

PF 66960/V1	
GOUZENKO, IGOR	PF 66960/V1

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Serial No.	Star Designation
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Star Designation	
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SEE ALSO LIST INSIDE COVER

Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date	Serial No.	Star Designation	Date
Q	K2ATI							
M	PA							
Q	LA2							
M	PA	2-8-84						
M	WTO PA							
Q	WPA							
M	PA	8 AUG 1987						
Q	RAP3	4 JUL 1991						
Q	PA	9 JUL 1991						
Q	HIES	26-7-01						

KV2/1419

S Form 960

PF 66960/V1

Register No.

Minute Sheet No. P.F. 66960.

1.

9.9.45. Extract from Telegram 251 from New York re CORBY. 1a.

2.

13. 9.45. Telegram No.CXG.296 from New York to G.S.S. re CORBY. 2a.

14.9.45. Copy of report on the MAY Case 2b
3.

Undated. R.C.M.P. report on CORBY. 3a.

4.

18.9.45. Telegram No.CXG.334 from New York to C.S.S. mentioning
the interrogation of CORBY. 4a.

5.

19.9.45. Telegram No.CXG.842 from C.S.S. to New York in reply to
CXG. 34 filed at 4a. 5a.

6.

21.9.45. Telegram No.CXG.849 from G.C & C.S. to New York. 6a.

7.

24.9.45. Copy of Memorandum sent to F.O. R.C.M.P. and S.I.S. 7a.

8.

24.10.45. Report of meeting between D.G. Sir John Anderson and
F.2.A. officer. 8a.

30.4.46.

Telegram N^o. 553 from New York. 9a.*Transferred into S.F. 440 N. & S. America Log Bk / P. 14.10.47*~~Telegram N^o. 553 from New York. Filed 11.10.47~~

10

12.6.46

Telegram N^o. 650 from New York.*filed in evi*

. 10a

11

17.6.46

From R.C.M.P. re

ROSE.

Filed in error.

17a

12

18.6.46

To S.B. enclosing copy of 10a

filed in error.

12a

13.

12.7.46.

Telegram to R.C.M.P. re report by Royal Commission re Corby case.

13a

22.7.46

From R.C.M.P. Ottawa enclosing copies of Royal Commission report.

13b

14

29.7.46

To H.O. re report of Canadian Royal Commission on CORBY case

14a

15

30.7.46

To R.C.M.P. Ottawa in reply to 13b

15a

30.7.46.

From R.C.M.P. with 2 copies of Royal Commission report.

15b

16

8.8.46.

From RCMP with 2 copies of Royal Commission report.

16x

19.8.46

From H.O. in reply to 14a

16a

16.8.46.

From SLB requesting copies of Royal Commission report.

16ax

17.

6.9.46.

From BAOR requesting copy of Royal Commission report.

17a.

18.

10.9.46.

To BAOR in reply to request at 17a.

18a.

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19.

D.C.

We have now received 40 further copies of the Canadian Royal Commission report. The suggested distribution is as follows :-

- 1 Home Office.
- 3 Directors of Intelligence.
- 1 Special Branch
- 1 Director of Public Prosecutions.
- 1 Bow Street Magistrates.
- 4 A.L.Os.
- 18 D.S.Os.
- 1 Director General of Security, Australia.
- 1 Director of Security Intelligence, New Zealand.
- 1 South Africa
- 1 I.P.I.
- 1 B.A.O.R.

I suggest that the copies going to the Directors of Intelligence and other members of Government departments should be sent out with a complimentary slip from you, while I will write a covering letter to our links in the Dominions and to D.S.Os.

May I please know if you agree?

A.D.F.
26.9.46.

R.H. Hollis
R.H. Hollis.

20.

A.D.F. Dupes. Means to ask.
27/9/46.

Filed 1.11.46.

28.9.46. From Offices of the Cabinet & M₁n. of Defence re Commission's report. 20b.

21.

1.10.46. Details of distribution of copies of Royal Commission Report. 21a.

22.

3.10.46. Acknowledgement of Report by D.N.I. 22a.

23.

4.10.46. To B.4.a with copies of Report for A.L.Os. 23a.

[P.T. Over.]

24.

- 4.10.46. Copy of letter sent to Far Eastern stations, West Indies, Malta,
Gibraltar and East Africa. 24a.
- 4.10.46. From DPP ref. Report of Canadian Royal Commission 24b

25.

- 7.10.46. Copy of letter sent to New Zealand, Australia and S.Africa. 25a.

26.

- 7.10.46. Copy of letter sent to Middle East Stations. 26a.

27.

- 7.10.46. Letter to Brig. Shoosmith, B.A.O.R. with copy of Report. 27a.
- 7.10.46. From S.L.C. East Africa re article in the Times
"Espionage in Canada". (filed 11.10.46) 27b.

28.

- 8.10.46. To Home Office enclosing copy of report on Canadian
Espionage case. 28a.
- 9.10.46. To S.L.C. East Africa in reply to 27b (filed 11.10.46) 28b.
- 10.10.46. To S.C. with copy of report to show to Colonial Office
(removed as identical with 29a). 28c.

29.

- 10.10.46. Minute from H.L. Sec. to S.C. re Canadian Royal
Commission report. 29a.

30.

- 11.10.46. To Colonial Office enclosing the Royal Commission's
Report. 30a.

31.

- 14.10.46. From Brig. Shoosmith acknowledging Canadian report (see 27a). 31a.

32.

- 15.10.46. From Colonial Office re distribution of Report to overseas links. 32a.
- 18.10.46. To Cabinet Office re 28y 32b

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33.

S.C.A.1.

Please see the attached. *SB*

Bates asked me at lunch on Tuesday last what external distribution was being given to the Report. I replied that all D.S.Os and S.I. Centres were getting copies and that doubtless our representatives would make the Report available to such Governors and local Police and Intelligence authorities as might wish to read it.

Bates was quite satisfied with this arrangement but it occurs to me that West Africa has been left quite uncovered. Would you be prepared to consider sending copies to our West African Links or if a sufficient number is not available, perhaps you could let them have a note summarising the case and its findings.

B.3.C.
22.10.46.

Mr. Thompson

34.

B.3.C.

We have a new copy of the Civil Security Review in preparation and this will include a note on the Canadian case. I should think that this would be sufficient for our West African links.

B.1.
24.10.46.

R.H. Hollis
R.H.Hollis.

24.10.46.

From DSO Gibraltar acknowledging 24a

34b

35.

25.10.46.

Note to D.D.G. with copy of 28y.

35a.

36.

25.10.46.

From DSO Malta acknowledging 24a

36a

~~26.10.46.~~

~~Removed as identical with 35a.~~
Removed as identical with 35a.

~~xxxx.~~

26.10.46.

From Downing Street (Colonial Office) re 30a

37a

[P.T. Over.

38.

28.10.46. To J. J. Drew, Cabinet Offices, attaching note on the Canadian espionage case.

38a.

39.

29.10.46. From A/Director-General of Security, Canberra, Australia, in reply to 25a.

39a.

40.

1.11.46. From D.S.O. Dodecanese acknowledging Canadian report.

40a.

41.

4.11.46. To A.D.N.I. with copy of note at 28y.

41a.

42.

5.11.46. From D.S.O. Caribbean Area acknowledging Canadian report.

43.

5.11.46. To B.I.C with plans of set up of Russian Embassy, Ottawa.

43a.

44.

16.11.46. From A/O returning copy of report lent to Colonial Office.
19.11.46. From S.L.O. Nairobi requesting further copy of Canadian report.

44x
44a.

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B.3.c *ur* 2/11
~~r. Spencer.~~

45.

With reference to 44a, I am afraid that these reports are rather difficult to get owing to the fact that the Canadians made a limited printing of them. In the circumstances, I do not think we ought to spare another for East Africa from our very slender stock. We have, however, got a new edition of the Civil Security Review with the printers, and this contains a short summary of the Canadian case. I hope that this summary will be able to fill the gap until Mason is able to provide the Directors with his copy of the Royal Commission report.

B.1
20.11.46.*Rose Hollis*
R.H.Hollis.

46

22.11.46. To S.L.O. Nairobi re 44a and 45.

46a

47

From Pretoria in reply to 46a. (dated 18.10.46.)

47a

48.

22.11.46. From SIME acknowledging Canadian report.

48a.

49.

27.11.46. From D.S.O. Egypt acknowledging Canadian report.

49a.

~~50.~~
E.S.a.

50.

With reference to 48a and 49a, we have a few more copies of the Royal Commission report on order, though they have not yet been received. We should therefore be able to let S.I.M.E. have one or two more copies in due course. As for Jenkins' request, we could, I suppose, produce one copy for King Farouk if you feel that it is important and in this case, we had better let you have one from our existing stock. Will you let me know if you want this?

B.1
29.11.46.

R.H. Hollis
R.H. Hollis.

51.

B.1., Mr. Hollis. *R.H.*

Reference Minute 50. I should be grateful if you could in due course let us have two more copies of the Royal Commission report for S.I.M.E. As regards Jenkins' request, it would probably help him a good deal in his relations with persons in official Egyptian circles if he could have the extra copy for which he asks. If you can spare one without serious inconvenience, we should be glad to have it.

B.3.a.
2.12.46 -

J.C. Robertson
J.C. Robertson.

52.

4.12.46. Note from D.G. Sec. re distribution of further copies of Report to South African Police.

52.a

53

17.12.46. Letter dated 12.12.46 from Commissioner, R.C.M.P., re publication by GOUZENKO of his memoirs in the Cosmopolitan magazine.

53a

54

18.12.46. To Commissioner Wood in reply to 53a.

54a

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55.

S.O./B.1. Secretary (.

An urgent request has been received from S.I.M.E. for two more copies of the official report on the Canadian espionage case.

I understand that this publication is in rather short supply, but I should be very grateful if you could possibly obtain these two further copies for us.

A/O
16.1.47

J. Hardman Jones
Miss J. Hardman-Jones.

56.

Note.

Miss Hardman Jones agreed that the above request was in all probability merely a reminder (see previous letter at 43a). I have promised to let her know when the next instalment of 12 copies of the Report arrive from Canada.

B.1 Secretary.
17.1.47.

57.

M/O Miss Hardman Jones.

With reference to your minute 55 and to serials 44a, 48a and 49a, I am sending you herewith 5 further copies of the Canadian Royal Commission report for despatch to Nairobi (1), SIMB (2) and D.S.O. Egypt (2). You will no doubt be sending copies of your covering letters to B.3.c and B.3.a, and I should also like copies in this file. Would you return the file to me as soon as possible?

B.1 Secretary.

27.1.47.

58.

27.1.47. Draft letter to Acting Governor, N. Rhodesia, with copy of Report.
Despatched 28.1.47.

58a.

59.

27.1.47. Draft letter to Police Commissioner, S. Rhodesia, with copy of report.
Despatched 28.1.47.

59a.

60.

27.1.47. Draft letter to D.S.O. Police with copy of report.
Despatched 28.1.47.

60a.

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61.

D.1.

We have now received a further consignment of the Canadian Royal Commission Reports and I have therefore placed at 58a, 59a and 60a draft letters to various officers to whom you promised copies during your African tour.

B.1
28.1.47.

Loac Hollis
L.H. Hollis

62.

28.1.47. To D. S. C. Egypt with 2 more copies of Canadian Report.

62a.

63.

28.1.47. To H/SISE with two more copies of Canadian Report.

63a.

64.

28.1.47. To S.L.C. East Africa with further copy of Canadian Report.

64a.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RECORDS
SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Sept 2001

MINUTE SHEET

Previous volume closed at serial 64.a. dated 28.1.47.

65..

4.2.47. Copy of letter from S.I.S. re. CORBY case. 65a.

66.

17.2.47. From Civil Security Bureau S. Rhodesia in answer to 60a. 66a.

67.

31.3.47. Telegram from D.S.O. Singapore requesting 6 more copies of Report. 67a.

68.

3.4.47. To D.S.O. Singapore in reply to cable at 67a. 68a.

69.

9.5.47. From H/SIFE in reply to letter at 68a.

69a.

13.5.47. From Mr. Cartmel-Robinson, Lusaka, acknowledging copy of "Royal Commission" Report.

69b.

70.

29.5.47. From Office of High Commissioner with report on findings in Corby case.

70a.

Removed to Supp Vol A 10.3.48

71.

Note.

Mr. Rivett Carnac told me that GOUZENKO had been paid 50,000 dollars for his articles in "Cosmopolitan". In addition to this, Twentieth Century Fox are arranging to make a film of the case with the title "Iron Curtain".

B.1.

R.H.Hollis.

4.6.47.

72.

9.6.47. Extract of letter to Mr. Thistlethwaite asking for copies of Cosmopolitan.

72a.

73.

10.6.47. From Canadian High Commissioner's Office with note on 'Human Rights' aspect of espionage case.

73a.

Removed to Supp Vol A 9.3.49

74.

26.6.47. From Mr. Thistlethwaite, in reply to 72a.

74a.

75.

30.6.47. To Mr. Thistlethwaite in reply to 74a, re. Cosmopolitan articles.

75a.

76.

7.7.47. To H/SIFE with 2 more copies of Royal Commission Report.

76a.

77.

11.7.47. To S.I.S. requesting copies of the Cosmopolitan.

77a.

TOP SECRET

EXTRACT

07:43:38 am 12.06

Extract for File No.: P.F. 66,960. Name: GOUZENKO

Original in File No.: S.F. 444 Vol: 1 Serial: 132 Receipt Date:

Original from: B2b paper No. 8 Under Ref.: 7 Dated: August 1948

Extracted on: 12.5.69. by: acs Section: R5

Extract from Appendices to B2b Paper No. 8 - "A Study of Defectors from the U.S.S.R."

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Igor GOUZENKO

Igor GOUZENKO was born in 1919. He was educated in primary and secondary schools and later entered the Academy of Engineering in Moscow, but after two months he was sent to a special school conducted under the aegis of the General Staff of the Red Army. GOUZENKO never became a member of the Communist Party but he became a member of the Komsomol at the age of seventeen. According to him it was not usual in peace-time to admit any but Communists to the special Academy which he attended, but during the war owing to the shortage of suitable candidates it was decided that Komsomols might go there for training.

From this school he was sent to the main Intelligence Division of the Red Army in Moscow and was then sent to the front in May 1942 where he remained for about one year. The Soviet authorities decided towards the end of 1942 that GOUZENKO should be sent abroad; his "documentation" took approximately six months to complete and included a very careful investigation of him by the N. K. V. D.

GOUZENKO arrived in Canada in June 1943 to act as cypher clerk for the Military Attache, Colonel ZABOTIN, who was appointed at the same time. About September 1944 a telegram was received by Colonel ZABOTIN indicating that GOUZENKO's return to Russia was required, but owing to representations made by the Military Attache this did not take place.

A few months previous to September 1945 GOUZENKO carelessly left drafts of two confidential despatches lying around where they were found by a charwoman and turned over to one of the Embassy officials. This individual took the matter up with GOUZENKO who, realising the seriousness of the position, implored him not to make a report about it. The man promised to do his best but some time later GOUZENKO received instructions to return to Moscow and a new cypher clerk was sent out. The latter was supposed to take over GOUZENKO's duties immediately but ZABOTIN did not consider him sufficiently qualified and left the seals in the hands of GOUZENKO. The formal transfer was to take place on 6th September 1945.

Originally GOUZENKO apparently intended to comply with his instructions and he bought some clothes to take back with him to Russia. Then it seems he began to have doubts. He was certainly afraid of being liquidated should he return. His wife and child were with him in Canada and it seems that the fact that nothing had happened to Victor KRAVCHENKO encouraged GOUZENKO to feel that he also had a chance of defecting.

GOUZENKO says that he had for some time been having a struggle with himself as to whether he should return to Russia. When he arrived in Canada he was impressed by the complete freedom of the individual which he found existing and which was utterly foreign to his experience in Russia and foreign to the information which he had received in Russia as to life in the democratic countries. He was impressed with the things that were on sale in the stores and with the fact that those things were there to be purchased by anybody who wanted to buy them. He was also greatly impressed with the freedom of the elections in Canada and the contrast between the system of nominating candidates and voting in Canada, and the system he had known in Russia where one name only appeared on the ballot. He also says that he had seen how the Canadian people had sent supplies to the Soviet Union and collected money for the welfare of Russian people while all the time members of the Russian Embassy were developing under cover counter-espionage activity directed against Canada.

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During the last few weeks prior to his departure from the Embassy on the 5th September 1945 GOUZENKO selected a number of documents which he left in their places in the files, turning over the edges or corners in order that he might take them out quickly at any time. On the 5th September he left the Embassy with the documents about 8 p.m. and went to the Ottawa Journal where he spoke to a woman reporter. It did not take her long to realise that this story was too hot to handle and she advised him to go to the Justice Department.

On the next day GOUZENKO, accompanied by his wife and son, went to the Justice Building and spoke to the private secretary to the Minister of Justice, to whom he also showed his documents. The private secretary asked GOUZENKO to wait and spoke to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. GOUZENKO was finally turned away with veiled accusations that he was after all in possession of stolen documents. Again he tried the Press, this time the Citizen and was referred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. By now he must have become somewhat flustered because the only thing that emerged clearly was that he wanted to become a Canadian citizen. Consequently he was sent to the Crown Attorney at the Court House. He spoke to the latter's secretary who, sensing the news value involved, called up Le Droit and then the Citizen, luckily without success.

Wearily, GOUZENKO returned to his apartment and at once he noticed that the place was being watched. Soon after he and his family had gone into his flat there was a knock on the door and his name was called. He did not answer but unfortunately his child ran across the room. GOUZENKO went out through the back door to the next-door apartment and asked his neighbours whether they would be willing to keep his child for the night in case anything should happen to him and his wife. Eventually the whole GOUZENKO family took refuge in the flat of another neighbour and their next door neighbour went by bicycle to get the police. The police arrived and interviewed GOUZENKO who said that he was a member of the Russian Embassy who had information of value to Canada and wanted police protection. The police arranged to watch the apartment building and to come up if their help was needed.

Between 11.30 and midnight, a party of four Russians, among them PAVLOV the Second Secretary and head of the N.K.V.D. in the Embassy, and ROGOV the Assistant Military Attache, broke into GOUZENKO's empty flat. The police were summoned and arrived to discover them ransacking the apartment. After arguments with the police the Russians left and the GOUZENKOs spent the remainder of the night with their neighbours under police protection.

On the following morning GOUZENKO was taken to the office of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police where he turned over his documents, told his story and asked to be kept in protective custody as he feared for his safety and that of his wife and child.

On the 8th September the Soviet Embassy sent a note to the Department of External Affairs informing them that GOUZENKO had failed to report for work on 6th September. They stated that it was later discovered that GOUZENKO had stolen some money belonging to the Embassy and had hidden himself together with his family. Complaints were also made about the rude behaviour of the Canadian Police to the Embassy officials and the Embassy asked what urgent measures should be taken to seek and arrest GOUZENKO and to hand him over for deportation as a capital criminal. In a further note a week later, the Embassy again asked the Government of Canada to apprehend GOUZENKO and his wife and without trial to hand them over to the Embassy for deportation to the Soviet Union. GOUZENKO denied the allegation forthwith and although the Department for External Affairs asked the Embassy for particulars of the moneys stolen, these were never forthcoming. In the opinion of the Royal Commission these circumstances disposed of the theft suggestion.

On the 10th October 1945 GOUZENKO made a formal statement before the Royal Commission:

"I, Igor GOUZENKO, wish to make the following statement of my own will:

Having arrived in Canada two years ago, I was surprised during the first days by the complete freedom of the individual which exists in Canada but does not exist in Russia. The false representations about the democratic countries which are increasingly propagated in Russia were dissipated daily, as no lying propaganda can stand up against facts.

During two years of life in Canada, I saw the evidence of what a free people can do. What the Canadian people have accomplished and are accomplishing here under conditions of complete freedom - the Russian people, under the conditions of the Soviet regime of violence and suppression of all freedom, cannot accomplish even at the cost of tremendous sacrifices, blood and tears.

The last elections which took place recently in Canada especially surprised me. In comparison with them the system of elections in Russia appear as a mockery of the conception of free elections. For example, the fact that in elections in the Soviet Union one candidate is put forward, so that the possibilities of choice are eliminated, speaks for itself.

While creating a false picture of the conditions of life in these countries, the Soviet Government at the same time is taking all measures to prevent the peoples of democratic countries from knowing about the conditions of life in Russia. The facts about the brutal suppression of the freedom of speech, the mockery of the real religious feelings of the people, cannot penetrate into the democratic countries.

Having imposed its Communist regime on the people, the Government of the Soviet Union asserts that the Russian people have, as it were, their own particular understanding of freedom and democracy, different from that which prevails among the peoples of the western democracies. This is a lie. The Russian people have the same understanding of freedom as all the peoples of the world. However, the Russian people cannot realise their dream of freedom and a democratic government on account of cruel terror and persecution.

Holding forth at international conferences with voluble statements about peace and security, the Soviet Government is simultaneously preparing secretly for the third world war. To meet this war, the Soviet Government is creating in democratic countries, including Canada, a fifth column, in the organization of which even diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Government take part.

The announcement of the dissolution of the Comintern was, probably, the greatest farce of the Communists in recent years. Only the name was liquidated, with the object of reassuring public opinion in the democratic countries. Actually the Comintern exists and continues its work, because the Soviet leaders have never relinquished the idea of establishing a Communist dictatorship throughout the world.

Taking into account least of all that this adventurous idea will cost millions of Russian lives, the Communists are causing hatred in the Russian people towards everything

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To many Soviet people here abroad, it is clear that the Communist Party in democratic countries has changed long ago from a political party into an agency net of the Soviet Government, into a fifth column in these countries to meet a war, into an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Government for creating artificial unrest, provocation, etc., etc.

Through numerous party agitators the Soviet Government stirs up the Russian people in every possible way against the peoples of the democratic countries, preparing the ground for the third world war.

During my residence in Canada I have seen how the Canadian people and their Government, sincerely wishing to help the Soviet people, sent supplies to the Soviet Union, collected money for the welfare of the Russian people, sacrificing the lives of their sons in the delivery of these supplies across the ocean - and instead of gratitude for the help rendered, the Soviet Government is developing espionage activity in Canada, preparing to deliver a stab in the back of Canada - all this without the knowledge of the Russian people.

Convinced that such double-faced politics of the Soviet Government towards the democratic countries do not conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of civilization, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime and to announce my decision openly.

I am glad that I found the strength within myself to take this step and to warn Canada and the other democratic countries of the danger which hangs over them.

(Sgd) GOUZENKO.

I have read the foregoing translation which was made from my original statement in Russian, and have found it to be correct.

October 10th 1945.

(Sgd) GOUZENKO."

In the course of his interrogations GOUZENKO produced a vast amount of information supported by documents covering the existence of a complete Red Army network operating in Canada. He appeared before the Royal Commission, which was set up in February 1946 to examine this information, and was considered to be a most reliable and informative witness. As a result of his defection twenty persons, one of them a Canadian Member of Parliament and many of them holding positions in connection with Canadian administration, atomic energy etc., were tried for supplying information to a foreign power. One at least of the Russian espionage service networks in Canada was thus entirely broken up and his evidence also led to the trial and conviction in this country of Dr. Allan Nunn MAY. In the opinion of the Royal Commission GOUZENKO by his action in defecting and in providing all the information in his possession had "rendered great public service to the people of this country and thereby has placed Canada in his debt".

In December 1946 GOUZENKO made an agreement with the Cosmo-politan magazine to publish his memoirs in serial form. He was of course a completely free agent in any question relative to his private interests and it was anticipated that since the espionage trials in which he was giving evidence were completed, he would take up residence in Canada. His articles appeared during 1947 but we have not seen them.

TOP SECRET

In April 1947, the Daily Graphic Inside Information reported that GOUZENKO had been made a British subject by the exercising of an old prerogative of the Crown. In an earlier newspaper reported through the Evening News it was stated that he might leave with his wife and two children for another British Dominion to live on the £25 a month annuity which had been bought for him by an anonymous Canadian.

TOP SECRET

To: ~~B. 1. b. / B. 2. b.~~

P.A. in.....

Please see the attached extract from

23 JUL 1948

HANSARD

HOUSE OF LORDS
HOUSE OF COMMONS

Oral Answers
Written Answers

Dated...14th July 1948.....

Column 1182, 1183.....

Date.....15th July 1948.....

Signature..... *McDonnell*.....

1183 Oral Answers HOUSE OF COMMONS

[MAJOR BEAMISH.]
and what report he has received of this film regarding the accuracy with which it exposes the aims and methods of international Communism.

Mr. Mayhew: A representative of the Foreign Office was invited by the British Board of Film Censors to a pre-view of this film on the 25th June in case there were matters of diplomatic concern arising from its public exhibition in this country. In reply to the last part of the Question, I understand that the film follows closely the Guzenko incident in the report of the Royal Commission on the Canadian Spy Trials.

*see U
the 20/1/48*

Major Beamish: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, quite apart from its entertainment value, this film is a most accurate presentation of the evidence given to the Royal Commission, and that, if anything, it errs on the side of understatement.

Mr. Piratin: Stop advertising.

Mr. Mayhew: It is not for me to comment on that.

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport: Has the Soviet Ambassador in London, who was the Soviet Ambassador in Canada at that time, raised any official objection to the showing of this film, and if so, on what grounds?

Mr. Mayhew: No, Sir.

Mr. Gallacher: In view of the fact that the Minister and his hon. Friends have just published a centenary edition of the Communist manifesto, which calls for the overthrow of present social relations, will he now alter his attitude to the foul anti-Communist propaganda of the American capitalists, or does he want to read the book?

FILM,
" THE IRON CURTAIN "

20. Major Tufton Beamish asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on what date, and with what objects Foreign Office representatives saw the film, " The Iron Curtain," before its public release;

~~B.I. Mr. Hollis~~

You may like to see this extract from

HANSARD HOUSE OF COMMONS 9.4.48.

Written answers to questions Columns 34 and 35.

**ESPIONAGE, CANADA
(ROYAL COMMISSION
REPORT)**

Major Beamish asked the Prime Minister whether he will now make arrangements for the widest possible dissemination of the evidence concerning the disloyalty of Communists which is contained in the Royal Commission Report on the Canadian spy case.

The Prime Minister: Arrangements were made, after this report first appeared, for copies of it to be made available to the public through His Majesty's Stationery Office. Copies were also sent to His Majesty's Missions abroad to be placed in the libraries attached to their Information Departments. This document has already received wide publicity and I do not consider that there is any need of the further arrangements suggested by the hon. and gallant Member.

Sir E. Graham-Little asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether, in view of the cost of the Canadian Report on Espionage emanating from the Russian Embassy in Ottawa, and the light it throws upon the Communist methods, he will arrange for an official digest to be made of the report, and put on sale by His Majesty's Stationery Office at a moderate price.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: No. It is our view that it would be inappropriate for the United Kingdom Government to publish an abbreviated version of a publication issued by another Commonwealth Government.

RS - A pa. in
A 16-6960/4. 81 23/7
M.C.

COPY.

I.P.I. Mr. Vickery.

I attach herewith a copy of the Canadian Royal Commission Report for sending on to D.I.B.

B.1
23.7.47.

Sgt R.H.H.
R.H.Hollis.

~~Checked by D.I.B.~~
W/S B.C.
7.8.47

901

23rd July, 1947.

792

Handwritten notes in the top left corner, partially illegible.

My dear Hollis,

Just a line to thank you for the copy of the Canadian Royal Commission Report on the Soviet Espionage Case in Canada which you very kindly sent me with your minute of the 22nd July. I am most grateful to you.

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature of the sender.

R. Hollis, Esq., O.B.E.,
Senior Officer, B.I.,
M.I.V., S.J.

SFS/I.P.I.

Handwritten notes in the bottom right corner, including the date 7.8.47.

SECRET

750
2875

FF/66960/Y.

22nd July, 1947.

My dear Hollis,

I have just received a request from the D.I.B. for another copy of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Soviet Espionage Case in Canada. As this second copy is probably required for the new Pakistan Intelligence Bureau I am very anxious to be able to comply with the request and should be most grateful, therefore, if you could let me have another copy of the report to send to the D. I.B.

Yours sincerely,

W.D. Bric

*W.D. Bric
7.8.47.*

SFS/I.P.I.

77

WT. 66960/B.1.c/ND.

10th July, 1947.

Dear

I have learnt from our representative in Washington that Dwyer sent to you copies of the "Cosmopolitan" for which GOUZENKO wrote a number of articles. We have been unable to get any of the editions ourselves and would be very grateful if you could supply us with copies of the issues or photostats of the articles.

Yours sincerely

R.L.F.
S.I.S.

R.F. erpell.

Handwritten scribbles

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. Sept 2001

22/5/1947 .1

17th July 1947.

Dear Winterborn,

With further reference to our letter of 25th April and your reply 17/10/20/3 dated 25.4.47, we have now obtained a very few extra copies of the Canadian Royal Commission Report and I am sending you two of these herewith.

Yours sincerely,

For Sir Percy Sillitoo.

Major H. H. Winterborn,
acting W/SM, c/o R. V. SMAN,
Singapore, S. E. A.

/M

2 encs.

1/2

Extract from letter to Mr. Thistlethwaite, Washington.

PF/69643/B.1

30th June 1947.

Dear Dick,

.....

I have just got your letter W.65 of the 16th June. We will see if we can get the Cosmopolitan articles from Broadway, so don't trouble about that unless I write again.

Yours ever,

R. Thistlethwaite Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington D.C.

Roger H. Hollis.

71.

Extract from letter from Mr. Thistlethwaite, Washington.

W.65.

16th June 1947.

Dear Roger,

.....

As regards the articles in the 'Cosmopolitan', I shall see what I can do with the F.B.I. Dwyer tells me, however, that he has sent back all of them to Broadway where they should be available to you.

.....

Yours ever,

Rec'd 26/6.

Dick.

R.H. Hollis Esq.,
B.1.

12a

Extract of letter from B.1 to Mr. Thistlethwaite.

B.1/Gen.

9th June 1947.

Dear Thistle,

GOUZENKO turned an honest penny with some articles in the 'Cosmopolitan' which we failed to get hold of. Could you get F.B.I. or R.C.M.P. to let us have copies of the issues or photostats of the articles?

.....

Yours ever,

R. Thistlethwaite Esq.,
British Embassy,
Washington D.C.

(Sgd) Roger H. Hollis.

72

Extract from letter to D.G. from Mr. Cartmel-
Robinson, Lusaka, dated 5th May. Received 13.5.47.
Original in SF.205/N. Rhodesia.

69K

Dear Sillitoe,

I have been an unconscionable time replying
to your letter of January 28th, (No. PFY.66960/DG)
under cover of which you posted me the Report of
the Canadian Royal Commission. It was most kind
of you to send it and we have been very interested
in it.

.....

PA PF 66960

held RJ


/

9 MAY 1947

Handwritten initials/signature

CONFIDENTIAL

SF.100/20/3



From: H/SIFE


Date: 23.4.47

To: Director General, Security Service.

copy -


[Redacted] 68a

With reference to your PF/66960/Y/B.1 of 3rd April, I do not think that we have a sufficiently strong case to ask for a special further printing of the Canadian Royal Commission report. If in fact a further printing is made we should still be grateful for the extra copies requested.



[Handwritten signature]
for H/SIFE

cty/mch



copy to 3.3.6.

(80)

1/33)60/1 .1

3rd April, 1947.

Dear Mr. Tolson,

I refer to your telegram of 21/3/47, the report of the American legal commission is at present out of print, and the testimony office has no copies. It is possible that further enquiries may be made, in which case we will put it for further consideration if you feel that they will still be useful to you after a few days. If you wish us to take any of the conditions to get a further printing, will you let us have details of the machine reproduction which you wish to give to the report, so that we can arrange it to be done on request.

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature

Mr. Tolson, Washington.

Mr. Tolson, Washington,
Justice Building, London.

Yours,

Handwritten mark

S. Form 100.

SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED IN CIPHER

From : D.S.O. SINGAPORE. Office File No. P.F. 66960. Originator's No. SLO/214.
 Passed for B.1. Date of Origin 31.3.47.
 Action to Date of Receipt 31.3.47.
 Copies to B.3.b. Deciphered by M.K.

Reference P.F/66960/Y/B.1. of October 4th 46.

Please send further six copies.



The text of this telegram is **Unparaphrased**, and must not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being **Paraphrased**. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

Official Communications should not be
addressed to individuals.

Telegrams "INTEL. BULAWAYO"



Ref: X8/1036.

Civil Security Bureau. *66*

P O Box 583.

BULAWAYO.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

CONFIDENTIAL.

17th February, 1947.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Sir Percy,

Major Harrison is still away on leave, and
I am acting for him.

This is to acknowledge, with many thanks,
receipt of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission
on Soviet Espionage in Canada, which you forwarded here
under cover of your PF.66960Y/DG dated 28th January.
As you remark, the Report makes very interesting
reading.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. Gordon

*Recd.
17/2*

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

17/2

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.:..... P.N. 66960 Y.Box 6437 Name:..... CORBY. *1-1-47*

Original in File No.:..... AF 422/General/2..... Vol. 6..... Serial:..... 115ab..... Receipt Date:..... 1-2-47.....

Original from:..... S.I.S. Under Ref.:..... LY. 42..... Dated:..... 3-2-47.....

Extracted on:..... 4-3-47..... by:..... AMM Section:..... R4.....

Copy of letter from S.I.S. re CORBY case.

Our representative in _____ has sent us the following information regarding the Swiss set-up in the Corby case :-

- a) Alexander ABRAMSON made three visits to Paris on official missions for the I.L.O. in 1946, in February, April and July.
 - b) Mrs. DUEBENDORFER has a sister named Rosy RUEDI, who is a Swiss subject and lives at 63 Bd.Victor Hugo, Nice.
 - c) Mrs. Berthe HELBEIN has a relative named Mme. MACHER, who lives at 26 rue Vallier, Levallois-Perret, near Paris.
 - d) When HELBEIN recently applied in Switzerland to the French for a transit visa, he produced a letter of recommendation from the "chef du bureau des passeports americain" at Washington.
 - e) Prior to her departure from Geneva in 1940 Helena SABINOWITZ was friendly with the following individuals :-
- V. TERENTINEF, a woman, residing at 6 rue Michel Chauvet, Geneva. Formerly an employee of the I.L.O., subject now runs a pension at the above address. Nationality unknown but not Swiss.

PTO.

THIS IS A COPY
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IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958. *Sept 2001*

STEINIG and wife, Jews, ex-I.L.O. or League of Nations, believed by informant to have left for South America.

A certain Mme. Mia GIELLY of 6 rue de la Rotisserie, Geneva, Latvian by birth and Swiss by marriage to Louis GIELLY, conservateur Beaux-Arts. Reported to hold very pro-Russian views.

Our Swiss representative states that it is almost certain that STEINIG is identical with one Leon STEINIG, born 6.6.1898 at Trembowla (?), Austria-Hungary, ex-Austrian national, of 5 rue Toepffer, Geneva. STEINIG, who described himself as a U.N.O. secretarial official, was granted a transit visa for the U.K. en route to the U.S.A. on 14.10.46. on behalf of U.N.O. He holds no passport, but travelled on a certificate of identity dated 29.6.42, issued at Washington D.C., valid for an unlimited period. STEINIG is now said to be living in the U.S.A., and with the backing of influential Jewish friends was recently appointed head of the Opium Board of U.N.O. in replacement of a Swede who was dismissed.

We have no trace of any of the additional names mentioned in the report, and nothing is known to their detriment by our representative.

Yours sincerely,

for Brigadier

M. Serpell, Esq.,
M. I. 5.

CONFIDENTIAL.

AF.50-14-32 1/0

28th January 1947

copy for B.3.0
" " FF 66960 ✓

S.I.C. East Africa.

With reference to your L/2/29 of
1st November 1946.

I enclose the further copy of the
report on the Canadian spy case for which you
asked.

I am sorry there has been some delay
in sending you this, but the reports are now in
very short supply and difficult to get hold of.

pm

Sir Percy Sillitoe.

JWJ/EJR

SECRET

SF.50-14-32 A/O

29th January 1947.

copy for B.S.a
" " PF 66960 ✓
H/S.I.S.

With reference to my SF.50-14-32 A/O of 15th
January 1947.

I now enclose the two extra copies of the
report on the situation in case for which you asked.

[Handwritten signature]
Yours faithfully,
Sir Percy Sillitoe.

JLL/BJH

✓

Handwritten text, mostly illegible due to low contrast and fading. Some faint words like "I have" and "to" are visible.

Handwritten text, possibly a date or a signature, mostly illegible.

Handwritten text, possibly a name or a reference number, mostly illegible.

Draft Letter to Commissioner S.T.Wood, C.M.G.,
R.C.M.P., Justice Building,
OTTAWA.

Approved by *[Signature]*

Date 18.12.46.

No. of Copies 3

Our Ref. PF/66960/Y/DG

For Signature by D.G.

Their Ref.

Despd. 18.12.46.

SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Dear *Commissioner,*

I am very grateful to you for your letter of 12th December, telling me that Igor GOUZENKO plans to publish his memoirs in serial form in the Cosmopolitan magazine. I will arrange to get copies of this and shall read them with interest. I fully understand the position to which you refer in your second paragraph, that you are unable to exercise control over the particulars which GOUZENKO may wish to publish.

I will of course observe your request that the information you now send me should be treated as personal and confidential.

May I take this opportunity of sending you my kindest personal regards and best wishes for the coming year.

Yours sincerely,

Continue overleaf if necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL

PFY.66960/DG

28th January 1947.

Dear *Cartmel Robinson,*

I promised to send you a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Soviet espionage in Canada. I am afraid it has been a long time in coming, but this has been due to difficulties in getting supplies as the Canadians greatly underestimated the demand there would be for the document. However, we have at last managed to get a few copies and I think you will find that the one I am sending you makes interesting reading.

Yours sincerely,

H.F. Cartmel-Robinson, Esq.,
C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Acting Governor,
Lusaka,
Northern Rhodesia.

CONFIDENTIAL

PFY.66960/DG.

28th January 1947.

Dear *Ross*

I promised Surgey to send you a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Soviet espionage in Canada. I am afraid it has been a long time in coming, but this has been due to difficulties in getting supplies as the Canadians greatly underestimated the demand there would be for the document. However, we have at last managed to get a few copies and I think you will find that the one I am sending you makes interesting reading.

I am also sending a copy to Harrison.

Yours sincerely,

PER [unclear]

Colonel J.E. Ross,
Commissioner,
B.S.A. Police Headquarters,
P.O. Box 589,
Salisbury,
Southern Rhodesia.

CONFIDENTIAL

PF.66960Y/DG

28th January 1947.

Dear Major Harrison

I promised to send you a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Soviet espionage in Canada. I am afraid it has been a long time in coming, but this has been due to difficulties in getting supplies as the Canadians greatly underestimated the demand there would be for the document. However, we have at last managed to get a few copies and I think you will find that the one I am sending you makes interesting reading.

I have also sent a copy to the Commissioner.

Yours sincerely,

Major F.W. Harrison,
H.Q., B.S.A. Police,
Bulawayo,
S. Rhodesia.

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE ADDRESSED.
THE COMMISSIONER
R C M POLICE
OTTAWA



ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
OTTAWA

REF 1.2

December 12th, 1946.

Secret and Personal

Dear Sir Percy,

You may care to know that Igor Gouzenko has recently entered into an agreement with Cosmopolitan magazine to publish his memoirs in serial form. The first of these articles will appear in the February issue of the magazine referred to and will be followed by three or four further instalments.


2. I am passing this information to you as I felt it would be of interest. Igor Gouzenko is contracting directly with Cosmopolitan magazine and is, of course, a completely free agent in connection with any question relative to his private interests. Under the circumstances, we will of course not be in any position to exercise control over the particulars which will appear in Cosmopolitan in due course.

3. As soon as the espionage trials are completed here, it is anticipated that Gouzenko will then take up his residence in Canada as a result of the financial resources which are at his disposal, by virtue of the contract made with Cosmopolitan and my understanding is that at this latter juncture the articles will be followed by the publication of a book.

4. I am informing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington of the facts outlined above but would very much appreciate the matter being treated as personal and confidential, for the time being at all events.

With kindest personal regards.

Yours sincerely,


S. T. Wood.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500, Parliament St.,
B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1, England.

S.O.B.1. Mr. Hollis.

On his return from South Africa, the D.G. has asked me to find out from you whether copies are available of the Canadian Royal Commission Report to be sent to the following people:-

1. H.F. Cartmel-Robinson, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Acting Governor,
Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia.
2. H.G. Hart, Esq.,
Commissioner of Police,
Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia.
3. Lieut.Colonel H.G. Seward,
Headquarters,
B.S.A. Police,
Bulawayo,
South Africa.
*J.E. Ross
Commander
HQ - Blue
PO Box 299
Salisbury Rhodesia*
4. Major F.W. Harrison,
Headquarters,
B.S.A. Police,
Bulawayo,
South Africa.

If copies are available, the D.G. would be grateful if you would kindly arrange for their despatch.

D.G. Sec.
4.12.46.

P. Barbary

DEFENCE SECURITY OFFICE, EGYPT,
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
M.F.L.F.

DS(E) 20/2/3

22nd November 1946.

Dear *Sir Percy Sillitoe*

With reference to your letter
PF/66960/Y/B.1 dated 7th October 1946.

I would be very grateful if you
could send me a second copy of the Report
of the Canadian Royal Commission on the
espionage case in Canada, as I have had
several requests from official contacts
who would like to read this case.

I have also been asked by an
official of the Palace whether it would
be possible to obtain a copy for H.M. King
Farouk, who would like to retain it if
there is no objection.

Yours sincerely,

G.J. Jenkins

(G.J. JENKINS)

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

GJJ/Dmcc

Note
27 NOV 1946
B3A.

48a

S. I. M. E.,
General Headquarters,
Middle East Land Force.

SILE/004/129/T/BS

Director-General,
Box No. 500,
Parliament St. B.C.,
L O N D O N, S.W. 1

2/ea

Brigadier Roberts has asked me to thank you for your PF/66960/Y/B.1 of the 7th October, enclosing a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on the espionage case in Canada.

Upon reading this report, we find it of such interest that we were wondering if you could let us have a further two copies of it. If this could be done we should be most grateful.

} See 63a

Note
RECORDED
B3A

N.W. Ireson
N.W. IRESON, F/Lt.,
for Brigadier, G.S.

18th November 1946

IPS.

✓

PA 11
PF 66960
B16
25/10/46

57
C.E/2433.



B.L.B. 11/87

B3C 25/11

Notes

P.O. Box 449,

PRETORIA.

B3C

18th October, 1946.

Dear Sir Percy,

I write to thank you for your letter PF/66960/Y/B.1 of the 7th inst., and for the copy of "The Report of the Canadian Royal Commission", which you were kind enough to send to me. I am very pleased to have my own copy although I had an opportunity of a sight of a copy from our External Affairs Department. I may say I was particularly interested and am giving the matter further study.

Again thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

BRIGADIER.

Sir Percy Sillitoe,
P.O. Box 500,
LONDON, S.W.1.,
England.

46A

P.F. 66960/Y/E.3.c.

22nd November 1946.


S.L.O.
Nairobi.

With reference to your SA/2/29 of 1st November, I am sorry that at the moment we are unable to send you a further copy of the Royal Commission Report, as they are very difficult to obtain owing to the fact that the Canadians only made a limited printing of them. We have, however, got a new edition of the Civil Security Review, which is with the printers. This contains a short summary of the Canadian case, and may help you out for the time being until we can send you another copy of the Royal Commission report.

S.S./CJH.



Director General.



AIX

(41)

B.I. Secretary

Herewith are copy of the Royal
 Commission's Report you let me have (see 29a)
 in Bates on the Colonial Office.
 Both he and I are grateful
 for the opportunity to read it.

Anthony

A/O.

16/XI/46.

Telegrams: "SUBSIDED", Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 3364.



c/o East African Governors' Conference
P.O. Box 601
Nairobi, Kenya

3/1/25

11.11.46

BT to ...

20/11/46

Reference is made to the letter of 10.10.46, and the enclosed information.

In the light of the fact that by no means all the completely
correct information reported by the Royal Commission, I am
pleased to inform that the various Directors of Security and
Intelligence.

It is clear from this document that not in-
frequently the methods of Communist penetration are so cleverly dis-
guised that they are unrecognised. For this reason alone, I feel each
D.T. should have a responsibility of making it as plain as possible,
and in order, therefore, if you will possibly send out another copy
of the document to speed up the process of distribution.

Yours sincerely,

C.J. Hunt,
As Security Liaison Officer
East Africa.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
No. 500-
Parliament Street S.W.
London, S.W.1.

RS

AA "Covent" please
not

43

B.I.C. Mr. Serpell.

It seems that these papers on the set-up of the Russian Embassy in Ottawa will be of interest to your section.

B.1
5.11.46.

R.H. Hollis.

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3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

Nov 01

SECOND FLOOR

1. Office of Second Secretary, Volenko.
2. Secretary of Ambassador (Technical), Mrs. Belochvostikon.
3. Office of Ambassador Zarubin.
4. Landing.
5. Stairway up to third floor.
6. Stairway up to second floor.
7. Vestibule.
8. Office of Consul and Second Secretary Pavlov.
9. Toilet.
10. Toilet.
11. Corridor (and stairs to Secret Room).
12. Cipher Room for Military Attache.
13. Cipher Room for the Ambassador and Commercial Councillor (Steel Door).
14. Same as No. 13. Large safe as well as incinerator for burning secret documents (Steel Door).
15. Corridor.
16. Small room - suspect radio set of NKVD in it.
17. Room for writing telegrams for Commercial Councillor (small incinerator here).
18. Cipher room for NKVD.

HELL R/S

REC 9461 NOV 9 4 39/43a

CONFIDENTIAL.

Defence Security Office,
Half-Way Tree P.O.
Kingston,
Jamaica.

R/1(27)

MS
5/11

22nd October, 1946.

81 2/11

Director General,

Reference your PF.66960/Y/B.1 of the 4th October, 1946, enclosing a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission.

2. I am writing on behalf of Lt. Col. Kirby Green to thank you for sending us this Report, which is of absorbing interest; not least because the case was very badly reported in the local press - indeed it was hardly reported at all, and it is invaluable to have the official account for reference.

3. I shall of course, show your letter and the Report itself to Col. Kirby Green directly he returns to Jamaica.

[Handwritten signature]

for Senior Defence Security Officer,
Caribbean Area.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.
Box No. 500, Parliament Street B.O.
London. S.W. 1.
England.

SECRET.

AP/66960/Y/A.1

4th November 1946.

Dear Whitestone,

Herewith a copy of our note on the Canadian Espionage Case about which you spoke. If it is too long for your purpose and you propose to cut it down extensively, perhaps you would let me see the final draft.

Yours sincerely,

R.H. Hollis.

Commander H.R. Whitestone,
C.D.M.I.,
Admiralty.

/s/
Enc.

✓

AU

Defence Security Office.
Dodecanese District.
MELF 2.

October 21st. 1946.

=====

Box 500.
Parliament Street B.O.
London.
S.W.1.

Ref your PF/66960/Y/B.1 dated the 7th. Oct.
1946.

I have to acknowledge receipt of the report
of the Canadian Royal Commission, addressed to my Predecessor,
SIMES, which is of exceptional interest to me personally, as
a Canadian.

I can promise it a good circulation amongst
those interested.

P.G.M. Gibbon

S/Ldr.
(P.G.M. GIBBON).
Defence Security Officer.

PGM/WCH.

133a / 131.

346

29 OCT 1945

~~10~~
31

TELEPHONE:
B. 098.
TELEGRAPH:
SUBSIDED, CANBERRA.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

COMMONWEALTH INVESTIGATION BRANCH,

CANBERRA, A.C.T.,

194

IN REPLY, PLEASE QUOTE NO.

2337

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten note: 29/10]

TOP SECRET

[Handwritten signature]

66960/Y/MS 24th October 1946

Dear Sir,

I have read with interest, I
attach herewith a note on the
practical application of the
points out the salient features.
It is, I think, slightly
longer than that you require,
but I think you will be able to
cut out anything you feel is
irrelevant for your purpose.

Yours sincerely,

Director, S.S.,
Ministry of Defence.



14322/46

WHS 26/10/46

Downing Street,

S.W.1.

24th October, 1946.*My dear Michael,*

With this letter I am returning the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission set up to investigate the communication of confidential information to agents of a foreign power, which you sent me under cover of your letter No. PS. 66960/Y/B3c of the 11th of October. It really is a most interesting report. 30

I understand that you will have already sent copies to your D.S.O.s and that you are considering the question of sending copies also to your representatives in West Africa, and that the Report will therefore be made available to Governors in this way.

Garvey I am sending a copy of this letter to Garby (Foreign Office) and will be grateful if he will pass this information to Matthews (D.I.D.) who asked me by telephone some days ago whether we would like copies of the report to send to Colonies. You will see from this letter that it has in fact already been arranged with the Security Service to make it available to Governors of territories likely to be concerned.

M. E. W. CLAYTON, ESQ.

*I am**Harrell.*

DEFENCE SECURITY OFFICE,
AUBERGE DE CASTILLE,
VALETTA,
MALTA.

DSO/3018

Director-General,
Security Service,
London, S.W.1.

16th October, 1946.

In the absence of Perfect in Cairo,
I am writing to thank you for your letter
PF/66960/Y/B.1. of the 4th October enclosing a
copy of the report of the Canadian Royal Commission
on the espionage case in Canada.

As I have already read several extracts
from this report in the "News Review" I was more
than anxious to get a copy of the full report, and
this will be read with great interest, especially
those particular passages mentioned in your letter.
As it is understood from you that this report has
no security grading and is on sale in Canada, I will
certainly lend it to one or two of my official
contacts here to whom I feel it will be of interest.

D.D.S.O.

BGA/PH

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FR/66960/Y.

35a

D.D.G. Captain Liddell.

I attach herewith a copy of Mr. Marriott's note on the
Canadian case, about which you spoke to Mr. Hollis.

B.I. Secretary.
25.10.46.

RECORDED
25.10.46

SECRET

REF 66960 Y/B.1 R5

330

**DEFENCE SECURITY OFFICE,
COLLEGE
~~GOVERNORS~~ LANE,
GIBRALTAR.**

Ref:No: 2679

14th October 1946

Director-General.

Thank you for your PF/66960/Y/B.1. of 4th October enclosing the report on the espionage case in Canada.

I note that there are no limitations on its circulation and that it has no secrecy grading and I shall therefore see to it, as suggested by you, that the report is made available to such members of the Colonial Government and Fortress Headquarters as are interested.

Andrew Hill

Assistant Defence Security Officer.

B3C 23/10

cll.

*B3C Fish
SO.B.1.*

✓

PF.66960/Y/206

18th October 1946

Dear Drew,

I attach herewith a copy of the report of the Royal Commission in Canada on the Soviet Espionage case. I should be grateful if you could let me have it back in due course.

As regards our conversation, I have had a talk with Gollis. The facts are that the report has been given a considerable write up in the Sunday Dispatch, the Weekly Review, The Times and in a special news letter called Tidings, the editor of which is Douglas Reed. The Stationery Office here, in order to meet various demands, have on order 1,400 copies from Canada, 400 of which I understand have been earmarked for the Foreign Office for dispatch to their representatives abroad. We have made a very short digest of the report in a form which we consider appropriate for distribution to the Managing Directors of the various factories with whom we are in contact in relation to secret contracts.

Perhaps when you have had a look at the volume we could have a further talk on the matter.

Yours sincerely,

J.A. Drew, Esq.,
Cabinet Office,
Great George Street.



796
1946

Downing Street,

S.W.1.

15th October, 1946.

My dear Mr. ...

Thank you very much indeed for sending me a copy of the Royal Commission Report under cover of your letter PS.66960/Y/B3C of the 11th of October 1946. I will certainly let you have it back just as soon as I can.

One of the reasons why I was so anxious to read this report was to see whether it was worth while sending copies to all or some Governors as a warning of the sort of thing that can happen. When you and Hollis have read it I will be grateful for your views on this point.

*Yours
D. ...*

M. E. W. CLAYTON ESQ.



3/a

Brig. S. N. SHOOSMITH,
From D.S.O., O.B.E.,
Telephone Herford 2118
Your Reference PF/66969/Y/B.1
Our Reference HQ.INT.DIV/DO/113

Intelligence Division,
70 Headquarters,
CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY
(BRITISH ELEMENT),
B.A.O.R.

14 October, 1946

My dear Liddell,

Thank you very much indeed for the copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission. It was most kind of you to take the trouble to send me this copy and I am very grateful. It will take a certain amount of reading by my chaps in the section concerned and they are extremely interested and are finding it of very great value.

Yours sincerely,

S. N. Shoosmith

Captain Guy M. Liddell,
BOX No. 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
London, S.W.1.

D.G.W. JJ
19/10 - BT
R.H.D. 21/10

Col. L. 17/10

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R.5 11 11
FF.66960/1/330.

11th October 1946.

My dear *Bates*

Herewith at long last the Royal
Commission's Report.

May I please have it back when you
have finished with it since we only have a
limited number of copies and the readers
waiting list (including myself) is enormous.

Yours

Mrs Clayton.

J.D. Bates, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

Enc.
REC/03.

[Handwritten mark]

PA/66960/Y.

29A

B. J. c. Mr. Clayton.

Herewith copy No. 7 of the Canadian Royal Commission Report. Would you please let me have it back as soon as Mr. Bates has finished with it?

B. 1 Sec.
10.10.46.

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11.10.46

CONFIDENTIAL.

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FF.66960(B30)

28Z (37)

9th October 1946.

Dear Mason,

With reference to your letter SA/2/26 of 23rd September. I am afraid this crossed with our outward letter to you FF.66960/Y/B.1 of 4th October with which we enclosed a copy of the full report by the Royal Commission which investigated the Canadian espionage case.

We were unable to send you more than one copy of this owing to the very limited number at our disposal but since the document is so comprehensive, I suggest that once you have read it yourself, you should circulate it to all Directors of Intelligence and Security in your area who will, I am sure, find it a most valuable publication.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) M.T.E. Clayton.

Sir Percy Sillitoe.

O.J. Mason, Esq.,
SLO EAST AFRICA.

MTEC/DB.

Copy in S/50/14/14C (together with 'other material').

287

For file please 17/10

FF/66960/Y/31

8th October, 1946.

Dear Miss Mum,

Herewith a copy of the piece on the Canadian espionage case which we intend to print in the Red Book, along with the other material which you have already seen. Will you let me know as soon as possible if you have any comments to make?

Yours sincerely,

Miss J. Mum,
Home Office.

R. H. Hollis.

RF/AH
Enc.

✓

TOP SECRET.THE CANADIAN ESPIONAGE CASE.A. Introduction.

Early in September 1945, Igor GOUZENKO, a Soviet national employed as a cypher clerk in the office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa, called at the Headquarters of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and offered to give information about an espionage network operated by the Russians in Canada. In support of his story, GOUZENKO produced a considerable number of documents which he had abstracted from the Military Attache's safe. These were not, of course, all the documents available, but were merely representative samples selected by GOUZENKO as illustrations of the accuracy of his story. They included the following:-

- (a) Dossiers referring to certain of the agents operated by the Military Attache.
- (b) Copies of telegrams exchanged between the Military Attache and the Director of Red Army Intelligence in Moscow.
- (c) Miscellaneous papers, including draft telegrams to Moscow, dealing with secret work.

The subsequent intensive, and in the circumstances necessarily protracted, interrogation of GOUZENKO by the R.C.M.P. during the course of which nothing emerged to cast doubts upon the accuracy of his story, was followed by the appointment on 5.2.46 by the Canadian Government of a Royal Commission to enquire into and report upon the whole matter. The proceedings of the Royal Commission, which took place in camera, included not only an examination of GOUZENKO himself, and the documents he produced, but also the examination of all persons directly or indirectly implicated by his evidence. Of these persons, thirteen were, simultaneously with the public announcement on 15.2.46 of the setting up of the Commission, detained by virtue of Orders made under the Defence of Canada Rules. The remainder were summoned to give evidence under sub-poena.

The Royal Commission, from time to time, made interim reports on its progress, and following upon each such report, formal charges were preferred against such of the persons as had been examined, and against whom it was considered that a prima facie case of an offence against the Official Secrets Acts had been established. In the event, charges under the Official Secrets Acts have now been preferred against all thirteen detainees, together with two others not originally detained, while in addition the man Alan Nunn MAY has already been convicted in this country, while another, Sam CARR, the National Organiser of the Canadian Communist Party, has evaded arrest.

B. Direction of Network.

The organisation reported upon by GOUZENKO was directed by the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, and its head in Canada was Colonel ZABOTIN, the Soviet Military Attache. Its object was intelligence on the widest scale, but it is evident that the majority of the agents were mainly chosen with an eye to their ability to obtain access to secret information of a type which would be of interest to military Intelligence.

By the spring of 1945, one of ZABOTIN's principal assignments was to obtain information about the atomic bomb, and it is clear that this task

/was

- 2 -

was regarded in Moscow as of first-rate priority. At the same time, only one agent, as far as is known, was effectively employed for this purpose, while as recently as August 1945 ZABOTIN was told by Moscow to continue simultaneously to acquire information about the Army and Air Force, in accordance with a very detailed directive. He was, for example, instructed to ascertain the location of certain specified Canadian and U.S. formations, and even the location of the Brazilian Infantry Division.

ZABOTIN came to Ottawa towards the end of 1943. He found on his arrival, and forthwith took over and enlarged a network which had been organised by his predecessor BOKOLOV about a year earlier. This nucleus, apart from its smaller size, differed mainly from the network subsequently run by himself in that contact with it had been primarily maintained through two members of the Canadian Communist Party, namely Sam CARR (who is the National Organiser) and Fred ROSE, an U.P. ZABOTIN, although on instructions from Moscow he kept himself in the background, modified these arrangements by substituting direct contact between the more important agents and members of his own staff, CARR and ROSE being reserved in the main for the still important role of talent spotters and advisers. For contact purposes ZABOTIN not only used his Assistant Military Attaches, but also his clerks, chauffeurs, a doorman, and the First Secretary of the Embassy. In this connection GURLEY has pointed out that most of the staff of the Military Attache were officers of the Red Army, he himself being a Lieutenant, and that their apparent positions bore little relation to their true importance. ZABOTIN's chauffeur, for example, was in reality a Captain in the Red Army.

C. Composition of Network.

Criminal proceedings are still in progress and it will be appreciated therefore that much investigation yet remains to be carried out before it will be possible finally to determine the exact number of persons implicated. For the purposes of this note, however, it is sufficient to say that with the exception of Sam CARR, Fred ROSE and one other, all the agents against whom charges have been preferred were, or had been, in Government employment in responsible positions, and that all were persons of intelligence and education. Thus eight were University graduates, and the departments where they were employed included the National Research Council, the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Munitions and Supply, the Office of the U.K. High Commissioner and the three Services.

D. Motivation of Agents.

The Royal Commission reported that perhaps the most startling aspect of the entire network was the uncanny success with which the Russians were able to find Canadians who were willing to betray their country. In this connection they found that it had been "overwhelmingly established by the evidence throughout that the Communist movement was the principal base within which the espionage network was recruited; and that it not only supplied personnel with adequately developed motivation, but provided the organisational framework wherein recruiting could be and was carried out safely and efficiently." They find no evidence that monetary incentive played an important part in the original motivation of these persons, though sums of money were in due course later paid to a number of the agents. For these, receipts were on occasion demanded and the Commission suggest that these could presumably be used for blackmail purposes if necessary.

But they find that the evidence shows that in the great majority of cases motivation was inextricably linked with courses of psychological development carried on under the guise of activities of a secret section of the Communist Party.

It seems to be the general policy of the Communist party to discourage certain selected sympathisers from joining the party openly. One object

- 3 -

of this is thought to be that it assists in gaining control of a number of organisations. But there would appear to be a further object, viz to accustom the adherent gradually to an atmosphere and an ethic of conspiracy. The technique of subjecting a person over a period of time to conditions of secrecy seems calculated to develop a psychology of a double life and double standards. Further one effect of this prolonged habituation to conspiratorial methods is to isolate the person from the great mass of the Canadian people.

The Commission studied the methods pursued in the study groups or "cells" and find that the curriculum was designed to weaken the loyalty of the member towards his society as such. The effect of the courses seems to be a gradual development of a sense of divided loyalties or, in extreme cases, of a transferred loyalty.

A further objective is gradually to inculcate a habit of complete obedience to the dictates of the party hierarchy and to instil in the mind of the member the view that obedience to the organisation takes precedence over his loyalty to Canada. The Commission find it significant that not a single one of the Canadians approached ever suggested that they contemplated taking the one loyal or legal course of action - reporting the criminal request to the Canadian authorities. They regard this as a striking illustration of the efficiency of the Communist study groups in inducing a motivation in clearly illegal party assignments.

The evidence suggests that at each stage of "development" the adherent is kept in ignorance of the wider ramifications and real objects of the organisation.

It also appears that anti-semitism and the natural reactions of persons of Jewish origin to racial discrimination was one of the factors played upon by recruiting agents. In some cases a desire for companionship and intellectual discussion may have played its part. In the vast majority one important element would seem to have been propaganda carried out by the Communists for various measures of social reform in Canada. In associating such domestic propaganda with the external propaganda of the particular foreign state, the Communists were following the successful technique of modern advertising such as a pretty face is used for advertising cigarettes.

The report suggests that it is by these means that a number of young Canadians, who began with a desire to advance causes which they considered worthy, were induced into joining Communist study groups. They were then persuaded to keep their membership secret and were later led along the ingenious psychological development courses until, under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupulous leaders, they were persuaded to engage in illegal activities. Essentially what happened was the transplanting of a conspiratorial technique first developed in less fortunate countries to promote an underground struggle against tyranny to a democratic society where it is singularly inappropriate.

E. Method of Recruitment.

The following extract from the Royal Commission report gives a clear account of the way in which agents were recruited:-

"ZABOTIN found already in existence in Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto numerous study groups where Communist philosophy and techniques were studied and where writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and later authors were read and discussed. To outsiders these groups adopted various disguises, such as social gatherings, music-listening groups and groups for discussing international politics and economics. In some

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- 4 -

at least of these groups dues were collected and the money used for various purposes including assistance to Communist Party leaders, and the purchase of Communist literature.

"These study groups were in fact 'cells' and were the recruiting centres for agents, and the medium of development of the necessary frame of mind which was a preliminary condition to eventual service of the Soviet Union in a more practical way.

Occasionally these groups were visited by higher Party officials who kept in close contact with them and obviously reported to Colonel ZABOTIN as to the ability of 'candidates' to become full fledged agents.

"When it was found that the candidates fulfilled all these requirements, they were definitely recruited as 'agents' and tasks were then assigned to them.

"The technique revealed by the documents is as follows: a senior member of the Canadian Communist Party, such as Sam CARR, the National Organiser of the Party, or Fred ROSE, the Quebec organiser, would propose certain Communists to one of ZABOTIN's Russian colleagues as potential espionage agents. Col. ZABOTIN would get details about the 'candidate', including his 'possibilities' - that is, place of work and the kind of information to which he had access - and would send this to Moscow. Moscow would then telegraph ZABOTIN permission or refusal to use this particular 'candidate'. The evidence is that Moscow would first make an independent check, which according to MOUSENKO was done through one of the parallel systems of networks.

"Sometimes Moscow would take the initiative in suggesting to ZABOTIN some communist in Canada to be contacted and enlisted for espionage work. The evidence is that Moscow made this suggestion on the basis of lists of non-Russian Communists whose names and dossiers, perhaps unknown to themselves, were kept on file in Moscow.

"The evidence shows that the espionage recruiting agents made use in their work of reports, including psychological reports, on Canadian Communists which had been prepared as part of the routine of the secret 'cell' organisation of that Party. Apparently these reports were prepared on various individual Communists by other Communists who had got to know them through joint membership in a study-group. The psychological reports would then be passed up through the pyramid of cells and made available to senior Communists for such purposes as the latter considered necessary. Such reports obviously facilitate selection of Canadian Communists for invitation to engage in espionage activity and assist the Russians in determining the method of approach. A preliminary feeling out of the selected recruit, before the latter realised the sinister purposes for which he was being considered could also be made within the framework of normal Communist Party activities and organisation, and there is also evidence that this was part of the technique of recruiting."

Since so many of the individuals comprising these groups were in responsible positions, and having regard to the use which it is known that ROSE had for many years made of one of the individuals involved, it is

/highly

- 5 -

highly probable that for some while before the Russians were in direct contact with individual members, these groups had been used by the Communist Party of Canada for the purpose of acquiring information for its own purposes. In these circumstances, the actual recruitment of a particular individual by or on behalf of the Russians merely represented a slight change of emphasis in an existing state of affairs, and scarcely confronted him or her with any very new moral problem to solve. To that extent, therefore, the details of the way in which each individual finally became a Soviet agent are of less importance than the earlier history of the way in which, by their Communist associations, they had been gradually conditioned for the purpose. One example, however, may be given, since it shows the ease with which the Russians could take over and use the services of individuals who had been disciplined in undercover groups.

One of the agents was a certain Captain Gordon LUNAN, by profession a Commercial artist but during the war seconded from the Army to the Canadian War-Time Information Bureau. He had been a member of the Communist Party for some years and was a regular attender at meetings of underground members of the Communist Party.

One day he met Fred ROSE, well known to him, and was told by the latter that there was a certain un-named individual whom he would like him to meet. A few days later, on arrival at his office, he found on his desk an anonymous note inviting him to meet an unidentified person at a street corner in Ottawa. LUNAN duly kept the appointment and there met a stranger whom he subsequently discovered to be one of the Soviet Assistant Military Attaches. The latter handed him a type-written documents consisting of instructions as to the way in which he was to take on a group of three agents. Notwithstanding the fact that LUNAN had little knowledge of his three collaborators (one of whom was actually a complete stranger to him) he appears quite readily to have accepted the assignment, and to have proceeded forthwith to establish contact with his sub-agents and to carry out the instructions which he had received from the Russian.

There remain two agents, Nunn MAY and Emma WOIKIN, both of whom were directly recruited by the Russians. In the case of MAY, the original recruitment must have taken place in England, although no details are available, since it is known that ZABOTIN had to be informed by Moscow of the password he should use for making contact. It is known that Moscow had suggested that contact should be effected through Fred ROSE, but that ZABOTIN had countered with the suggestion that this would be better done through one of his own Officers. To this Moscow agreed. In the case of WOIKIN, the history of her recruitment was that following upon the rejection by her employing department of her application to work in Russia, she applied to the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa for employment there. This was refused, but in turn she was told that there were other ways in which she could help the Soviet Union, namely by supplying information about her work, and this she agreed to do. WOIKIN is of Russian blood.

F: Method of Operation.

One of the remarkable features of this case is the extent to which members of the Embassy Staff have themselves established direct contact with the agents. Thus Major ROGOV, the assistant Military Attache (Air) was in direct touch with Sam CARR and three other agents. The first named was contacted through the intermediary of a leading undercover member of the Communist Party to whom ROGOV would telephone messages in a pre-arranged form, as a result of which the actual meeting took place later between ROGOV and CARR at a time and place also nominated by the telephone message. It appears also that ROGOV had regular meetings with CARR which took place perhaps as often as once a week. Such meetings are known to have taken place out of doors at a street corner,

/in

- 6 -

in a car and in the intermediary's house. LUNAN was seen about once a month by ROGOV, usually between nine and ten in the evening, but on each occasion at a different meeting place. A member of LUNAN's group, was directly contacted by ROGOV after it became apparent that the information he was supplying was too technical for LUNAN to understand. Accordingly after the introduction had been effected he met ROGOV at regular intervals, the time and place being settled by a telephone message in a pre-arranged form.

With regard to the other agents already mentioned, it is known that at one time or another all of them, with three exceptions, had direct Russian contacts, all of them members or former members of the Military Attache's own staff, the only exceptions being the First Secretary and the Tass representative, both of whom had been concerned with the earlier organisation set up by ZABOTIN's predecessor. All such contacts appear to share the characteristic that they were effected in person either at pre-arranged intervals or at the instance of the Russians, and that in the main they took place out of doors. In one instance it is known that an agent left espionage material concealed in a wash room adjoining a dentist's waiting room and that from there it was collected by a Russian. It is believed that the dentist was quite unaware of what was going on.

The second feature of interest was the very close control even in matters of detail, exercised by Moscow. They were supplied not only with full details of the character, background and potentialities of each agent, but they were also kept informed of the exact method by which they were handled and contacted, and Moscow in turn not only supplied detailed assignments for each agent, but also directed and criticised the actual mechanics of their handling. In the third place, a very substantial part of the material supplied by the agents was in the form of original documents, in some cases running to many pages, and in the majority of cases these were photographed by the Embassy and the originals returned to the agents. In the fourth place, with the exception of certain small payments by way of expenses, the network seems very largely to have operated on a voluntary basis.

G. Information obtained by the Russians.

The scale of operation of this network was so large that it is not possible in a short memorandum to give an account of the material obtained from the agents. It can be said, however, that the material covered substantially the whole field of the work upon which each individual was engaged. Thus it appears from the itemised list of ZABOTIN's mail despatched to Moscow in January 1945, that one agent alone was responsible for 360 pages of information, while another agent on one occasion produced seventeen secret documents dealing with magnet radio locators for field artillery and 700 pages of secret scientific research reports. It is evident that the other agents were supplying material on a somewhat comparable scale.

H. General.

ZABOTIN, in addition to running the network already described, had many other espionage activities which are rather beyond the scope of a short note. These included constant efforts to recruit new agents and to expand his organisation, the arrangements for supplying an agent in the U.S.A. with a renewal of a false passport, and the transmission of funds for an espionage organisation in Switzerland.

Finally, it must be emphasised that GOUZENKO was only able to report in detail on the activities of that part of the Soviet Intelligence Service with which he himself was concerned, namely the Intelligence Department

/of

of the Red Army. He did, however, additionally report that similar organisations (in some cases of even greater size) were being run by the N.K.V.D., the Red Navy, and organisations concerned with Commercial and political espionage. Although he could from the nature of things give few details of any of these, there is every reason to suppose that what he has said about both their existence and their size, is true.

.....

Telegrams: "SUBSIDED", Nairobi.

Telephone: Nairobi 3364.



c/o East African Governors' Conference

P.O. Box 601

Nairobi, Kenya.

22

SA/2/26

23.9.46.

27/10

Dear Sir Percy,

I have just seen a rather excellent article in the "Times" Weekly Edition, dated 4th September 1946, entitled "Espionage in Canada".

Mr. Sandwith, D.I.S. Kenya, displayed considerable interest in this article, and I thought other Directors of Intelligence would probably like to see it.

As I am unable to get further copies, and the police photographic section is heavily involved in a criminal case, I wonder if you could send me out some dozen photostat copies which I will distribute.

Yours sincerely,

O.J. Mason,
A/Security Liaison Officer
East Africa.

RES
Duplicate

Bsc

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
London, S.W.1.

CJM/MF

21

PF/66960, Y/2.1

7th October 1946.

Dear ChooSmith,

When you were over here recently, you asked if we could obtain for you a copy of the Report of the Canadian Loyal Commission. I have now got one and am sending it to you for your retention. The report is on sale publicly in Canada and no secrecy grading attaches to it.

Yours
Sgt. G. M. [unclear]

Brigadier S.H. ChooSmith, C.B.E., C.D.,
70 H.Q. Intelligence Division,
C.C. (B.I.),
Herford, B.I.

171

Copies of this letter and their Report also sent to the following D.S.Os :

- ✓ Egypt. Lt. Col. Jenkins.
- ✓ Rhodes. Maj. Simes.
- Eritrea. Capt. Shearman.
- Palestine. Lt. Col. Isham.
- Beirut. S/Ldr. Underwood.
- Cyprus. Sq/Ldr. Neilson.
- Iraq. F/Lt.

26

22/10/46

7th October 1946

Dear Sir,

In an earlier report I have already a copy of the report of the ... which you will no doubt find of interest. I should like particularly to call your attention to the summary on ... and the section headed 'Description of ...' on page 17.

The circumstances surrounding the investigation of this case have enabled the Commission to examine the whole matter under conditions of quite exceptional advantage from the ... is unusually full and accurate. We therefore feel that this report should be available to you and that you should be able to pass it to any official contacts who you think should see it.

The report is in vande and there are therefore no limitations which we need impose on its circulation, nor has it any security grading.

Yours sincerely,

Walter ...
Middle East.

WV
WV


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Nov 01

Telephone:
Grosvenor 4881.

Telegrams:
Public Prosecutions,
Piccy, London.

Please quote:



DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS,
DEVONSHIRE HOUSE (East Entrance),
MAYFAIR PLACE, PICCADILLY,
LONDON, W.1.

17 4th October 1946.

Dear Miss Middleton,

Many thanks for sending
me a copy of the Report of the
Canadial Royal Commission.

Yours sincerely,

Theobald Mathew

Miss Middleton,
Box 500,
Parliament Street B.O.,
S.W.1.

Copies of this letter and the Report sent to

- ✓Maj.R.S.Browne, Australia.
- ✓Brig.R.J.Palmer, S.Africa.

25a

EF/66960/Y/A.1.

7th October 1946.

Dear Cummings,

I have obtained a number of copies of the report of the Canadian Royal Commission which investigated the espionage case in Canada, and I am sending you one copy herewith for your retention. I believe you will find this report of great interest and I call your attention in particular to the passage on recruiting methods beginning on page 43, and that on the motivation of agents on page 57.

The report is on sale publicly in Canada and no secrecy grading attaches to it.

Yours sincerely,

J. Cummings Esq., Director of Security Intelligence,
 Director of Security Intelligence,
 P.O. Box 775,
 Wellington,
 New Zealand.

✓

EL/MI
 Enc.

Copies of this letter together with a copy of the Report have been sent to the following :

2Aa

- Maj. Tufnell Barrett, Trinidad.
- ✓ O.J. Mason Esq., Nairobi.
- ✓ Lt. Col. Fawdry, Gibraltar.
- ✓ Lt. Col. Perfect, Malta.
- Col. Dixon, Singapore.
- Lt. Col. Bourne, Burma.
- Lt. Col. , Hong Kong.
- Lt. Col. Fripp, Malayan Union.

HP/46960/T/B.L.

4th October, 1946.

Dear Sirby Green,

I am sending you herewith a copy of the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on the espionage case in Canada, which you will no doubt read with interest. I should like particularly to call your attention to the passages on recruiting methods starting on page 43, and the section headed 'Infiltration of Agents' on page 57.

The circumstances surrounding the investigation of this case have enabled the Commission to examine the whole matter under conditions of quite exceptional advantage from the investigation point of view, with the result that the product is unusually full and accurate. We therefore feel that this report should be available for you and that you should be able to lend it to any official contacts who you think should see it.

The report is on sale in Canada and there are therefore no limitations which we need impose on its circulation, nor has it any security grading.

Yours sincerely,

Lt. Col. R. Kirby Green,
R.S.C. JAMAICA.

For Sir Percy Gillies.

HR/VII
Enc.

THIS IS A COPY
 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
 IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
 ACT 1958
 Dec 107

23a

PF/66960/Y

D.4.a. Miss Johnson.

Herewith four copies of the Canadian Royal Commission
Report for the use of A.L.Cs.

161.
4.10.46.

VH
R.H.Hollis.

Ref: PFY.66960/SLB
Yr.ref: 1/481/46
Enclosure

3rd October, 1946.

Dear Sir Theobald,


In the absence of Mr. Hill on leave, I am sending to you a copy of The Report of the Royal Commission for your information and retention.

Yours sincerely,

(Secretary,

Sir Theobald Mathew, KBE., MC.,
Director of Public Prosecutions,
Devonshire House,
Mayfair Place, Piccadilly, W.1.

/MKM



79

Rear Admiral W.E. Parry
acknowledges, with thanks,
receipt of the Report of
the Royal Commission.

Intelligence Division,
Naval Staff,
Admiralty, S.W.1.

3rd October, 1946.

11 21a

Note.

Copies of the Canadian Royal Commission Report were distributed to the following on 1.10.46. as from D.G. :-

- Home Office (through Miss Nunn).
- D.M.I. Major General Templer.
- ✓ D.N.I. Rear Admiral Parry.
- ACAS(I) Air Vice Marshal Elmhirst.
- Special Branch (Deputy Commander Burt).
- I.P.I. Colonel Vickery.
- ✓ Director of Public Prosecutions } through
Bow Street Magistrates } S.L.B.

B.I. Sec.
1.10.46.

THIS IS A COPY
 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
 IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
 ACT 1958

Nov 01

574



OFFICES OF THE CABINET
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

20B

GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1

By the way in P/66960/4 28th September, 1946.
B1 1/11

Dear Liddell,

The Lord President has examined the report of the Commission on the Canadian spy case and has asked for a summary of it, running to about 1,000 words, to be prepared.

I am afraid that my knowledge of the case is so sketchy that I should have to read the very voluminous report with some care to provide me with what he wants. It occurred to me that you might have something available, or could have it prepared, which would meet his purpose.

I would be very grateful if you could let me know whether you could help in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

J.A. [Signature]

Captain Guy Liddell,
58, St. James's Street,
S.W.1.

18

F.2.c/G3n/JM.

10th September, 1946.

Dear Peter,

Your letter of 6th September, ref. RICH/12/DO, has been handed to me by Miss Russell King.

I quite agree that the report of the Canadian Royal Commission should be read by all Intelligence Officers, and with this in mind we have ordered a supply of copies which are now on their way from Canada. It is, however, only a limited edition and it has not been at all easy to satisfy our requirements. One copy, however, has been earmarked for B.A.O.R., and will be forwarded as soon as received, but presumably this will not reach you personally for some little time, and I will discuss with Roger Hollis on his return from leave the possibility of lending you one of our own office copies.

Yours ever,

J.H. Marriott.

Lt.Col. The Hon.P.W.Ransb than,
16 (Hamburg) Intelligence Office,
B.A.O.R.

✓

SECRETRIOH/12/DO6 Sep '46

From:- Lt. Col. The Hon. P.E. RAMSBOTHAM.
16 (HAMBURG) Intelligence Office,
B.A.O.R.

Dear *John*

Is there any chance of your obtaining for me the full report by the Royal Commission appointed in Canada to investigate the espionage network recently active there? From reading the short account of it in 'The Times' for 3 Sept. it appears that there are several chapters in this report which contain matters of considerable interest to all Intelligence Offices who have anything to do with similar problems.

Here in HAMBURG we have recently come across important evidence of such activities, and feel that we would benefit by a study of this Canadian report.

I am writing to you direct on this as I don't suppose there are sufficient copies available of the report for a general distribution from our own headquarters. If you can see your way to *this copy by note* request, I would be extremely grateful.

John *un* *Peter*

J. Russell King, Esq.,
Box No.500
Parliament Street B.O.,
London. S.W.1.

B.A.O.R.
Tele: 44 04 51 Ext.3.
PER/FDS.

MB.

HOME OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,

S.W.1.

*AA
PT-66900*

19th August, 1946.

Dear Mr. Hollis,

--- I return herewith the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission. The Home Secretary has seen it and is much obliged to you for sending him your copy.

--- I also enclose a copy of the note by Sir Alexander Maxwell which I mentioned the other day.

We shall be glad to have a copy of the Report to keep when further supplies reach you. Do you know if it is proposed to put it on sale here? It was very inadequately reported in the Press and one would like to see at any rate the first section of it studied in this country.

Yours sincerely,

Minister

R.H. Hollis, Esq.,
MI 5.

X

SMO

G.R.

COPYS. of S.

16a(1)

Report of the Canadian Royal Commission
on Soviet Espionage

This Report contains most interesting and valuable information as to the ramifications and methods of the Soviet espionage system in Canada. This information is of special importance, because there is every reason to think that what the Soviet have been doing in Canada they are also doing in this country and in other countries.

The Canadian investigations show that attached to the Embassy in Ottawa there were several officials each of whom ran an independent espionage system - one a system directed by the Red Army Intelligence Service in Moscow, another a system directed by the Secret Political Police of the Soviet Union, a third a Naval system of intelligence, and a fourth a system of Political Intelligence. The heads of these various systems worked independently of each other and without knowledge of what the others were doing, but each of them reported to Moscow, where there must be a most elaborate organisation for collecting information about countless individuals and numerous subjects and for issuing instructions of a most detailed character to the agents in various countries. One of the central organisations for collecting information about Communist sympathisers in various parts of the world is the secretariat in Moscow of the Comintern. Although in name the Comintern has ceased to operate, its secretariat apparently still functions (see pages 38 and 39).

As a result of this information about individuals, Moscow is able to send to its agents abroad information about individuals who can be usefully recruited into the espionage system. For example, when Dr. Allan May, who had been a temporary British civil servant, went across to Canada, Moscow sent a telegram to their Ottawa agent telling him to get in touch with Dr. May, whose cover name was "Alek", and saying "Try to get from him detailed information on the progress of the work on uranium" (see page 450).

The Report also shows with what remarkable success the Soviet espionage organisation recruits agents through the Communist Party and its Study Groups. The particular network of agents which was uncovered in Canada was a network directed by a man called Zabotin, who was Military Attaché to the Russian Embassy

/in

in Ottawa, and the Report says (page 44) "In every instance but one Zabotin's Canadian espionage agents were shown to be members of or sympathisers with the Communist Party". A list of these agents is given on pages 57 and 58, and almost all of them were people of education holding responsible positions. The story of Kathleen Willsher, which is set out on pages 227 onwards, is particularly interesting. She was a graduate of the London School of Economics who spoke French, German and some Russian. She went to Canada in 1930 at the age of 25 as a stenographer, and was promoted to become Assistant Registrar. As Assistant Registrar she had access to all sorts of files in the High Commissioner's Office, and because of her Communist sympathies felt it right to give information to Fred Rose, the Communist M.P., who passed on the information to Zabotin. She evidently regarded herself as a quite humble member of the party, whose duty it was to contribute in some small way to the party's requirements. On page 231 she was asked "You recognised, I suppose, when Mr. Rose made that suggestion to you, that he was suggesting an improper thing for you to do?" She answered "Well, I did, but I felt I should contrive to contribute something towards the helping of this policy, because I was very interested in it. I found it very difficult, and yet I felt I should try to help".

Although payments were commonly made to the agents in the form of "expenses" they were comparatively small payments, and it is clear that devotion to a political idea and not greed for money was their real motive.

The full information given in this Report about Dr. Allan May's activities will be of use to the Home Office if there should again be attempts to secure his early release.

M.I.5. have asked that when you have had a look at this Report the copy may be returned to them as they are very short of copies at present, but they will try to get an additional copy for the Home Office to keep.

(Intd.) A.M.
30.7.46.

Thank you. I note particularly the penultimate paragraph above.

(Intd.) J.C.E.
3.8.46.

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

Hax

~~A.D.F.~~

Canadian Royal Commission Report.

This is to confirm our previous conversations regarding the number of copies of this report which I shall be glad to have in due course:-

- D.P.P..... 1
- Bow Street Magistrates.....1
- S.L.B.l.....1

Total 3

D.P.P. is at present on leave but is due back at the end of August. I know that as soon as he returns he will be asking me if his copy is available, and if you could let me have one for him by then I shall be greatly obliged. If I am absent when the copy becomes available, will you give it to Mr. Hill who will send it to the Director.

S.L.B. 3.
16.8.46

B. Handlans (sec)
Dictated by E.J.P. Cussen (Lt. Col).

1389

770

16x

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE
ADDRESSED:—

THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. M. POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

FILE NO. G.369-67

OTTAWA,

CANADA

July 30, 1946.

Dear Sir Percy,

We are forwarding you two more copies of the Report of the Royal Commission. We regret the necessity of sending these in such small numbers for we fully appreciate the excellent use you can make of them. Copies are at present at a premium but you can be assured that when more are made available to us, you will receive further copies.

2. We would be interested in learning your requirements.

Yours sincerely,

F. J. Mead
F. J. Mead.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500,
Parliament Street, B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1, England.

Encs.

AB
duplicate 12 books

BSC ADF

No. 1388

156719

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE
ADDRESSED:—

THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. M. POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

G.369-67

FILE NO. _____

OTTAWA,

CANADA

July 26, 1946

Dear Sir Percy,

With reference to previous correspondence,
forwarded in this mail are two additional copies of
the Report of the Royal Commission, others will follow as
made available to us.

Yours sincerely,

F. J. Mead.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500,
Parliament Street, B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1, England.

Encs.

157
Dup. 5
2 copies of book as stated.
B3C ADF

Handwritten notes:
12/15
F. ...

Handwritten:
R. ...

RF/66960/ADF

30th Jul, 1946.

Dear Commissioner,

I am most grateful to you for the two copies of the Royal Commission report sent to me with your letter G.369-67 of 15th July. This report has now been studied and it appears to us to be a document of such importance that we should like in due course to circulate copies to our representatives in this country and in other parts of the world. In order to do this we should be most grateful if you could obtain for us an additional forty copies, sending them to us by sea. It is our intention that the report is for general sale to the public and will therefore be produced in sufficient quantity for you to obtain such a number.

If you would be good enough to let me know the cost of obtaining these copies, I will arrange to reimburse you for them.

Yours sincerely,

Commissioner S.T. Wood, C.M.G.,
R.C.M.P., Justice Building,
OTTAWA.

for Sir Percy Gillitt.

RFJ/VIL

Handwritten mark:
L

AF/Y/66960/DF

29th July 1946.

Dear Sir Alexander,

The Home Secretary has asked to see a copy of the report of the Canadian Royal Commission on the Soviet spy case there. I am attaching a copy of this report, but as it is a very bulky document, you may perhaps like to know the passages which appear to be the most important. Section II, running from page 11 to page 95, gives a good general review of the case. Sub-section 6 headed 'Motivation of Agents', pages 57 - 64, is particularly important. In addition, I suggest that the three brief sections 12, 13 and 14, covering Summary of Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion, should be read.

Section III deals with the cases of the individual agents. The best representative group is no. 5 - Munn's group - on pages 123 - 162. There is a brief summary of the case against Alan Munn Munn on page 447.

I should be grateful if you could return to me this copy of the report in due course as only a very few copies have been made available to us as yet. We are trying to get further copies and will send you one for the Home Office when these arrive.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Alexander Maxwell, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
Home Office.

A.M. Hollis.

AM/VH

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE
ADDRESSED —

No. ¹³⁸⁴..... ⁶⁶⁹

THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. M. POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

1-2

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

FILE NO. G. 369-67

OTTAWA,
CANADA

duplicate

CANADA

July 18, 1946

B3c

App: Attached and in reply to your DS/1948/46 of 13th July. Ted Thompson

53 C/22/7/46.

Dear Sir Percy,

With reference to cable 13-7-46, forwarded in this mail are two copies of the Royal Commission Report as you requested. Unfortunately the number of copies made available to us at this time makes it impossible for us to fill your full request. However as soon as additional copies are made available they will be forwarded to you providing you still require them.

Yours sincerely,

S.T. Wood
S.T. Wood.

Sir Percy Sillitoe, C.B.E.,
Box No. 500,
Parliament Street, B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.
England.

[Handwritten mark]

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION OF FINAL REPORT

OF CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION.

- 1 Home Office.
- 3 Service Ministries.
- 1 Special Branch.
- 1 D.P.P.
- 1 Bow Street Magistrates.
- 12 MI5 Internal A.L.O.'s.
- 19 D.S.O.'s.*
- 1 Australia.
- 1 New Zealand.
- 1 S.Africa.
- 1 I.P.I.
- 1 B.A.O.R.

43.

D.S.O.'s*

- 5 B3c.
- 9 B3a. Via SIME.
- 5 B3b.

S. Form 98.

SECRET TELEGRAM FOR DESPATCH IN CIPHER

137

Office File No. 137/66960 Section of Origin D.F.

Date 12.7.46 Signed [Signature]

To: [Faded text]

R.C.P.

Reference your letter No. of
our telegram

grateful if you would let us have six report six copies of final
report by Royal Commission for distribution to interested parties
here.

1943/46.
13/7./46
ESC

The text of this telegram is Unparaphrased, and must not be distributed outside
British Government Departments or Headquarters, or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without
being Paraphrased. Messages marked 'O.T.P.' need not be paraphrased.

Shown to Malcolm (e) Donald 2/5/44.

TOP SECRET.

NEW YORK.

No. 553 of 30th April.

A. Preliminary hearings of all CORBY agents are now complete.

Score is as follows.

B. Convictions - one (WOIKIN).

Committed for trial - 12.

Dismissals - one (SHUGAR).

C. There can be no doubt of guilt of latter but documentary evidence against him was always admittedly slight.

D. Grand jury will commence sitting May 6th but trials will probably not begin before May 13th. It is intention to start with MAZERALL, HALPERIN and SMITH and try them jointly with LUNAN as a witness against them unless defence objects and demands separate trials.

~~TOP SECRET~~
4-5-44

I attended a meeting between the D.G. and Sir John Anderson today in connection with the communist connections of Professors Blackett and Bernal, and at the D.G's request I did during the course of the meeting give a short outline of the Corby case.

24.10.45.

Sumner

11

REF ID: A6637

Copies for: 1. 6000

Original in E. 1.6137, 66437, 3rd. supp. vol. 1, vol. 2.

N.B. Copy sent to S.I.

MEMORANDUM.

1. In the early part of 1943 a physicist who will be referred to in this memorandum as "A" left this country for Canada under the auspices of the Government of Scientific and Industrial Research and in Canada has been working under a National Research Council grant as a physicist on the Atomic Mission. He returned to this country on the 17th of October, 1945, on completion of his work and it is believed that he is about to resume his ordinary academic work in London at King's College, Strand. It is well known that his capabilities are so great that Professor Cockcroft, Head of the Atomic Mission, Canada, has recommended him for further important work in connection with atomic research in this country.
2. On or about the 7th September, 1945, a confidential informant employed in the Department of the Russian Military Attaché in Ottawa sought an interview with me by a Canadian mounted police to whom he disclosed details of an espionage network operating in Canada under the control of the Russian Military Attaché, Colonel Zabolotin. In the course of the interview, the informant, who is a R.C.M.P. original of rank Sergeant Major and from the 1st Canadian Trench Battalion, together with copies of other documents which he has seen there. The informant, who will be hereinafter referred to as Corby, gave information in his interview of sixteen individuals in Canada the majority of whom have been identified and who are now the subject of investigation and surveillance by the R.C.M.P. Among them are a Communist M.P. and the National Organizer of the Labour Progressive Party (the name by which the Communist Party is known in Canada). By means of these individuals the Russians appear to have penetrated into all the departments of External Affairs, the National Research Council, the Department of National Defence and the Office of the High Commissioner.
3. CORBY has also given information about PRIBROSE, a Soviet agent that PRIBROSE is a Soviet agent recruited in London before his departure and first approached by the Russians in Canada about six months ago. According to CORBY, PRIBROSE has supplied Colonel Zabolotin with useful and valuable information about atomic work and has further provided Zabolotin with two samples of uranium 235 and 233, which are alleged already to have been flown to Moscow. It is also alleged that PRIBROSE has supplied Zabolotin with information about an electronic device used by the U.S. Navy against enemy suicide aircraft. Apart from CORBY's own statements about PRIBROSE's activities, the R.C.M.P. also possess copies of telegrams exchanged between Moscow and Zabolotin which, if they can be accepted as genuine and if CORBY's statement that the individual there in reference to Alec is PRIBROSE, do confirm that PRIBROSE has provided information about atomic research and has supplied the Russians with a sample of uranium 235. Additionally, they confirm that he has supplied information about the electronic apparatus before mentioned. It is fair to say that, if accepted, the evidence so far produced, whether or not it is sufficient to substantiate a charge against PRIBROSE, leaves no doubt as to the accuracy of CORBY's allegations. In addition to documents relating to PRIBROSE's activities in Ottawa, CORBY has produced copies of telegrams between Moscow and Zabolotin which show that on October 7th next and, if necessary, thereafter at intervals of ten days, PRIBROSE may establish contact with the Soviet agent in London.
4. In the light of the foregoing, a decision is necessary as to the present and future action with regard to PRIBROSE. It is submitted that the following considerations are relevant:
 - (a) It is believed that the Russians may not know that CORBY is in British hands, although they are aware of his activities.

- 2 -

disappeared. It is accordingly believed that there is some possibility that PRIMOFF will on one of the due dates, probably, however, not the first or even the second, make a contact in London with a Soviet agent at present unknown. If this contact is made, it would afford an opportunity to uncover a network of Soviet espionage which may prove at least as extensive as that already uncovered in Canada.

(b) Desirable as this objective may be, it should not be allowed to outweigh the primary importance of effecting PRIMOFF's arrest, should an opportunity occur where only immediate action would provide the necessary evidence.

(c) It is considered that the evidence at present available is not sufficient to justify the arrest of PRIMOFF, or, if he is arrested, to afford a reasonable probability that he would be convicted by a court of law. It is, of course, possible that further investigation of the documents at present available may provide the necessary corroboration of COLBY's statements, but at this stage it would be unwise to rely on this possibility.

(d) It is not possible so to supervise all the movements and activities of PRIMOFF as to ensure that he is not passing information to the Russians or even making a secret trip to Canada from this country to Russia without at the same time gravely impairing the chances of uncovering a Soviet organization here and of providing corroboratory evidence of PRIMOFF's guilt. In practical terms this means that if there is to be any chance of successful covering the expected rendezvous, PRIMOFF cannot be subjected to continuous surveillance until the first meeting. Close observation in the case of a man who expects to leave can only be maintained for a comparatively short time without risk of detection. PRIMOFF is therefore at this moment not under direct surveillance.

(e) Arrangements have been made to ensure that for the next few weeks PRIMOFF will acquire at least as much information about atomic research and development than he already possesses. Meanwhile, such steps as are possible have been taken to prevent his departure from the United Kingdom.

(f) If as the result of the acquisition of additional satisfactory evidence it is possible to arrest PRIMOFF and prefer a charge against him, it is reasonable to assume that the fact of such arrest will immediately be discovered by the Soviet Embassy, London, and that in a very short space of time it will be known to the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Thus, the arrest of PRIMOFF, if though possible and desirable, would also, to necessitate the simultaneous arrest in Canada of all persons implicated there. Failure to synchronise the arrests would inevitably mean that compromising documents in possession of suspects in Canada and the U.S.A. would be destroyed.

(g) The implication of the Russian Embassy in Ottawa with espionage activities is so great that direct action could hardly fail to involve diplomatic repercussions. Furthermore, the activities of Colonel Sabtin as at present uncovered closely touch upon the security of the U.S.A. with the result that the U.S.A. would similarly be involved in diplomatic repercussions if the case were brought to a head.

5. In view of the foregoing considerations it is considered desirable

(a) to obtain the concurrence of the British and American Governments to action which may well lead to complications with the U.S.S.R.

(b) to ensure that action between the appropriate departments of the three Governments is synchronised. (The departments concerned are already in touch with a view to working out a common policy)

24.9.45.

Copy in P.F 66960 Supp. vol B.

TOP SECRET. 10

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

21.9.45.

IMMEDIATE.CXG. 849.

For 48000 personal from Director G.C. & C.S.

Following has been transmitted to JONES in Washington.
as GCCS in 12429.

Begins:

1. R.C.M.P. have in custody a cypher clerk from office of Soviet Military Attache. He has already provided some useful crypto information.
2. Canadians have agreed at our request that he should be interrogated at once by S.S.A. if Americans will consent. We consider his information will probably be of considerable assistance if he is interrogated on technical matters by an officer fully versed in crypto problem involved.
3. Although this is BOURBON question please approach CARTER CLARKE in first instance as matter is one of Military Attache cyphers and a very delicate business.
4. If Americans agree to send an officer (and Canadians ask that it be restricted to one only) please arrange that he contacts STEPHENSON in New York who will hand him over to appropriate contact in Canada. This is necessary to avoid crossing lines with F.B.I. STEPHENSON is steering F.B.I. interrogations in Canada clear of crypto matters. Ends.

his mt. 20/9

TOP SECRET.

ADDRESSED NEW YORK.

19.9.45.

CXG.842

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following from C.S.S. himself for 48,000 personal.

Your 334 of September 18th.

- A. Paper not repeat not yet ready.
- B. I am sending first rough draft by first opportunity.
- C. Owing to its provisional form it should be distributed outside S.I.S. only (repeat only) to HOLLIS.

Note: Draft referred to in para. B. was despatched on 20.9.45.

TOP SECRET.

ETA

NEW YORK

18.9.45.

1814 BST.

RAPH.
19.9.45.
1010 BST.

19.9.45.

0940 BST.

CXG. 334 of 18th September.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following is for C.S.S. only. Personal decypher yourself.

From 48,000.

HOLLIS requests send immediately copy of CAREW HUNT's paper on Soviet intelligence which will be valuable aid to us in interrogating CORBY.

already sent
by T.S.
25/9

TOP SECRET.5/1
203

264

Telegram from NEW YORK.

Dated 10th September, 1945.

SECRET

URGENT IMMEDIATE

Following for Sir Alexander Cadogan from Malcolm MacDonald
and N. A. Robertson.

Re: -

A. Further to our telegram of 10th September following are
digests of translations of telegrams mentioned in paragraph B.

1. August 11th repeat August 11th, 1945 to Grant extremely
important. Information required on following points.

(a) to confirm official report of transfer of United States
troops to United States and South Pacific and also

9th repeat 9th army; 3rd repeat 3rd, 5th repeat

repeat 7th, 13th repeat 13th, army corps;

armoured division, 2nd repeat 2nd, 4th

8th, 20th repeat 20th, 30th repeat 30th

45th repeat 45th, 104th repeat 104th

13th repeat 13th tank division. Find

and how many troops will remain in Europe

Copy No. 1

Attached is an exposé of the circumstances in
which Corby came to our attention.

1
v. Reed

C O R B Y

Corby is about 27 years of age, married with one child. He bears the rank of Lieutenant in the Red Army. He is not a member of the Communist party but he had been a Komsomol. Owing to the man power shortage during the war years, confidential jobs were thrown open to Komsomols who were not yet full fledged members of the Communist party. He received training as a cypher clerk in the Central Code Section of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and, about October or November 1943, he came to Canada as an assistant to the Military Attache. In fact he was to act as the personal cypher clerk of the Attache, and also to help him with his confidential records and papers.

A few months ago, Corby carelessly left drafts of two confidential dispatches lying around where they were found by a charwoman and turned over to one of the Embassy officials. This individual took the matter up with Corby, who realizing the seriousness of the position, implored him not to make a report about it. The man promised to do his best, but a while later, Corby received instructions to return to Moscow and a new cypher clerk was sent out. The latter was supposed to take over Corby's duties immediately but the Military Attache did not consider him sufficiently qualified and left the seals in the hands of Corby. The formal transfer was to take place on September 6th.

Originally, Corby apparently intended to comply with his instructions and purchased suitings to take back with him to the Soviet Union. Then it seems, he began to have doubts. Without question, he was afraid of being liquidated should he return. It may be recalled that, about

- 2 -

the middle of 1944, a man by the name of Kravchenko made a much publicised exit from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington. This occasioned much comment in the Embassy in Ottawa and considerable surprise was expressed that nothing had happened to Kravchenko. Corby felt he had a chance. He himself claims that he was sickened by the evidence of intrigues and espionage directed against Canada after that country had done so much to aid the Soviet Union in her struggle against the Nazis.

NOTICE
830
1944

Be that as it may, Corby decided that his salvation lay in publicity. At nine o'clock on the evening of September 5th, he went to the Ottawa Journal and there spoke to a woman reporter. It did not take the latter very long to decide that this story was too hot to handle and she advised that he go to the Justice Department.

Next day, the 6th, Corby, accompanied by his wife and child, went to the Justice Building and spoke to the Private Secretary to the Minister of Justice. He also showed him documents which he had extracted from the Military Attache's safe (to which he and the Attache alone had the combination) presumably on the previous day.

The Private Secretary asked Corby to wait and spoke to the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. However, Corby was finally turned away with veiled accusations that he was after all in possession of stolen documents. Again he tried the press, this time the Ottawa "Citizen" and was referred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He must have become somewhat flustered by this time, because the only thing that emerged clearly was that he wanted to become a Canadian citizen!. And consequently he was sent to the Crown Attorney at the Court House. He spoke to the latter's Secretary, who, again sensing the news value angle, called up "Le Droit" and then the "Citizen", but luckily without success.

Wearily, Corby returned to his apartment, and quickly noticed that the place was being watched. Soon after he got in, there was a knock on the door: Corby didn't answer, but decided that it would be safer to move into a neighbour's apartment. And the neighbours in question 'phoned the municipal police.

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Meanwhile, the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs had got in touch with the RCMP, and spoke to the Intelligence Officer.

Toward midnight a raiding party led by the NKVD man, Vitali Pavlov, and including the Assistant Military Attache Rogov and two others, broke into Corby's apartment with a jemmy and, finding no one at home, hid in the room. The noise attracted the City police who were rather enclined to take everyone in custody, but the RCMP intervened and Pavlov's men departed.

The next morning, the City police brought Corby to the Justice building where he was cursorily interrogated. The importance of his information was immediately evident and he was removed to a place of safety, where he has been reinterrogated on several occasions and at great length.

The Soviet Embassy has presented a note to the Department of External Affairs asking that a search be made for one of their missing employees. They have been informed that the proper machinery would be set in motion and there the matter rests at the time of writing.

15.9.45

Original in P.F.66949, Y Box 5408, vol.1: 21a.

TOP SECRET.

Copy in P.F.66960, supp. volume A.

The MAY Case.

1. The following is a summary of information contained in a series of telegrams which have been received through S.I.S. channels from New York between the 9th September, 1945, and the 12th September, 1945. These telegrams have been variously sent by the Department of External Affairs, Canada, to Sir Alexander Cadogan, and from the S.I.S. representative to C. This summary, however, has been prepared only from the point of view of the Security Service in connection with such action as may be considered necessary or possible against Alan Nunn MAY.

2. Subject of the Telegrams:

Information has been received since the 8th September, 1945, by the R.C.M.P. Ottawa on the following matters:

- (a) Russian espionage activities in Canada;
- (b) Espionage activity for the Russians in Canada on the part of Alan Nunn MAY; and
- (c) possible future espionage activity in England by MAY.

3. Source of information referred to in paragraph 2 above;

- (a) A clerical officer of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa;
- (b) Documents obtained from the Soviet Embassy, Ottawa, presumably through the agency of the clerical officer referred to above.

4. Position of source;

Source came to Canada about two years ago and works under the Soviet Military Attache, Colonel Zabolin (the latter is referred to in CXG as Zubotin). Source has received special Intelligence training and prior to coming to Canada was employed in H.Q. in Moscow. Source is described in CXG 251 as being "in our custody" and in CXG 259/260 it is said that "Soviet Embassy shows signs of alarm at disappearance of official who is source of our information". It is further stated in the same telegram however that "we (sc. the British) have no way of knowing to what degree they suspect that information about their (sc. Russian) activities has come to our knowledge". In CXG 255 paragraph B.1.e, it is stated that "in view of what has happened in Ottawa it is probable MAY will be warned against making this contact" but it is further suggested that MAY should be allowed proceed on off-chance that he makes contact."

It seems from the foregoing that source's relations with the R.C.M.P. may have received some degree of publicity.

5. Information supplied by source;

- (a) Russian espionage in Canada. Colonel Zabolin, whose cover name is Grant, is the representative in Canada of a new Russian Bureau, apparently under military or semi-military control, which is responsible for all foreign espionage and intelligence and has superseded the 4th Department. He has an Embassy staff of sixteen members and is assisted by the 2nd Secretary, PAVLOV. The 3rd Secretary, GUSAROV, is in charge of a new political intelligence unit which is believed to replace the old Comintern apparatus. Zabolin has access to the

/Department

Department of External Affairs, to the Office of the U.K. High Commissioner in Ottawa, the Department of National Defence, the National Research Council, and is in relation with a Communist M.P. and the National Organiser of the Canadian Communist Party. In CXG.278 it is stated that sixteen of Zabotin's agents have been identified to date and that others are known to exist. The coincidence of the number sixteen suggests the possibility that his identified agents may be the same as the persons working on his staff, although this clearly does not apply to the Communist M.P. and the National Organiser.

Examples are given in the S.I.S. telegrams of the material already obtained by Zabotin and of the matters to which he is directing his attention.

(b) Espionage activity by MAY in Canada.

48 Alan Nunn MAY, whose Russian cover name is Alec, is a Doctor of Physics at Cambridge University, who arrived in Canada about two years ago to work under the National Research Council as a physicist on the Atomic Mission. He has for four years past furnished Zabotin with "useful and valuable information" and in particular he has provided two samples of Uranium 235 which were flown to Moscow (N.B. the National Research Council question whether what was flown to Moscow was actually U.235. It is known however that he has had access to samples of U.233 and might have removed one milligram without notice). He has been paid by the Russians at least 500 dollars.

Particulars are given in CXG 274/5 of the information and materials to which MAY is known to have had access.

(c) MAY is due to leave Canada by R.A.F. Ferry Command for the U.K. on the 15th September. By telegram from Moscow to Zabotin dated 22nd August, 1945, MAY has been instructed as to a method of contact between himself and the Russian Intelligence Service in London. Details of method of contact are set out in CXG 272 and 273. This telegram superseded a telegram from Ottawa to Moscow which is undated (see CXG 280) but which is clearly of an earlier date. In the earlier telegram it is stated "we have worked out with Alec the instructions in London. Alec will be working from Kings College, Strand. It will be possible to find him there by means of the telegram (sic) book". It is possible that this part of the earlier arrangement may still stand.

6. The action which has already been taken consists of sending a telegram to the S.I.S. representative in America urging that MAY should be allowed to proceed to England and that direct action against any other persons implicated should be deferred if possible until the 7th October next (the date of the first rendezvous between Alec and his contact in London) and, in any event, until MAY has actually left Canada.

7. From information available here it has been established that one Alan Nunn MAY, born 2nd May 1911, was granted an exit permit at the end of 1942 to proceed to Canada on the Atomic project. His description fits that given for the MAY referred to in the S.I.S. telegrams and the identification is reasonably certain. On his exit permit application he stated that his home address was 16, Jesus Lane, Cambridge, and that his then employment was at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge, on behalf of the University of Cambridge. A photograph is available from his application for a renewal of his passport in 1942. At the time he left England he was the holder of

/N.R. Card

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N.R. Card ASAJ 379/3 and on departure he declared that his only Bank account was at Lloyds Bank, Ltd., Cambridge Branch. The only other available information obtained from the Cambridge University Register shows that he was at Trinity Hall in 1935 and that he took the Degree of Ph.D. at Cambridge in 1936. He is N.T. in our records except in respect of his exit permit application in 1942, although presumably he was vetted at an earlier date.

14.9.45.

signed. H.H. Marriott.

R.L./R.3.y.

26.10.45.

TOP SECRET.

~~TOP SECRET~~
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NEW YORK.

13.9.45.

1832 BST.

14.9.45.
1015 BST.
FEC.

14.9.45.

0945 BST.

CKG. 296 of Sept. 13th.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following for CSS only. Personal decipher yourself
from 48,000.

Reference my series beginning with telegram 251
Sept. 8th.

Informant will be referred to hereafter as CORBY
repeat CORBY.

S. Form 81/B.P./5000/5.43.

EXTRACT.

Extract for File No.: PF.66960 Name:.....

Original in File No.: PF.66960 Supp Vol A Serial: 1a Dated: 9.9.45.

Original from: New York Under Ref.: 251

Extracted on: 25.10.45. by: NR Section: R3y

Following strictly personal for Sir Alexander Cadogan from N.A. Robertson,
Department of External Affairs, Canada.

Begins:-

A. Statement made yesterday to Royal Canadian Mounted Police by clerical officer of Soviet Embassy in Ottawa indicates that Soviet agents have had a certain access with Department of External Affairs and within office of United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa, to contents of secret telegrams exchanged between our Governments.

B. Statement is supported by convincing documentary evidence which indicates extensive political and scientific espionage in Canada. Only material I have seen is set of summaries of recent Dominion's Office telegrams received in this Department. Summaries are amateurish and would not be very enlightening. We have no evidence yet of cryptographic compromise. Source of information and a number of original documents are in our custody. Investigation is proceeding in consultation with Stephenson and F.B.I.

Ends.