter? If so and if CLARK KERR is returning promptly to Moscow safest and most expeditious method of informing WILGRESS would be for CLARK KERR to pass on story to WILGRESS for his sole information.

If you think fit you might let CLARK KERR see preliminary British security co-ordination report in C.'s possession.

We are now considering the general action to be taken and will wish to act in full accord with both London and Washington.

Investigation has reached a point at which a general decision on policy is called for almost at once.

Ends.

Dec '45 25/9

P.F. 66 949

D.B.

*22/9*

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
16 A

The following telegram dated 21.9.45 has been received from Hollis. It refers to the long telegram we sent to him suggesting the discontinuance of the use of S.I.S. channels of communication:-

"Paragraphs one and two. Decision to use Stephenson channel only for this case was taken by High Commissioner and others. I will discuss your request with High Commissioner tomorrow on his return from Washington. But am answering remainder your telegram via Stephenson. I believe this is advisable in present circumstances."

In view of the foregoing, I suppose that the attached telegram should now be sent via Philby.

*J.H. Marriott*

F.2.a  
22.9.45.

J.H. Marriott.

S. Form 100.

Confirmation copy.

**SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER**

From:.....R.C.M.P. .... Office File No. *FF. 66949* ..... Originator's No. *MP/45* .....

.....Ottawa..... Passed for *D.B.* ..... Date of Origin.....*21.9.45.*

..... Action to *[Signature]* ..... Date of Receipt.....*22.9.45*

..... Copies to *[Signature]* ..... Deciphered by .....*NCM*.....

*210/9*

Reference your DS/2260/45 19.9.45.

TOPSECRET. From HOLLIS.

Paragraphs (1) and (2). Decision to use STEPHENSON's channel only for this case was taken by High Commissioner and others. I will discuss your request with High Commissioner tomorrow on his return from Washington but am answering remainder your telegram via STEPHENSON. I believe this is advisable in present circumstances.

*A7. Note: Above telephoned to Mr. Marriott 1450 hrs. 22.9.45.*

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

Original in P.F. 66960 serial 6a.TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

21.9.45.

IMMEDIATE.CXG. 849

For 48000 personal from Director G.C. &amp; C.S.

Following has been transmitted to JONES in Washington.  
as GCCS in 12429.

Begins:

1. R.C.M.P. have in custody a cypher clerk from office of Soviet Military Attache. He has already provided some useful crypto information.

2. Canadians have agreed at our request that he should be interrogated at once by S.S.A. if Americans will consent. We consider his information will probably be of considerable assistance if he is interrogated on technical matters by an officer fully versed in crypto problems involved.

3. Although this is BOURBON question please approach CARTER CLARKE in first instance as matter is one of Military Attache cyphers and a very delicate business.

4. If Americans agree to send an officer ( and Canadians ask it to be restricted to one only ) please arrange that he contacts STEPHENSON in New York who will hand him over to appropriate contact in Canada. This is necessary to avoid crossing lines with F.B.I. STEPHENSON is steering F.B.I. interrogations in Canada clear of crypto matters.

Ends.

Received in M.I.5. 25/9

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
11  
/

NEW YORK.

20.9.45.

2302

J.E.A.C.  
21.9.45.  
0935.

21.9.45.

0845.

CKG. 354. September 20th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself  
from 48000 for Z.B. from HOLLIS.

Your D.S./2260/45 part two.

The authorities here have not yet decided whether publicity  
is desirable and pending this decision I consider arrest would  
be inadvisable. We are discussing these policy matters with  
High Commission and External Affairs and hope to have early  
decision. I will inform of this. If it is decided to  
?attempt to prosecute evidence would have to be obtained by  
searches and interrogations ?and chances of ?getting this  
would be lessened by premature arrest of PRIMROSE.

*his mt 25/9*

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK

20.9.45.

1212

e.r.  
20.9.45.  
1950.

20.9.45.

1910

CXG. 343 of 20th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000;

Your telegram 832 September 18th.

- A. R.C.M.P. agree to one officer from ARLINGTON interrogating source some time next week, provided interview is limited to cryptographic matters in order not to cross lines with F.B.I.
- B. There will therefore be no need for you to pass information from my telegram 314 to 317 to ARLINGTON since ROBINSON will show it to officer on arrival.
- C. When making necessary arrangements, please ask officer to get immediately in touch with me and I will hand him on to examination unit in Ottawa.
- D. We propose inform F.B.I. that cryptographic aspect is being handled by examination unit on conjunction with ARLINGTON.

rec'd this 25/9

S. Form 98.

Copy sent to S.I.S.

7609


# SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

Office File No. PF 66949 Section of Origin E.2.a.

Date 19.9.45 Signed Capt. G. H. Liddell

To: ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
OTTAWA CANADA

2260/45  
19.9.45  
referred to NCM/LB



Reference your letter  
our telegram No. referred to NCM/LB

FOR HOLLIS

1. WE WOULD WELCOME ESTABLISHMENT DIRECT COMMUNICATION THROUGH THIS CHANNEL BETWEEN MOUNTED POLICE AND OURSELVES ~~AND DISCONTINUANCE OF USE OF ANY OTHER CHANNEL~~ OF THIS CASE.

2. PRESENT POSITION UNSATISFACTORY AND CAUSES DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY.

PF 669493. [FRIERSON] ARRIVED AND SAFELY HOUSED.

3. OBSERVATION NOT DISCONTINUED OWING HIS APPARENT UNBUSINESS AND OUR WISH TO PRESERVE OBSERVATION FOR FIRST RENDEZVOUS OCTOBER.

5. ALL OTHER AVAILABLE CHECKS NOW OPERATING.

6. HAVE INFORMED AICERS HEAD OF ATOMIC COUNCIL RE RE OF POSITION AND SECURED FRIERSON'S SEPARATION FROM TOP SECRET MATERIAL IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO AROUSE HIS SUSPICIONS.

7. AICERS INFORMS US THAT FRIERSON INFINITELY MORE VALUABLE TO RUSSIANS AS GENERAL CONSULTANT AND ADVISER THAN AS BETRAYER OF TOP SECRET INFORMATION. DUE TO THIS

REASON OF NOT KEEPING HIM UNDER CLOSE OBSERVATION AND THUS RISKING RISK OF HIS ESCAPE AND CONTACTS UNKNOWN TO US AND KEEPING HIM UNDER SUCH CLOSE OBSERVATION THAT HE IS NOT THE SLIGHT AND POSSIBLY ESCAPE FROM THIS COUNTRY WE FEEL THAT EVENTUAL

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted even in cipher without being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

S. Form 98.

7609

**TO: SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER**

Office File No. PE 66949 Section of Origin F.2

Date 19.9.45 Signed Sgd. G.M. Liddell

To: ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

OTTAWA CANADA

Reference your letter No. .... of .....  
our telegram

SOLUTION MUST BE IF POSSIBLE TO ARREST HIM.

8. WE ARE SEEKING FROM HIGHEST AUTHORITY DECISION ON PROCEEDING BUT MEANTIME SHOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS SINCE ARREST OF PRIMROSE MIGHT AND WE THINK WOULD AFFECT POSITION IN CANADA WHILE IF ARRESTS ARE DECIDED ON IN CANADA ACTION MUST TO BE SYNCHRONISED ON BOTH SIDES.

9. WE DO NOT THINK THAT PRIMROSE WILL HAND OVER MATERIAL AT FIRST OR EVEN SECOND RENDEZVOUS. THUS EVEN IF ARREST DECIDED ON IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO FOREGO WHEN IT WOULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS YOU OR WE FIND ADMISSIBLE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE OF PRIMROSE'S GUILT.

10. WE ARE CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF SAFELY HANDLING OF PRIMROSE MATERIAL WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAND OVER AT RENDEZVOUS.

11. WE HAVE NO REPEAT NO TRACE OF ANY OF THE RUSSIAN INDIVIDUALS SO FAR MENTIONED IN THIS CASE OTHER THAN MATERIAL ALREADY KNOWN TO RCMP. ANY TRACES OF RUSSIANS WILL FOLLOW.

12. NO REPEAT NO TRACE ON NORMAN VEAL BUT ARE STILL SEARCHING AND SUGGEST THAT OCCUPATION WAS PROBABLY HUMAN ELEMENT AND NOT SPRING LAMB.

13. ~~THE~~ ~~TEXT~~ ~~OF~~ ~~THIS~~ ~~TELEGRAM~~ ~~IS~~ ~~UNPARAPHRASED~~ ~~DATES~~ ~~MUST~~ ~~NOT~~ ~~BE~~ ~~DISTRIBUTED~~ ~~TO~~ ~~INDIVIDUALS~~ ~~IN~~ ~~BRITISH~~ ~~GOVERNMENT~~ ~~DEPARTMENTS~~ ~~OR~~ ~~HEADQUARTERS~~, ~~OR~~ ~~RE-TRANSMITTED~~ ~~EVEN~~ ~~IN~~ ~~CIPHER~~ ~~WITHOUT~~ ~~BEING~~ ~~PARAPHRASED~~. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased

(25087) Wt.28490/3595 10,000 7/43 A. & E.W.Ltd. Gp.698  
(26081) Wt.41173/4249 20,000 12/43 .. .. 1.7260



ON WHOM LOOKUP WANTED.

*NP 1500*

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

18.9.45.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
ACXG. 832.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48,000 personal decipher yourself.

A. Your CXG. 314 of 15th September. The technical information provided is we consider correct.

B. The answer to questions (a) and (b) in final paragraph of your CXG. 317 is yes, and presumption in (c) correct.

C. Position is as follows: G.2 have been engaged upon this problem conjointly with us and we have moral obligations to hand them on certain features of this information which are valuable. We consider that it would be profitable for one officer from G.2 to interrogate CORBY. We are fully aware from BAMFORD of extreme delicacy of whole matter and wish for your advice as to whether such steps are possible. In any case we could hand on the information already provided by CORBY without disclosing source, though second step would be far better. See no reason why G.2 should know more than that CORBY is deserter.

D. Would Canadians object? If not we would arrange details through JONES.

E. If you agree you can consult Canadians forthwith.

TOP SECRET.  
—————~~6317~~  
4A

NEW YORK

18.9.45.

1614.

J.C.M./J.E.A.B.

19.9.45.

19.9.45.

0920.

0820

CXG. 335 of September 18th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

Reference your 823 of September 14th.

Following for Sir Clerk CADOGAN from MALCOLM MACDONALD. Begins:-

I have shown this message to NORMAN ROBERTSON and HUME WRONG. They were sorry to see that MACKENZIE King's suggestion that BYRNES should be told about the affair had apparently not been acted upon. On assumption that it would be, they had told the American Ambassador here (when informing him in general terms of situation) that he should not and need not communicate with State Department on the subject as BYRNES was being informed in London.

Similar line was taken by Sir William STEPHENSON's office with F.B.I. representatives when they were here.

We appreciate that there may be special reasons why matter has not yet at any rate been discussed with BYRNES. Above facts however create an embarrassing situation.

ROBERTSON would be grateful for information as to whether  
it is intention to inform BYRNES before he leaves London and  
reasons for not doing so if reply is negative. Ends.

TOP SECRET.

~~#21~~  
12A

NEW YORK.

17.9.45.

1741 BST.

G.S.E.  
18.9.45.  
0945 BST.

18.9.45.  
0900 BST.

CKG. 330 of September 17th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

*WILLIS*

A. It is not impossible that with careful planning we might be able to "turn" one of Grant's agents. ELLI is particularly well-placed to have access to all types of information which opens up considerable possibilities for deception.

B. This might be best achieved by planting bogus documents in her way.

C. Such an operation would clearly call for joint agreement between British, Canadian and United States Governments.

Before we even explore possibilities we should like your views as to general desirability and whether you would be in a position to provide material if we have decided it is reasonably safe to attempt establish channel.

TOP SECRET.

~~3 SA~~  
11A

NEW YORK

17.9.45.

1412

A.D.W.  
17.9.45.  
2120 BST.

17.9.45.

2110 BST.

CXG. 326 of September 17th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only.

Personal decipher yourself.

From 48,000.

HOLLIS arrived Montreal this morning and is en route  
Ottawa.

TOP SECRET.  
\_\_\_\_\_36A  
10A

NEW YORK.

16.9.45.

1947 BST.

17.9.45.

0825 BST.

P.T.  
17.9.45.  
1000 BST.CXG. 322 of September 16th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

My immediately preceding telegram.

As you know, one member of my staff is involved. She is Miss WILLSHER who was appointed to this office from London in 1930, has worked here ever since and been an assistant registrar for the last few years. She is an indirect agent working through a contact in Communist Party. We are not yet sure how valuable her efforts have been to her friends, but they may be serious. Work of R.C.M.P. and other authorities concerned here is proceeding smoothly. Consultation and co-operation between them, including American security authorities who have been brought in, seems to be excellent. I am assuming that you see all relevant messages from STEPHINSON.

NEW YORK.  
16.9.45.  
1742.

TOP SECRET.

~~35A~~  
9A

17.9.45.  
0925

J.E.A.C.  
17.9.45.  
0955.

CXG.321. September 16th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from 48,000. My immediately preceding telegram.

Department of external affairs are not able to spare either ROBERTSON or Wrong to come to London immediately, and they are only members of department who know of this business, but BANFIELD will give you a good and accurate idea of nature and scope of espionage organisation which has been discovered so far.

It is already clear that Russian embassy here are centre of a widespread and formidable system of espionage with several direct agents working in important Government departments and other official Canadian organisations and other agents with indirect links with embassy through members of communist party. No doubt, this pattern is being followed by Russian diplomatic representatives wherever possible in other countries. The information we are receiving may repeat may give us clue to an agent in United Kingdom and possibly to others elsewhere.

My immediately followin, telegram.



TOP SECRET.

34A  
8A

NEW YORK.

16.9.45.

17.9.45.

0823 BST.

P.S.  
17.9.45.  
0944.

CXG.320 of 16.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only.

Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from Malcolm MACDONALD.

Investigations are continuing. The work involved is so considerable and results of it are so important that it has been and still is impossible for us to release Sir William STEPHENSON's officers who are assisting R.C.M.P. But detective-sergeant BAYFIELD of R.C.M.P. is coming to London in connection with part of work, leaving here by R.A.F. Ferry Command Transatlantic aeroplane this Sunday, 16th, weather permitting. He should be in London sometime following Monday and is carrying reports for C.

He will be available for two days in London before he has to return here. He will bring written interim report on affairs and will also be briefed to give you orally full general information up to date.

My immediately following telegram.

313  
7A

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

15.9.45.

0642 Pm.

5?  
16.9.45.

15.9.45.  
1100 BST  
F.E.C.

1110 BST.

CKG. 313 of Sept. 15th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for CSS only personal decipher yourself from  
48,000. Your 826 Sept. 15th.

There is no point in H coming to New York via Montreal.

For security reasons he should have entered Canada from  
U.S.A. in accordance my 287 Sept. 12th. quote for security  
reasons he should come via repeat via New York unquote.

Will collect him at DORVAL.

**TELEGRAM TO BE ENCODED.**

ADDRESSED: N.Y.

CX .....

REPEATED:

Date ..... 10.9.44

Instructions for Dispatch:

NOT TELETYPE

CXG 226

Following for 43,000 from N.F.S. himself.

By CXG 317 of September 12th.

- A. HOLLIS repeat HOLLIS. Head of the anti-communist and anti-Soviet Division is flying from Paris for to-morrow September 15th repeat September 15th.
- B. His ultimate destination is New York (your CXG 227 of September 12th refers)
- C. Should you no longer consider it necessary for him to visit New York first please intercept him at ... repeat ... airport near ... where his aircraft is due to land sometime on September 17th repeat September 17th. In any case I suggest you should get someone to ... at ... containing clear directions as to what he should do.
- D. We cannot quote any Flight number except ... 15th repeat N.F.S. 15th.

	<u>Section</u>	<u>Initials</u>	Copies to
Originating Officer	.....	.....	..... (2 copies)
Dispatching Officer	.....	.....	D (3 copies)
			D.F.S.
			.....
			.....

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SA

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

14.9.45.

CXG. 823.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is from C.S.S. Personal for 48000. Decypher yourself.  
Please repeat following telegram to High Commissioner Canada.

Following for Lord Halifax from Sir A. Cadogan.

We have seen telegram from C.'s representative No. 288 of  
12th September and C.'s reply. We have given full weight to  
considerations felt by Field Marshal, Head of Scientific Research  
and yourself. Our security authorities however are absolutely  
confident that they can keep person in question under effective survey.

Our considered opinion is that risk of further disclosure in  
this country is small. On the other hand procedure we propose may  
lead to revelation both of a network and of further information on  
this particular subject.

We approve action reported in your Ancam 415 reporting that you  
were informing General Groves. Please now tell him what we are doing  
and why. Should he raise violent objection could not High Commissioner  
Canada to whom this telegram is repeated arrange for plane to be  
detained 24 hours pending further urgent consideration here?

Pending MAKIN's arrival and fuller information I have not repeat  
not spoken to BYRNES. Nor to my knowledge have P.M. or S. of S.

Telegram ends.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

TOP SECRET.

## EXTRACT.

52

Extract for File No.: P.F. 66960, Y Box 6337 Name: .....  
 Original in File No.: P.F. 66949, Y Box 6408. Serial: 16a. Dated: 14.9.45.  
 Original from: New York. Under Ref.: CXG.307.  
 Extracted on: 26.10.45. by: R.L. Section: R.3.y.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decipher yourself. From 48,000

May immediately preceding telegram

E. Situation clearly calls for closest detailed co-operation and fullest information on future developments from your side in order they may be weighed against any emergencies R.C.M.P. may have to deal with here.

F. PRIMROSE is returning to England permanently where he is to resume his academic position at King's College, London. COCKCROFT had already recommended him as member of top United Kingdom scientific committee on atomic research. In order not to alarm PRIMROSE, COCKCROFT is maintaining these recommendations.

G. In view fears in Washington we are attempting to make arrangements for under cover man to accompany PRIMROSE on plans as we now find that this can be done with very small danger of alerting him.

-----

copy in PF 66949. Y. Box 6408. *Review* = NUNN MAY

TOP SECRET.

*HGA*  
*+ A*

NEW YORK.	<u>Origins</u>
12.IX.45.	CSS/LX/DDSP.
	e.r.
13.ix.45.	13.ix.45.
0724	

CXG.288 of 12th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

Ambassador and Field Marshal and Head of Scientific Research

48-land wish you to know and to report to Foreign Secretary that they feel strongly that subject of your telegram 814 September 12th

*NUNN*  
*JA 7*

should not repeat not be allowed to travel as proposed because of danger of further disclosure of (grp.mut.) or capture. Also: that in present locale there is unlikely to be any publicity whereas there might be in 22-land. I have answered these fears with, inter ALIA: description of obvious advantages to acquiring further leads to penetration of situation which may be potential of wider implications than disclosure scientific information; that any publicity in 22-land highly unlikely and course being followed was dictated by X.B. past experience, etc.

Section Y

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

TOP SECRET.

## EXTRACT.

45

Extract for File No. P.F. 66960, Y Box 6437, Name: .....  
 File No. P.F. 66949, Y Box 6408. Serial: 15a. Dated 13.9.45.  
 Original from New York. Under Ref. CXG. 819. 306  
 Extracted on 26.10.45. by R.L. Section R.3.y.

Following is for CSS only: Personal decipher yourself.  
 From 48000.

Your telegram 819 of September 13th.

A. R.C.M.P. are fully aware wider insssues of case and we had jointly already made arrangements that no repeat no action of any kind be taken whatever until PRIMROSE has left unless emergency arises.

B. While in case so vitally affecting Canadian security interests R.C.M.P. cannot give absolute assurance that circumstances will not arise demanding direct action they sontemplate no direct action in near future.

.. Indeed it is possible they may never be able take direct action since such action must by inference make it clear to Soviet Intelligence ? (that they) are holding Soviet official whom they have been informed by Soviets is renegade and whom they are notionally seeking on behalf Soviet Embassy.

D. Only action at present tentatively under consideration after PRIMROSE's departure is neutralizing of source in (? U.K) High Commissioner's office by moving her to food mission where she will be innocuous. It is not anticipated that this move will arouse any

W. W. STEA

PTO.

suspicion. Source in external interview has already  
been partially neutralised without causing suspicion.

---



~~1571~~  
42

NEWYORK

12.9.45.

CXG 287 of 12.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following is for CSS only.

Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000:

Your telegram 817 September 12th:

Yes please send immediately. For Security reasons he should come via New York. Suggest British O.A.C. Friday. Please telegraph departure plane number.

TOP SECRET.

TH

265

266

267

Telegram from NE. YORK.

Date: 10th September, 1945.

URGENT.

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm  
Macdonald.

Owing to fact that most of documents which need examination in case of which you know are in Russian and require translation, and also because full cross-examination of source will take considerable time, even the first construction of a coherent story cannot be completed for at least several days. In normal circumstances I should not propose any attempt at a considered appreciation of situation should be sent to authorities in London until this process was much more advanced. But in view possible influence of matter on important policies now being considered by Foreign Ministers in London it seems clear to me that Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary should have fullest possible information at an earlier date. We here could employ either of following two methods of informing them.

1. We could send series cable reports on any developments which we considered of sufficient significance.
2. We could arrange for one or two individuals to fly to London leaving here, if necessary, tomorrow or next day, who know full

-2-

facts of case so far as revealed, to make interim report.

At the same time we should of course continue to cable information on further developments.

The second course seems to me desirable. I think that best plan would be for two men to come to London: first, one of Stephenson's security service men who has been here for last three days and who knows all facts, about the evidence, etc. and second a member of Canadian Department of External Affairs who could give information not only about the actual case but also about background of general relations between Russian Embassy and department and other organizations concerned, personalities in Embassy etc. etc., this team of two could give you much useful general information and commentary which we cannot hope to include in cables.

Telegram from New York  
 KV 265/7

Telegram from NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE.

Dated 10th September, 1945.

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm MacDonald.

I have discussed this proposal with Mackenzie King, Norman Roberts and HUME (group affiliated which decodes as WRONG). They agree with it generally, but cannot at present commit themselves to sending a suitable member of Department of External Affairs in next few days. They are giving further urgent consideration to this and in connection with it are bearing in mind that they may in any case wish to send someone to London for Foreign Ministers discussions. In that case one of our security service men can come to London. Sir William Stephenson agrees to this. He could leave here tomorrow or next day or whichever day after that seems most desirable. Every day adds to our knowledge and therefore the longer he stays here the more information he would have. On the other hand, he already knows much of value that we cannot physically put into cables and after arriving in London he would readily appreciate the significance of any additional information which we sent from here. My concern with which Mackenzie King and his advisers warmly agree in proposing this is to assist

-2-

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to assess what may be importance of these developments. It may be that they do not think a visit of kind is necessary at present stage. I should be grateful for any comments and instructions on matter through this channel.

-2-

is the only one we are using. An F.B.I. representative is arriving in Ottawa to-day and B.S.C. officers are already here. In view of possible political implications in situation revealed in ship Prime Minister would be grateful if your Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary would inform Mr. Byrnes of these developments.

D. You should know that Soviet Embassy shows signs of alarm at disappearance of official who is source of our information. We have no way of knowing to what degree they suspect that information about their activities has come to our knowledge. Ends.

TOP SECRET.

---

5A

259

260

Telegram from NEW YORK.

Dated 10th September, 1945.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm MacDonald and N. A. Robertson.

Begins:-

A. Investigation is far from complete and it is not possible to assess quality information which may have been passed to Soviet Embassy. You will doubtless have seen telegram from Stephenson to 'C' reporting inter ALIA our present knowledge scientific side of espionage activities.

B. Two recent messages addressed from Moscow to Military attache in his capacity as local head of espionage organisation seem to us disturbing. We are aware indiscriminating character of Soviet curiosity and hesitate to draw any inference from these specific enquiries addressed to Ottawa.

For your information translation of texts follow in my immediately following telegrams. 263-264 at 3a in margin

6A  
C. Circle of persons informed of developments has been kept as narrow as possible and this present channel of communication

TOP SECRET. JH

Telegram from New York.

Dated 9th September 1945.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following Strictly Personal for Sir Alexander Cadogan from  
Malcolm Macdonald.

Begins:- 17

Norman Robertson has informed me of contents of message which  
he sent you earlier to-day. He and I have discussed situation fully.  
I am taking all necessary discreet steps to deal with it in my office  
and shall continue to do so. At present evidence is being sifted and  
we cannot be sure of degree to which the individual in my office alleged  
to be concerned is involved. Please feel free to inform Sir Eric Machtig  
confidentially of this matter since Robertson and I agree that for the  
present we should employ only this Stephenson channel of communication  
with London and I have sent no information whatever to Dominions Office.  
Ends.



S. Form 81/B.P./5000/12.44

EXTRACT.

22

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp B Name:.....

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp A Serial: 2a Dated: 10.9.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: 255 - 258

Extracted on: 24.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm Macdonald.  
Begins:  
Further to my telegram of September 8th.....

1(g) Robertson draws my attention to fact that vetting of United Kingdom scientists sent to Canada on project was responsibility of British Government and if these leakages on further investigation prove as serious as they appear at moment then H.M.G. will be liable to criticism by United States Government.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

## EXTRACT.

12

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp B.....Name:.....

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp A.....Serial: 1a.....Dated: 9.9.45.

Original from: New York.....Under Ref. No. 251.....

Extracted on: 24.10.45.....by: NR.....Section: R3y.....

Following strictly personal for Sir Alexander Cadogan from N.A. Robertson,  
Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Begins:-

A. Statement made yesterday to Royal Canadian Mounted Police by clerical officer of Soviet Embassy in Ottawa indicates that Soviet agents have had a certain access within Department of External Affairs and within office of United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa, to contents of secret telegrams exchanged between our Governments.

B. Statement is supported by convincing documentary evidence which indicates extensive political and scientific espionage in Canada. Only material I have seen is set of summaries of recent Dominions Office telegrams received in this Department. summaries are amateurish and would not be very enlightening. We have no evidence yet of cryptographic compromise. Source of information and a number of original documents are in our custody. Investigation is proceeding in consultation with Stevenson and F.B.I.

Ends.