PF 66960/SBV1

GOUZENKO, IGOR

PF 66960/SBV1

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401

PF66960/SBV1

SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
	P.A.	20 AUG 1980						
	K7/6							
	~~H7/1~~							
	PA							
	K7/6							
	~~K7/6~~	8 MAR 1982						
	PA	13 SEP 84						
	~~K5/6~~	21 OCT 1985						
	PA	25 OCT 1985						
	H1E/5							

KV2/1425

S Form 238

Y FILE

THIS FILE WHEN IN TRANSIT MUST BE IN A CLOSED ENVELOPE, ADDRESSED PERSONALLY TO THE OFFICER.

HELD by R.5

The file should be passed for P.A. to R.5.

PF 66,960 FILE COPY SBV1

P.F.66960, Y Box 6437, supp. vol. B.

Registry No. Minute Sheet No. 1.

1.

9.9.45. Telegram(251) from New York forwarding signal from Ottawa. 1z.
9.9.45. Telegram (252) from Malcolm Macdonald to Sir Alexander Cadogan re 1z. 1a.

2.

10.9.45. Extract from telegram(255-258) from New York.re 1a. 2z.
10.9.45. Telegram(259-260) from New York to Sir Alexander Cadogan. 2a.

3.

10.9.45. Telegram (265-267) from New York to Sir Alexander Cadogan re proposal of visit to London of two individuals from New York. 3a.

4.

12.9.45. Telegram (CXG.287) from New York to C.S.S. re 817, 12.9.45. 4z.
12.9.45. Telegram (CXG.288) from New York to C.S.S. in reply to 814 of 12.9.45. 4a.
13.9.45. Extract from telegram(CXG.819) from New York. 4b.

5.

14.9.45. Extract from telegram (CXG.307) further to 4b. 5z.
14.9.45. Telegram (CXG.823) To New York from C.S.S. re 4a. 5a.

6.

15.9.45. Telegram (CXG.826) to New York from C.S.S. re Mr. Hollis' arrival in Canada, re 4z and further to CXG 817 of 12.9.45. 6a.

7.

15.9.45. Telegram (CXG.313) from New York to CSS re 6a and further to 4z, re Mr. Hollis' visit to Canada. 7a.

8.

16.9.45. Telegram (CXG.320) from New York to CSS re Det. Sgt. Bayfield coming to London. 8a.

(22793) Wt.[illegible] [illegible] P. T. Over.

9.

16.9.45 Telegram (CXG.321) from New York to CSS further to 8a. 9a.

10.

16.9.45. Telegram (CXG.322) from New York to CSS further to 9a, and re Kay Willsher. 10a.

11.

17.9.45. Telegram (CXG.326) from New York to CSS re arrival of Mr. Hollis. 11a.

12.

17.9.45. Telegram (CXG.330) from New York to CSS re possibility of turning one of Grant's agents. 12a.

13.

18.9.45. Telegram (CXG.832) to New York from CSS. 13a.

14.

18.9.45. Telegram(CXG.335) to CSS referring to 5a. 14a,

15.

19.9.45. Telegram to R.C.M.P. (for Mr. Hollis) re action on Primrose. 15a.

16.

20.9.45. Telegram (CXG.354) to CSS re 15a. 16y.
20.9.45. Telegram (CXG.343) to CSS in reply to 13a. 16z.
22.9.45. Telegram from Mr. Hollis re communication. 16a.
22.9.45. Telegram (CXG.370) for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Norman Robertson re Corby case. 16b.
21.9.45. Telegram (CXG.849) from D.G.C. & C.S. to New York re CORBY 16za

17.

23.9.45. Telegram to R.C.M.P. Ottawa re policy for the arrest of Primrose. 17a,

18.

23.9.45. Telegram to R.C.M.P. Ottawa re necessity for synchronising action in U.S., Canada and U.K. 18a.

19.

24.9.45. Telegram from R.C.M.P. Ottawa (Mr. Hollis) further to 16a. 19a.

24.9.45. Telegram (CXG.864) for Norman Robertson from Sir A. Cadogan re 16b. 19b.

24.9.45. Memorandum on case 19c

20.

24.9.45. To R.C.M.P. Ottawa enclsoing memorandum of case.at 19c 20a.

24.9.45. To Foreign Office enclosing memorandum of case at 19c 20b

21.

25.9.45. Telegram (CXG.380) from New York to CSS . 21a.

22.

25.9.45. Telegram (CXG.381) from New York to CSS further to 21a. 22a.

23.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.383) re the return of Mr. Hollis to London from New York to CSS. 23a.

(22793) Wt.38205/4097 200,000 10/42 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.698 J.5613

[P T. Over.

24.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.385) for Sir A. Cadogan from Malcolm Macdonald. 24a.

25.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.386) to CSS further to 24a. 25a,

26.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.387) to CSS further to 25a. 26a.

27.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.390) to CSS further to 26a. 27a.

28.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.867) from CSS for Norman Robertson from Sir A. Cadogan re the arrest of Primrose and the implications. 28a.

29.

26.91.45.Telegram (CXG.871) from CSS to New York. 29a.

30.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.868) to CSS re 12a. 30a.

31.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.394) to CSS re return of Mr. Hollis. 31a.

32

26.9.45. Telegram CXG.395 to CSS from Mr. Hollis re his arrival in London. 32a.

33.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.397) to CSS, for Sir A. Gadogan from Norman Robertson . 33a.

34.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.388) to CSS, for Sir A. Cadggan from Malcolm Macdonald, re general policy of case. 34a.

35.

27.9.45. Telegram (CXG.389) to CSS further to 34a. 35a.

36.

26.9,45 Telegram (CXG.391) to CSS further to 35a. 36a.

37.

26.9.45.Telegram (CXG.392) to CSS continuing telegram at 36a. 37a.

38.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.393) to CSS continuing telegram at 37a. 38a.

39.

26.9.45. Telegram (CXG.393) correction to 38a. 39a.

(22793) Wt.33205 4097 200,000 10/42 A & E.W.Ltd Gp.698 J.5813

[P. T. Over.

40.

26.9.45. Telegram from R.C.M.P. requesting repetition of line in telegram at 19a. 40a.

41.

28.9.45. Telegram (CXG.881) from CSS, for Malcolm Macdonald from Sir A. Cadogan. re 34a-39a and 33a. 41a.

42.

28.9.45. Telegram to J.S.M. Washington (CANAM 427). 42a.

43.

?29.9.45. Telegram from Malcolm Macdonald to Sir A. Cadogan. 43a.

44.

30.9.45. Telegram (CXG.420) to CSS for Sir A. Cadogan. 44a.

45.

30.9.45. Telegram (CXG.421) for CSS continuing 44a. 45a.

46.

30.9.45. Telegram (CXG.422) to CSS continuing 45a. 46a.

47.

30.9.45. Telegram (CXG.423) continuing 46a.

48.

30.9.45. Telegram (CXG.424) to CSS continuing 47a. 48a.

49.

1.10.45. Telegram (ANCAM 427) from J.S.M. Washington to Sir. A. Cadogan. 49a.

50.

1.10.45. Telegram (CXG.426) to CSS from New York. 50a.

51.

1.10.45. Telegram (CXG.431) to CSS for Mr. Hollis from R.C.M.P. 51a.

52.

2.10.45. Draft telegram to New York (for RCM.P) re action against agents involved in case in Canada. 52a

53.

2.10.45. Note by A.D.F. re telegram at 44a and reply at 52a. 53a.

54.

5.10.45. Telegram (CXG.911) from CSS . re telegrams at 55a. 54a.

55.

5.10.45. Telegram (CXG,912-917) to New York, re the possible arrest of Primrose, referring to 44a-47a and 50a. 55a.

(22793) Wt.33295/4997 200,000 10/42 A & E.W.Ltd. Gp.698 J.561.

[P T. Over.

56.

6.10.45. Telegrams 472-477 to New York, summary of the situation in the Corby case. 56a.

57.

6.10.45. Telegrams 478/479 from New York for Norman Robertson re the legal position. 57a.

58.

6.10.45. Telegram (481+) from New York in reply to 55a. 58a.

59.

7.10.45. Telegrams (CXG,483/484)to CSS for Sir A . Cadogan from Lord Halifax. 59a.

7.10.45. Telegram (CXG.924) to New York from C.S.S. 59b

60.

8.10.45. Telegram (CXG.491) from New York to C.S.S. referring to 56a and 57a 60s

61.

8.10.45. Telegram (CXG.492) from New York to C.S.S. further to 6 0a 61a

8.10.45. Telegram (CXG.493) from New York to C.S.S. in reply to 59b 61b

9.10.45. Telegram (CXG.930) from C.S.S. to New York for R.C.M.P. 61c

62.

9.10.45. Telegram (CXG.931) from C.S.S. to New York forwarding message to R.C.M.P.fromHollis 62a

9.10.45. Note by A.D.F. on meeting held at the Dominions Office. 62b.

10.10.45. Telegram (CXG.505) from New York to C.S.S. - reply from F.B.I. re arrests 62c

11.10.45. Telegram (CXG 508) from New York to C.S.S. further to 62c 62d

63.

14.10.45. Telegrams (CXG.525-528) From Malcolm Macdonald to Sir J. Stephenson, D.O. 63a

64.

14.10.45. Telegram (CXG.529) from Malcol MacDonald to Stephenson D.O. further to 63a 64a

Reference No.	Main Document	
	65.	
16.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.961) from C.S.S. to New York re departure of Hollis	65a
19.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.554) from New York to C.S.S. re decison in CORBY Case	65b
19.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.555) from New York to C.S.S. further to 65b	65c
19.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.556) from New York to C.S.S. further to 65c	65d
19.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.557) from New York to C.S.S. further to 65d	65e
20.10.45.	Telegram (CXG.564) from New York to C.S.S. re WITOZAK	65f
	66.	
23.10.45.	F.2.a. note on meeting at Dominions Office	66a
24.10.45.	Telegram (18) extracted from Supp.Vol.A.PF66960 Y6437 re DUEBENDORFER.	66b.

Note. 67.

Mr. Gandee (of Bromley's section in F.O.) informed me today that a minute on the lines discussed at this meeting recorded @ 66a had been submitted to Mr. Bevin for transmission to the PM, that it had had to be amended but that the final version had been approved by Mr. Bevin — was now on its way to the PM.

[illegible]
26/10

68

27.10.45.	Telegram to New York (No.24)	68x
29.10.45.	Letter from Foreign Office, Mr. Bromley, enclosing copy of Minute which S. of S. has sent to the P.M. following a meeting held with Mr. Norman Robertson in Dominions Office on 23.10.45.	68a.
	69.	
31.10.45	Telegram for transmission by S.I.S. for HOLLIS - A.D.F. New York re method of taking action in CORBY case.	69a.

70.

When I saw Mr. Norman Robertson this afternoon I told him of the telegram we are sending to Hollis as at 69a. Mr. Robertson quite appreciated our point of view and pointed out that he had some considerable while earlier himself suggested that there might be a good deal to be said for not necessarily pulling in PRIMROSE at the same time as the accomplices in Canada are dealt with.

[illegible]
J. H. Marriott.

F.2.a.
31st October, 1945.

[P. T. Over.

(22793) Wt.33205/4997 200,000 10/42 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.698 J.5613

71.

31.10.45 Telegram (619) from New York re policy re method of taking action in CORBY case. 71a.

1.11.45 Telegram (641) re Telegram 24 and WITCZAK. 71b.

72.

2.11.45 Telegrams (647,648) from New York re interrogation of PRIMROSE and agents in Canada. 72a.

73.

D.G. 8/11/45

Serials 68y - 72a will show you the present position of the policy discussions in this case.

F2a/JHM
5.11.45.

J. H. Marriott.

5.11.45 Draft Foreign Office Brief for Washington discussion of CORBY case. 73a.

74.

D.G.

I think that we ought to reply to the Telegram at 72a. A suggested draft is therefore at 75a.

F.2.a.
6th November, 1945.

J. H. Marriott.

75.

6.11.45. Draft Telegram for A.D.F. in reply to 72a. 75a.

76.

6/11/45

6.11.45 Draft telegram for A.D.F. re duration of visit to America and staying over for Prime Minister's meeting. 76B

77.

With reference to minute 76, I explained to D.B. that after our meeting, Bromley had added to paragraph (b) of the Appendix of the note at 73a, a statement to the effect that all the Canadian Agents should, if possible, be convicted including Sam CARR, Fred ROSE, and other non-official individuals, and that the Foreign Office would consider their exclusion calculated both to prejudice the interrogation of other Agents, and to detract from the effect upon the Russians of a comprehensive clean-up of their network.

J.H. Marriott.

F.2a
7.11.45

78.

7.11.45 Telegram 77 to New York re interrogation of PRIMROSE 78a

79.

7.11.45 Telegram 78 to New York re A.D.F. staying over until Nov.18th to cover meeting of Prime Ministers. 79a

80.

7.11.45 Telegram 678 from New York in reply to 79a 80a

81.

9.11.45 From Foreign Office sending final draft of material at 73a 81a

82.

9.11.45 Telegram 90 to New York in reply to 71a 82a

83.

9.11.45 Telegram 96-7 to New York re interrogation of MALANIA & PRIMROSE 83a

84.

13.11.45 Telegrams717-8 from New York in reply to 83a 84a

85.

13.11.45 Telegram 719 from New York re suspects to be detained and interrogated in Canada. 85a

86.

15.11.45	Telegram 735 from New York (Mr. Hollis) re "D. Day" for case	86a

87.

19.11.45	Telegram 759 from New York re action against CORBY etc.	87a
19.11.45	Telegrams 761-3 copy of telegram re BENTLEY case	87b
19.11.45	Telegram 764-5 re action against CORBY ring	87c
20.11.45	From Foreign Office enclosing letter from Mr. Neville Butler	87d

88.

D.G.

You will wish to see the telegram at 87a. The brief, which Mr. Neville Butler of the Foreign Office took to the Sub-Committee referred to in para.A, is filed at 81a. Para.D of the telegram at 87a is a little obscure since I understand that Mr. Neville Butler, who has now returned to England, has brought with him an account of the meeting between the Prime Ministers and the President which shows that, contrary to what is set out in S.I.S.' telegram, the President did agree to the course of action recommended by the Prime Ministers.

I have not yet seen Mr. Butler's account of the proceedings, but I suggest that what happened is this: Namely that the President did agree to action, but that in so doing he had not consulted Mr. Hoover, and that the latter may have insisted to S.I.S.' Representative that he would oppose any action which might prejudice the new F.B.I. case, details of which appear in the copy telegram at 87b. S.I.S. are cabling New York and Ottawa to ask what is the exact position and to find out whether D. Day has yet been fixed. They will also enquire as to the date Mr. Hollis expects to return - you will remember that he has provisionally booked a passage for the 26th inst.

You will also wish to see 83a and 84a which deal with the scope of the eventual interrogation of PRIMROSE and the extent to which the R.C.M.P. are willing to allow the interrogators to use the information and material available.

J.H. Marriott.

A.D.F.
21.11.45

21.11.45

D.G. through D.B.

Since dictating the above minute I have received Mr. Butler's account of the meeting between the President and the Prime Ministers, and have also received a telegram from Hollis. These are now filed at 87d and 87c respectively. Now that all the documents are available, I think that the apparent obscurity to which I referred in my minute 88 has now been dissipated, and that the position is clear - namely that the meeting between the President and the Prime Ministers arrived at no decision whatever and that everything remains in abeyance for the next fortnight pending F.B.I.'s further investigations into their own case. This situation is, I think, unsatisfactory and accordingly S.I.S. are cabling their representative in New York urging that it should be represented to the Americans that further delay increases the now very considerable risk of the Russians anticipating us by taking counter-action themselves, and that, the Russians, having by now already been thoroughly alerted by CORBY's disappearance, action in the CORBY case is unlikely further to prejudice the case referred to in the telegram at 87b

J.H. Marriott.

A.D.F.
21.11.45

90.

21.11.45	Telegram 772 from New York re decision of Prime Ministers & President	90a

91.

21.11.45	Telegram 169 to New York	91c
21.11.45	Telegram 774 from New York re date when action to be taken	91a
24.11.45	Telegram 793 from New York re possibility of separate action by Canadians and Americans	91b

D.G. through J.B.

Please see at 90a and 91a the latest telegrams dealing with the date when action is to be taken in the CORBY case.

A.D.F.
26.11.45

J.H. Marriott.

95.

26.11.45	From Foreign Office re telegram sent by them to Lord Halifax re CORBY	93a

94.

28.11.45	Telegram 820 from New York - US powers not prepared for action in CORBY case whenever Canadians went at	94a

95.

2.12.45	Telegrams 855-7. Canadian Prime Minister in favour of partial action only	95a

96.

2.12.45	Telegram 855 - re new decision of Canadian P.M. deprecating action suggested.	96a

97.

2.12.45	Telegram from M.I.5 to Canada deprecating action suggested at 95a	97a

98.

3.12.45	Telegram 860 from New York - Canadian P.M. again changed his mind and now contemplates no action at all for time being.	98a
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4.12.45	Telegrams [illegible] from New York re Press leakage [illegible] ADAMS	98c
[illegible].12.45	Telegram [illegible] from New York re further Press leakage	

At the request of Mr. Norman Robertson in Ottawa, I to-day saw Mr. Wilgress, the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow who is over in England in connection with the U.N.O. and gave him a general picture of the CORBY case. I offered to let him see any papers in connection with the case which he might care to look at. He said that he would very much like to see these papers before he returned to Moscow, and promised to get in touch with me again when he was free-er.

A.D.F.
5.12.45

R. H. Hollis.

100.

5.12.45	Telegrams 827-8 to New York in reply to 98b	100a
6.12.45	Telegram 877 from New York re showing CORBY papers to Wilgress.	100b
6.12.45	Telegram 876 from New York further to 98c and 98d re press leakage	100a

101.

7.12.45	Telegrams 881-2 from New York re Canadian Prime Minister's final view	101a

102.

8.12.45	Telegram 883 from New York re Source of leakage re DALE	102a

103.

10.12.45	Telegram 889 from New York re repercussions of [illegible] leakage	103a

104.

12.10.45	Telegram 897 from New York re departure of MIKHAILOV and GRANT - effect on action decision.	104a

"FILE CLOSED"

"FILE CLOSED"

215A

TELEGRAM

B.S.C.. NEW YORK PERSONAL FOR STEPHENSON

HOLLIS is sailing on Queen Elizabeth leaving Southampton October 22nd for Halifax. He proposes to visit Washington and Ottawa and to see you but would be glad in the light of local conditions to have a message from you awaiting him at Halifax as to the order in which you think these visits should be made. Can you request R.C.M.P. to arrange air reservation from Halifax to destination?

Telephoned to Miss Cargeaux

Rd. 16/10

16.10.45

ADF 15/10
16.10.45

Copy for Supp. B.

104a.

COPY OF TELEGRAM 897 from New York of 12.12.45 (filed in Supp.A)

A. F.B.I. report Soviet Inspectors KOSSAREV and FOMITCHEV are at present in New York. Soviet Consul-General New York, Pavel MIKHAILOV, has been ordered to return to Moscow. Latter is "Molier" judge on page 40 of our CORBY report.

B. F.B.I. have also learned from most delicate source of unknown reliability that GRANT may leave for Moscow shortly, though there has been no official intimation yet of such a move.

C. New Assistant Military Attache, Gregory POPOV has just arrived in Ottawa.

D. Following Zarubins' departure, these moves begin to look like transfers for - seen in para D of your telegram 227-S. While withdrawal of GRANT would take sting out of any protest Canadians eventually make, it will nevertheless from this very fact probably make them view eventual action with less alarm.

E. Have you any traces of KOSSAREV, FOMITCHEV, or PAVLOV.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

103a

No. 889 of December 10th.

102-

Reference my telegram 883.

PF67203
46525

A. [ADAMS] case revived over weekend with backing from representative George A. DONDERO hard-shell Republican from Michigan of some standing.

B. DONDERO demanded House Military Affairs Committee call Hoover to give testimony on Soviet espionage in U.S.A.

C. DONDERO also stated Hoover should be asked whether "his efforts had been frustrated by any other Government agency in bringing about arrests or taking any other action intended to protect national security".

TOP SECRET. 102

NEW YORK.

No. 883 of December 8th.

My telegram 876. 100B

pf67203.Y6525

A. Journal American has temporarily stopped flogging [ADAMS] story and has produced little or no reaction. It is probable that Senator WHERRY will read it into Congress record on Monday. WHERRY, a former undertaker, is not highly considered and it is likely (subject to unforeseen developments) that matter will die natural death in his hands.

B. Meanwhile F.B.I.'s communist section is apparently endeavouring so far without success, to trace source of leak who undoubtedly had access to some F.B.I. reports. (?I learn) from more than one source that F.B.I. express themselves as most alarmed at breach of security and apprehensive that it may be attributed to them.

C. (?For your personal information) source of leak is stated privately by F.B.I. to be most likely one of GROVES men or someone attached United States joint chiefs as these are only two organisations (apart from F.B.I.) who would normally have access to reports on leakage of atomic research information.

Copy B.

Asit ... Seen by D.G. Ross 12/12

TOP SECRET. 12/12

10/a

NEW YORK.

No. 881 of 7th December.

15 wired to Ottawa 12/12/45

Your telegrams 227 and 228.

A. I have expressed your and M.I.5's views to both Commissioner of R.C.M.P. and to Under Secretary of State. Former's views are similar to yours, and External Affairs are also aware that security interests are not best served by this delay.

B. We and R.C.M.P. have maintained strongly throughout that early action on lines of Washington memorandum was proper course, but these recommendations are countered by pointing out open acceptance of this memorandum by two Prime Ministers presupposed at time joint action by United States which is not at present forthcoming. This is in fact set out as point two of memorandum.

C. Point at issue is that Prime Minister is clearly determined that he will not accept responsibility of action which will bring Canadian Government into public diplomatic collision with Russians without similar supporting action being taken by Americans. The further arguments which you advance in favour of early action (particularly those in your para. E) are fully appreciated here but they are fundamentally based on security and intelligence interests and therefore cannot affect Prime Minister's decision based upon diplomatic considerations, which to him are overriding and on which he has already made up his mind.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 882 of December 7th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. There would appear to be nothing at present which might modify the decision except perhaps a press leak in Canada of the kind at present going on in U.S.A. or possibly further alarming revelations of Soviet espionage in the Dominion. It is therefore most likely that prosecution of the CORBY case must wait on F.B.I.'s attack on GOLOS network.

E. It is difficult to assess how long this will be. When I spoke with LADD last week he could not then give any date for action. SILVERMASTER group is very active and F.B.I. appears to be concentrating on this. They also hope eventually to obtain strong evidence by breaking Duncan LEE who is weak character.

F. In spite of apparent stale-mate we must hope delay will nevertheless not be over long since F.B.I. are clearly making effort. I am in touch with Washington developments and will keep you informed.

Supp B.

1000

From New York

6.12.45.

877.

TOP SECRET.

Please inform M.I.5 that Norman Robertson hopes they will show WILGRESS the papers before he leaves.

100B

New York

876

6.12.45.

Top Secret.

FBA no memo. Paris. 10/12

My telegram 869: 98

PF 67203 Y.6525

A. Journal American continues [ADAMS] story December 5th with vague revelations of Communist courier system which it links with Maritime Union.

B. Original story was copies by one Washington paper and Canadian press but has not been touched by serious papers or any commentator of standing.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.12.45.

No. 227.

Your 860 of December 3rd.

A. We are greatly relieved to hear that King has abandoned the plan outlined in your 855 of December 1st.

B. We agree with comments on that plan expressed in your 858 of December 1st namely that from security and intelligence point of view it offered absolute minimum of advantage.

C. On other hand prospect of indefinite delay now opening before us is almost equally disappointing.

D. Delay will blunt the sharpness of our thrust when at long last it is delivered and will give Soviet authorities yet more leisure to prepare their counter-blast. It will give opportunity for the routine transfer of Grant and his associates out of range of the Canadian protest.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

5.12.45.

No. 228.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. We do not consider that handling of case on these lines will in any way deter Soviet authorities from pursuing their espionage activity nor will it aid the security services here and elsewhere in obtaining backing for necessary action. Hesitant attitude of Canadian government will therefore prejudice tackling of security problems inside Canada as well as outside particularly in England.

F. In our view most promising course of action is that laid down in Washington memorandum (your 764 of November 19th refers).

G. We know that you will give ~~our~~ R.C.M.P. all necessary support in pushing this solution. Do not repeat not hesitate to quote security and intelligence authorities in London in support.

H. Above telegram written in conjunction with M.I.5 who wish to be associated with views expressed therein.

TOP SECRET.

98d

NEW YORK.

No. 869 of December 4th.

98c

My telegrams 863/64

A. Journal American follow-up to-day breaks new story of unnamed Russian official operating from Amtorg to obtain information on jet propulsion from United States engineers. Agent is probably Alexei SORVIN mentioned in CORBY case in connection with WSTEINBERG.

B. Editorial comment carries direct attack on State Department for hampering F.B.I. action against proved agents. Matter is being vociferously supported by Senator WHERRY (R) whose resolution calling for probe of Communist elements in State Department is before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

C. There is no doubt whatever that attack is inspired, and neatly timed to precede enquiry into reasons for HURLEY's resignation and charges against State Department which opens to-morrow.

D. General opinion in Ottawa at present is that if diclosures and pressure continue at present rate, Speed case may be forced to earlier action than anticipated and CORBY case would follow suit.

Suppl B.

Anti Soviet
M. in ADAMS

TOP SECRET.

918

NEW YORK.

No. 863 of December 4th.

A. New York journal American this afternoon broke story of [Arthur ADAMS]repeat ADAMS, underheadline "Russian atom spy trailed by F.B.I." Story, which is frequently inaccurate but clearly inspired, directly indicates unnamed Soviet officials. Following are brief actual facts on ADAMS from files.

P.F.67203
4.6525

Traces as 422/Canada

B. Subject is Arthur Alexandrovich ADAMS, resident of New York.

C. After some earlier visits, he arrived United States April 17th 1935 per s.s. EUROPA as official representative of GLAVAVIAPROM to work with CURTIS WRIGHT export corporation. Statement at that time showed him to have been born in Eskiltuna, Sweden, 1885, and to have graduated from Kronstadt Naval Engineering School in 1909.

D. From 1936 to 1938 he was in Toronto under guise electrical engineer. He travelled considerably in Canada and is known to have photographed bridges, power plants etc. In 1936 statement was signed in Canada by non-existing sponsor to the effect ADAMS had been born in Toronto. By this means he obtained Canadian citizenship.

My immediately following telegram.

No date
Present.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 864 of December 4th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. ADAMS was at one time in contact with Doctor Henry HARRIS of CORBY case and was associated with Juliet Poyntz GLAZER of New York (?who x was) known to Speed. His contact with Soviet Consulate in New York in 1945 appears to have been Eric Bernay repeat BERNAY.

F. In September 1944 ADAMS contacted physicist from Chicago Research Laboratory and obtained material from him. He has since been under constant surveillance by F.B.I. of which he was aware.

G. His wife is in communication with Dorothea KEANE repeat KEANE apparently resident in Moscow and at one time believed to be associated with ADAMS.

H. Newspaper story is presented as oblique attack on State Department which is accused of refusing F.B.I. permission to arrest ADAMS. You will recall State Department were far from co-operative over "AMERASIA" fiasco and this leak comes, to say the least of it, most opportunely when F.B.I. are preparing Speed case for consideration of State.

I. It is possible that this publicity may forcibly affect decision on CORBY case outlined by Macdonald in my telegram 860/1. You will be informed of developments.

x could read alternatively as ?not.

97a

FOLLOWING FROM M.I.5 for COMMISSIONER, R.C.M.P.

YOUR 855 of 2.12.45

A) WE FEEL THAT FROM A STRICT SECURITY ANGLE ACTION PROPOSED WILL YIELD SMALL RESULTS IN CANADA AND WILL GIVE MINIMUM ASSISTANCE TO SECURITY AUTHORITIES ELSEWHERE.

B) WE SUGGEST THAT AMBASSADORS DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PRECIPITATE ACTION WHICH CAN IF NECESSARY BE DELAYED UNTIL HIS RETURN.

C) WE BELIEVE DIPLOMATIC PROTEST UNACCOMPANIED BY PROSECUTION UPON DISMISSAL OR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT WILL BE TAKEN BY RUSSIANS AS INDICATIVE OF WEAKNESS OF EVIDENCE ON WHICH PROTEST IS BASED.

D) WE STRONGLY URGE IN THE INTERESTS OF CANADIAN AND BRITISH SECURITY ADOPTION OF PROCEDURE ON THE LINES OF MEMORANDUM DRAWN UP IN WASHINGTON.

E) IF ACTION ON LINES OF YOUR 855 IS DECIDED PLEASE ADVISE IF MALANIA IS TO BE QUESTIONED. PRIMROSE CANNOT BE INTERROGATED WITHOUT RISK OF PUBLICITY.

TOP SECRET.

98

From: NEW YORK.

Date: 3.12.45.

No: 860.

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm Macdonald repeated Washington for Lord Halifax.

Our 855-7: — 95a

A. Further examination of position has led Mackenzie King to abandon plan he contemplated which was reported in my telegram under reference. He has done this largely on strong advice of R.C.M.P. and other authorities here, who emphasise its great defects from security point of view.

B. Decision now is to take no diplomatic or police action for the present. Trend of thought amongst all Canadian authorities concerned is to wait until Americans are ready to take action on their own case. This might conceivably happen at any time in the near future. It is more likely not to materialise for several week if not months.

My immediately following telegram.....

TOP SECRET.

Suppl. B

9

NEW YORK.

No. 862 of December 4th.

980

My telegram 860/61.

A. In order prevent fiasco which would have resulted from course of action outlined in my telegram 855/857 R.C.M.P. were forced to recommend that no action at all at present would be preferable. They will have maintained however that arrests and interrogation as agreed in Washington was correct course.

B. It is clear that Mackenzie King is not prepared to accept responsibility of allowing Canadian Government to take action unsupported by similar action in United States.

TOP SECRET.

From: NEW YORK

Date: 4.12.45.

No: 861

My immediately preceding telegram.

3. In the meantime departmental action will be taken to extent of further neutralising power of various agents in Government employ to do damage. These agents will all now be transferred to work where they will be harmless. In this connection I am considering what is best to take with member of my office concerned and will report further on this.

4. Mackenzie King had his interview with Russian Ambassador this afternoon in stead of tomorrow. Ambassador explained that he is proceeding to Moscow in accordance with Soviet Government's policy of having consultations with various of their Ambassadors on termination of war. He spoke in terms of cordial friendship for Canadian Government and people and expressed desire of his Government for closer political, economic and cultural relations. Mackenzie King reciprocated these sentiments.

5. Ambassador leaves Montreal by aircraft tomorrow afternoon en route for Moscow via Britain.

6. Position will be kept under constant review by Canadian authorities. I shall await any further development.

96

New York. Flying.
2.12.45.
1018 . . .

2.12.45.
1 45 . . .
[illegible]

[illegible] of December 2nd. [illegible].

Following is for [illegible] only. Personal decypher yourself.

From [illegible].

Your telegram 2nd December 1st.

[illegible]. You will have seen [illegible]'s telegram to [illegible].

[illegible]. It is clear that [illegible] King's present attitude is reached without due regard for intelligence and security aspects of case, and condition (grant) apprehensions of subsequent political repercussions in Canada without United States involvement in any action.

[illegible]. Officers concerned are privately far from satisfied with prospects and appreciate dangers of this compromise.

[illegible]. We have pointed out that, other considerations aside, suggested action will not even involve [illegible] and [#98347.] who should primary targets, and that departmental enquiry cannot prove satisfactory since denial of activities by agents would simply leave them unpunished.

E. [illegible] will strongly resist proposed course and request Prime Minister to reconsider. It will be impossible for them to adequately handle case by December 4th along lines proposed, and in requesting delay we hope they may be able successfully to recommend more satisfactory measures.

Copies sent C.S.S.,IX, ASP.

95

From: NEW YORK. TOP SECRET.

Date: 2.12.45.

No: 855.

Following for Sir Alexander CADOGAN from Malcolm MACDONALD repeated Washington for Lord Halifax.

1. Mr Mackenzie King is contemplating early action on following lines:-

a) Approach to Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa to give him suitable message expressing Canadian Government's views on Russian espionage activities and to request recall of Grant and his colleagues in Embassy.

b) Approach to agents in Government departments and Earnscliffe by Heads of those Departments and myself respectively, followed by full but confidential department enquiries. R.C.M.P. would assist in these enquiries. They would involve interrogations but not detentions except where confessions may be forthcoming.

2. General purpose of this is to:-

a) let Soviet Government understand that Canadian authorities know of their activities in Canada and that they are prepared to take firm diplomatic action.

My immediately following telegram.....

From: NEW YORK. TOP SECRET.

Date: 2.12.45.

No: 856

My immediately preceding telegram.

2. b) Take action to break espionage ring by stopping agents activities in departments.

c) Avoid publicity if possible.

3. Apart from high diplomatic and political considerations Mr King is much influenced by legal advisers views that convictions in court would be difficult and probably impossible in great majority of cases. To test this opinion, he has asked for immediate outside legal opinion, which may not be secured for, say, another week.

4. Amongst consequences of above line, some most important agents such as SAM CARR and [FRED ROSE] Pf. 98,347 would not be proceeded against, since they are not connected with Governments departments.

5. Plan is to be thought out further. Espionage naturally presents many difficulties and complications. Police and security representatives in particular are pointing out immense difficulties and risks of line proposed. Political authorities here, including Mr King, had intended that action, if decided upon, should be taken after careful preparation in about a week's time.

My immediately following telegram.....

From: NEW YORK

Date: 2.12.45.

No: 857

TOP SECRET.

My immediately preceding telegram....

5 continued. They have learned to-day however, that Russian Ambassador is leaving Ottawa next Tuesday, December 4th., on his way by air to Moscow. This development has taken them by surprise and they naturally do not know what may be significance of his visit to Moscow. He has asked to see Mr King urgently on Monday. Mr King at present has put him off until Tuesday afternoon. Mr King's present provisional idea is that he should speak to Ambassador on lines of la above at that interview. There is obviously great advantage in such a message being delivered by Mr King in person to Ambassador in person. On the other hand it will almost certainly be impossible to have plans ready in time for this initial action on Tuesday afternoon. One of many questions now being considered here is, therefore, whether much effect would be lost by making the diplomatic approach through Russian Charge d'Affaires after Ambassador has left.

6. Above is all tentative at present, but consideration of it is being speeded up on account of Russian Ambassador's impending departure. I will telegraph to you further as soon as I can send you more definite information. In the meantime please let me have any comments you wish to make.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

43

Mr. Marriott.

With Mr. Bromley's compliments.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
26th November, 1945.

Supp B

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

940

No. 820 of November 28th.

Following is for Sir A. CADOGAN repeated Ottawa for Mr. M. MACDONALD from Lord HALIFAX.

Your telegram 192.

1. ACHESON told PEARSON last night that United States Government were now prepared for Canadian Government to take action in CORBY case whenever they wished. It seems that Speed case is now unlikely to yield positive results for a considerable time and United States Government no longer have any security reasons for holding up Canadian action. They have not even asked to be informed or consulted as to date.

2. PEARSON pressed ACHESON to say that United States Government saw no political objection to action being taken but ACHESON would not be drawn.

3. PEARSON is informing Ottawa where decision and action now lie.

T.E.B.

Nº 192

TELEGRAM

Lord Halifax

via "C"

TOP SECRET.

Following for Ambassador from Sir A. Cadogan.

Thank you for your telegrams Nos. 774 and 775 of the 22nd November about Corby case which make position rather clearer.

2. I should be grateful if Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, to whom I am repeating this telegram, would let me know the result of Mr. Pearson's enquiry mentioned in penultimate paragraph of your No. 775 so that we may be ready to take action at the moment agreed.

Repeat to:

Mr. Malcolm Macdonald

Supp B (duplicate)

TOP SECRET.

Adressed
NEW YORK.

27.11.45.

No. 192.

Pass following also to Malcolm MACDONALD.

Following for Ambassador from Sir A. CADOGAN:-

A. Thank you for your telegrams 774 and 775 of 22nd November about CORBY case which makes position rather clearer.

B. I should be grateful if Mr. Malcolm MACDONALD (to whom I am repeating this telegram) would let me know the result of Mr. PEARSON's enquiry mentioned in penultimate paragraph of your telegram 775 so that we may be ready to take action at the moment agreed.

9/B.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

Suppt B

No. 793 of November 24th.

Your telegram 169. ? S.I.S. telegram not

A. HOLLIS and Dwyer have spoken to Commissioner of R.C.M.P. along these lines and inform me he is fully conscious of points you make. They have also discussed situation with external affairs.

B. Situation ow is:-

1). Canadians realise that unless Americans can set date for joint action in near future, CORBY case may have to be resolved separately.

2) If Americans are unable to give date, in view enormous ramifications of Miss CORBY case, Mackenzie King will be asked to make separate decision with his Cabinet.

C. Since Canadians for ?political reasons naturally would prefer joint action, PEARSON has been instructed to clarify situation with ACHESON this morning.

9/a.

wpp B

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 774 of 21st November.

Following for Sir A. CADOGAN repeated Ottawa for Malcolm MACDONALD from Lord HALIFAX.

1. PEARSON and MAKINS duly saw ACHESON last night.

2. They confirmed that it had been agreed between Mr. BYRNES and Mr. Mackenzie KING that no action should be taken for a period of 14 days from Friday November 16th.

3. One reason was desire of F.B.I. expressed to President by Edgar HOOVER for further time to interrogate person familiarly known here as Miss CORBY now in their hands.

My immediately following telegram.

S.F. 422/USA/Link.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 775 of November 21st.

My immediately preceding telegram.

4. PEARSON told ACHESON that he thought it was understood in Ottawa that procedure to be followed when action was taken had been explained to Prime Minister and President by Mr. Mackenzie KING (this is procedure agreed between Canadians and ourselves in Washington). It followed that only point outstanding was date on which action would be taken.

5. PEARSON is confirming assumption in preceding paragraph with Ottawa. He is also ?enquiring whether Mr. Mackenzie KING contemplates any further consultation with Washington before taking action on expiry of fourteen day period.

6. ACHESON asked for as much notice as possible of date on which stations Government proposed to act.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

21.11.45.

No. 169.

Your telegram No. 760 of November 19th.

A. Your para. D. This prospect of further delay is most disappointing.

B. I fully appreciate that F.B.I. would resist any action likely to disturb their investigation of BENTLEY case.

C. It appears however that

(a) Russians are already thoroughly alerted.. Action in CORBY case could hardly further prejudice BENTLEY investigation.

(b) Opposition to early action comes not from F.B.I. but from State Department.

D. Meanwhile CORBY scents are growing rapidly colder since it is already well over two months since first alarm was given.

E. Further, Russians are being given ample time to prepare their case in advance and also possibly to organise counter action.

F. Their quiescence hitherto is, in itself, ominous.

G. Your difficulties are fully appreciated and I am sure that you are losing no opportunity of speeding matters to a decision.

H. Please inform HOLLIS that above views are shared by M.I.5.

TOP SECRET.

90

From: New York.

Date: 21st November 1945.

No: 772

For your information President informed Prime Minister of Canada that he would communicate his views on CORBY case by end of this month. Canadian Prime Minister would prefer joint action simultaneously in United States and Canada. If TRUMAN's views are that United States cannot act promptly KING would consult his Cabinet before agreeing ~~support~~ independent (see below) action.

Mr. Philby read the above telegram to me over the telephone 22.11.45. As the last sentence is unintelligible S.I.S. are asking for clarification. It is possible that the word "support" should read "separate".

J.H.M.

N.B.

S.I.S. informed us that last sentence should read"...KING would consult his cabinet before agreeing to independent action".

87d

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

20th November, 1945.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.

Dear Marriott

I enclose herein a copy of a letter I have had from Mr. Neville Butler in Washington, together with its enclosures which will, I think, be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely

R E Bromley

J.H. Marriott, Esq.

COPY.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

TOP SECRET.

14th November, 1945.

Dear Tom,

We have had three talks with the Canadians about Corby, with Malcolm Macdonald in the chair. At the third meeting the Canadians produced a draft agreement and procedure, with a very tentative draft annexed to it, which Mr. Mackenzie King might, if he agreed, make in the Canadian House of Commons. This draft and annex, and another annex furnished by Hollis about the position in our own country, were put up to the Prime Minister this morning, and Mr. Mackenzie King and he took them up at a meeting this afternoon with the President and Mr. Byrnes. I had got Battcock to tell Mr. Byrnes previously that we were bringing the matter up and to brief him.

(copies enclosed)

Rowan, who was at the meeting, tells me that the President said that he was quite agreeable to action being taken by the Canadians and ourselves as proposed, provided that this did not prejudice action which they were themselves contemplating in regard to a similar network which they have just nosed out here: he would speak to the F.B.I. on the subject, and let us know.

I gather from Rowan that it is doubtful whether the Americans will take supporting action against the American or Americans (there may not be more than one) implicated in the case, as evidence is very slight.

The Prime Minister expects to be back on Wednesday November 21st, and this would give him time to tell his colleagues in London, if he wished, about the action that we are due to take in London.

Yours ever,

(Signed) NEVILE BUTLER.

T.L. Bromley, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

COPY.

TOP SECRET.

Draft agreement on procedure for dealing with the "Corby" case.

1. The controlling considerations in dealing with the Corby case are:

(a) The practices of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, which undoubtedly are followed also in the United States and United Kingdom, are not to be tolerated.

(b) While the case should be handled firmly, it should be dealt with, nevertheless, so as to disturb as little as possible the continuance of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

(c) The case provides an opportunity for exposing the uses to which the Soviet Government puts local Communists elements, and one objective should be to make it as difficult as possible for them to continue (or, in Canada, to reconstruct) their network based largely on these elements.

(d) It should, however, be so handled as to give the least possible substance to charges that counter-action has been taken for ideological reasons.

2. It is agreed that the Corby case should lead to appropriate police action in Canada against identified agents and that supporting action should be taken in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the first place, it should consist of the interrogation of agents, accompanied, when legal power exists and this course is considered desirable, by temporary detention. In all cases in which enough evidence is discovered, prosecutions should be instituted. In Canada, the police interrogations may be [illegible] by an investigation by a Judge, acting as a [illegible] Commissioner and [illegible] to sit in camera. The position in the United Kingdom is described in Annex I.

3. It is agreed that diplomatic action should be taken at the same time in Canada to secure the removal of those members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy who are directly implicated in espionage. This should take the form of declaring to the Soviet Ambassador that the Military Attaché and those associated with him are persona non grata and requesting their immediate removal from Canada. The Ambassador should be given a concise statement of the reasons for the request. His own recall should not be demanded.

4. Once police action has been started, publicity is unavoidable. It is desirable that it should be guided and controlled as far as possible. Initially, this can probably best be done by means of a public statement by the Prime Minister of Canada. A tentative draft statement is attached as Annex II, but its precise terms cannot be finally settled at this stage. Publicity in the United States and in the United Kingdom should, as far as possible, follow the same general course as in Canada.

5. It is for consideration whether action against agents should be accompanied by the despatch of a message to Marshal Stalin from Mr. Mackenzie King.

6. It is agreed that police action in the three countries should be taken in the course of the week beginning November 25th, and should immediately be followed by diplomatic action in Canada.

COPY.

TOP SECRET.

ANNEX I

1. While the espionage agents in Canada can be detained for interrogation under an Order-in-Council, no such powers exist in the United Kingdom and Primrose will therefore have to be questioned without being detained. He could only be detained following his questioning if he makes admissions, under caution, which will enable the authorities to arrest him and bring a charge against him, or if investigations in Canada or elsewhere produce material on which such a charge can be laid.

2. The greater part of the information about the activities of Primrose has been supplied by Corby and there is little documentary evidence or first hand information about Primrose's activities and movements. He was apparently operated by the Soviet authorities as a separate unit and not as a part of one of the espionage groups, and it is therefore unlikely that information which will incriminate Primrose will be obtained from other agents.

3. Primrose gives the impression of being a strong and determined character who will not be likely to lose his head and confess to the authorities unless he is confronted with evidence of his activities of a much stronger nature than is at present available.

4. For the above reasons, the authorities are not very sanguine of obtaining a confession from Primrose on which it will be possible to bring a charge against him.

4. In order to ensure a full and impartial investigation, Mr. Justice _____ has been appointed to act as a Royal Commissioner to hear evidence and to present a report, which will be made public. The circumstances of the case make it desirable that some at least of the testimony given before the Royal Commissioner should be heard in camera. It is the intention of the Government that, after the report of the Royal Commissioner has been received, prosecution will be instituted in all cases in which the evidence warrants it.

5. It is not possible at this stage for me to make a more complete statement and, in particular, to make public the names of those concerned. Some of them appear to be far more deeply and consciously involved than others. Some have probably acted as innocent tools of designing men. I ask, therefore, that the matter should be treated with caution and reserve, pending the time when it will be possible to issue a fuller statement. Until the investigation by the Royal Commissioner has been completed, the case remains sub judicé.

TOP SECRET.

8c

From: NEW YORK.

Date: 19.11.45

No: 764

Supp B

Following for M.I.5 from Hollis.

A. After discussions at British Embassy in Washington a memorandum was prepared on CORBY case for ATTLEE and MACKENZIE KING containing the following points:-

One R.C.M.P. should detain CORBY search and interrogate agents.

Two Similar action so far as possible should be taken in United Kingdom and U.S.A.

Three Agents against who there was a legal case should be prosecuted.

Four The Canadians would set up a royal commission to advise on how soon detained agents could be released and to report on full facts of CORBY case.

Five The Canadians should make a diplomatic protest to Soviet Ambassador and demand the recall of Military Attache and his accomplices.

Six MACKENZIE KING should make a statement to house on these matters.

Seven D. day suggestion approved fixed at any day convenient to R.C.M.P. in week beginning Monday November 26th.

My immediately following telegram.....

From: NEW YORK.

Date: 19.11.45.

No: 765

Following for M.I.5 from HOLLIS.

My immediately preceding telegram.

B. This memorandum was accepted by two Prime Ministers and points were put to President in a meeting on November 14th. It is understood that President asked for time to consider matter, particularly in view of a new case mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram.

C. While neither BUTLER nor ROBERTSON on Saturday evening was entirely sure of scope of further discussion with President, the CORBY case was discussed on Friday afternoon and Americans are believed to have asked for a moratorium of a fortnight after which they would be prepared to enter into new discussions of action to be followed in CORBY case. They made this request in hope that position of their own case would become more clear during that fortnight.

D. F.B.I. appeared anxious for early action on CORBY case and it therefore seems that proposal for delay arose from State Department and not from F.B.I.

COPY.

Original in SA 422/US

Telegrams 761/762//763 from New York dated 19.11.45

ELISABETH TERRIL BENTLEY, repeat ELISABETH TERRIL BENTLEY, visited the F.B.I. some two weeks ago and made statement.

B. She advised that she had been working for some years for World Tourist Incorporated of New York, a travel agency operated by Jacob GOLOS repeat GOLOS until his death in November 1943. During war he also organised United States Service and Shipping Corporation sending food parcels to Russia. Both these firms were used as cover for espionage organisation which after death of GOLOS came directly under Soviet control. It had previously been under Communist Party and always retained strong party connections.

C. Source acted as courier between various agents and sub-agents. Network follows usual pattern of Soviet Intelligence operations and extensive penetration of American Government circles has been brought to light. There is reason to believe espionage ring was controlled by N.K.V.D.

D. About thirty agents have been identified but the ramifications of the case have not yet been fully explored.

E. Source has referred to one "CEDRIC B" whom we are inclined to identify as Cedric BELFRAGE. She claims that he handed over a long report on training agents by Scotland Yard (sic)

F. Source also mentions Peter RHODES repeat RHODES who is described as newspaper man whose mother was British Intelligence agent in last war. Source stated that RHODES had been covering war in U.K. and in Africa that N.K.V.D. had lost touch with him and were attempting to renew contact.

G. F.B.I. believe that they have identified this man as Peter Christopher RHODES born December 30th 1911 in Manila. Father was of German origin and mother, nee ABRAHAMS born in Jamaica. RHODES attended Oxford University 1934-36 and was then employed by United Press in London, Paris, Moscow and Stockholm. Reportedly in Soviet Union after invasion of Norway.

H. In December 1941 RHODES was connected with the U.S. Federal Communications Commission in London. Later he went to North Africa. Towards end of 1944 he was with U.S. office of War Information in London. Please cable any available information.

I. Source has not been active as courier for some time and F.B.I. are now endeavouring to obtain confirmatory evidence to enable them to put legal case before the authorities.

Extract from PF.66949 vol.3

86

TELEGRAM 735 of 15th NOVEMBER FROM HOLLIS.

.....D. PRESENT INTENTION IS THAT D. DAY SHOULD BE DURING WEEK BEGINNING NOVEMBER 26th.

TOP SECRET.

87a

From: NEW YORK.

Date: 19th November.

No: 759.

A. ATTLEE and KING.

Fully briefed on CORBY case prior to opening of Washington talks by a sub-committee consisting of ROBERTSON, WRONG BUTLER MACDONALD and HOLLIS.

B. This sub-committee recommended full action against CORBY culprits including arrest, legal action where possible the appointment of a Royal Commission in Canada to conduct hearings and report on case and recall of incriminated Soviet diplomatic personnel. It also recommended that matter be given a certain amount of publicity, prelude to which would be statement by MACKENZIE KING in Canadian Parliament.

C. Both ATTLEE and KING accepted these recommendations and early in conversations ATTLEE made it clear that a decision would have to be reached.

My immediately following telegram.

65

NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

No. 719 November 13th.

84a (page 2)

Encl. to B
Copy for Supp A

Reference my 718 paragraph I.

A. ?Orders in Council have been issued for following agents. They are referred to by numbers under which they are listed in our report on CORBY case.

B. Numbers, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 26, 30 and Hermina RABINOWITZ.

C. All above will be detained and interrogated with the possible exception of numbers 4, 13, 22, 26, and RABINOWITZ concerning whom action is not yet decided. It is believed number 4 may turn King's evidence with careful handling. Action against number 13 is not yet decided. Identification of number 22 is not entirely satisfactory. Number 26 is not sufficiently implicated and question of diplomatic immunity of RABINOWITZ is under consideration.

1. Sam CARR @ FRANK @ WALTER.
3. Emma WOIKIN @ Nora
4. Kathleen WILLSHER @ Elli
5. [Fred ROSE MP] @ De BOISE PF.98347.
6. Gordon LUNAN @ BACK
7. Durnford SMITH @ BADEAU
8. Ned MAZERALL @ BAGLEY
9. Isidor HALPERIN @ BACON
10. H.S. GERSON @ GRAY
12. David SHUGAR @ PROMETHEUS
13. Professor BOYER
14. Eric ADAMS @ Ernst
15. James S. BENNING @ FOSTER
20. S/Ldr. Mat NIGHTINGALE @ LEADER
22. S/Ldr. F.W. POLAND
26. Norman VEALL
30. Dr. Henry HARRIS @ The DOCTOR.

From: NEW YORK.

Date: 19th November 1945.

No: 760.

C. (continued) However matter was only discussed on 14th instant when TRUMAN stated ~~prisoner~~ that he had not been fully briefed. On morning of 15th BYRNES spoke to HOOVER and this matter was raised.

D. Final decision has not been reached, and since Anglo-Canadian side had hoped to be able to set D-day for week of November 26th it may be assumed that action will be further delayed.

E. Judging from my conversation with HOOVER it seems clear that restraining influence on American side comes from State Department. The whole American attitude however may have been profoundly influenced by discovery of extensive Soviet espionage network in this country believed to have been operated by N.K.V.D. Additional details are contained in my immediately following telegram. New case is in course of active investigation and Americans are now in position to say that blowing of CORBY case before they are ready may prove serious handicap to their enquiries.

84a

83

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESS NEW YORK.

9.11.45.

No. 96.

Following for HOLLIS from M.I.5.

A. On the assumption that we do interrogate PRIMROSE and we should like you to consider with R.C.M.P. scope such interrogation and how much of the information and documents produced by CORBY we may use if necessary.

B. We apprehend that general action against whole net-work will inevitably involve at least tacit disclosure that source of information is CORBY or at any rate man in CORBY's position. Russians will certainly know our source is CORBY.

C. We therefore suggest we should be allowed if necessary to attribute our information to a well-placed informant.

D. The position of the documents is rather different since they are presumably Soviet property which we know to have been stolen from the Embassy if they are not indeed covered by diplomatic privilege.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

Lyp B

9.11.45.

No. 97.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. We think it unlikely that Russians will demand the return of the documents since this would involve admitting their genuineness. We suggest therefore that they may be used in interrogations.

F. BUTLER is being asked to raise this question at the meeting but we should be grateful for precise directions as to limitations, if any, which R.C.M.P. wish to impose on use of any material for interrogation purposes.

G. You will appreciate that until interrogations start we cannot forecast line which they may take and we must give clear brief to the interrogator who naturally wishes to have all available ammunition for his very difficult task.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

9.11.45.

No. 90.

Following from Malcolm MACDONALD from Sir Alexander CADOGAN.

Please repeat to Lord HALIFAX.

A. Thank you for your telegrams 619 - 622 of October 31st.

B. Considerations you mention are much in our minds. We feel that most satisfactory arrangement would be for full discussion on nature and timing of future action should take place at the forthcoming meeting when all interested parties will be together. Mr. BUTLER, who will be a member of the British party, will carry brief setting forth British views in order that the question may be raised.

C. Meanwhile Mr. ATLEE and Mr. MacKenzie KING have agreed that, in view of the difficulty of interrogating all the Canadian suspects simultaneously without risk of publicity and consequently of prejudicing the forthcoming negotiations, no action should be taken against suspects until a decision on the future handling of the atomic problem has been raised.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

81a

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th November, 1945.

Dear Marriott

I enclose a copy of the draft agreed between us which has been approved and also a copy of the telegram we are sending to Mr. Malcolm Macdonald and Lord Halifax.

Yours sincerely

P E Bromley

J. H. Marriott, Esq.,

TOP SECRET.

The Corby Case.

The action we want is the destruction of this network at the earliest possible moment and the discovery of all its ramifications.

To achieve this we would like to have

(a) The conviction of Primrose;

(b) The conviction of all the Canadian and American agents. We particularly feel that the exclusion of e.g. Sam Carr and other non-official agents would lessen the chance of getting admissible evidence against the network and the effect to be gained by firmness in the handling of the case as a whole.

(c) The removal of the Soviet Diplomatic personnel involved.

We appreciate that this will involve publicity, but feel that we should disregard this. It should not be forgotten that by volume the atomic leakage is a relatively small part of the network's activities.

Of the foregoing objectives the one least likely to be achieved is the conviction of Primrose. The failure to achieve this will involve the risk of evasion by Primrose and the placing of his scientific abilities at the disposal of the Russians. If a decision to share the secrets is taken, this risk vanishes. If the decision to share is not taken then it must be decided at the meeting whether the risk is worth running. It should be emphasised that the British Security Authorities cannot guarantee to prevent him getting away. As an alternative the risk of driving Primrose into a Russian asylum would to some extent be lessened if no action were taken against him at all. Such a suggestion would undoubtedly arouse unfavourable comment both from the Canadian and United States representatives at the meeting.

TOP SECRET. 80a

NEW YORK.

No. 678 of November 7th.

Personal to Director General from HOLLIS.

A. I have just received your telegram 78 and will make arrangements to stay until the end of meeting. I was about to telegraph to you to make this recommendation myself as I have seen Lord Halifax and Makins at British Embassy and Pearson and Stone at Canadian Embassy and they seem to feel that it would be advisable for me to stay.

B. R.C.M.P. were anxious for me to return to Ottawa before coming back to London. I will do this if it appears advisable unless I hear from you that you want me back earlier.

C. I have a tentative booking on B.O.A.C. clipper for Monday November 26th arriving, if not delayed in London November 28th.

T. S. B.

November, 1940.

telegram to T. SECRET.

NEW YORK for

Mr. Malcolm Macdonald and Lord Halifax.

Following for Malcolm Macdonald from Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Thank you for your telegrams Nos. 619-622 of 31st October.

Considerations you mention are much in our minds. We feel that most satisfactory arrangement would be for full discussion on nature and timing of future action to take place at the forthcoming meeting when all the interested parties will be together. Mr. Butler, who will be a member of the British party, will carry brief setting forth British views in order that the question may be raised.

Meanwhile Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King have agreed that in view of the difficulty of interrogating all the Canadian suspects simultaneously without some risk of publicity and consequently of prejudicing the forthcoming negotiations,

no/

no action should be taken against suspects
until a decision on the future handling
of the atomic problem has been reached.

79a

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

7.11.45.

No. 78.

Following for HOLLIS from Director General.

A. The Foreign Office have asked that you should remain in America until after meeting between the President and the Prime Ministers.

B. I have granted this request and you should therefore remain for consultation.

C. Meeting is expected to last until 18th November and CORBY case will probably be discussed at end of meeting.

78c

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

7.11.45.

No. 77.

Following for HOLLIS from M.I.5.

Your telegrams 647 and 648.

A. Neville BUTLER is bringing to America a memorandum which we helped to draft containing Foreign Office views on way CORBY case should be dealt with.

B. Memorandum states inter alia that Foreign Office wish for prosecution of PRIMROSE but asks for a decision from the meeting between President and Prime Ministers whether risk of driving him to seek Russian asylum may be run.

C. This meeting will have to decide whether or not PRIMROSE is to be interrogated.

D. We appreciate force of your argument in para. A your 647 but you and R.C.M.P. will doubtless agree that responsibility for running risk of what we consider will probably be an abortive interrogation must be taken on highest level.

Register No. Minute Sheet No.

766

D.B.

I think that a signal should be sent to Hollis in connection with the attached letter from the Foreign Office. I suggest the following:

"Following for HOLLIS from Director General:-

(1) The Foreign Office have asked that you should remain in America until after meeting between the President and the Prime Ministers.

(2) I have granted this request and you should therefore remain for consultation.

(3) Meeting is expected to last until 18th November and CORBY case will probably be discussed at end of meeting.

F.2.a.
6th November, 1945.

J. H. Marriott.

(23893) Wt.51405/5520 300,000 8/43 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.698 J.5340

[P.T.OVER

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

3rd November, 1945.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.

Dear Captain Liddell,

You will have seen copies of telegrams Nos. 619-622 from New York about the CORBY case.

We are taking up the suggestion made in telegram No. 620 that full discussion on future action should take place during the forthcoming meeting with the President and it is proposed that Mr. Nevile Butler should raise the matter during that meeting. For this purpose Mr. Butler has asked me to prepare a note indicating the action we want and I would propose, as I mentioned to you on the telephone, to concert this with Marriott.

Mr. Butler and I both think that it would be most useful if Hollis could be in the States during the meeting, as his detailed knowledge of the case and of the views of the Canadian authorities would be invaluable, and I am therefore writing to ask you whether this could be arranged. The meeting will probably cover the period November 11-18 and Mr. Butler thinks that this particular point may come up in the latter half of that week.

Yours sincerely

R. E. Bromley

Captain Guy Liddell, C.B.E.
M.I.5.

754

DRAFT TELEGRAM

FOR HOLLIS YOUR TELEGRAMS 647 and 648

1. NEVILLE BUTLER IS BRINGING TO AMERICA A MEMORANDUM WHICH WE HELPED TO DRAFT CONTAINING FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS ON WAY CORBY CASE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH.

2. MEMORANDUM STATES INTER ALIA THAT FOREIGN OFFICE WISH FOR PROSECUTION OF PRIMROSE BUT ASKS FOR A DECISION FROM THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTERS WHETHER RISK OF DRIVING HIM TO SEEK RUSSIAN ASYLUM MAY BE RUN.

3. THUS MEETING WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT PRIMROSE IS TO BE INTERROGATED.

4. WE APPRECIATE FORCE OF YOUR ARGUMENT IN PARA. A. YOUR 647 but YOU AND R.C.M.P. WILL DOUBTLESS AGREE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RUNNING RISK OF WHAT WE CONSIDER WILL PROBABLY BE AN ABORTIVE INTERROGATION MUST BE TAKEN ON HIGHEST LEVEL.

6.11.45.

T.E.B.

TOP SECRET.

The Corby Case.

Minute

It is evident that any measures to be taken against the known or suspected agents connected with the Corby case in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the U.S.A. must be concerted between the three governments in the light of the political considerations [illegible] and it has been decided that any such [illegible] must not precede the meeting of the [illegible] Ministers and the President, since it would involve the risk of publicity which might in turn prejudice an approach to the Russians if that were decided on at the meeting. It should be remembered that information has been gained about a wide range of [illegible] as well as about the atomic weapon.

2. Our view in the Foreign Office has been that we should take the straightforward course, i.e. that if on evidence we can [illegible] to arrests and trials, we should do so with the object of stopping the network doing further harm and following up its ramifications to prevent further mischief.

3. The Canadians have inclined to the view that a special approach should be made to the Russians at a high level, acquainting them with our information as to what has been going on and obtaining secrecy in return for an undertaking that all these activities should cease. At the same time the principal agents should be detained and thoroughly examined and the Canadian authorities /

.thorities would ask for the recall of the Russian Ambassador (which we advise against) or at least of the Military Attaché and other members of the Embassy who are actively engaged. This would be done discreetly in an attempt to avoid publicity.

4. The American authorities say only that they have insuffidient evidence to justify arrests.

5. Both the Canadians and ourselves are agreed that some action should be taken as soon as possible - The Canadians consider that [illegible]k of it would be interpreted by the Russians as a sign of weakness - and the three main problems to be settled are:

1. What action can be taken against the agents implicated in Canada, the U.S.A. and the U.K.

2. What action can be taken vis a vis the Russian Embassy in Ottawa.

3. What degree of secrecy can be preserved under 1. and 2. above.

6. There is at present no admissible evidence against PRIMROSE and no power to detain him. He could only be questioned on a voluntary basis and M.I.5. are of the opinion that they would be unlikely to break down PRIMROSE and are therefore not at all sure of the utility of interrogating him. They consider that the information in their possession is not sufficient to give them a reasonable chance of extracting an admission from him and they further feel that an abortive questioning of PRIMROSE is likely to frighten him into seeking sanctuary with the Russians. In opposition to this view it can be argued that failure to take action against the most guilty of all the agents will create a bad impression both in Canada and the U.S.A., while action in Canada will certainly lead the Russians to believe that PRIMROSE is compromised and may well induce them to take the initiative in suggesting to PRIMROSE that he should seek sanctuary.

[illegible] involved and search of premises. Against this is the [illegible] certainty that a warning was issued to agents soon after Corby's disappearance and they will have had time to

destroy evidence and perfect cover stories. ~~The simultaneous~~ questioning of the eighteen or so suspected agents would involve their detention for a week or so in view of the lack of trained interrogators in Canada and hence probably cause publicity.

8. The Americans, as mentioned above, do not consider that sufficient evidence is available.

9. As regards (ii), the kind of diplomatic action will depend on the decisions taken at the forthcoming meeting as to whether or no there is to be sharing of the scientific and other details of the weapon with the Russians. If it is a reed to share, then the method advocated by the Canadians in paragraph 3 above is presumably the right one.

10. As regards (iii) publicity should if possible be avoided if the secret is to be shared, but it must be remembered that the simultaneous questioning of the eighteen or so suspected agents would involve their segregation from one another for some time, and this segregation could only be achieved by their detention. This detention cannot be hidden and the fact of it will certainly leak to some extent. If as the result of such detention and questioning sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of all or a greater number of the agents is obtained, a formal prosecution is likely to produce an amount of publicity as will demand public comment in all four countries. If there is publicity it should be remembered that there may be some body of opinion in the three Western Countries which will take the view that the Russians were justified in trying to find out what they could about the atomic weapon. This would however not apply to the other intelligence obtained and there may well be serious criticism of the Governments concerned if the facts leak out and no action has been taken against the agents.

[illegible] agents.

11. Neither our own or the Canadian Embassy in Moscow has as yet been informed. The Canadians fear that the Russians, who must be /

be aware that we know what has been going on, may trump up a charge of espionage against one or the other in Moscow and so take the wind out of our sails.

TOP SECRET.

CORBY CASE.

The action we want is the destruction of this network at the earliest possible moment and the discovery of all its ramifications.

To achieve this we would like to have

a. The conviction of PRIMROSE
b. The conviction of the Canadian and American agents.
c. The removal of the Soviet Diplomatic personnel involved.

We appreciate that this will involve publicity, but feel that we should disregard this. It should not be forgotten that by volume the atomic leakage is a relatively small part of the network's activities.

Of the foregoing objectives the one least likely to be achieved is the conviction of PRIMROSE. The failure to achieve this will involve the risk of evasion by PRIMROSE and the placing of his scientific abilities at the disposal of the Russians. If a decision to share the secrets is taken, this risk vanishes. If the decision to share is not taken then it must be decided at the meeting whether the risk is worth running. It should be emphasised that the British Security Authorities cannot guarantee to prevent him getting away. As an alternative the risk of driving PRIMROSE into a Russian asylum would to some extent be lessened if no action were taken against him at all. Such a suggestion would undoubtedly arouse unfavourable comment both from the Canadian and United States representatives at the meeting.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 647 of 2nd November.

For M.I.5. from HOLLIS.

Your telegrams 40 and 41.

A. In my view action against agents in Canada will prove conclusively to Russians that the Grant network is blown and Russians will ?then decide whether they want PRIMROSE in Russia irrespective of whether he is interrogated. The Russians would hardly be rash enough to use him or allow him to contact them after this. You are therefore unlikely to get further useful evidence.

B. If this is so nothing is lost by abortive interrogation and much is gained by a successful one.

C. Successful interrogation would clearly provide valuable information about working of Grant network. It probably would not produce material of use for interrogation ?of other suspects but neither is interrogation in Canada likely to produce material for dealing with PRIMROSE. So far as we know, PRIMROSE was in touch with VEALL only and it is not intended to interrogate him.

My immediately following telegram.

Supp B

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 648 of 2nd November.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. The chances of successful interrogation should therefore be assessed on the material which you already have, and are likely to grow smaller if PRIMROSE is alerted by interrogations in Canada. In these circumstances it seems to me wise to interrogate simultaneously if PRIMROSE is to be interrogated at all.

E. If policy decision is for prosecution I feel that every effort should be made to prosecute PRIMROSE who is the worst traitor in network. If a Royal Commission is appointed they will certainly expect information about PRIMROSE which we should attempt to supply.

F. R.C.M.P., while not wishing to influence your decision, would undoubtedly be disappointed if you did not interrogate.

G. Will you keep me advised in Washington through STEPHENSON.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 641 of November 1st.

For M.I.5. from HOLLIS. Your telegram 24 October 28th.

A. I agree ?with your view that directive was impossible to obey. You will have seen MacDonald's telegrams 619 to 22 to CADOGAN which represents our present views.

B. The WITCZAK passport case may have some bearing on forthcoming policy decision. Examination of Passport Office file shows that sponsor of false ?application form recently substituted for original document of genuine WITCZAK has almost certainly rendered himself liable to prosecution. If legal opinion confirms this, decision will have to be taken whether policy interests should override the normal operation of law.

C. The legal opinion will be sent to London as soon as it is received. This telegram is simply to advise you that one case is probably in a form to be taken into Court. We could not of course proceed with it until action is taken in remaining part of ?CORBY case.

TOP SECRET.

YORK.

No. 619. October 31st.

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm MacDonald.

A. Information which has recently accumulated regarding conduct of at least some agents here, in United States and Switzerland as well as of Primrose in London, indicates that their masters sounded the "alert" to them as a result of CORBY's disappearance. C. has presumably reported all this to you. The various agents have no doubt therefore been instructed to take such steps as they can to dispose of any incriminating material in their possession. Consequently from that point of view it would not seem to matter on which date in reasonably near future police action is taken against them.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 620 of October 31st.

My immediately preceding telegram.

B. We think that United Kingdom and Canadian Prime Ministers may prefer to postpone decision as to what precise action should be taken until after their discussions with President Truman a fortnight hence, then whole question can be considered in its broadest aspect and in relation to other matters to be discussed. I send this message to indicate that, in our view, barring some new development, such a delay will not repeat not for reasons stated above, prejudice effectiveness of police action to be taken.

C. At the same time we venture to hope strongly that at their meeting the heads of three Governments will reach decision as to what police and diplomatic action should be taken and date or dates on which their decision should be ?implemented.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 621. October 31st.

My immediately preceding telegram.

C. contd. From police point of view and from point of view of making sure that further important secret information is not constantly leaking to Russians, it will be extremely awkward if action against all agents is indefinitely postponed. Moreover, maintenance in various Government Departments of officials identified as agents ought not to be endured much longer.

D. Authorities in London and Washington are of course in best position to decide exact diplomatic importance of matter and what diplomatic action is most appropriate. But I venture to suggest that if Russians do by now definitely know (as seems at least possible) that we are aware of the details of espionage organisation, they will think us weak and afraid if we do not take definite diplomatic as well as police action. I know that you have this very much in mind. I am not concerned in this message in expressing a view whether that action should be taken in first instance secretly with Russian Government or published to the world.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 622 of 31st October.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. We here agree with you, Robertson's and M.I.5.'s opinion (reported in your telegram 24) that proposal to interrogate only agents who are in Government employ and at the same time to avoid publicity is not practicable. If I may express a personal opinion, I suggest that it is also inexpedient. Russians would immediately discover that we had taken proposed action, with (it seems to me) two serious results. First, our failure at the same time to either take some diplomatic action with them or to give publicity to proceedings would convince them that we feared them. Second, if they are preparing some counter offensive (e.g. an espionage trial of their own in Moscow), they might open this at once and so prejudice the chance of our exploiting present situation to our advantage.

F. As I cannot communicate through Embassy's office channels on this question, I have assumed throughout that you are keeping Machtig or Stephenson fully informed.

G. Wrong has seen this message and asks that you should pass a copy to Norman Robertson.

File as 69a in Supp B

TOP SECRET. 69A

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

31.10.45.

No. 40

Following from M.I.5. for HOLLIS.

A. No decision has yet been given by Prime Minister on policy with regard to method of taking action in CORBY case and our belief is that decision will be postponed until after the meeting between Prime Minister and President.

B. Meanwhile we are inclining to the view that whatever type of action is eventually decided upon we here ought not to take simultaneous action against PRIMROSE but ought to leave him alone.

C. Our reasons are: (1) We do not think that we have enough material to give interrogators a reasonable chance of breaking him; (2) His behaviour is such as to convince us that he must have been warned by the Russians of possible compromise and this not only postpones the day when we may get further useful evidence but also to some extent decreases the danger of leaving him still at large; (3) An abortive interrogation of PRIMROSE serves no useful purpose and indeed may induce him to do the very thing we most fear, namely to escape to Russia;

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

31.10.45.

No. 41.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following from M.I.5. for HOLLIS.

C. continued. (4) We doubt if even a successful interrogation of PRIMROSE would produce material of use to the interrogation of the other suspects, whereas general interrogation in Canada might possibly produce useful material for dealing with PRIMROSE.

D. We are anxious not to give R.C.M.P. the impression that we are shirking responsibility and we should like your views on our suggestion.

E. You can point out to R.C.M.P. that their interrogators will be in a much more favourable position when questioning a large group of people than we shall be when questioning an isolated individual.

Suff B 681

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

TOP SECRET
AND PERSONAL.

29th October, 1945.

Dear Sir David,

You may like to see the enclosed copy of a Minute which our Secretary of State has sent to the Prime Minister as a result of the Meeting which we held with Mr. Norman Robertson in the Dominions Office on the 23rd October, 1945.

Yours sincerely,

P. Broadley

30/10/45

Major-General Sir David Petrie, C.I.E.,
C.V.O., C.B.E.,

DRAFT TELEGRAM for HOLLIS

Approved by DB

1. No decision has yet been given by Prime Minister on policy with regard to method of taking action in COREY case and our belief is that decision will be postponed until after the meeting between Prime Minister and President.

2. Meanwhile we are inclining to the view that whatever type of action is eventually decided upon we here ought not to take simultaneous action against [illegible] and ought to leave him alone.

3. Our reasons are:

(a) We do not think that we have enough material to give interrogators a reasonable chance of breaking him;

(b) His behaviour is such as to convince us that he must have been warned by the possible of possible compromise and this not only postpones the day when we may get further useful evidence but also to some extent decreases the chance of leaving him still at large;

(c) An abortive interrogation of [illegible] serves no useful purpose and indeed may induce him to do the very thing we most fear, namely to escape to Russia;

(d) We doubt if even a successful interrogation of PRIMROSE would produce material of use to the interrogation of the other suspects, whereas general interrogation in Canada might possibly produce useful material for dealing with PRIMROSE.

4. We are anxious not to give S.C.M.P. the impression that we are shirking responsibility and we should like your views on our suggestion.

5. You can point out to S.C.M.P. that their interrogators will be in a much more favourable position when questioning a large group of people than we shall be when questioning an isolated individual.

30.10.45

Copy handed to Philby 31.10.45 for transmission

. ./40/CD.

[illegible]T.

[illegible] INT[illegible].

The Corby Case.

[illegible] you please refer to my minute [illegible]/40/[illegible] [illegible] 10th October on the above case.

[illegible]. I understand that after a discussion with [illegible] the desirability of taking action against the suspects in Canada and the United Kingdom at an early date you [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] agree that these suspects might be interrogated, but not arrested, provided that no publicity ensued.

[illegible] meeting held at which [illegible] representatives of the Security Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Foreign Office were present, to decide what steps should be taken to implement this.

4. This discussion showed that owing to the small resources available for interrogation to the Canadian police authorities, the simultaneous interrogation of the/

the eighteen or twenty suspects in Canada would necessitate their detention for a week or more. This would inevitably cause considerable comment and anxiety among their families and co-workers and publicity could hardly be avoided.

5. An alternative would be to interrogate only the number which could be dealt with in one day - say two or three. This would have the disadvantage that these would subsequently inform the head of the Communist party in Canada who would warn the other suspects and cause them to destroy any remaining evidence and they would then be useless to the police. Evidence received since the meeting suggests that such a warning has already been issued; nevertheless the security authorities feel strongly that if an interrogation is to be carried out, all the suspects must be interrogated at the same time, and held until the interrogation is complete.

6. The conclusion seems therefore to be that in view of your ruling that there should be no publicity,

and of the risk that publicity about this case might prejudice discussions of an approach to Russia at your forthcoming meeting, no further action could be taken as regards the suspects until after the meeting has taken place. This will of course mean that Fuchs will remain free for the present. We know that he has contact with one top scientist working for the Government on atomic research: probably only Sir John Anderson can assess the risk.

7. I feel myself that we are dealing too tenderly with these people and I would prefer that a turn should be put to their activities as soon as possible. I do not however see what action can be taken before your meeting which would not involve some risk of publicity.

8. If you still feel therefore that in view of paragraph 4 and 6 above this risk must not be taken, I take it that action must be deferred.

File in Supp B

TOP SECRET.

681

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

27.10.45.

No. 24.

For Hollis from M.I.5.

A. Subsequent to meeting at Dominions Office which you attended on October 9th when decision was taken to ask Prime Ministers to decide whether CORBY case was to be carried to prosecution or handled without publicity, Prime Ministers did meet October 21st.

B. Unfortunately Prime Ministers issued directive that accomplices should be interrogated but that this should be limited to those in Government employment. There was to be no publicity.

C. Foreign Office, Robertson and ourselves agreed that directive was impossible to obey and matter has been referred back to Prime Ministers for decision which however has not been forthcoming.

66b

Extract for Supp. Vol. "B": - P.F. No. 66960 Y 6437
"High level correspondence in the "CORBY" Case.

TELEGRAM
ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET

No. 18 26.10.45

IMMEDIATE.

Our 996 of October 24th.

A. 42700 now reports that DUEBENDORFER left her flat in Geneva without warning "about six weeks ago".

B. Swiss police have been making enquiries as to her whereabouts which indicates that she has failed to register her new domicile.

C. This may mean that she has left country or is in hiding.

D. We are pressing (our Berne representative) to discover exact date of her disappearance.

E. At first glance this new fact would seem to show that ZABOTIN got off the mark very quickly after CORBY's disappearance. Assumption that whole group has been warned therefore gathers strength.

Original filed in Supp. Vol. "A" Vol. 2. PF 66960 Y 6437
"Information produced by "CORBY".

now at sec. 30a
in SF.422-0114-2
(with numbers excised!)
K7/1, 6.10.72

66A

With Captain Liddell I attended a meeting this afternoon at the Dominions Office at which were present Sir John Stephenson, Mr. Neville Butler, Mr. Bromley, Mr. Norman Robertson and Mr. Clutterbuck. The meeting was called to discuss a draft telegram prepared by Mr. Robertson as the result of a meeting which had taken place on Sunday night last between the Prime Minister and Mr. McKenzie King. At that meeting it had apparently been decided that subject to the concurrence of the U.S.Government action should be taken both in England and Canada against the members of the espionage organisation of the Soviet Military Attaché in Ottawa, but that such action should be limited to:-

a) Calling in those members of the Canadian organisation who were in Government employment.

b) Conducting the questioning of the persons mentioned in (a) in such a way as to ensure that there will be no publicity.

c) Refraining from preferring any charge.

d) At a later stage demanding the recall of certain members of the Soviet Embassy.

The meeting was handicapped by the fact that none of those present had attended the meeting between the Prime Ministers and that no written record existed of such meeting. It was however agreed after a long discussion that owing to the limited resources available to the R.C.M.P. and particularly having regard to the fact that even in the R.C.M.P. only a comparative handful of Officers had knowledge of the Corby case, the requirement that there should be no publicity attendant on questioning the suspects was incapable of fulfilment unless only a very small number of such suspects were so questioned. In fact within the definition of Government employees it appeared that about fourteen people would be involved, and this number cannot be adequately questioned unless they are detained

/by

by Order. Any detention by Order is bound to involve publicity.

It was also agreed that so far as Primrose himself is concerned we here do not feel that the case for having him questioned at an early date is at all strong and that accordingly from the security point of view the decision as to the date when the general questioning takes place should rest with the R.C.M.P. It was also agreed that from the police point of view it was infinitely preferable to pull in all the suspects simultaneously rather than to pull in only a limited number, and that the disadvantage of the latter course outweighed any advantage gained by taking early action. Since the prohibition against publicity is likely to extend until after the date when the two Prime Ministers and the President have met it was acknowledged that this recommendation might involve a further delay of at least three weeks, but it was agreed that we should accept this disadvantage.

The Foreign Office and Mr. Robertson will report these conclusions to their respective masters.

23.10.45.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: PF.66960..Supp..Vol..B ..... Name: .....

Original in File No.: PF.66960..Supp..Vol..A..vol..2 ..... Serial: 76a ..... Dated: 20.10.45. .....

Not new: Th.

Original from: New..York ..... Under Ref. No. 564 .....

Extracted on: 30.10.45. ..... by: NR ..... Section: R3y .....

A. Study of WITCZAK's correspondence with his wife during past month leaves no doubt that general warning was issued to Canadian and United States networks shortly after CORBY's disappearance.

B. Neither WITCZAK nor his wife seem to have regarded situation as serious until September 28th when WITCZAK was summoned to Washington and is believed to have visited Soviet Embassy.

C. On October 1st W. was told that "doctors (N.K.V.D.?) were expecting complete 'case history' from 'home hospital' (Moscow) on evening of October 7th". Coincidence of this date with that ~~first~~ set for first PRIMROSE contact may be significant and may indicate that Moscow were expecting PRIMROSE to be arrested.

D. On October 16th, Bunia WITCZAK held long conversation with N.K.V.D. man in Los Angles (?) and immediately afterwards advised W. to "sever all contact with relatives and if necessary create a scandal for them".

E. Last sentence is enigmatical but poses question whether W. end of case may not be blown by him before very long.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

EXTRACT.

TOP SECRET

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol B Name:

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol A Vol 2 Serial: 70a Dated: 19.10.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: No. 556

Extracted on: 30.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y

My immediately preceding telegram.

5. I endorse the views set out by Hollis in his telegram 930, namely that delay will increase chances of Russians getting in first with a trumped up charge and of agents over here perfecting their cover stories and destroying any incriminating evidence which they may still have in their possession. CORBY, in conversation a few days ago, also mentioned that Russians might take initiative and would already have started to take steps to cover up over here.

6. Sir Orme Sargeant appears to be ware of danger of delay as expressed in para. C. your telegram 958. It might be pointed out in this connection that PRIMROSE is not only person who is dangerous so long as no action is taken against him.

7. As an example of inevitable leakages which are bound to take place and which have already come to our ?attention is fact that a R.C.M.P. British clothes man known to a waiter who works in Connaught Restaurant in Ottawa, was asked by the latter whether he knew anything about disappearance of a Russian Embassy employee who had ?taken papers with him when he left Embassy.

My immediately following telegram.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/12.44

EXTRACT.

E

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol B Name:

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol A Vol 2 Serial: 71a Dated: 19.10.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: No. 557

Extracted on: 30.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y

My immediately preceding telegram.

7 continued. The waiter (known as " NICK the Greek") passes himself off as a British Intelligence agent and hinted that British Intelligence had been called in. This is probably an N.K.V.D. fishing expedition although we are not inclined to take it very seriously.

8. Hoover has informed Commissioner that action here would not jeopardise any F.B.I. operations but that, with information presently available, the F.B.I. will not necessarily be (?in a position) to take joint action.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

EXTRACT.

TOP SECRET

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol B Name:

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol A Vol 2 Serial: 69a Dated: 19.10.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: No. 555

Extracted on: 30.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y

My immediately preceding telegram.

3. Also significant is fact that WITCZAK's wife Bunia was contacted by MOUIHACHEV, secretary to Soviet Vice Consul in Los Angeles, on October 16th. MOUIACHEV is believed to be N.K.V.D. man and he and Bunia talked for over an hour in street.

4. Discrett enquiries have shown that WITCZAK passport was at least partially carried out. 1937 passport file has been tampered with. Original application and photograph have been removed and replaced by forged application form and by photographs of false WITCZAK and of his wife. In ordinary way discovery of this fact is sufficient for police to institute vigourous enquiries and perhaps apply warrant for apprehension of WITCZAK on criminal charges. As matter now stands, they feel unable to take any action involving a member of GRAFT's network since instructions are that no action be taken which might precipitate matters.

My immediately following telegram.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol B Name:

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol A Vol 2 Serial: 68a Dated: 19.10.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: No. 554

Extracted on: 30.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y.

I trust we shall soon have a decision in the CORBY case because:-

1. From security aspect it is becoming more important to remove known agents from national research council. department of external affairs, ministry of munitions and supply, and office of United Kingdom High Commission. Although we have indications that whole network has been warned we cannot be sure that they are not continuing to operate.

2. From operational aspect we are faced with problems like WITCZAK. We know that he has been warned and he is now on run. He shook F.B.I. surveillance in a Turkish Bath in New York and has now, by lucky chance, been picked up again in Chicago where he is still making every effort to shake surveillance. For all we know he may be making for Seattle where there are Russian ships.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK. 16.10.45.

No. 961. MOST IMMEDIATE.

A. HOLLIS is sailing on Queen Elisabeth leaving Southampton October 22 repeat October 22 for Halifax and proposes to visit Washington and Ottawa and to see you, but would be glad, in the light of local conditions, to have a message from you awaiting him at Halifax as to the order in which you think these visits should be made.

B. Can you request R.C.M.P. to arrange air reservation from Halifax to destination?

TOP SECRET.

641

NEW YORK.

14.10.45.

2254

SEC.
15.10.45.
1040.

15.10.45.

0920

No. 589 of 14th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following for Sir John SHEPHERSON from Malcolm MACDONALD.

Following is text of WRONG's letter:

"You are already aware that evidence has reached Canadian authorities that a number of clerical staff of your office appears to be involved in unlawful communication of secret and confidential information to agents of a Foreign Power. I am informed by Royal Canadian Mounted Police that, in interests of security, it may prove necessary to interrogate and possibly temporarily detain persons concerned in course of investigation of affair. Without entering into legal position of members of your office consider that it is appropriate that I should seek, in advance, your concurrence in action of this nature, and I should be glad if you would inform me that you have no objection.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

14.10.45.

2254 GMT

15.10.45.

0955 GMT

S.A.J.
15.10.45.
1110 GMT

No. 525 of October 14th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following personal and secret for Sir John STRANGMAN, dominion office, from MALCOLM MACDONALD.

A. My immediately following telegram contains text of letter addressed to me yesterday by HUME WRONG. CLUTTERBUCK will have given you general account of situation concerning member of my staff referred to. She has not, we believe, had any direct dealings with any member of Soviet embassy but has, according to apparently reliable oral statements by COREY, supplied matter to a fellow communist, who is employee of bank of Canada, and an important agent working directly for Embassy. She may or may not have known or guessed this latter fact. As regards precise matter which she passed, existing evidence about this is not repeat not at all satisfactory. It certainly would not hold water in a court of law. My personal impression, which is I think shared by those in the know here, is that she has not been of particularly valuable assistance to her friends. On the other hand there is no repeat no doubt that she is on their official list as an indirect agent and that she has been passing secret information of greater or lesser importance from my office. In what way or form she passed information is not established.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

14.10.45.

1054 GMT

S.A.J.
15.10.45.
10.45 GMT

15.10.45.

0910 GMT

No. 526 of October 14th. SECRET IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

B. In light of above R.C.M.P. and other authorities here would not propose, in first instance at any rate, to arrest her with a view trial. Their present plan is to try to work things so that she turns King's evidence. We hope that she will do this and that we shall as a consequence ?get useful evidence from her in particular about her contact. Our tentative idea is that I should talk to her first and endeavour to persuade her to turn King's evidence. Further action against her will depend in part at least on her reaction to this approach.

C. The Canadian authorities have ?prepared orders in council enabling them to interrogate and/or detain for various purposes almost 20 of known direct or indirect agents. One of these orders applies to member of my staff in question. MUNE WRONG's letter to me in my immediately following telegram to this.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

15.10.45.

RAPID.
15.10.45.
1045.

15.10.45.

0945

No. 527 of 14th October. MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. I am of course responsible for proper protection of all members of my staff in official matters. I should be failing in my duty if, for example, I permitted any of them to be wrongly detained by police. It is in this light that I have to view the proposed possible action against a member. Two considerations arise. First, what is the legal position? WRONG's letter does not enter into this question. I have no professional adviser here, but so far as HOLMES and I have been able to examine the matter we believe all members of BARNSLIFFE staff are bound by Canadian Official Secrets Act as amended by order in Council number 1860 of 1941. Legal adviser to external affairs department shares this view. If this is correct, detention of member of my staff in circumstances described above is, presumably, legally proper. Nor does any question of diplomatic immunity arise as this is not a diplomatic post.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

14.10.45.

1045.

H.D. & G.S.B.
15.10.45.
1000.

14.10.45.

0905.

No. 528 of October 14th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. Other consideration which arises is political one. From this point of view it seems to HOLMES and me that we cannot and should not in any way seek to prevent action against person concerned. It would be wrong and cause criticism if she were treated more favourably than Canadian civil servants and others also involved in this business.

F. Unless you disagree I therefore propose to write to WRONG telling him that I have no objection to action proposed in his letter. I should be grateful for your comments as soon as possible as action may be desirable within next few days. Please reply by channel which I am employing for this message.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

11.10.45.

1109.

H.D.
11.10.45.
1715 BST.

11.10.45.

1645 BST.

No. 508 of October 11th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is repetition asked for in your telegram 941 October 11th.

"No arrest can be made at present state of investigation in the absence of extradite charge for overt act in United States".

TOP SECRET.

626

NEW YORK.

10.10.45.

1140 GMT

RAPH
10.10.45.
2230 GMT

10.10.45.

2200 GMT

CXG. 505 of October 10th. MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000.

Following is F.B.I.'s reply to R.C.M.P. on question of fixing a date for joint action:-

"Matter of possible arrest October 18th of persons in United States associated with CORBY. Situation has been presented to Attorney General. No arrest can be made at present state of investigation absence (gr. X mut.) charge for overt act in United States investigation continuing. You will be advised immediately of Attorney General's opinion concerning other possible action as soon as received."

X as coded: extradite. (Repetition has been asked for).