

PF 66960/SAV2
GOUZENKO, IGOR
PF 66960/SAV2

W  
401

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
	PA			PA	
	PA	110 JUL 1973		PA	
MFS	PA			PA	
	P.A.	20 MAR 1971		PA	
	R-2-f			PA	
	PA	19 MAY 1975		PA	
	pa	10 JUL 1975		PA	
	PA	20 JAN 1976		PA	
	PA			PA	

\*PF66960/SAV2\*

PF 66960/SAV2
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~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET.

Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 178 of February 20th.

-144-

My telegrams 167-169.

A. MAZERALL's nerves and memory are improving simultaneously.

He has recalled considerable details of communist cell to which he belonged but this is of no immediate interest to you. However he has stated one member of cell, Gordon ROGERS of National Research Council, was in direct touch with Russian Embassy and is believed by MAZERALL to have been collecting information. Since COREY did not know of this individual there is chance this may prove lead into NKVD organisation. ROGERS is being immediately investigated by RCMP.

B. DURNFORTH SMITH has again been exhaustively interrogated.

He is acutely apprehensive but every approach produces only denial. In view evidence against him, it is most likely he will not be further interrogated as it will almost certainly prove profitless.

My immediately following telegram.

R 34  
Please instruction  
marked out  
this

TOP SECRET.  

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Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 179 of February 20th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

C. [WILLSHER] <sup>P.F. 603, 469.</sup> has made further guarded admissions. She has stated on more than one occasion she would contact ADAMS at street corner and go for 15 minutes drive with him. She has admitted to "discussing" Anglo Canadian financial relations with him which dovetails nicely with Corby's statement concerning Keyne's report. She has partly at least implicated woman who worked for [ADAMS] <sup>P.F. 603, 472.</sup> named Agatha CHAPMAN who on more ~~than one~~ than one occasion arranged details for her contacts with ADAMS. CHAPMAN is being investigated. WILLSHER still attempts unconvincingly to explain away these and earlier admissions as innocent results of discussion groups to which she belonged.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.  

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Telegram from NEW YORK

No. 180 of 20.2.46.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. After long and delicate interrogation, during which he was told of overwhelming evidence against him, LUNAN was finally brought to point where he stated he might be prepared assist Canadian Government and that he could be of great help. He has gone far enough to make retraction ?difficult and with luck he will make statement tomorrow. This will be of particular importance. First because he was in direct contact Russian Embassy, and second because he is most likely of detainees possibly to have heard something about Primrose. We have now seen M.I.5's report on latter which Wrong brought over, and in view of LUNAN possibility and Primrose's unease we would suggest M.I.5 may like delay re-interrogation until we see if LUNAN talks. Incidentally LUNAN can implicate HALPERIN and this would take care of whole "Back" group without use Corby or documents.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.  

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Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 181 of February 20th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. Without giving you details, POLAND has explained appearance PAVLOV's name among his papers reasonably. He originally met him at Embassy reception for Press. He has also written his wife, who is being particularly active on his behalf, not to attempt at present to interfere in situation. Interrogator is not prepared give any opinion yet, but there must continue to be very considerable doubt as to [POLAND's] P.F. 99959 implication.

P.F. 603,465.  
F. WOIKIN, MAZERALL and WILLSHER, in that order, are likely to be first to be brought before Commission beginning at end this week.

TOP SECRET.

*Handwritten: 1/24/50*

*Handwritten: 6*

Telegram from NEW YORK

No. 177 of February 20th.

My telegram 165.

A. Canadian press is rather quieter today and in some papers story does not reach head lines. Situation has been assisted by statement from St. Laurent that Commission's findings cannot be expected yet. This may be followed by more detailed statement explaining situation.

B. It will however be extremely difficult to prevent pressure for revelations during minimum of three weeks which Commission will need to take evidence.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
65

PF/66960/Y/A.D.P.

19th February 1946.

Dear Philby,

I am returning to you the paper on the CORBY case which you sent. There are, I suggest, the following small inaccuracies :-

Page 1, para 2 : the documents were not stolen at random, but were, according to CORBY, carefully selected and marked over the period before he ran away, so as to illustrate his story.

Page 2, para 1 : the Canadian Communists acted as talent spotters rather than links.

Page 2, para 3 : BRIDGEMAN was transferred after CORBY's desertion.

Page 3, para 4 : CORBY's papers showed clearly the kind of information which the Military Attache was collecting. Perhaps you hedged on this, so as to avoid giving the Directors of Intelligence too much detailed information.

Page 4, para 2 : on the final arrangement, I do not know that the Canadians plan to include diplomatic action.

I feel that the question of circulating this document from your Office to the Directors of Intelligence is a matter of some embarrassment. The case took place in Canada and has ramifications in this country and in both Canada and here the security responsibility rests on our Office and not on yours. The close cooperation which we have had over this case has, of course, given you just as much information as we have about it and as you know, we have welcomed this. But when it comes to putting out such a paper to the Directors of Intelligence, it may, I am afraid, give the impression that the responsible department is yours and not M.I.5. Would it be possible, in order to avoid this, that you

/should

should not cut a revealing letter when discussing this document,  
and that it has been shown to the department responsible for  
dealing with counter-espionage in the Empire and that S.I.S.  
agrees that this is an accurate record of the case.

Yours sincerely,

W. R. Philby Esq., M.I.C.  
S.I.S.

W. R. Philby

REV 4



Secret.

~~SECRET~~  
In reply, state NUMBER and DATE.

6-A

Top Secret & Personal.  
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1946, February 1946.

Dear Hollis,

I attach a hurriedly dictated draft of a memorandum which "J" wishes to give to the Service Directors of Intelligence. It needs tidying up in several respects and I would be glad to incorporate in the final version any comment which you may have to make.

Yours sincerely,

*Handwritten signature*

R.H. Hollis, Esq.,  
M.I.5.  
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TOP SECRET.

Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 165 of February 19th.

My telegram 160. <sup>143</sup>

A. Owing to lack of further official information, Canadian press throughout country is speculating wildly with every kind of sensationalism. Stress is continually laid on atomic aspect.

B. It may be necessary to make some further guarded official statement to contain these excesses. This is at present under consideration.

C. Labour Progressive Party attitude is seen only in erroneous statements by <sup>PF 38796</sup> Tim BUCK and <sup>PF 98347</sup> Fred ROSE that no party members are involved and that any attempt to pin activities on party will "boomerang". BUCK left yesterday for New York - no doubt to get more competent advice before publication of weekly Tribune, Communist Party mouth-piece, on Friday.

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~

62A

Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 167 of February 19th.

142e

My telegrams 161 to 64.

A. My para. B. Under interrogation MAZERALL has now implicated DURNFORTH SMITH stating that latter approached him and suggested they work together on photographing of documents. SMITH under interrogation still continues to deny all knowledge of matter.

B. My para. I. Late last night NIGHTINGALE had written statement which we have not yet had time to study. At first glance it appears to be most guarded document with few half admissions apparently designed to give impression that writer may have talked indiscreetly in company which he did not realise was undesirable. It is too early to evaluate this with any accuracy.

My immediately following telegram.

R34  
M  
sent to  
1/27/2

TOP SECRET.

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Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 168 of February 19th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

C. My para. I. SCOTT BENNING has now had preliminary interview. He is comparatively assured and RCMP interrogator has ?impression that he was warned and that he may have shrewd idea of how much we know. When confronted with some of evidence he took line that someone else must have had access to documents attributed to him and pointed out that many of them would not come his way in course of his work. In letter written last night to his wife, which looks as if it was partly designed to be read by RCMP (as indeed it was), he appears as innocent but ?willing victim of circumstances.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

Telegram from NEW YORK

No. 169 of 18.2.46.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. My para. G. POLAND has now completed written statement on LUNAN as house companion if true (sic), it is well put together and covers LUNAN's ?habits, telephone calls etc. but in view of what we know of LUNAN fact that POLAND noticed nothing unusual says little (as he admits himself) for his competency as a Royal Air Force security officer.

I am informed however, though I have not seen them, that papers seized belonging to POLAND indicate that on six occasions he was in touch Vitali PAVLOV. We are therefore very tentatively considering possibility that his co-operation on subject of LUNAN may spring from fact that he may be NKVD man rather than from complete innocence. This possibility will be explored.

E. On present showing I see little likelihood of any information on PRIMROSE being extracted

P.F. 99959  
P.F. 603,468  
PF 66949  
MAY.

R3Y

F2 28/2

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Telegram from NEW YORK.

*Handwritten scribble*

*61A*

No. 160 of February 18th.

A. Canadian press reaction gathered great force by Saturday night and all large papers throughout Dominion devoted much space to it with violent headlines.

B. Every paper gives Russia as "foreign mission" in question, and Howe's ill-advised statement that atomic information is not concerned is used only to emphasise likelihood of this aspect.

C. Omission of specific number of detainees in Prime Minister's statement has allowed for speculation which in Toronto papers places number at 50. Majority however, settled for 22.

D. **There is some comment in Ottawa that Canadian Government's action is particularly courageous with hints that Canada was let down by lack of support from United Kingdom and United States.**

E. Left wing line is not yet apparent. Corby's correct name has been mentioned for first time by Ottawa "Journal" this morning.

*R34  
Pr. reviewed on  
marked to ADAMS  
and LUSA  
72/12/2*

TOP SECRET. ~~TOP SECRET~~

60A

Telegram from:  
NEW YORK

No. 161 of February 18th.

PF 603.605

A. [Preliminary interviews of detainees by two RCMP interrogators have been efficiently conducted over weekend, ADAMS and LUNAN having been successfully detained.]

PF 67189  
Lunan.  
// extract

B. MAZERALL has written guarded confession, admitted to working for LUNAN and quoted his own cover name "BAGLEY". He has minimised importance of how much information he gave. He has implicated no one else and only mentioned LUNAN with reluctance. He was first approached by Fred ROSE. He is an impracticable idealist.

C. WOIKIN has confessed and dictated statement. She has admitted giving information and documents to representative of a foreign power but refuses to give name of contact. She admits to having taken at least one "present" of fifty dollars. She will probably give name of her contact later - it may be Madame SOKOLOV. Of significance is her statement that she was warned early in October to cease work as there might be trouble. This no doubt explains why Primrose did not make contact.

My immediate following telegram.

R34  
mentioned  
marked  
ADAMS and  
LUNAN  
other

TOP SECRET.

Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 162 of February 18th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

D. <sup>P.F. 603,465.</sup> ~~WILLSHEP~~ has written two statements. It is probable that she did not deliberately give information knowing it was to go to a foreign power. She does admit discussion with ADAMS in general terms and says that on occasions he made notes. This, she states, was to help cause of labour progressive party and we are inclined to believe this. She admits to making at least one trip to Montreal to see him and accepted "expenses" of 25 dollars for fare. She is ingenuously prepared to return this money now. She will not admit giving ~~ADAMS~~ documents. It is too ~~early~~ early to assess degree of her implication. <sup>P.F. 603,472</sup> She was first approached by Fred ROSE.

My immediately following telegram.



TOP SECRET.  

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Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 163 of February 18th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. DURNFORTH SMITH flatly denies any knowledge of affair nor will he admit to recognising photostat of his own handwriting. He suggested it was probably a forgery. He is however in bad nervous state and his guard reports that he was physically sick after his first interview. He will probably confess later.

F. LUNAN of course denies implication completely. Unfortunately for him he colours easily under shock. He did so when his cover name was quoted to him and when shown photostat of his first instruction from GRANT. It is of little or no importance whether he confesses as evidence against him is overwhelming.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
LUNAN  
PT 6/18/88  
Y. 6498

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.  

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Telegram from NEW YORK.

No. 164 of February 18th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

G. There is possibility that POLAND, against whom evidence was anyway light, may prove to be only very slightly involved. He is at present writing statement on activities of LUNAN with whom he shares an apartment. He will be better assessed after serious interrogation.

H. <sup>PF 603,605</sup> [The tough ones will be SHUGAR, who declared whole proceedings ridiculous] <sup>PF 603,472.</sup> [ADAMS] who refused even to admit date of his birth without lawyer, GERSON who is entirely confident, BOYER and HALERPIN who is shaken but slippery.

I. NIGHTINGALE is likely to sing shortly as he came through his interview badly and asked for writing materials later.

SCOTT BENNING has not yet been interviewed.

J. Above is result only of preliminary interviews. Serious interrogation begins tomorrow.

TOP SECRET. ~~142~~

59A

NEW YORK.

No. 150 of February 16th.

A. At 4 p.m. yesterday Prime Minister sent for Russian Charge d'Affaires who was accompanied by <sup>P.F. 603,468.</sup> [PAVLOV,] presented him with Press release one hour ahead of time, and informed him that words "foreign mission" referred to Russian Embassy in Ottawa. Russian Charge d'Affaires went through all motions of surprise, distress etc. and left saying he must consult with his Government.

B. There were no incidents of any interest during arrests. Detainees are held "Incommunicado" at RCMP barracks in Rockcliffe on outskirts of Ottawa under heavy guard with building covered by searchlights during night. They are having all necessary comforts, good food, books and magazines. Most affected so far is DURNFORTH SMITH who is clearly very frightened and shows signs of breaking. <sup>P.F. 99959.</sup> [POLAND] on the other hand is vociferously demanding legal representation. It is not without humour that at time of arrest POLAND told his wife that if he were not heard of in three days she could look for him in mines of Siberia. Interrogations begin ?today.

My immediately following telegram.

R3-1  
 M. and P. 1/27/46  
 to [unclear] 1/27/46  
 H-127/2

TOP SECRET.

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NEW YORK.

No. 151 of February 16th.

*[Eric Adams] PF. 603,472*  
My immediately preceding telegram.

C. ~~ADAMS~~ *PF. 603,472* has so far not been apprehended owing to adverse flying conditions out west. RCMP sergeant with ministerial order attempted to intercept ADAMS at Prince Albert where latter was due on Government mission. ADAMS' plane however is grounded at Moose Jaw where he is under surveillance by local RCMP while attempt is being made to fly in arresting officer with necessary authority.

D. Large number of documents, papers and books have been siezed but these have not yet been examined. RCMP corporal who arrested HALPERIN states, however, that latter's note book contains names of other detainees not previously known to have been associated with him. Examination of this material begins tomorrow.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 152 of February 16th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

E. Canadian radio last night gave story first prominence without comment in earlier evening broadcasts, but it took second place when end of United States steel strike was announced later in evening. There was some speculation as to possibility of leaks of atomic information in Ottawa and Minister of Reconstruction Howe somewhat confused issue temporarily by announcing that atomic information is not concerned. This will undoubtedly cause comment later since documentary evidence concerning Primrose has already been brought before Royal Commission.

F. All Corby's documents have now been brought before Commissioners and first stage of proceedings will close today with special political statement which Corby has requested permission to make. Corby has made best possible impression on Supreme Court of Justices from point of view of both integrity and accuracy.

My immediately following telegram.

TOP SECRET.

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NEW YORK.

No. 153 of February 16th.

My immediately preceding telegram.

F. continued. Commission will begin next week to take background evidence of agents' government position, accessibility to information etc. as preliminary to appearance of agents themselves on Wednesday or Thursday of next week by which time RCMP interrogators will have completed their work.

G. This morning's Canadian papers front page headline story with heavy speculation concerning atomic information and involvement of Soviet Union. Montreal Gazette carries hastily written Drew Pearson article. Opposition leader BRACKEN has congratulated Government on its action. General Press reaction is entirely satisfactory and will no doubt continue as further information is made available.

58a

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT  
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958. DEC 2002

57a

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT  
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958. DEC 2002



TOP SECRET.

57a  
560

NEW YORK.

No. 120 of February 11th.

My telegram 88. <sup>7350</sup>

- A. In private conversation POPOV has stated that during war he was active in Balkans.
- B. He also stated he spent some time in Istanbul and sailed for Canada from Constanza.
- C. Could you attempt to trace him on this flimsy information.

R34

Supp A.

by Popov you.

1/2

72c  
15/2

✓ R34  
2/11/46

TOP SECRET.

~~1350~~  
5:11

NEW YORK.

No. 92 of February 4th.

- 1350

My telegram 88 para. C.

A. Toronto now informs me that at bottom of receipt appears following phrase :

"Basis: telegram from centre Jan 17th 1946."

- 21

B. This now leaves no doubt whatever that POPOV is GRU officer.

R3P  
add mic Popov

722/1572

✓

TOP SECRET.

~~1352~~  
544

NEW YORK.

No. 88 of February 2nd.

NT Supp. A.  
120

NOTED  
ERM

A. Gregori POPOV (see my telegram 897 December 12th para. C.) was picked up last night in street fight in Toronto red-light district by city police, jailed as drunk and disorderly and charged with carrying concealed weapon.

B. After offering to fight magistrate, POPOV was searched and on his person he had 600 dollars in cash and receipt for 150 dollars dated January 19th and signed CHESTER repeat CHESTER. Receipt purports to be for medical expenses for CHESTER's wife.

C. However we know from CORBY that CHESTER is cover name of Captain GORSHKOV repeat GORSHKOV (see CORBY report page 5b) and according to present information from Toronto use of this cover name would seem to indicate that POPOV may be taking up where ZABOTIN left off.

R 34  
add names /  
Popov  
Gorshkov

13/2  
72/13/2

10/2/03  
5/2/03

R34  
PE P7A in PF 66960  
Supp A. vol. 3  
72  
251.  
53A

TOP SECRET.

PF.66960 (Supp A.)

F.2.b. Mr. Spencer.  
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Corby has reported that the head of the English Section in the Russian Intelligence Headquarters in Moscow is a Colonel GRIGOREV who, he suggests, may now be in England in some official capacity. GRIGOREV is N.T. in our records and I am having Corby asked why he thinks he may be in England. In the meantime I understand that you have records of two men named GRIGORIEF who appear however no longer to be in this country. Bearing in mind that Corby himself left Russia towards the end of 1943, I think that it would be interesting to know the exact periods which the two GRIGORIEFs spent in England.

*Marriott*

J. H. Marriott.

F2a/JHM  
3.11.45.  
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*Wan*  
*...*  
*...*  
*...*

Exhaustive enquiries have revealed no trace of anybody in this country who can be identified as Colonel GRIGORIEF. *Dee*

23.1.46 - F.2c

From: NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

5211  
~~12~~

Date: 5.1.46.

No: 964.

Your telegram 292 January 3rd:

A. Your para.B: GRIGORI KOSSAREV <sup>P.F. 603, 470</sup> is certainly identical with KOSSAREV who was out here.

B. Your para.D: F.B.I. believe FOMITCHEV <sup>P.F. 603, 447</sup> is Christian name to be SERGEI repeat SERGEI but are checking on further details which you gave.

C. F.B.I.'s opinion is that these men are definitely GRU inspectors and this is borne out by transfer of ZAROTIN and MIKHAILOV during their visit. <sup>SECRET X ref  
u PF 692 74</sup>

314

17/11

Copy.TOP SECRET.~~TOP SECRET~~  
5111

To NEW YORK

2.1.46.

No 292

Your 897 of December 12th.

- A. No trace of Gregory POFOV or PAVLOV.
- B. We have record of <sup>P.F. 603, 470.</sup> [GRIGORI KOSSAREV] Soviet diplomatic courier born 1910 who in May 1945 was in Algiers and who returned from there to the U.S.S.R. He travelled on Soviet diplomatic passport 7003 issued at Kubichev September 27th 1944.
- C. KOSSAREV's description given as height 5 ft. 9 inches thick dark hair en brosse, clean shaven, thin pointed face and nose, brown eyes.
- D. We also have record of a GRIGORI HYTCH FOMITCHEV born ZHILKONTSY Moscow district on October 30th 1897. In May 1943 he requested visa for South Africa where he was to be employed as clerk to Soviet Consul General.
- E. Are these your men?
- F. Can F.B.I. confirm that KOSSAREV and <sup>P.F. 603, 467.</sup> [FOMITCHEV] are GRU inspectors and not ordinary diplomatic couriers.

n/a.

11/11

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
50A

*Supp A*

*Why for Supp B*

From: NEW YORK.

No: 921

Date: 21.12.45.

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A. My telegram 906 para.B: F.B.I. confirm Grant sailed on SS Alexander SUVAROV.

B. Ship apparently sails for Murmansk and not Odessa without touching at any European port.

~~SECRET~~  
49A

Cable From New York 15.12.45

PF 69274.

- A. F.B.I. inform me that [MIKHAILOV] sailed yesterday from Alexander Souverov out of Jersey City bound for Odessa.
- B. GRANT and his wife who have been in Washington recently also had passage booked on board this ship and F.B.I. believe that he also sailed.
- C. F.B.I. will endeavour to confirm this and will also advise us if this ship is expected to touch at any European ports.

*Mr Pichay telephoned  
this over on 17/12/45.*

*12/12*



*Att. to report  
copy to report  
and FOMITCHEV*

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 897 of 12th December.

*See also*

*P.F. 603, 470.*

- A. F.B.I. report Soviet inspectors <sup>P.F. 603, 467.</sup> [KOSSAREV] and [FOMITCHEV] are at present in New York. Soviet Consul-General New York, <sup>P.F. 69374</sup> [Pavel MIKHAILOV,] has been ordered to return to Moscow. Latter is "MOLIER" judge on page 40 of our CORBY report.
- B. F.B.I. have also learned from most delicate source of unknown reliability that GRANT may leave for Moscow shortly, though there has been no official intimation yet of such a move.
- C. New assistant Military Attache Gregory <sup>x x</sup> POPOV has just arrived in Ottawa. *? PAVLOV*
- D. Following ZARUBIN's departure, these moves begin to look like transfers for - seen in para. D. your telegram 227 to 28. While withdrawal of GRANT would take sting out of any protest Canadians eventually make, it will nevertheless from this very fact probably make them view eventual action with less alarm.
- E. Have you any traces of KOSSAREV, FOMITCHEV or <sup>x</sup> PAVLOV. *- ? P O P O V.*



*IS have been asked  
to check this name  
in*

*R 3-1 -  
pp. 4 up. names  
marked with x and  
and FOMITCHEV  
ADP  
15/12 / 31/12*

TOP SECRET.

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177-X  
L-1

NEW YORK.

No. 801 of November 26th.

Commissioner R.C.M.P. anxious to have any background material on activities of CORBY's BOSSES any part of the world. Please send me anything available.

TOP SECRET.

From: New York.  
No: 729 of November 14th.

~~SECRET~~  
46  
11/14

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P.F. 137,693

A. F.B.I. report HAZEN SISE, Canadian, formerly of Canadian film board and attached to Canadian Consulate General in Washington was passing political information to N.K.V.D. in 1943.

B. SISE is friend of LUNAN and was with ambulance corps unit in Spanish civil war. At present believed in Canada.

C. R.C.M.P. are investigating.

11/11

TOP SECRET. ~~#102~~

12.11.45. 45

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.


No. 111.

Your 536 of October 16th and following telegrams.

A. We have the following traces.

B. Report of March 1943 from Russian source in Istanbul states

P.F. 79,975


 [Major-General PANFILOFF] repeat PANFILOFF was "Assistant Director of Intelligence Organisation" in 1940.

C. Source stated that PANFILOFF was a tank expert and neither liked nor understood intelligence work.

D. Was close friend of STALIN and one of early political commissars.

E. Has never been abroad and speaks no foreign language.

F. His weaknesses are drink, women and lack of self control.

G. Same source states that Colonel LEVSTIGNOV repeat LEVSTIGNOV was "Director of Foreign Section". *Already used*

H. He was originally a Railway Officer and Graduate of General Staff Academy.

I. Another source reported in 1943 that <sup>PF 801824</sup> [Major Leonid SEREDA] repeat Leonid SEREDA was Assistant Military Attache in Sofia. *Already used*

J. No other traces except of those of KUZNETSOV already communicated to you.

L 79/4

*4371*  
*Handwritten notes*

Original in: P.F. 603,922. WITCZAK. 15a.

Copy for: P.F. 66960. Supp.A. Information Produced by CORBY.

TOP  
SECRET  
AND  
PERSONAL.

CX. dated 2.11.45.  
IX

Dear Marriott,

I attach:

1. A digest of CORBY's information on the Organisation of the H.Q. of the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Red Army.

*P.F. 603,922.*

2. A report on Ignacy WITCZAK.

3. A copy of an F.B.I. report on WITCZAK's correspondence.

4. Photographs of Ignacy and Bunia WITCZAK.

Would you please return items 3 and 4 in due course, as I have no copies?

Yours sincerely,

Sgd. H.A.R. Philby.

J.H. Marriott, Esq.,  
M.I. 5.,  
St. James's.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958. *Aug 2001*

Copy in SF 44/Supp B.

Organisation of the Headquarters of the  
Chief Directorate of Intelligence  
of the Red Army

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1. The following report on the organisation of headquarters of the Chief Directorate of Intelligence of the Red Army is limited in its scope owing to the fact that the source, CORBY, left Moscow in June 1943, time when a re-organisation of the Red Army Intelligence was taking place. Also it must be remembered that he was not a highly placed official in this organization, that, although as a cipher clerk he had access to probably more information than the average official, he nevertheless is frequently very unsure of many of the divisions and sections of the organization in which he worked. Much of the information is obtained by inference from telegrams which he decoded in Canada and from conversations with other officers. For this reason this report should be regarded as an entirely accurate account of the organization of the Intelligence Headquarters and may be subject to

some sections where information of greater reliability is available.

1. The Headquarters of the Soviet Secret Service, the Glavnoye Razvedyevnoye Upravleniye, abbreviated as GRU, is no longer expected to be able to provide reliable information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States (including Washington). The documents of the GRU were destroyed in a fire in the early 1950s. The information available to the GRU is now based on the reports of its agents in the United States, and it is not clear how reliable this information is. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

2. The KGB, the main intelligence agency of the Soviet Union, is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

3. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

4. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

5. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

6. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

7. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

8. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

9. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The GRU is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

10. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is. The KGB is also expected to be able to provide information on the activities of Soviet agents in the United States, but it is not clear how reliable this information is.

- 3 -

of offices were built under ground there.

3. The benches under the trees opposite the main building are continuously used for the contacting of agents and staff returning on visits from abroad. The officers come from the Mall ing across the street and the returning agents arriving by Metro. Corby remarked that this was one of the few places in Moscow where well-dressed men might be seen, since the returning agents had money provided at home with foreign clothes of a better quality than could normally be found in Moscow. The men were in uniform or in no shirtwaist and round trousers. In the evening a considerable number of KGB agents were seen who were easily recognizable in the manner of their walking in the street. They wore driver's coats of a military style issued by the headquarters.

4. A number of the staff and some of the agents are housed in the Novo Moskovskaya Gostinitsa (New Moscow Hotel) which is situated near the Kremlin at a short distance from the Red Square. The hotel stands on the side of the Moscow River at the end of the bridge which crosses the river near the Red Square. Another house used for the same purpose is on Ilushikha Street.



125327

5. The GRU before June 1943 was under the command of a Chief Director who was responsible to the Chief of the General Staff. At the time Gorky left Moscow this post was held by [Lt.-General ILLICHENOV,] but at the present it held by Col.-General SURKOV. Under the Chief Director was the Assistant Chief of the GRU and controlling the work of the GRU. Major-General VIKHIEV at present holds this position in the 1st division of the GRU, and was responsible for obtaining strategic intelligence of all kinds from the 2nd division of the GRU was responsible for obtaining tactical intelligence of all kinds for military value. The GRU was part of the Uchrasch Volokavaya [unclear] which is perhaps best described as military secret service.

6. The GRU exercised information from the GRU was from the Uchrasch Volokavaya [unclear] [unclear] of its GRU. Gorky has clearly very little information concerning structure of the GRU, but, what information is entirely with information already in our possession. It is possible to confirm that the degree of penetration of the GRU lines depended upon the size of the unit to which the GRU was attached - the larger the unit the further the

- 5 -

penetration obtained by its ROs. Thus, the ROs of a Front would operate deeper into enemy territory than those of an Army or Division, while on the other hand the Headquarters of the Obshche Voiskavaya would itself operate far back in the interior in conjunction with partisan groups.

7. The main change which took place in June 1943 was the removal of the Obshche Voiskavaya from the GRU. According to Corby it was at that time placed directly under the Chief of the General Staff and operated entirely separately from the GRU. It would appear that the OVR had grown enormously in size owing to the need for tactical information during the war, but he does not consider its operations of great importance in long range considerations. It is believed that, now requirements of this kind will have diminished, it is possible that the OVR may be brought back under the GRU.

8. Of great importance, however, is the organisation and operations of the remaining 1st RU of the GRU. Unfortunately, although Corby has supplied considerable detailed information concerning the personnel and organisation of the GRU, he quite clearly does not fully understand the

- 6 -

the organisation at the top level. He refers to the organisation for which he worked as the 1st RU, but he cannot state whether this division merely retained its old title of 1st RU, when it was so called to distinguish it from the 2nd RU or OVR. If this is so, then in fact the 1st RU would control all the sections of the Foreign Intelligence Organisation of the Red Army. Corby admits however that the 1st RU may well refer now only to the control of the Operational Sections; that the 2nd RU, now no longer in any way connected with the OVR, controls the Information Sections; and that there are other RUs controlling personnel, administration and finance. It would appear more likely that the second alternative is correct since this approximates more closely to information of an earlier date in our possession.

9. However, Corby has supplied a considerable amount of detailed information concerning the Operations Division, the Information Division, the Cipher Division and Education Division of the GRU, together with their respective subsections and, whether or not these divisions can be accurately placed within the framework of the GRU, nevertheless the information concerning the divisions themselves is of considerable value.

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10. Of first importance is the OPERATIONS DIVISION which is responsible for the organisation and direction of GRU agents abroad. As has been explained above, it is not clear whether the Operations Division should be correctly referred to as the 1st RU or whether the 1st RU is a directorate controlling this division. The head of the 1st RU is <sup>P.F. 79,978</sup> [Major General BOLSHIKOV] whose assistant is probably <sup>P.F. 603,476</sup> [Colonel MILSTEIN]. It will be recalled that Milstein himself made an inspection tour of the GRU organisations in Canada and the United States in the spring of 1944 and, since it may be considered unlikely that the Chief of Operations himself would make such a tour, it seems plausible that the 1st RU is in fact the Operations Division, headed by BOLSHIKOV and that, therefore, MILSTEIN is the Assistant Chief of Operations.

11. This Division comprises a number of geographical sub-sections which Corby refers to as "directions". Since these geographical sections are clearly not "Upravlenie", they will be referred to throughout as sections. Corby gives the following geographical sections under the Chief of Operations:-

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1944

1944

1944

1944

- (i) Western European section controlling Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom;
  - (ii) A section controlling the Lowlands, Slovakia, and others (which partly refers to the Eastern European section);
  - (iii) Balkan section, controlling Albania, Hungary, etc...;
  - (iv) American section, controlling Mexico, Central America, etc...;
  - (v) The Middle East section, controlling Turkey, Iraq, etc...;
  - (vi) The Far Eastern section, controlling China, etc....
- ... however, it is to be noted that in these sections the two lines of communication are in certain areas such as the ... the ... section ... have some separate sections of their own ... to ... is the most ... section ... the Eastern European section.

12. ... of the personnel in charge of the ... section of the German ... the person in charge is [P.F. 77505] who is described as a woman of remarkably masculine features.

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In the early part of 1943 POLIAKOVA appears to have been working in the English section but was later made the head of the German Section. Apparently Poliakova attained this position through her brilliant control of the GRU agent SISI in Switzerland who was at that time running a sub-agent in the German General Staff and apparently obtaining information of the utmost value.

13. Head of the American Section is believed to be Colonel MUROLTZOV. <sup>Declassified 12/18/75</sup> This section formerly controlled the United States, Canada and Mexico but Corby believes that the United States has now been made into a separate section of its own.

NOTED  
Ch

14. In early 1943 the head of the English Section is believed to have been Colonel GRIGOREV. <sup>Dec</sup> Corby heard that this officer passed through the United States quite recently and is believed to be in some official capacity in England at present.

NOTED  
Ch

15. Head of the Balkan Section is Colonel SEREDA. <sup>FF 821824</sup> This man was formerly Assistant Military Attache in Sophia where he was the object of an abortive attempt at assassination. The date of his appointment as Head of the Balkan Section is not known.

NOTED  
Ch

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16. The Geographical Sections of the Operational Division are charged with organising GRU networks of agents abroad and obtaining information of all kinds. The staff for each country consists generally of three or four officers. Apart from the organisation of the networks these sections maintain a filing system of personnel cards giving full details of each agent, notes as to his reliability, and evaluation of his qualities and payments made to him. Incidentally, Corby has never heard the word "Agentur" applied to this division.

17. Next in importance is the INFORMATION DIVISION Chief of which is believed to be <sup>MT P. 125357</sup> [General KHLQI OV.] This is possibly now the 2nd RU. Although this division plays no part in the organisation or running of the GRU networks, it has nevertheless a very large staff of specialists. Corby clearly has no detailed knowledge of the organisation of this division but it would appear that the emphasis is on subject sections rather than geographical sections. Corby mentions specifically Military, Economic, Political, Scientific and Air Sections, together with various unspecified technical groups. There appear also to be experts on various countries in this division. The

NOTED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED

- 11 -

sections are in touch when necessary with expert groups which are entirely separate from the GRU organisation. Thus, the Scientific Section maintains contact with the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, the Economic and Political Sections with the Institute of World Economics and Politics, and the Military Sections with the War Academies of the Soviet Union.

18. One point of interest is that the Information Division is not only responsible for the collation of reports but also for their distribution. In this connection Corby mentions that by no means all reports obtained are passed to the Chief of the General Staff, under whom the GRU operates, but that a certain number of them were routed direct to the Commissariat for Defense (NKC) - particularly political reports which the Deputy Commissar for Defense might not wish to pass through the hands of the Chief of Staff.

19. THE SPECIAL TECHNICAL DIVISION appears to be of considerable importance and maintains a number of sections under its control. The first of these is the Section of Documentation which is responsible for forging passports and documents. The second section is the Photographic Laboratory responsible for the developing of all micro-film



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received from abroad and also for the preparation of all photographic material required in the field. The third section is the Special Secret Laboratory responsible for the making of counterfeit money and any special scientific apparatus that may be required, together with poisons to be used for liquidation purposes. It is not known who is in charge of this work.

20. THE EDUCATION DIVISION is of considerable interest owing to the care and attention which appears to be paid to the training of both agents and staff, and information which Corby provided agrees substantially with that already in our possession. Corby himself attended Special studies under the Espionage Course (Kursy Razvedtschikol) which in his time was also responsible for training of OVR officers. This school was situated in the Chernichevsky Street in Moscow, though during the German raids it was moved to Masan. The course which Corby attended was known as "Erkuks", and appears to be a special course for intelligence cipher clerks.

21. Corby had heard of, but had not attended, the Espionage College which he stated was for the preparation of the staffs of Military Attaches abroad and also for prospective illegal residents. Apparently the standards of the Espionage College are much higher than those of the

**Language Course.**

Corby had also heard of the special training of the Special Staff which he stated was divided into groups of people dealing with special subjects. He stated that the work in conjunction with the maintenance of these assignments, which he stated was a direct connection with the FBI.

THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI OFFICE IS DIVIDED INTO THREE MAJOR SECTIONS. THE FIRST IS THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION WHICH IS KNOWN BY THE OFFICIALS AS THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR. THE SECOND IS THE OPERATIONAL SECTION, AND THE THIRD IS THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CIPHER SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPING OTHER CIPHER METHODS OF COMMUNICATIONS SUCH AS CIPHERS USED BY ILLEGAL AGENTS. THE HEAD OF THIS SECTION IS MR. JAMES H. COMPTON. THE THIRD SECTION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF MESSAGES AND MAINTENANCE OF FILES.

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The chief of this section is not known, but his assistant is Captain RIVINGTON.

2a. Also attached to this division was Colonel WILLIAMS, an expert in all forms of codes and cyphers, as indicated in the 'gruks'.

2b. This division is not broken down by geographic regions and cipher clerks do not do any one particular cipher or code but may, during the course of the day, decode messages from all parts of the world. This system was established deliberately in order to take advantage of the fact that the cipher clerks are acquainted with the various codes and cyphers used around a high degree of accuracy. It is stated that the system was established to deal with the fact that the cipher clerks are not trained in any one particular code or cypher but are trained in all of them. It is stated that the system was established to deal with the fact that the cipher clerks are not trained in any one particular code or cypher but are trained in all of them.

2c. The Radio Section of this division is entirely separate from the Special Communications Division. In each message received by this division from all directions the messages are passed to the Special Communications Division for decoding. Radio Communications Division is also responsible for the training of radio technicians to be sent abroad and the standards demanded are extremely high.

- 15 -

Corby has never heard this division referred to as the "Centre" - a term which is usually employed to denote GRU headquarters.

27. THE DIVISION OF SPECIAL DUTIES is difficult to place in the framework of the GRU. It is referred to as the otdel Spetsialnik Zadani (OSZ) and it is not clear whether this is a division of the GRU or possibly only a section of the Special Technical Division. It is, however, responsible for organizing the operations which do not fall naturally under the direction of the Operations Division. Its work appears to be mainly confined to the undertaking of special missions abroad designed to obtain one specific object. All special mission agents are recruited, trained and dispatched by this division.

28. THE DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN RELATION OF THE MILITARY COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENSE (NKO), while officially under the direction of the NKO, is according to Corby actually controlled by the GRU. This division, originally under the direction of Major General EVSTIGNEEV, was responsible for relations with the Military Attaches of foreign countries in the U.S.S.R., and was also for the official and legal work of Russian Military Attaches abroad. However, friction immediately arose between this division and the Operations Division responsible for the

Excerpted  
to PP  
75, 281

16 -

illegal work of Military Attaches. As a result of this,
 LUTIGNEV was removed in 1944 and control of Russian
 Military Attaches abroad was entirely removed from this
 Division. It is now concerned solely with relations with
 foreign Military Attaches in Russia and, according to Corby,
 the former Military Attache in Istanbul is not at his hand.

THE FINANCE DIVISION is responsible for the payment
 of headquarters personnel, of staff abroad, and for the
 financing of all operations. Corby was originally paid
 1,000 roubles a month when he started work in Moscow. He
 had men or other clerical staff who were receiving as much
 as 2,000 roubles. Payments of staff abroad were
 commensurate with the standard of living of the country
 in which they were posted. Thus, the former Military Attache
 was receiving 350 (Canadian) a month although the former
 Attache in Istanbul, Colonel Bolin, received only 100 a month.
 Money for the espionage operations of the Military Attaches
 abroad is obtained either directly from the GRU or in
 currency sent direct from the GRU by bank. It is a rule
 of the GRU that all agents must be paid, even though they
 might be prepared to work for ideological reasons.
 It is considered that payment ensures a direct hold
 on agent.

30. Corby has also provided information on other divisions of lesser importance. The 1st DISTRICT DIVISION is responsible for all staff promotions, reliability of personnel, and allocation of posts abroad. It is also responsible for the dispatch of official staff to Military Attaches. The Chief of this division is Colonel Y. T. CORBY, assisted by Major G. J. [unclear].

31. The 2nd DISTRICT DIVISION is entirely concerned with the personnel division and at Corby's time was under the direction of Colonel G. J. [unclear]. It has a number of sections. The first is the [unclear] section, which is responsible for equipment and legal staff of Military Attaches. The latter are supplied with suitable clothing, footwear, and general baggage in the [unclear] [unclear] they are being dispatched. The [unclear] [unclear] is responsible for the [unclear] of [unclear] [unclear] of [unclear] as for returning and [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] section is in charge of the transportation of [unclear] [unclear] staff.

32. There is also apparently a special [unclear] [unclear] of [unclear] collated reports. Access to this list [unclear] [unclear]

- 13 -

be obtained with permission of the head of the library who may only be approached by the chief of the division.

30. The general impression of the GSI obtained from survey is that it is an extremely efficient intelligence system, demanding the highest standards of work, well run, and suffering partly from over-specialization. One aspect of the organization worth mentioning is that it is extremely fluid. Apart from the absence of formal disciplines in its ranks, there are no rigid barriers between departments and considerable interchange of personnel is allowed. In fact, the organization is a very loose structure of relatively few staff members and the comparatively simple task in the past has been to find the moving and to be in areas where great changes are taking place. The young of the organization, the average junior officers, are in their twenties and it is hard to find even a senior officer over the age of 40.

42a

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
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UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958. DEC 2002



Copy in P.F. 75,281.

TOP SECRET.

EVSTIGNEEV.

~~TOP SECRET~~

40H

NEW YORK.

No. 558 of October 20th.

IMMEDIATE.

My telegrams 536 to 538. (36a-38a)

Please correct paragraph A. (9) <sup>+</sup>EVSTIGNEEV was removed in 1944 and according to CORBY replac?(ed by) former Military Attache to ?Istanbul.

Copy in P.F. 75,281. EVSTIGNEEV

+ as coded.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy in PF. 66960 Supp Vol B

PF. 603,922 WITCZAK. TOP SECRET.

~~SECRET~~

39A

NEW YORK.

No. 555 October 19th.

IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

where is it?

Copy is at 655 in Supp B

NOTED  
11-3-52

3. Also significant is fact that WITCZAK's wife BUNIA was contacted by MOUKHACHEV, secretary to Soviet Vice Consul in Los Angeles, on October 16th. MOUKHACHEV is believed to be N.K.V.D. man and he and BUNIA talked for over an hour in street.

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ACT 1958. DEC 2002

VERY URGENT.

F.2.A.R.2.

Could you please L.U. urgently for me the following:

Major General PAMFILOV. Chief of general intelligence of Red Army up to 1942.

Lt. General ILLICHOV. He followed PAMFILOV. up till 1945.

Colonel General KUTZNEZOFF. He followed ILLICHOV

Major General KISSILEV. Assistant chief of general intelligence.

Major General BOLSHIKOV. Chief of first intelligence division.

Colonel MILSTEIN. Assistant to BOLSHIKOV.

General KHLOPOV. Chief of information.

Lt. Colonel POLIAKOVA. Woman officer. Under chief of ? operations.

Colonel MUROMTZOV. Head of American Section.

Colonel GRIGOREV. Was head of English section. May now be in England.

Colonel SEREDA. Believed to be head of Balkan Section. Formerly assistant Military Attache in Sofia.

R.2.

100 U

Colonel YEGOROV.

Chief of Personnel.

●

Lt.Colonel LOMTIEV.

Assistant to YEGOROV.

—

Major General EVSTIGNEEV.

Chief of Foreign Affairs Section  
(Military Attache)

NT

Colonel BALTENKO

Chief of Cypher Section.

NT on

Lt. Colonel PAVLENKO.

Assistant to BALTENKO.

NT on

Lt.Colonel KRAVCHENKO

Chief of first division of  
cypher section.

NT on

Lt.Colonel KONDRATIEV.

Chief of second division of  
cypher section.

NT on

NT

Colonel MUILKOV.

Now believed to be in abul.  
Special instructor in cyphers.

●

Colonel DIRIVIANKO

Chief of Administration who  
received Japanese surrender  
terms from General MacArthur.

F.2.a.  
19.10.45.

*Republish Year*

Copies in P.F. 75,755  
P.F. 75,287 TOP SECRET.

~~21st~~

50 AF

NEW YORK.

No. 536 of October 16th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

A. CORBY supplies the following details of personnel in GRU H.Q.:-

P.F. 125327  
P.F. 75,755 - KILZAKOV

1. Chief of general intelligence of Red Army up to 1942 was [Major General PAMFILOV] P.F. 79,975 He was followed by Lieutenant General ILLICHOV who left in 1945 and was replaced by Colonel General KUTZNEZOFF.

2. Assistant chief of general intelligence HQ. is Major General KISSILEV.

3. Chief of first intelligence division is Major General BOLSHIKOV assisted by [Colonel MILSTEIN] P.F. 603,471 who is probably chief of operations.

4. Chief of information is probably General KHLOPOV.

5. Under chief of operations is head of German section [Lieutenant Colonel POLIAKOVA] P.F. 77507 who is only woman officer of any rank and gained position through brilliant operation of SISI in Switzerland.

My immediately following telegram.

*[Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including "21st" and "50 AF"]*

TOP SECRET.

24-1  
~~SECRET~~

NEW YORK.

3/17

No. 538 of October 16th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

10. Chief of Cypher Section is Colonel BALTENKO assisted by Lieutenant Colonel PAVLENKO. Chief of first division of cypher section is (Lieutenant Colonel <sup>if 110, 755</sup> KRAVCHENKO) who deals with codes. Chief of second division of cypher section is Lieutenant Colonel KONDRATIEV who deals with book cyphers. Special instructor in cyphers was Colonel MULLKOV now believed to be in Kabul.

11. Chief of Administration was Colonel DIRIVIANKO who received Japanese surrender terms with MACARTHUR.

B. Above is outline of (? O.G.P.U.) as known to CORBY but clearly subject to considerable changes since he was in Moscow.

2  
134

TOP SECRET.

2157

~~TOP SECRET~~

36a

NEW YORK.

No. 537 of October 16th.

38a

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

6. Head of American Section is probably Colonel MUROMTZOV.

Head of English Section was Colonel GRIGOREV who may however now be in England in some official capacity.

7. Head of Balkan Section at present believed to be

[PF 801824] Colonel SEREDA who was formerly assistant Military Attache in Sofia and object of abortive attempt at assassination there.

8. Chief of Personnel is Colonel YEGOROV assisted by Lieutenant Colonel LOMTIEV responsible for official despatch of staff.

9. Chief of Foreign Affairs Section (Military Attache) is Major General EVSTIGNEEV who is responsible for Military Attaches in their official repeat official capacity only.

My immediately following telegram.

P.F. 75, 281. EVSTIGNEEV.

X See 73a

*[Handwritten signature and scribbles]*

Copy in PF.66962 ELLI

TOP SECRET.

~~2731~~  
~~351~~

351A

NEW YORK.

No. 533 October 16th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

A. CORBY states that cover name for ?all foreign ?intelligence or counter espionage services is ZILONE repeat ZILONE meaning green in Russian.

max

B. Agent referred to by CORBY in 534 was referred to as working in ZILONE.

at ser. 4a g  
RF. 66962 (ELLI)

10/17/64  
10/17/64



~~TOP SECRET.~~

~~TOP SECRET.~~  
344

NEW YORK.

No. 532 October 16th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

A. CORBY has stated that in 1943 RU were operating two agents in Rome. Communications were by clandestine W/T and all messages were in French. Agents cover names were FELIX repeat FELIX and ~~ERI~~ repeat ERI.

C. Many telegrams from London decoded by CORBY in 1943 were signed <sup>85,4231</sup> DRAGON repeat DRAGON.

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ADP/518  
22/10/41

*Notes on the COLBY case prepared  
ADP in Canada  
(1942)*

(1) Colonel Nikolai Zaborin, Military Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, is known to have been a spy network in Canada and the United States. The evidence for this is based in part on original documents of clear authenticity, and part upon the testimony of an informant who bears all the marks of reliability. His words can undoubtedly be checked in due authority is granted for the necessary action.

(2) Colonel Zaborin used the cover name "John" for his espionage activities. His associates in Ottawa and in the Embassy are known to have been: "Jack" (cover name "John"), the military attache's secretary, (cover name "John"), clerk in the attache's office, and the attache's chauffeur (cover name "Davy" or "Davy" - Mr. Potinov who is believed now to be a Soviet citizen). All the above are of course Soviet citizens.

(3) Twenty-seven possible agents have been identified, or in part. They fall into the following categories: National Research Council - Government Departments - Armed Forces - Miscellaneous - So far as is at present known eighteen of these agents are Canadian, four are English, two are Polish, one Czech, and one is unknown. The last three people are probably in Canada.

(1) Only one further point remains to be seen in the introductory remarks. The induction in which the informant or the cessation of his testimony is likely to be certain if the difficulties are in fact not slight and endanger his life.

(2) In the broadcast he asks what are the alternatives in this case and be handled:-

(a) is a more extensive inquiry

(b) on preventive lines

The policy in alternative (a) would be to allow the informant to continue to operate under observation, in order to ensure the maximum amount of information about the enemy and their methods, and alternative (b) would be to have the informant placed in a position where he betrays himself to the enemy, and is held prisoner of the enemy, and is then treated as a spy and is not to be executed.

(3) The second alternative would be to have the informant placed in a position where he betrays himself to the enemy, and is held prisoner of the enemy, and is then treated as a spy and is not to be executed.

(a) by the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations.

(b) by the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations.

(c) by prosecution of those who have been involved in such a legal case can be made, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations, and the withdrawal of the informant from the field of operations.

(4) Course (a) would have little effect on the Russians, and would interest our own people in the meaning that our evidence was worth the effort.

- 3 -

(8) Course (b) would have a number of concrete advantages. Certain of the agents could be rigorously examined before dismissal. There is material in the hands of the authorities which almost guarantees that some at least of these examinations would be fruitful and would add to the intelligence knowledge of the "Grant" network and Russian espionage procedure generally. These enquiries may be expected to have a deterrent effect, as regards such activities, upon the agents and in the near-Communist circles from which such agents are generally drawn. This is an important point, as Soviet espionage activities are undoubtedly encouraged by the willingness of members of native Communist parties to act as agents. The request for the withdrawal of the Military Attache and his collaborators will demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the information in the possession of the authorities is substantial and serious. The actions of Colonel Zabolin, or perhaps merely the fact that he has been found out, will probably be the subject of enquiry on his return to Moscow, and if he should be punished this may have a salutary effect upon Soviet Military Attaches in other parts of the world, some of whom, incidentally, are known to have carried out similar activities. The "Grant" network has drawn its agents mainly from Canada, the British Isles and the United States and it is inevitable that the governments of these countries should be informed. The Soviet Union, therefore, while avoiding public humiliation, will suffer a deserved diplomatic setback, which may help to persuade the Soviet authorities that such espionage in friendly countries is on balance unprofitable.

(9) Course (c) would provide opportunities at least as great as course (b) for the examination of the agents and the extraction of intelligence. If the prosecutions were successful the deterrent effect upon potential agents would be greater. The prosecutions would inevitably cause considerable publicity in the press of the world.

An alternative version of (c) might be brought about by an inspired but unofficial leakage to the press, which would probably be followed by a protest from the Soviet Embassy. The resulting enquiry would be likely to bring the story to light and reveal material on which prosecutions would be brought.

- 2 -

(10) It is by no means impossible that the examination laid down in course (b) or course (c) might produce evidence which would enable prosecutions to be brought against some of the agents without raising the question of the use of the Corby material and possibly without openly implicating a foreign power.

(11) It would be unwise to overlook the possibility that at some future date either Corby or one of the dismissed agents may attempt to sell the story of this Soviet espionage network to the press.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Alias</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Employment</u>
<u>National Research Council.</u>			
Burnford Smith	Badeau	Canadian	N.R.C.
Ned Mazerall	Bagley	Canadian	N.R.C.
(Norman A. Veal) #26451	-	English	N.R.C.
Alan Nann May	Alec	English	formerly N.R.C.
<u>Government Departments.</u>			
Emma Woikin	Nora	Canadian	Dept. of External Affairs
[Kay Willsher] noted	Elli	English	High Commissioner's office
H.S. Gerson	Gray	Canadian	Records Division Ammunition Production Branch Dept. of Munitions & Supply
<u>Armed Forces.</u>			
Maj. Isidor Halperin-Bacon		Canadian	formerly Prof. of Path. Queen's College, Kingston
Lieut. D. Shugar	Frometheus	Canadian	R.C.N.
S/L Mat Nantingale	Leader	Canadian	formerly Bell Telephone
-	Holland	Canadian	Air Intelligence
-	Surejel	Canadian	Naval Intelligence
<u>Miscellaneous.</u>			
[Sam Carr] noted	Frank	Canadian	Organising Secretary Labour Progressive Party
Fred Rose	de Boise	Canadian	Member of Parliament
[G. Lunan]	Back	Canadian	Editorial Staff, "Canadian Affairs".
PEL 7188			

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<u>Name</u>	<u>Alias</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Employment</u>
Misc. (Cont'd.)			
Prof. Boyer	Professor	Canadian	McGill University
[Eric Adams] <i>Noted</i>	Ernst	Canadian	Bank of Canada
Scott Binning <i>Noted</i>	Foster	English	Bank of England
	-	-	
Ignaci Bitchak	-	Pole	Los Angeles
Arthur Steinberg	Berger	American	

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TOP SECRET.

32A

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

NEW YORK.

2.10.45.

1930 BST.

H.D.  
3.10.45.  
0915 BST.

3.10.45.

0900 BST.

CXG. 442 of October 2nd.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only.

Personal decipher yourself.

From 48000.

My telegram 419 September 30th. 447

CORBY uses word cryptographer to mean cypher clerk. Please correct.



~~1466~~  
~~SECRET~~  
314

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

1.10.45.

CXG. 892.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. for 48000. Personal, decipher yourself.

Following for R.C.M.P. from HOLLIS.

I find that we have made an extra copy of the interim report produced by EVANS and also of the additional pages I brought back. It will not therefore be necessary to send us another copy but please arrange for us to have extra copies of any further additions.

see 18a in Vol. 1  
: this sup?

30A

TOP SECRET.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

NEW YORK.

30.9.45.

P.S.

1.10.45.

0923

1.10.45.

0847 BST.

CXG. 419 of 30.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48000.

A. COREY states Captain <sup>see log</sup> ~~K~~IGNATIEFF ~~V~~ is or was cryptographer for Soviet Military Intelligence in London.

B. BORUCHIN occupies similar post in Kabul Afghanistan.

C. Source has also revealed ?local code names of countries.

Canada equals LESTEHA.

America equals POLOSATA.

Germany equals KOLBASIA.

England equals IDUONIA.

*how can they*

Copied to PF 123,085.

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
214

NEW YORK.

29.9.45.

1918 BST

D.L.  
30.9.45.  
0950 BST.

30.9.45.

0850 BST.

CXG. 418 of 29th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only. Personal decipher yourself.

From 48000.

A. CORBY states Moscow showed greatest interest in recall of  
\* General MACNAUGHTON in 1944, and even went so far as to  
suggest to Grant that he might be approached.

B. Grant discouraged this but arranged for SOKOLOFF to  
establish friendship with MACNAUGHTON's son from whom SOKOLOFF  
obtained interesting information as to reasons behind General's  
recall.

C. There is no indication that MACNAUGHTON's son passed  
information consciously.

\* PI.

LU

\* Pres. Gen. Andrew George Latta  
Born 25.2.1887  
(Canadian)

c.B., CMG, DSO, DFC, DSC, MC, DSO, DFC, DSC, MC, DSO, DFC, DSC, MC  
\* Gen. Andrew George Latta (International Who's Who 1944-45)  
+ who's who.

D3/DS to see  
10/5/68 See  
K

D3/NDJ  
22/4/68

TOP SECRET.  
\_\_\_\_\_1181  
~~201~~  
1.4

NEW YORK

24.9.45.

1033

e.r.  
24.9.45.  
1100

24.9.45.

0821

CXG. 379 of 24th.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
48000.

A. **CORBY has stated during interrogation that consistant attitude of officials in Soviet Embassy in Ottawa is that U.S.S.R. is preparing already for war against wester democracies. World war 3 is continually referred to in Embassy circles.**

B. CORBY considers that type of information requested by Grant by Moscow (atomic bomb, troop movements, coastal maps, tank production etc.) is confirmation enough of Soviet attitude. Of course he is not in a position to state whether this attitude is occasioned by fear of an agression by democfacies but he nevertheless maintains that it exists.

C. He has stated that he believes that production in U.S.S.R. is not to be re converted to peacetime requirements but is to continue in full war production behind scenes.

D. **According to CORBY Soviet officials expressed themselves as regarding San Francisco Conference as nothing more than a talk FEST and as of no serious significance.** They did however consider it useful public platform for propaganda designed to

-2-

lull Western Powers into false views as to Soviet intention.

E. As an example of Soviet manipulation of conference to their own ends CORBY cited fact that on one occasion Ukrainian delegation voted against U.S.S.R. and exerted publicly their autonomy. According to CORBY this was manoeuvre arranged in advance to illustrate suppressed liberty of a Soviet Republic and formed the bases of an amusing report written to Moscow by <sup>PF. 603 1/2/41</sup> [ZARUBIN,] Soviet Ambassador to Ottawa.

F. It should be emphasized that above are CORBY's own views.

*De' Miss 25/9*

S. Form 98.

Copy sent to SIS

TOP **SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER**

Office File No. PF 66949 Section of Origin D.B.

Date 23.9.45 Signed [Signature]

Capt. G.M. Liddell.

To: R.C.N.P.

Ottawa.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Reference your letter No. CXG 523 of 16.9.45 131  
PF 66959 quix telegram

FOR HOLLIS.

1. [Norman VEALL]: born 24.5.19  
holds British Passport 17704 of 28.11.42
2. Exit permit application November 1942 shows him ex-employee Cavendish Laboratory. Sponsored by D.S.I.R.
3. One of his references was Meteorological Officer, W.N.F. Newmarket.
4. Reference your CXG 501 of 13.9.45 - do not consider that [ELLI] could be identical with UKKN: PF 66962

2350/45

23.9.45

TK

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or be transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. Messages marked "O.T.T." need not be paraphrased.

TOP SECRET.

26A

NEW YORK.

22.9.45.

1542 BST.

e.r./D.L.

22.9.45.

1710 BST.

22.9.45.

1700 BST.

2360

[redacted] of 22nd.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decipher yourself.

From 48000.

353 22A

My telegram [redacted] September 20th.

We have now ascertained that address is that of headquarters of Intelligence department of Red Army.

re: this 28/9

S. Form 98.

Copy sent to SIS.

T O P

**SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER**

25A

Office File No. <sup>PF 66949</sup> ~~Y-6408~~ ..... Section of Origin ~~.....~~ / JLE  
Date 22.9.45. .... Signed [Signature]  
Capt. C. Liddell.

To: Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  
Ottawa, Canada.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Reference your letter No. .... of .....  
our telegram

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Available particulars only traces in our records for Russians mentioned in reports are (i) MALENKOFF, who is member of POLITBURO and leading C.P. S.U. (ii) KUSNITZOV, who may have been Military Attache in Turkey in 1927, and (iii) PAVLOV, who may have been 1st Secretary Berlin in September, 1939.

1,6. traces will follow.

ROSE now working every day at King's College and making arrangements for ... in London. His behaviour gives no ground for supposing that he is at all ...

ROSE's luggage due Avonmouth on 24th September but we do not propose to ... this because (a) we do not consider it at all probable that there is ... of interest there and (b) we are afraid that a thorough search might alert ... and might prejudice chance of his keeping rendezvous.

Must you agree with paragraph 4.

PF 66949  
Y. 6105

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments, or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher without being Paraphrased. Messages marked "O.T.P." need not be paraphrased.

(25087) Wt. 23490/3595 10,000 7/43 A. & E. W. Ltd. Gp. 698  
(26081) Wt. 41173/4249 20,000 12/43 " " 1.7200

TR/NTM



NEW YORK.

TOP SECRET.

22.9.45.

1127

DL/e.r.  
22.9.45.  
1910

22.9.45.

1830

CXG. 363 of 22nd.MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

- PF 127,662.

Latest information from CORBY as follows:-

- A. Recent visit to Washington GRANT indicated to Moscow that seemed likely prospect. Moscow intimated that latter was already working for them.
- B. MILSEN real name [PF 603,471. MILLSTEIN] Inspector General of Red Army Intelligence Department visited United States last June under guise diplomatic courier. He was critical of Military Attache's organisation in United States and this resulted in numerous personnel changes.
- C. MILSEN also conferred with [SAM CARR] regarding passports and identity papers. PF 603,481
- D. Reference my para. A. above, CORBY's opinion is that large proportion diplomatic representatives of Russian satellite states such as Hungary, Roumania, etc. will be Moscow agents. Cites case of code clerk Lublin Provisional Government Embassy in Moscow who was N.K.V.D. man and actually appeared in N.K.V.D. uniform.

see 'this' 25/9

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23/1

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

21.9.45.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

CXG. 854.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48,000 personal decipher yourself.

Copy

PF 45-755

- A. Only traces of names supplied so far by CORBY are as follows.
- B. KUZNETSOV is known to us as very senior official of Red Army Intelligence Staff. We believe CORBY's statement that he is Chief Director.
- C. We have trace dated July 1939 of HARRY L. SHUGAR of 2778 St. CATHERINE Road Montreal (repeat 2778 St. CATHERINE Road Montreal) according to which he was subscriber to "Workers Age" (repeat "Workers Age"). No further details.
- D. Trace dated May 1935 of <sup>PF 603, 472</sup> Eric G. ADAMS 4870 COTE DES NEIGES Appartement 30 Montreal (Repeat 4870 COTE DES NEIGES appartement 30 Montreal). ADAMS stated to be connected with Communist Opposition activity in Canada.
- E. ADAMS' wife contacted opposition Group in New York and stated she was sympathetic to Communism but knew little of various groups. New York Group replied that Montreal Group would contact her.
- F. Z.B. will telegraph their traces to HOLLIS.

rec! this 25/9

Handwritten scribbles

TOP SECRET.

*107*  
*227*

NEW YORK

20.9.45.

2302 BST

S.A.J.  
21.9.45.  
0920 BST.

21.9.45.

0900 BST.

CXG. 353 of Sept. 20th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decipher yourself from 48000.

A. Does address ZNAMENSKY 19 repeat ZNAMENSKY 19, probably in Moscow, mean anything to you?

B. We infer from context in which it appears in CORBY documents recently translated that it is address of H.Q. of some Soviet intelligence organisation.

*see CXG 360*

*HQ Intelligence Dept. see  
log.*

*und. nr 28/9*

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
ZIA

NEW YORK

18.9.45.

1614

J.C.M./J.E.A.B.

19.9.45.

19.9.45.

0920.

0820

CXG. 333.

September 18th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only personal decypher yourself from  
48,000.

- A. Further information indicates that agent under cover name  
MARTIN was providing Grant with information on air and naval  
matters.
- B. Martin is identified as DJEVENOV of TASS in Ottawa formerly  
at New York. He is personal friend of Molotov and in his capacity  
as Tass representative takes orders from DEKANTSOV, one of Molotov's  
assistants. He attended San Francisco conference.
- C. Tasks assigned to him about June included reports on election  
and re-establishment party activities on class war basis.
- D. X.K. received information from South America in June that  
Communist parties were returning to class warfare. The directive  
to South American C.P.S. had allegedly come from Molotov himself  
whilst he was in San Francisco. This may tie in with paragraph C.